Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
UK aircraft carrier contracts not fit for purpose, MPs warn
The multibillion-pound contract signed by the previous Labour government to build two aircraft carriers by the end of this decade is “not fit for purpose”, a committee of MPs reports on Tuesday, warning that it needs urgent renegotiation if projected costs are not to rise further.
In the latest expression of concern about the fate of the carrier project, the Commons public accounts committee says it is “still not convinced that the Ministry of Defence has this programme under control”. It added that the project to build the carriers “remains subject to huge technical and commercial risks, with the potential for further uncontrolled growth in costs”. When the carrier project got the green light from the UK government in 2007, it was assumed the projected price of building the two carriers – the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales – was £3.65bn. Since then, costs have been revised up sharply and the assumption now is that the two carriers will cost more than £5bn to build.
Tuesday’s PAC report highlights two growing concerns about the project which could see costs rise further.
First, the PAC says the contracts signed with industry contain very few incentives for contractors to keep costs under control. At present, the MoD and industry will share equally from any gains from finishing the project below the “target cost” of £5.24bn. However, the PAC notes that the target cost would have to be exceeded by £2.5bn before industry were to start losing any profits. “The current carriers contract is not fit for purpose as it fails to provide industry with any real incentive to control costs,” the PAC says. It adds that the MoD has “not been able to transfer delivery risks to contractors and has struggled to manage its relationship with UK industry”.
The second concern highlighted is that the production costs of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that are due to fly from the carrier could rise much further.
According to a report this year by the National Audit Office, the cost of developing JSF, which is being procured through a collaborative programme led by the US, has more than doubled since the start of development in 2001. The NAO said there could be further costs increases if, for example, other partner nations reduced the number of aircraft they bought. The PAC says on Tuesday that this is an issue of real concern to MPs. “Carrier Strike remains a high risk programme as the [MoD] has little control over the technical risks and costs involved in acquiring the aircraft,” the committee says. “Despite assurances from the [MoD], we are not convinced that it has the aircraft contract under control.”
In response to the report, Philip Hammond, the defence secretary, said the MoD was negotiating with industry to bring the costs of the carrier project under control. “But we are doing so within the context of a contract that gives us very little negotiating leverage,” he said.
Tuesday’s report also restates concerns expressed by the NAO in May that, according to current plans, the Crowsnest early-warning radar system essential for protecting the carriers will not be available for operation until 2022 – two years after the first carrier and aircraft are delivered and operated. However, the MoD insists the Crowsnest programme will deliver “an initial operating capability by the time the first carrier is in operational service”.
Report PDF version.
The multibillion-pound contract signed by the previous Labour government to build two aircraft carriers by the end of this decade is “not fit for purpose”, a committee of MPs reports on Tuesday, warning that it needs urgent renegotiation if projected costs are not to rise further.
In the latest expression of concern about the fate of the carrier project, the Commons public accounts committee says it is “still not convinced that the Ministry of Defence has this programme under control”. It added that the project to build the carriers “remains subject to huge technical and commercial risks, with the potential for further uncontrolled growth in costs”. When the carrier project got the green light from the UK government in 2007, it was assumed the projected price of building the two carriers – the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales – was £3.65bn. Since then, costs have been revised up sharply and the assumption now is that the two carriers will cost more than £5bn to build.
Tuesday’s PAC report highlights two growing concerns about the project which could see costs rise further.
First, the PAC says the contracts signed with industry contain very few incentives for contractors to keep costs under control. At present, the MoD and industry will share equally from any gains from finishing the project below the “target cost” of £5.24bn. However, the PAC notes that the target cost would have to be exceeded by £2.5bn before industry were to start losing any profits. “The current carriers contract is not fit for purpose as it fails to provide industry with any real incentive to control costs,” the PAC says. It adds that the MoD has “not been able to transfer delivery risks to contractors and has struggled to manage its relationship with UK industry”.
The second concern highlighted is that the production costs of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that are due to fly from the carrier could rise much further.
According to a report this year by the National Audit Office, the cost of developing JSF, which is being procured through a collaborative programme led by the US, has more than doubled since the start of development in 2001. The NAO said there could be further costs increases if, for example, other partner nations reduced the number of aircraft they bought. The PAC says on Tuesday that this is an issue of real concern to MPs. “Carrier Strike remains a high risk programme as the [MoD] has little control over the technical risks and costs involved in acquiring the aircraft,” the committee says. “Despite assurances from the [MoD], we are not convinced that it has the aircraft contract under control.”
In response to the report, Philip Hammond, the defence secretary, said the MoD was negotiating with industry to bring the costs of the carrier project under control. “But we are doing so within the context of a contract that gives us very little negotiating leverage,” he said.
Tuesday’s report also restates concerns expressed by the NAO in May that, according to current plans, the Crowsnest early-warning radar system essential for protecting the carriers will not be available for operation until 2022 – two years after the first carrier and aircraft are delivered and operated. However, the MoD insists the Crowsnest programme will deliver “an initial operating capability by the time the first carrier is in operational service”.
Report PDF version.
Last edited by ORAC; 3rd Sep 2013 at 06:57.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
What about buying some 2C Hawkeyes (Northrop Grumman)?
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
fit the carrier with one of those booster buttons they have in Formula 1 - as the Hawkeye staggers over the deck - BOOST and when the relative speed is zero grab it
would only cost £ 100000000000000000000000000000000 to develope
would only cost £ 100000000000000000000000000000000 to develope
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: East Sussex UK
Age: 66
Posts: 6,995
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
As reported by British Forces News ...
BFBS News : Aircraft Carrier Project "At Risk"
BFBS News : Aircraft Carrier Project "At Risk"
Britain's aircraft carrier programme faces further spiralling costs and the project remains a "high risk", MPs have warned.
Significant technical problems have not been resolved and there is potential for "uncontrolled growth" in the final bill, according to the Public Accounts Committee.
MPs warn they are "still not convinced" that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a grip on the project and suggested it has "little control" over the costs of acquiring the aircraft
They heap criticism on the MoD for providing "deeply flawed information" that led to plans to switch the type of aircraft to be flown from the carriers. The move was later abandoned at a cost to taxpayers of £74 million, the National Audit Office revealed earlier this year.
Significant technical problems have not been resolved and there is potential for "uncontrolled growth" in the final bill, according to the Public Accounts Committee.
MPs warn they are "still not convinced" that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a grip on the project and suggested it has "little control" over the costs of acquiring the aircraft
They heap criticism on the MoD for providing "deeply flawed information" that led to plans to switch the type of aircraft to be flown from the carriers. The move was later abandoned at a cost to taxpayers of £74 million, the National Audit Office revealed earlier this year.
Join Date: Apr 2013
Location: Glasgow
Posts: 20
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
While it is on the wishlist, I think we can safely say we are out of the carrier club. The political will is no longer there. Sure there are a few keels laid down, but like the late 1940's, they will be sold off for nothing.
ISTR at the time of SDSR10 it was being bandied around that Cameron only agreed to keep the carriers because it would have been more expensive to cancel the order. If this growth in cost means that cancelling them would have been cheaper, the chances of the PM remaining publicly well-disposed towards the project are.... slim.
Last edited by Easy Street; 4th Sep 2013 at 00:20.
BBC News - Royal Navy aircraft carrier costs 'to double'
So in 6 years the project is £2.35 billion overbudget of which just £74 million can be attributed to the Dave B / Dave C debacle.
So what has caused the rest of the predicted overbudget? Stupidly low quote by the contractors to get the work knowing that the government will just pay whatever bills are presented once the ship build is beyond the point of no return, poor contract writing allowing the contractors plenty of 'wiggle' room or continual 'capability requirement creep'?
More importantly what other capabilities are going to have to be axed to balance the books?
So in 6 years the project is £2.35 billion overbudget of which just £74 million can be attributed to the Dave B / Dave C debacle.
So what has caused the rest of the predicted overbudget? Stupidly low quote by the contractors to get the work knowing that the government will just pay whatever bills are presented once the ship build is beyond the point of no return, poor contract writing allowing the contractors plenty of 'wiggle' room or continual 'capability requirement creep'?
More importantly what other capabilities are going to have to be axed to balance the books?
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It was ever thus folks...and it always will be. Chill. This is the way our country does business (and I use term "business" loosely)
Last edited by The Old Fat One; 4th Nov 2013 at 09:06.
Originally Posted by Wrathmonk
So what has caused the rest of the predicted overbudget?
Re-profiling (rolling-over) annual spends might save money in the short term but inevitably has long-term consequences.
So in 6 years the project is £2.35 billion overbudget of which just £74 million can be attributed to the Dave B / Dave C debacle.
What I suspect this is, is BAES striking a price for surrendering a fairly strong contractual position, which (if you believe the PAC & NAO) basically means they make a profit unless the ship cost exceeds £7.5 Bn or some such ludicrous number. In other words, they could "legitimately" charge staff costs only loosely attributable to the carrier project to it, right up until they hit that penalty barrier, while still making a profit (allegedly).
Who is responsible for that situation (if it indeed exists) is a different question. It does however highlight that MoD commercial and cost estimating capabilities remain less than optimal, as does the sole-source by default arrangment that they have allowed (indeed encouraged) to develop.
Its a shame the media feels the need to use phrases like "costs to double" implying this is a recent event, rather than accurately report that closing off contract risks has cost another £300M. However, that's what you get when a government spends several years vacillating, places an order, then changes the delivery date, before another one comes along once the project is running and tries to change a contract before changing its mind again.
Join Date: Nov 2012
Location: Planet Claire
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As I recall, our then PM, Mr Brown signed the contract with BAE Systems for the carriers.
The deal was that BAE Sys got paid the same amount whether they built them, or the ships got cancelled.
QED, may as well build them.....
In Rosyth, which is in Browns constituency...
I mean, what chance have we with cnuts like Brown running things?
Edit to add: I seem to recall a spokesman for BAE Sys' commenting:
'it is a contract struck between consenting adults', or some similar wording.
ie, a bargain that was unjustifiable by him- but legal.
The deal was that BAE Sys got paid the same amount whether they built them, or the ships got cancelled.
QED, may as well build them.....
In Rosyth, which is in Browns constituency...
I mean, what chance have we with cnuts like Brown running things?
Edit to add: I seem to recall a spokesman for BAE Sys' commenting:
'it is a contract struck between consenting adults', or some similar wording.
ie, a bargain that was unjustifiable by him- but legal.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
Posts: 838
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All I can say is that this whole FIASCO appears to beggar belief and what I am posting here observations that were made during the latest Public account select Committee meeting.
As has been stated the final assessment of costing surrounding the 'B' or not to 'B' farce is currently estimated to be at least £74m but final costs will only be known next year.
The first carrier will become operational in the year 2020, however the Committee noted that Crowsnest will not become operational until 2022 at the very earliest.
Quote: The Committee accepted that Crowsnest was essential to protect both the carrier and the crew
The Ministry of Defence conceded that when QE enters service in 2020, it will not be protected by crowsnest and this might constrain where the carrier can operate. However the MoD assured the Committee that there would be other options for protecting the carrier, including land-based AEW and reliance upon allies.
I may well be in the minority here but I have never read such clap trap and what is really frustrating is the folks giving this evidence to the Select Committee were six civilians and the Deputy chief of the Defence Staff and guess what? This very senior officer was not an able seaman, nor even an admiral, instead it was a very senior officer from the RAF (an Air Marshal who I will not name)
If this was not bad enough, it gets worse.. warships replenish at sea, taking on both stores and fuel from professionally manned ships from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service but when this carrier becomes operational, these vessels will be over forty years of age, not just forty years old but forty years of hard pressed service in all four corners of the globe and yet the MoD concede it still does not have the funding to replace these ships..
The Committee has also learnt the second carrier will on completion be placed into storage but this may change under SDSR 2015.
In 2011 the Ministry of defence conceded it was right to dump the 'B' in order to avoid its limitations, including shorter range, smaller bomb bay payload, an extra engine and greater complexity when compared to the carrier variant.
These six civilians and the RAF officer were asked to give evidence regarding this decision and tried to explain how they were more confident in the F35-B than it was two years ago.
Despite the MoD's assurances the Committee remained concerned that significant risks remain by reverting to the F-35B!!! I have no idea how well briefed the RAF officer was but a quick search on this forum revealed some interesting comments
This Air Marshal is now 'The senior responsible owner of the JSF program, he has been in post for eighteen months and expects to be there for the next two and a half years and is 'not an individual who tended to change his mind'
One of the reasons for wanting the cats and traps carrier was to allow our aircraft to cross deck with our allies but the AM stated that there had now been a change of emphasis and it was now 'agreed' that it was more important to work alongside one another rather than have the ability toland aircraft on each other's carriers!!!!
I have always been concerned about the claims that were made regarding how easy it would be to cross deck the 'B' to the deck of a ship that had not been specifically designed, or modified to accept this aircraft. The evidence given by the Air Marshal would suggest cross decking has been ruled out??? I personally have been at sea when we have had to come to the aid of a helicopter that for one reason or another could not make it back to its own 'mother'. 'Landing' an aircraft on the sea is a one way, very expensive landing..
The Air Marshal went on to say that if we had stayed with the cats and traps variant we would not have become operational until approximately 2023, whereas by going with the 'B' we are able to inter-operate with our allies from 2020.
My thoughts here are that by going with the STOVL variant we MIGHT, just might have Crowsnest by 2022, this is a helicopter that operates as an AEW aircraft, but if we had waited just one more year.... we would have a far superior JSF and the AEW capability is not even comparable. We would have been able to operate the E2D aircraft which offers the very latest sea borne AEW capability. I would ask all our resident experts this question... If we had refitted HMS Eagle, and kept those Phantoms, Buccaneers and the Fairey Gannet updated with the latest upgrades that would no doubt be available... Would we have a better capability than we have now? No doubt it might have been likely that the aircraft would have been replaced with the F-18 and please take that into account but even if they were not replaced, would we have a force that could project more influence than what we are now doing?
I digress.
The Air Marshal stated that it was irrelevant that the C had a bigger bomb bay, he stated the 'B' can carry all the types of weapons we plan to use.. He did concede at one time the Meteor air-to-air missile would not fit, but after a modification, it does!! (does it)
It was also conceded that the only way the F-35B could return to the deck of the type of carrier we are left with is by carrying out a rolling landing.
This is way, way, way beyond my are of knowledge or expertise and please accept I am only repeating the words spoken by a high ranking officer.
The Air Marshal confirmed that the Ministry of Defence is developing a Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landing System, which means that, instead of landing vertically, the F-35B can now land at low speed. This should avoid jettisoning its weapons. Previously, the MoD had believed this could not be done.
A Committee member pointed out that no one else was doing this and, in any event the proposal was untried. The Air Marshal confirmed that only the British are developing this programme, but insisted that this was not high risk. He was confident the capability could be delivered.
The Air Marshal was then asked to justify the less capable F-35B over the more capable F-35C. He confirmed that the F-35C was bigger, had a longer range, could carry more weapons and was more capable
However by remaining with the F-35C, it would be another 3 years before the aircraft came into service, when compared with the F-35B.
It was better to get a less capable aircraft three years earlier at a cost that the Mod could afford. He also pointed out that the F-35B was many times more capable than the Harrier which it replaced.
Me again... Is it correct to claim these aircraft will not be operational until the years 2020 and 2023 respectively?
The chairman of the Committee was concerned that by not having the F-35C, the Navy would loose its deep offencive capability. The Air Marshal confirmed that the Armed Forces Committee had agreed that the deep offencive capability could be deferred until the replacement for the Typhoon was being considered!!
The committee then went on to further question the Air Marshal about Crowsnest with the Committee believing that this was an essential part of carrier strike, but the Air Marshal disagreed and stated it had never been essential to have Crowsnest operational at the same time of initial operating of the carriers.
The air Marshal confirmed once more that Crowsnest will not be available until 2022. Instead Queen Elizabeth will have a greater reliance on allies, Type 45 destroyers, or land based AEW.
A Committee member pointed out to the Air Marshal that, without Crowsnest, the carrier was not only highly un-usable, but highly sinkable. The Air Marshal confirmed that it would only be a risk if we were not working with allies or the other capabilities were not available. He admitted that for two years use of the carrier would be constrained. However he also made reference to the use of other nations' capabilities. The Navy would be working alongside allies and we would be able to share capabilities.
Me again.. Thank goodness we have allies that will always be there for us and the RAF will always be above us, giving that ship the 24 hour AEW cover that might be needed in times of hostilities.
The Air Marshal was then asked how many destroyers would be needed to work with the carrier . He replied by stating the plan 'at the moment' is to have 19 destroyers and frigates. He was unable to give a precise answer as to the number of destroyers to be deployed with each carrier.
Despite being pressed, the Air Marshal would not be drawn on giving a figure. However he did concede that if deploying the carrier into a high-intensity operation, the Navy would have to put a significant number of its six Type 45 destroyers against that task and consequently other lower priority tasks would simply not be covered.
Me again
What an absolute pot mess and me being me... I asked myself why on earth the Ministry of Defence elected to put an Air MArshal before this Select Committee as opposed to an Admiral?
Could this have been a crafty way of keeping the Silent Service, silent?? Would an Admiral finally be honest and give open and frank answers to a Select Committee? Or could it be that this Air Marshal knows more about how the Navy both operates and deploys? How much permanent AEW cover is given to our fleet by the RAF and how often do the fast jets of the RAF operate in a strike role without AEW or possibly prior EW support.
The current Minister for Defence is stating his preference is for having both carriers completed and both being made operational. Is there the man power to do this, do we have the sailors to fully man all ships, including both carriers and still have that ship to shore billets. Are there the aircraft to put on these carriers when both are deployed operationally?
The First sea Lord has announced that initially there will be two squadrons of these aircraft (the RAF have been told they are not getting any of the 'A' variant) The first squadron will be the RAF 617 squadron followed by 809 Naval Air Squadron. Both will be based at RAF Marham and....... The joint nature of UK Lightning operations will result in some RN personnel serving in 617 Squadron and some rAF personnel serving in 809 Squadron.
Me again. How well did this work the last time it was tried when all our Harriers were signed over to the RAF? Are we going down the exact same route as before and is this a case of expecting things to be different when we try to do the exact same thing again? Will the result be different? Obviously the overall responsible senior owner of these aircraft believes it will work
If we were to ask the RAF what F-35 would be their aircraft of choice, would it be the 'B'?
If we were to ask the RN what F-35 would be their aircraft of choice, would it be the 'B'? Two 'B's or not to 'B' and what is the answer.
We talk about having the cheapest variant but is it? Is it really the cheapest variant?
We now know it is either being converted\adapted to carry specific weaponry and are we having to pay for this?
That Rolling Landing issue is indeed being fully funded by the Ministry of Defence and is that ever a cheap option?
If we can afford to have aircraft carriers then should we have proper carriers and use them to their FULL potential? This way we can at least cut down the huge expense of forward deploying RAF squadrons to the airfields of our allies.
Finally does anyone seriously believe that the RAF will ever be able to offer AEW for a forward deployed carrier and maintain that service..or can we seriously rely on our allies to perform this duty? A polite question and certainly not a criticism of the RAF as I believe this is asking far too much of this service.
Would we have been better to have ordered our carriers with full complements of the tried and trusted latest Hornet, Growler, E2D and a few supporting aircraft or are we still better off doing what we are doing... Having aircraft owned by the RAF and flown by both Royal Navy and RAF pilots?
whewwww Oh and the bold type with underlining is me emphasising specific parts of those quotes. Most of this post consists of extracts from a Parliamentary Select Committee Meeting, so I am just the messenger.
.
As has been stated the final assessment of costing surrounding the 'B' or not to 'B' farce is currently estimated to be at least £74m but final costs will only be known next year.
The first carrier will become operational in the year 2020, however the Committee noted that Crowsnest will not become operational until 2022 at the very earliest.
Quote: The Committee accepted that Crowsnest was essential to protect both the carrier and the crew
The Ministry of Defence conceded that when QE enters service in 2020, it will not be protected by crowsnest and this might constrain where the carrier can operate. However the MoD assured the Committee that there would be other options for protecting the carrier, including land-based AEW and reliance upon allies.
I may well be in the minority here but I have never read such clap trap and what is really frustrating is the folks giving this evidence to the Select Committee were six civilians and the Deputy chief of the Defence Staff and guess what? This very senior officer was not an able seaman, nor even an admiral, instead it was a very senior officer from the RAF (an Air Marshal who I will not name)
If this was not bad enough, it gets worse.. warships replenish at sea, taking on both stores and fuel from professionally manned ships from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service but when this carrier becomes operational, these vessels will be over forty years of age, not just forty years old but forty years of hard pressed service in all four corners of the globe and yet the MoD concede it still does not have the funding to replace these ships..
The Committee has also learnt the second carrier will on completion be placed into storage but this may change under SDSR 2015.
In 2011 the Ministry of defence conceded it was right to dump the 'B' in order to avoid its limitations, including shorter range, smaller bomb bay payload, an extra engine and greater complexity when compared to the carrier variant.
These six civilians and the RAF officer were asked to give evidence regarding this decision and tried to explain how they were more confident in the F35-B than it was two years ago.
Despite the MoD's assurances the Committee remained concerned that significant risks remain by reverting to the F-35B!!! I have no idea how well briefed the RAF officer was but a quick search on this forum revealed some interesting comments
This Air Marshal is now 'The senior responsible owner of the JSF program, he has been in post for eighteen months and expects to be there for the next two and a half years and is 'not an individual who tended to change his mind'
One of the reasons for wanting the cats and traps carrier was to allow our aircraft to cross deck with our allies but the AM stated that there had now been a change of emphasis and it was now 'agreed' that it was more important to work alongside one another rather than have the ability toland aircraft on each other's carriers!!!!
I have always been concerned about the claims that were made regarding how easy it would be to cross deck the 'B' to the deck of a ship that had not been specifically designed, or modified to accept this aircraft. The evidence given by the Air Marshal would suggest cross decking has been ruled out??? I personally have been at sea when we have had to come to the aid of a helicopter that for one reason or another could not make it back to its own 'mother'. 'Landing' an aircraft on the sea is a one way, very expensive landing..
The Air Marshal went on to say that if we had stayed with the cats and traps variant we would not have become operational until approximately 2023, whereas by going with the 'B' we are able to inter-operate with our allies from 2020.
My thoughts here are that by going with the STOVL variant we MIGHT, just might have Crowsnest by 2022, this is a helicopter that operates as an AEW aircraft, but if we had waited just one more year.... we would have a far superior JSF and the AEW capability is not even comparable. We would have been able to operate the E2D aircraft which offers the very latest sea borne AEW capability. I would ask all our resident experts this question... If we had refitted HMS Eagle, and kept those Phantoms, Buccaneers and the Fairey Gannet updated with the latest upgrades that would no doubt be available... Would we have a better capability than we have now? No doubt it might have been likely that the aircraft would have been replaced with the F-18 and please take that into account but even if they were not replaced, would we have a force that could project more influence than what we are now doing?
I digress.
The Air Marshal stated that it was irrelevant that the C had a bigger bomb bay, he stated the 'B' can carry all the types of weapons we plan to use.. He did concede at one time the Meteor air-to-air missile would not fit, but after a modification, it does!! (does it)
It was also conceded that the only way the F-35B could return to the deck of the type of carrier we are left with is by carrying out a rolling landing.
This is way, way, way beyond my are of knowledge or expertise and please accept I am only repeating the words spoken by a high ranking officer.
The Air Marshal confirmed that the Ministry of Defence is developing a Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landing System, which means that, instead of landing vertically, the F-35B can now land at low speed. This should avoid jettisoning its weapons. Previously, the MoD had believed this could not be done.
A Committee member pointed out that no one else was doing this and, in any event the proposal was untried. The Air Marshal confirmed that only the British are developing this programme, but insisted that this was not high risk. He was confident the capability could be delivered.
The Air Marshal was then asked to justify the less capable F-35B over the more capable F-35C. He confirmed that the F-35C was bigger, had a longer range, could carry more weapons and was more capable
However by remaining with the F-35C, it would be another 3 years before the aircraft came into service, when compared with the F-35B.
It was better to get a less capable aircraft three years earlier at a cost that the Mod could afford. He also pointed out that the F-35B was many times more capable than the Harrier which it replaced.
Me again... Is it correct to claim these aircraft will not be operational until the years 2020 and 2023 respectively?
The chairman of the Committee was concerned that by not having the F-35C, the Navy would loose its deep offencive capability. The Air Marshal confirmed that the Armed Forces Committee had agreed that the deep offencive capability could be deferred until the replacement for the Typhoon was being considered!!
The committee then went on to further question the Air Marshal about Crowsnest with the Committee believing that this was an essential part of carrier strike, but the Air Marshal disagreed and stated it had never been essential to have Crowsnest operational at the same time of initial operating of the carriers.
The air Marshal confirmed once more that Crowsnest will not be available until 2022. Instead Queen Elizabeth will have a greater reliance on allies, Type 45 destroyers, or land based AEW.
A Committee member pointed out to the Air Marshal that, without Crowsnest, the carrier was not only highly un-usable, but highly sinkable. The Air Marshal confirmed that it would only be a risk if we were not working with allies or the other capabilities were not available. He admitted that for two years use of the carrier would be constrained. However he also made reference to the use of other nations' capabilities. The Navy would be working alongside allies and we would be able to share capabilities.
Me again.. Thank goodness we have allies that will always be there for us and the RAF will always be above us, giving that ship the 24 hour AEW cover that might be needed in times of hostilities.
The Air Marshal was then asked how many destroyers would be needed to work with the carrier . He replied by stating the plan 'at the moment' is to have 19 destroyers and frigates. He was unable to give a precise answer as to the number of destroyers to be deployed with each carrier.
Despite being pressed, the Air Marshal would not be drawn on giving a figure. However he did concede that if deploying the carrier into a high-intensity operation, the Navy would have to put a significant number of its six Type 45 destroyers against that task and consequently other lower priority tasks would simply not be covered.
Me again
What an absolute pot mess and me being me... I asked myself why on earth the Ministry of Defence elected to put an Air MArshal before this Select Committee as opposed to an Admiral?
Could this have been a crafty way of keeping the Silent Service, silent?? Would an Admiral finally be honest and give open and frank answers to a Select Committee? Or could it be that this Air Marshal knows more about how the Navy both operates and deploys? How much permanent AEW cover is given to our fleet by the RAF and how often do the fast jets of the RAF operate in a strike role without AEW or possibly prior EW support.
The current Minister for Defence is stating his preference is for having both carriers completed and both being made operational. Is there the man power to do this, do we have the sailors to fully man all ships, including both carriers and still have that ship to shore billets. Are there the aircraft to put on these carriers when both are deployed operationally?
The First sea Lord has announced that initially there will be two squadrons of these aircraft (the RAF have been told they are not getting any of the 'A' variant) The first squadron will be the RAF 617 squadron followed by 809 Naval Air Squadron. Both will be based at RAF Marham and....... The joint nature of UK Lightning operations will result in some RN personnel serving in 617 Squadron and some rAF personnel serving in 809 Squadron.
Me again. How well did this work the last time it was tried when all our Harriers were signed over to the RAF? Are we going down the exact same route as before and is this a case of expecting things to be different when we try to do the exact same thing again? Will the result be different? Obviously the overall responsible senior owner of these aircraft believes it will work
If we were to ask the RAF what F-35 would be their aircraft of choice, would it be the 'B'?
If we were to ask the RN what F-35 would be their aircraft of choice, would it be the 'B'? Two 'B's or not to 'B' and what is the answer.
We talk about having the cheapest variant but is it? Is it really the cheapest variant?
We now know it is either being converted\adapted to carry specific weaponry and are we having to pay for this?
That Rolling Landing issue is indeed being fully funded by the Ministry of Defence and is that ever a cheap option?
If we can afford to have aircraft carriers then should we have proper carriers and use them to their FULL potential? This way we can at least cut down the huge expense of forward deploying RAF squadrons to the airfields of our allies.
Finally does anyone seriously believe that the RAF will ever be able to offer AEW for a forward deployed carrier and maintain that service..or can we seriously rely on our allies to perform this duty? A polite question and certainly not a criticism of the RAF as I believe this is asking far too much of this service.
Would we have been better to have ordered our carriers with full complements of the tried and trusted latest Hornet, Growler, E2D and a few supporting aircraft or are we still better off doing what we are doing... Having aircraft owned by the RAF and flown by both Royal Navy and RAF pilots?
whewwww Oh and the bold type with underlining is me emphasising specific parts of those quotes. Most of this post consists of extracts from a Parliamentary Select Committee Meeting, so I am just the messenger.
.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Umm, where did I put the Garmin?
Posts: 346
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
While it is on the wishlist, I think we can safely say we are out of the carrier club. The political will is no longer there. Sure there are a few keels laid down, but like the late 1940's, they will be sold off for nothing.
You seem to be quite bitter about the RAF glojo.
Anyway, the MoD is in the driving seat with the Treasury holding the fuel card and the map. The RAF do not have the ability to make the decisions you imply and attribute to the air marshal.
The system is open to criticism but you have to know roughly what the system is before you go on a tirade.
Others will pick apart your observations but I would start with the thought of the E2D; I ask when did it ever feature on our plans and just how would we pay for it?
Anyway, the MoD is in the driving seat with the Treasury holding the fuel card and the map. The RAF do not have the ability to make the decisions you imply and attribute to the air marshal.
The system is open to criticism but you have to know roughly what the system is before you go on a tirade.
Others will pick apart your observations but I would start with the thought of the E2D; I ask when did it ever feature on our plans and just how would we pay for it?
Originally Posted by AtomKraft
The deal was that BAE Sys got paid the same amount whether they built them, or the ships got cancelled.
QED, may as well build them.....
In Rosyth, which is in Browns constituency...
I mean, what chance have we with cnuts like Brown running things?
QED, may as well build them.....
In Rosyth, which is in Browns constituency...
I mean, what chance have we with cnuts like Brown running things?
If the UK wants any aircraft carrier, it will have to sign a contract that is bullet proof from political interference.
Originally Posted by Glojo
however the Committee noted that Crowsnest will not become operational until 2022 at the very earliest.
Originally Posted by Glojo
It was also conceded that the only way the F-35B could return to the deck of the type of carrier we are left with is by carrying out a rolling landing.
Last edited by peter we; 4th Nov 2013 at 13:08.
glojo
Great rant.
The clue is in the chaps title. Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. That means a joint appointment so in previous years it may well have been a submariner briefing on RAF equipment.
I am sure that the Air Marshal in question would have asked for, and received, many detailed briefs from the relevant (expert?) Naval Staffs within Whitehall and CINCFLEET (and may well have had one or two sitting behind him whilst giving evidence at the committee ready to kick his chair if he said anything off the party line). And if they are anything like the ones I had to write for Army and Navy colleagues (on RAF topics) then they will no doubt have been written in very plain, and clear, language so that the person reading it can both understand it and put the message across to others.
But lets not detract from the standard RN opening salvo - "It's all the RAFs fault"
Great rant.
the Deputy chief of the Defence Staff and guess what? This very senior officer was not an able seaman, nor even an admiral, instead it was a very senior officer from the RAF (an Air Marshal who I will not name)
I am sure that the Air Marshal in question would have asked for, and received, many detailed briefs from the relevant (expert?) Naval Staffs within Whitehall and CINCFLEET (and may well have had one or two sitting behind him whilst giving evidence at the committee ready to kick his chair if he said anything off the party line). And if they are anything like the ones I had to write for Army and Navy colleagues (on RAF topics) then they will no doubt have been written in very plain, and clear, language so that the person reading it can both understand it and put the message across to others.
But lets not detract from the standard RN opening salvo - "It's all the RAFs fault"
