Future Carrier (Including Costs)
An F-35B with 22,000 pounds of weapons could carry 6,000 pounds of fuel and would have an effective range of ~the other end of the runway, even if 22,000 lb could be carried (with only four stations rated above 1,000 lb, and four of the rest rated for AAMs-only). Enough of this "beast mode" idiocy.
Loaded on to this state-of-the-art jet from 17 (Test and Evaluation) is the weaponry it would typically carry on a strike mission: 22,000lb of destructive and defensive power.
n this case the ‘bombheads’ on HMS Queen Elizabeth – red-surcout-wearing air engineer technicians – carefully loaded inert Paveway l@ser-guided bombs and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles (for taking out aerial threats) on to the external pylons and bomb bay.
Fully-loaded, it’s known as “beast mode” by crews because of the firepower it delivers – nearly three times more than a Harrier, and as much as the heaviest payload carried by a WW2 Lancaster bomber (a Grand Slam or ‘earthquake’ bomb.
n this case the ‘bombheads’ on HMS Queen Elizabeth – red-surcout-wearing air engineer technicians – carefully loaded inert Paveway l@ser-guided bombs and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles (for taking out aerial threats) on to the external pylons and bomb bay.
Fully-loaded, it’s known as “beast mode” by crews because of the firepower it delivers – nearly three times more than a Harrier, and as much as the heaviest payload carried by a WW2 Lancaster bomber (a Grand Slam or ‘earthquake’ bomb.
Very few seek to argue that the F-35B is not a significantly compromised machine, least of all the USMC who announced back in the spring that they were accelerating deliveries of C-models in preference to Bs...
(I heard that General Rudder's callsign is 'Stick'
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Orca, other contributors,
I hesitated to post this, but I thought it would help put the F-35B and its performance in context. Please feel free to disagree and criticise anything - that's how we all learn stuff.
All aircraft designs are 'compromised' in one way or another. No one aircraft can do everything that any aircraft could do. The Lancaster was a superb bomber, but probably not a good fighter. The Typhoon is an awesome air combat aircraft, but not much good at hauling cargo. All aircraft are designed to meet requirements: some don't drive the basic airframe design (example - digits of cockpit displays must be at least 3.4 mm high, or something). But some DO drive the whole design (example - 'combat range of 1000 miles at low level at high speed' drove the TSR2 design).
So what drove the F-35 design? The requirements were driven by years of studies that showed a need to balance out and out airframe performance against required strike mission loads while exploiting low observability and more advanced sensor and communications capabilities. Internal weapons bays would be required to support a reduced signature. LO ruled out external fuel tanks as a solution to achieving desired ranges. All that would place pressure on aircraft internal volume, and that in turn meant that F-35 would never be a 'lean and mean' 9g dogfighter. The Key Performance Parameters (KPPs - JSF speak for key requirements) were carefully chosen to reflect those basic objectives.
The F-35B design was also driven by two key requirements that were particular to STOVL. These were to perform a STO for a given mission in a certain length - this figure was driven by the size of USN LHD flight decks. The second requirement was the vertical landing bring back (VLBB), calling for the aircraft to be able to land vertically with a specified internal weapon load. These two requirements absolutely drove the design of the F-35B. They could only be met by a powered lift aircraft that had enough powered lift capability and internal weapons bay volume. ( The F-35B team also had to meet a number of 'joint' KPPs, but the only performance related 'joint' KPP was that for mission radius. )
The choice of these two KPPs was deliberate and informed. The people drawing them up back in the 90s had realised that any powered lift aircraft design would experience huge pressure on internal volume (lift fans take up space). As a result, they only asked for the STOVL aircraft to bring back (or carry) 1,000lb class weapons, to give the design team some margin on both volume and wight. Unfortunately, in the early days of the development programme, the LM JSF team had a poor handle on airframe weight and internal design. Really poor. That led them to believe that they could produce a 'common weapons bay' design for all 3 variants, giving the STOVL variant the ability to carry 2,000lb weapons internally. They couldn't. LM then had to redesign the STOVL aircraft more or less completely, with the big change being reducing the size of the weapons bays back to the 1,000lb weapon size originally envisaged. (By the way, at that time, all three variants were grotesquely overweight and unable to meet any performance related KPPs - the B variant led the subsequent redesign effort, but all three aircraft were extensively changed).
The F-35B is not 'significantly compromised'. Its design is deliberate and aimed at meeting KPPs that supported operation from ships. It's damn near the size of an F-4. It can launch from a ship at higher weights than the F-4 could from UK ships. It can land on with 3,200lbs of internal weapons. Its sensor and comms capabilities are way ahead of anything else out there. And it can operate from ships that have got around 600 feet of deck. It's the future of maritime air power for those countries that can't afford, or don't know how to build, CVN type carriers and the aircraft to go on them. (Right now, only the US can do that).
My view (and that's all it is) is that the next few years will see more and more countries putting F-35Bs on a variety of ships, some called 'aircraft carriers'. The Japanese, South Koreans and Italians are al moving that way. The UK seems to be planning a joint UK/USMC air wing for the QE's 2021 deployment, with somewhere about 24 aircraft embarked.
Final point. I'm not an LM shill. I'm not an F-35 fanboy. I'm just an old naval aircraft engineer who has a little understanding of just how damn hard it is to design, make, test and deploy a supersonic STOVL strike aircraft to sea. I admit to getting a bit miffed when the efforts of extremely fine and clever people (not including me, by the way) are disparaged, especially when lots of those clever people are excellent Brits.
Best regards as ever to all those who are working hard right now to give the UK an outstanding maritime strike capability, and to those who are getting ready to deploy it.
Engines
I hesitated to post this, but I thought it would help put the F-35B and its performance in context. Please feel free to disagree and criticise anything - that's how we all learn stuff.
All aircraft designs are 'compromised' in one way or another. No one aircraft can do everything that any aircraft could do. The Lancaster was a superb bomber, but probably not a good fighter. The Typhoon is an awesome air combat aircraft, but not much good at hauling cargo. All aircraft are designed to meet requirements: some don't drive the basic airframe design (example - digits of cockpit displays must be at least 3.4 mm high, or something). But some DO drive the whole design (example - 'combat range of 1000 miles at low level at high speed' drove the TSR2 design).
So what drove the F-35 design? The requirements were driven by years of studies that showed a need to balance out and out airframe performance against required strike mission loads while exploiting low observability and more advanced sensor and communications capabilities. Internal weapons bays would be required to support a reduced signature. LO ruled out external fuel tanks as a solution to achieving desired ranges. All that would place pressure on aircraft internal volume, and that in turn meant that F-35 would never be a 'lean and mean' 9g dogfighter. The Key Performance Parameters (KPPs - JSF speak for key requirements) were carefully chosen to reflect those basic objectives.
The F-35B design was also driven by two key requirements that were particular to STOVL. These were to perform a STO for a given mission in a certain length - this figure was driven by the size of USN LHD flight decks. The second requirement was the vertical landing bring back (VLBB), calling for the aircraft to be able to land vertically with a specified internal weapon load. These two requirements absolutely drove the design of the F-35B. They could only be met by a powered lift aircraft that had enough powered lift capability and internal weapons bay volume. ( The F-35B team also had to meet a number of 'joint' KPPs, but the only performance related 'joint' KPP was that for mission radius. )
The choice of these two KPPs was deliberate and informed. The people drawing them up back in the 90s had realised that any powered lift aircraft design would experience huge pressure on internal volume (lift fans take up space). As a result, they only asked for the STOVL aircraft to bring back (or carry) 1,000lb class weapons, to give the design team some margin on both volume and wight. Unfortunately, in the early days of the development programme, the LM JSF team had a poor handle on airframe weight and internal design. Really poor. That led them to believe that they could produce a 'common weapons bay' design for all 3 variants, giving the STOVL variant the ability to carry 2,000lb weapons internally. They couldn't. LM then had to redesign the STOVL aircraft more or less completely, with the big change being reducing the size of the weapons bays back to the 1,000lb weapon size originally envisaged. (By the way, at that time, all three variants were grotesquely overweight and unable to meet any performance related KPPs - the B variant led the subsequent redesign effort, but all three aircraft were extensively changed).
The F-35B is not 'significantly compromised'. Its design is deliberate and aimed at meeting KPPs that supported operation from ships. It's damn near the size of an F-4. It can launch from a ship at higher weights than the F-4 could from UK ships. It can land on with 3,200lbs of internal weapons. Its sensor and comms capabilities are way ahead of anything else out there. And it can operate from ships that have got around 600 feet of deck. It's the future of maritime air power for those countries that can't afford, or don't know how to build, CVN type carriers and the aircraft to go on them. (Right now, only the US can do that).
My view (and that's all it is) is that the next few years will see more and more countries putting F-35Bs on a variety of ships, some called 'aircraft carriers'. The Japanese, South Koreans and Italians are al moving that way. The UK seems to be planning a joint UK/USMC air wing for the QE's 2021 deployment, with somewhere about 24 aircraft embarked.
Final point. I'm not an LM shill. I'm not an F-35 fanboy. I'm just an old naval aircraft engineer who has a little understanding of just how damn hard it is to design, make, test and deploy a supersonic STOVL strike aircraft to sea. I admit to getting a bit miffed when the efforts of extremely fine and clever people (not including me, by the way) are disparaged, especially when lots of those clever people are excellent Brits.
Best regards as ever to all those who are working hard right now to give the UK an outstanding maritime strike capability, and to those who are getting ready to deploy it.
Engines
Ignoring the obvious stealth advantages, how does the Gripen compare to the F35?
Would there be a benefit in having additional simpler & lower cost aircraft on board to supplement a tier 1 aircraft on missions that would support its operational capabilities?
Would there be a benefit in having additional simpler & lower cost aircraft on board to supplement a tier 1 aircraft on missions that would support its operational capabilities?
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I haven’t seen any mention of SVRL in this deployment. I was expecting that to be an area where more progress would be made. I wonder if the risks associated with that type of landing have been reviewed and it’s become out of appetite?
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Tech Guy, Hula,
Perhaps I can help a little here.
Tech, your question helps illustrate the difficulty in comparing aircraft that were designed against different requirements. The Gripen is, in my view, a very good medium weight fighter bomber, with some excellent supportability features and good performance. However, it's not a very good naval aircraft, as it wasn't designed to operate from ships. Actually, it's a really poor naval aircraft, as it can't operate from a carrier at all.
Some help here - a conventional naval aircraft that uses catapults and arresting gear needs a range of special design features. The main aerodynamic features are an ability to carry out approach and landing at much lower speeds than land based aircraft, to allow the arresting gear to bring it to a halt, and special aero design to allow it to get airborne safely at the end of the catapult launch. These drive large wings and control surfaces, plus a ton of other stuff. The main airframe feature is the extra strengthening to handle the launch and arresting loads, as well as the far higher landing loads caused by the 'no flare' landing required to accurately engage the arresting gear. This last one is really significant. The Gripen has none of these. They are very, very major and significant, and add a LOT of weight to the aircraft.
Very few land based aircraft have made the transition to a flight deck. The only ones that jump out of my aged brain are the FJ-1 to FJ-4 Fury of the 1950s, and the T-45 Goshawk of the 1980s. The T-45 was just a trainer, and didn't have to carry weapons, but even so it had to have major changes made to operate from the deck, adding more than a ton to its empty weight. The FJ-1 Fury was a minimum change from the Sabre, but it rapidly grew into the totally different FJ-4 to be combat effective. Of course, the STOVL Harrier made the transition with not too many modifications, but that's not a cat and trap aircraft.
Hula, as far as I know, the current deployment of QE with the embarked F-35Bs is planning to extend the envelope of SRVL operations to higher weights and also more demanding deck conditions. I'd expect that they would want to clear night ops as well. Yes, the risks associated have certainly been thoroughly reviewed, and would have been reviewed again before the trials plan was approved. I don't believe there's any loss of 'appetite' - SRVLs are very important to the UK to give greater flexibility and more bring back to F-35B operations. However, I'm not 'in the loop' these days, so I'm prepared to be proved wrong in my assumptions.
Hope this reply helps everyone get a better understanding of the challenges and the solutions that the teams have to develop to get aircraft to sea and operate effectively. I know that this is a specialist area of knowledge, and I'm always happy to help where I can.
Best Regards as ever to all those Fleet Air Arm people who are, once again, showing the world new ways of operating aircraft at sea.
Engines
Perhaps I can help a little here.
Tech, your question helps illustrate the difficulty in comparing aircraft that were designed against different requirements. The Gripen is, in my view, a very good medium weight fighter bomber, with some excellent supportability features and good performance. However, it's not a very good naval aircraft, as it wasn't designed to operate from ships. Actually, it's a really poor naval aircraft, as it can't operate from a carrier at all.
Some help here - a conventional naval aircraft that uses catapults and arresting gear needs a range of special design features. The main aerodynamic features are an ability to carry out approach and landing at much lower speeds than land based aircraft, to allow the arresting gear to bring it to a halt, and special aero design to allow it to get airborne safely at the end of the catapult launch. These drive large wings and control surfaces, plus a ton of other stuff. The main airframe feature is the extra strengthening to handle the launch and arresting loads, as well as the far higher landing loads caused by the 'no flare' landing required to accurately engage the arresting gear. This last one is really significant. The Gripen has none of these. They are very, very major and significant, and add a LOT of weight to the aircraft.
Very few land based aircraft have made the transition to a flight deck. The only ones that jump out of my aged brain are the FJ-1 to FJ-4 Fury of the 1950s, and the T-45 Goshawk of the 1980s. The T-45 was just a trainer, and didn't have to carry weapons, but even so it had to have major changes made to operate from the deck, adding more than a ton to its empty weight. The FJ-1 Fury was a minimum change from the Sabre, but it rapidly grew into the totally different FJ-4 to be combat effective. Of course, the STOVL Harrier made the transition with not too many modifications, but that's not a cat and trap aircraft.
Hula, as far as I know, the current deployment of QE with the embarked F-35Bs is planning to extend the envelope of SRVL operations to higher weights and also more demanding deck conditions. I'd expect that they would want to clear night ops as well. Yes, the risks associated have certainly been thoroughly reviewed, and would have been reviewed again before the trials plan was approved. I don't believe there's any loss of 'appetite' - SRVLs are very important to the UK to give greater flexibility and more bring back to F-35B operations. However, I'm not 'in the loop' these days, so I'm prepared to be proved wrong in my assumptions.
Hope this reply helps everyone get a better understanding of the challenges and the solutions that the teams have to develop to get aircraft to sea and operate effectively. I know that this is a specialist area of knowledge, and I'm always happy to help where I can.
Best Regards as ever to all those Fleet Air Arm people who are, once again, showing the world new ways of operating aircraft at sea.
Engines
It might be reasonable at this point to remind everyone of Rafale, which aside from the F-111 (I believe) is the only high-performance aircraft to have been designed from the egg for CTOL and CV. They did a nice job (inventing CATIA in the process) and Rafale M has a much lower OEW than F-35B or F-35C, and can definitely beat the former in everything except LO, and (I suspect) can haul as much as far as the latter also.
This brings up an interesting viewpoint on carrier STOVL. When you operate a jet fighter from an 800-1000 foot deck, you need some assistance in acceleration and deceleration. On a conventional carrier, this is provided by catapults and arrester gear that (speaking hypothetically as an aviator) I leave behind on the boat. When I go STOVL, I take those functions off my >50,000 ton ship and put them on my airplane, where I carry them around all the time, even when I'm pulling 7 g. Note the OEW delta between the F-35A and F-35B, even though the latter has no internal gun and an aggressively lightened structure.
Long, long ago in a galaxy far, far away, one could say "but wait, STOVL lets me operate from mini-carriers". But when you define your carrier-air mission such that you want to do defensive CAP and air-to-ground missions concurrently, and your airplane is F-4-sized, this no longer applies.
This brings up an interesting viewpoint on carrier STOVL. When you operate a jet fighter from an 800-1000 foot deck, you need some assistance in acceleration and deceleration. On a conventional carrier, this is provided by catapults and arrester gear that (speaking hypothetically as an aviator) I leave behind on the boat. When I go STOVL, I take those functions off my >50,000 ton ship and put them on my airplane, where I carry them around all the time, even when I'm pulling 7 g. Note the OEW delta between the F-35A and F-35B, even though the latter has no internal gun and an aggressively lightened structure.
Long, long ago in a galaxy far, far away, one could say "but wait, STOVL lets me operate from mini-carriers". But when you define your carrier-air mission such that you want to do defensive CAP and air-to-ground missions concurrently, and your airplane is F-4-sized, this no longer applies.
Last edited by LowObservable; 1st Nov 2019 at 13:43.
Long, long ago in a galaxy far, far away, one could say "but wait, STOVL lets me operate from mini-carriers". But when you define your carrier-air mission such that you want to do defensive CAP and air-to-ground missions concurrently, and your airplane is F-4-sized, this no longer applies.
But it does beg the question - the primary advantage of STOVL is it allows for a much smaller carrier. But the Queen Elizabeth is huge - even by aircraft carrier standards. Yea, it's smaller than the American Nimitz and new Ford class, but it's much larger than the WWII vintage carriers. So why not provide it with cat/trap capabilities?
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Good question! Initially, the plan was to operate the F35B, and hence no need for cats and traps. However, the carriers were to be designed for future conversaion to cats and traps, to future proof post F35B.
Then, F35C began to come into the picture. The defence review in 2010 proposed that we might sell one carrier (after the global financial crisis) and fit the other one with cats and traps for F35C.However, this was to utilise the EMALS from the Ford, which was proving troublesome and expensive. So before long, the idea began to falter.
The 2016 defence review reverted to F35B, and retention of both carriers, albeit with the second having enhanced amphibious (read Royal Marines) capability. So back to STOVL.
Theoretically, both could go CATOBAR in future if required, although it sounds like open-heart surgery!
Then, F35C began to come into the picture. The defence review in 2010 proposed that we might sell one carrier (after the global financial crisis) and fit the other one with cats and traps for F35C.However, this was to utilise the EMALS from the Ford, which was proving troublesome and expensive. So before long, the idea began to falter.
The 2016 defence review reverted to F35B, and retention of both carriers, albeit with the second having enhanced amphibious (read Royal Marines) capability. So back to STOVL.
Theoretically, both could go CATOBAR in future if required, although it sounds like open-heart surgery!
Originally Posted by Engines
The F-35B is not 'significantly compromised'.
My 1% disagreement is quoted above and ultimately stems from the CONOPS* and the requirements, not the engineering. The B carries less payload, less far and less quickly than the other variants. Speaking as an aviator, that is a significant compromise.
Now, I recognise that the carrier strike concept is about more than just the aviation which occurs at the end of it, but here’s the thing. The UK is unique among B operators in not having any As or Cs and having no plans to acquire any, at least not publicly (and there are those who would have us believe that we’ll have 69 Bs to take us to QEC mid-life and then another 69 as fatigue and attrition replacements).
By settling exclusively for the B, our entire 5th generation fleet bears the compromises made to enable a basing option which is useful for much of the time, but not so useful in the scenario which for the UK ultimately justifies the huge expense of 5th generation capabilities: Article V operations on NATO’s eastern flank. Sure, the carrier group can be employed on blue water ops with the Bs on air defence duties, but is that really what we acquired them for? There lies the significance of the compromise, in my estimation at least.
[* Digression: my issue with the CONOPS is the question of tanker support, firstly when the carrier is forced to stand off in an environment where 5th generation capabilities are needed, and secondly when exploiting the carrier group’s primary advantage of being able to operate free from the constraints of land basing rights. Neither aspect has been adequately addressed at any stage of the UK programme, and both aspects are aggravated by the B’s shorter range.]
Last edited by Easy Street; 1st Nov 2019 at 01:35.
Was thinking the same. The French PA2 using the same hull would have been a conventional design. For that kind of money and size why limit yourself to STOVL? Let alone the performance trade off between the F35B and the F35C?
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Dear All,
Thank you for your positive comments - it's nice to know that my posts help a little here and there. Also thank to those who responded with their posts - exchange of ideas is always a good thing. I'd like to respond to those, and hopefully help the thread along.
LO raises the very good examples of Rafale and the F-111 as aircraft designed from the outset to be both CTOL (land based) and CV (cat and trap carrier based). The F-111B CV variant proved to be unsuccessful, and when I worked at Fort Worth it was frequently quoted as an example of how not to put an aircraft to sea. It couldn't 'thread the needle' of being able to get a reasonable payload off the catapult (very high empty weight) or get back on board at a feasible speed (not enough wing). It shows what an excellent job the French made with Rafale, although I would like to know just how common the airframes are between the land based variants and the 'M'.
The reason I mention that is to pick up on LO's point about empty weights, and the effect on them of going STOVL. He is absolutely right that the empty weight of the F-35B is higher than that of the F-35A, and he is also right that the 'B' has to carry around the weight of the equipment to get it on and off the ship. However, I would gently point out that the F-35C also carries some weight to allow it to use the launch and recovery gear (the cats and traps) on the ship. Using the 'empty weight' figures from the 2016 OT&E report, the three variants come out as follows (figures slightly rounded to make the mental maths easier):
F-35A - 29,000 pounds
F-35B - 32,400 pounds
F-35C - 34,580 pounds
From these, the F-35B's 'STOVL weight penalty' is around 3,400 pounds, The F-35C, however, has a weigh penalty of 5,580 pounds. This is due to the factors I highlighted in an earlier reply, where the unique loads generated by cat and trap operations generate massive additional stresses that have to be managed by additional or much beefier bits of metal. The F-35C also has to have larger wings, fins and tailplanes to be able to do that slow precision approach and landing stuff as well as flying away from a catapult launch. Plus a landing gear system that weighs well over twice that of an A. These all add many pounds. The designers I worked with told me that the 'C' model was the least 'common' of the three variants. I freely admit that this isn't a straight comparison - those bigger wings on the 'C' do translate into increased internal fuel capacity and longer range. However, they also mean lower speeds and reduced turn performance - the 'C' model bleeds energy in the turn faster than the A or the B. Horses for courses, as ever. By the way, the 'C' also lacks an internal gun and has, I can assure you all, a very aggressively lightened structure, just like the other two variants.
To pick up on LO's last point - yes, STOVL does let you operate from smaller ships. I can't quite follow the rest of his argument (which is my fault, not his), but I would gently offer the observation that the USMC have a bit of a handle on what they are doing (just like the USAF, the USN, the RAF, the RN and other F-35 operators) and they are not putting 12 or 13 F-35Bs on an LHA and sending it out east for the look of the thing.
As an engineer, I would not want to get too far into CONOPs matters such as raised by Easy Street. I do think, though, that he raises a valid point about UK F-35 force structure, and the fact that we are planning for an 'all B' force with consequent effect on our F-35 ops from land bases. I've previously posted my opinion that a split A/B force could be a better option for the UK. There is quite a bit of commonality between the A and the B, especially where many of the normal support related costs drivers apply (e.g. training, avionics spares and sustainment, systems components), and a split A/B force, working off a common training and support system would, in my view, be worth looking at. Along with that, I would suggest that the 'Forward' A and B aircraft could then be returned to their proper Force Command HQs (Air and Sea), thus restoring the proper chains of responsibility for operational development and not least air safety responsibilities.
Finally, (and sorry for the long post) a gentle reminder (at least from my addled memory) of the CVF/F-35 historical relationship and SDR 2010. The F-35B STOVL variant was, up to that time, the UK's focus, coming out of the initial Naval Air Staff Target for a Sea Harrier replacement to operate from 'Invincible' class ships, and also because STOVL expertise was the UK's main bargaining chip to get full 'Tier 1' partner status on the JSF programme. (The formal UK/US document that got the UK on to JSF was actually titled the 'STOVL MoU'). However, from the outset, the UK wanted to keep all options open for the CVF future carrier, and mandated a ship large enough to be converted to cat and trap. This led to two very large carriers, almost as big as the USN's 'Forrestal', which was the first of the 'super carriers'. This decision was also influenced by the view (not at all wrong) that much smaller carriers (like the 20,000 ton Invincibles) suffered from serious constraints on internal space for fuel, weapons and hangarage. However, with over 40 years' since the last time anyone in the UK had tried to design a ship of this class and size, the MoD had a few gaps in their technical expertise, especially at higher levels.
That mattered, because when SDR 2010 came around (and I know quite a few people of all 3 services who tell me that the 2010 SDR was one of the most fouled up Defence Reviews of all time), the problems the F-35B was then having caused what I can only call a 'panic'. This led to high priced people in Mod Main deciding that the UK should go 'cat and trap' - after all, how hard could it be to convert the (already designed) CVF? They'd watched the spiffing Carrier Alliance videos showing how you could just peel off the deck and install the cats, after all. I know for a fact that this decision was taken without input from the Carrier team - the two star in charge was given under 48 hours (over a weekend) to come up with the costs to justify the decision.
In the event, when reality dawned, including the actual state of progress on EMALS at that time and the complexity of a conversion of CVF back to cat and trap (NWSRG is exactly right when he calls it 'open heart surgery'), the decision was reversed in 2012, I think. Was it the right decision to go back to STOVL? Time will tell, but I think (my view only) it was. When you start to add up the real costs of operating an effectively sized cat and trap fleet of aircraft including the need for tankers (not so much for strike range, but as essential safety measures to refuel aircraft waiting to recover while a fouled deck is cleared), the long range AEW, special personnel to man and operate and repair the cat and trap gear, the training load for the pilots, and so on, I honestly believe that the UK can't get into that game and do it properly. It's only the USN that can do it, at present. But hey, I'm just an old engineer.
Thanks to all those who have helped this become such an informative and enjoyable thread. And who have put up so kindly with my ramblings. I'll go quiet now for a bit.
Best regards as ever to our young men and women who are out right there now on land and at sea working hard and professionally to give the UK the defence capability it needs and deserves.
Engines
Thank you for your positive comments - it's nice to know that my posts help a little here and there. Also thank to those who responded with their posts - exchange of ideas is always a good thing. I'd like to respond to those, and hopefully help the thread along.
LO raises the very good examples of Rafale and the F-111 as aircraft designed from the outset to be both CTOL (land based) and CV (cat and trap carrier based). The F-111B CV variant proved to be unsuccessful, and when I worked at Fort Worth it was frequently quoted as an example of how not to put an aircraft to sea. It couldn't 'thread the needle' of being able to get a reasonable payload off the catapult (very high empty weight) or get back on board at a feasible speed (not enough wing). It shows what an excellent job the French made with Rafale, although I would like to know just how common the airframes are between the land based variants and the 'M'.
The reason I mention that is to pick up on LO's point about empty weights, and the effect on them of going STOVL. He is absolutely right that the empty weight of the F-35B is higher than that of the F-35A, and he is also right that the 'B' has to carry around the weight of the equipment to get it on and off the ship. However, I would gently point out that the F-35C also carries some weight to allow it to use the launch and recovery gear (the cats and traps) on the ship. Using the 'empty weight' figures from the 2016 OT&E report, the three variants come out as follows (figures slightly rounded to make the mental maths easier):
F-35A - 29,000 pounds
F-35B - 32,400 pounds
F-35C - 34,580 pounds
From these, the F-35B's 'STOVL weight penalty' is around 3,400 pounds, The F-35C, however, has a weigh penalty of 5,580 pounds. This is due to the factors I highlighted in an earlier reply, where the unique loads generated by cat and trap operations generate massive additional stresses that have to be managed by additional or much beefier bits of metal. The F-35C also has to have larger wings, fins and tailplanes to be able to do that slow precision approach and landing stuff as well as flying away from a catapult launch. Plus a landing gear system that weighs well over twice that of an A. These all add many pounds. The designers I worked with told me that the 'C' model was the least 'common' of the three variants. I freely admit that this isn't a straight comparison - those bigger wings on the 'C' do translate into increased internal fuel capacity and longer range. However, they also mean lower speeds and reduced turn performance - the 'C' model bleeds energy in the turn faster than the A or the B. Horses for courses, as ever. By the way, the 'C' also lacks an internal gun and has, I can assure you all, a very aggressively lightened structure, just like the other two variants.
To pick up on LO's last point - yes, STOVL does let you operate from smaller ships. I can't quite follow the rest of his argument (which is my fault, not his), but I would gently offer the observation that the USMC have a bit of a handle on what they are doing (just like the USAF, the USN, the RAF, the RN and other F-35 operators) and they are not putting 12 or 13 F-35Bs on an LHA and sending it out east for the look of the thing.
As an engineer, I would not want to get too far into CONOPs matters such as raised by Easy Street. I do think, though, that he raises a valid point about UK F-35 force structure, and the fact that we are planning for an 'all B' force with consequent effect on our F-35 ops from land bases. I've previously posted my opinion that a split A/B force could be a better option for the UK. There is quite a bit of commonality between the A and the B, especially where many of the normal support related costs drivers apply (e.g. training, avionics spares and sustainment, systems components), and a split A/B force, working off a common training and support system would, in my view, be worth looking at. Along with that, I would suggest that the 'Forward' A and B aircraft could then be returned to their proper Force Command HQs (Air and Sea), thus restoring the proper chains of responsibility for operational development and not least air safety responsibilities.
Finally, (and sorry for the long post) a gentle reminder (at least from my addled memory) of the CVF/F-35 historical relationship and SDR 2010. The F-35B STOVL variant was, up to that time, the UK's focus, coming out of the initial Naval Air Staff Target for a Sea Harrier replacement to operate from 'Invincible' class ships, and also because STOVL expertise was the UK's main bargaining chip to get full 'Tier 1' partner status on the JSF programme. (The formal UK/US document that got the UK on to JSF was actually titled the 'STOVL MoU'). However, from the outset, the UK wanted to keep all options open for the CVF future carrier, and mandated a ship large enough to be converted to cat and trap. This led to two very large carriers, almost as big as the USN's 'Forrestal', which was the first of the 'super carriers'. This decision was also influenced by the view (not at all wrong) that much smaller carriers (like the 20,000 ton Invincibles) suffered from serious constraints on internal space for fuel, weapons and hangarage. However, with over 40 years' since the last time anyone in the UK had tried to design a ship of this class and size, the MoD had a few gaps in their technical expertise, especially at higher levels.
That mattered, because when SDR 2010 came around (and I know quite a few people of all 3 services who tell me that the 2010 SDR was one of the most fouled up Defence Reviews of all time), the problems the F-35B was then having caused what I can only call a 'panic'. This led to high priced people in Mod Main deciding that the UK should go 'cat and trap' - after all, how hard could it be to convert the (already designed) CVF? They'd watched the spiffing Carrier Alliance videos showing how you could just peel off the deck and install the cats, after all. I know for a fact that this decision was taken without input from the Carrier team - the two star in charge was given under 48 hours (over a weekend) to come up with the costs to justify the decision.
In the event, when reality dawned, including the actual state of progress on EMALS at that time and the complexity of a conversion of CVF back to cat and trap (NWSRG is exactly right when he calls it 'open heart surgery'), the decision was reversed in 2012, I think. Was it the right decision to go back to STOVL? Time will tell, but I think (my view only) it was. When you start to add up the real costs of operating an effectively sized cat and trap fleet of aircraft including the need for tankers (not so much for strike range, but as essential safety measures to refuel aircraft waiting to recover while a fouled deck is cleared), the long range AEW, special personnel to man and operate and repair the cat and trap gear, the training load for the pilots, and so on, I honestly believe that the UK can't get into that game and do it properly. It's only the USN that can do it, at present. But hey, I'm just an old engineer.
Thanks to all those who have helped this become such an informative and enjoyable thread. And who have put up so kindly with my ramblings. I'll go quiet now for a bit.
Best regards as ever to our young men and women who are out right there now on land and at sea working hard and professionally to give the UK the defence capability it needs and deserves.
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 2nd Nov 2019 at 14:26.
