Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Talking to someone at the MoD last year they said that in NATO wargames the UK carriers immediately bug out for the edge of the game to avoid being sunk.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 1,136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I heard that in a recent NATO war game an airfield got attacked by infantry and a whole squadron destroyed and then another ceased functioning after a TLAM strike.
Oh no, my mistake - those weren’t war games it actually happened in Bastion and Syria.
If only these airfield things could move.
Oh no, my mistake - those weren’t war games it actually happened in Bastion and Syria.
If only these airfield things could move.
Not a lot of point being at the centre of the game if you've got aircraft to do that for you. It's an aircraft carrier not a frigate.
I heard that in a recent NATO war game an airfield got attacked by infantry and a whole squadron destroyed and then another ceased functioning after a TLAM strike.
Oh no, my mistake - those weren’t war games it actually happened in Bastion and Syria.
If only these airfield things could move.
Oh no, my mistake - those weren’t war games it actually happened in Bastion and Syria.
If only these airfield things could move.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 1,136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Don’t know, don’t work for either. In 1982 the Argentinians lost a capital ship and that didn’t seem to change their strategy. Are we saying that losing ships changes strategy but losing aircraft and airfields doesn’t?
Aircraft losses having strategic impact? Depends. Loss of a Voyager-load of troops to enemy action was reckoned to be a campaign-ending risk in Afghanistan, partly reflecting the low stakes for the UK by the end. Loss of a squadron of fighters on the ground? Depends how many you have to replace them. Loss of 50% or more of a fleet in one action, which is the order of magnitude we'd be talking if a QEC went down with 36 Lightnings aboard, would certainly hurt but I still think the bigger impact would be the boat itself. There is just too much emotional investment and symbolism in it for its loss to be anything short of catastrophic for the nation.
The Argentines tied their remaining ships up, were roundly defeated and went on to depose their leadership in a state of national humiliation so I wouldn't say the events following the sinking of the Belgrano were great evidence of resilience to a symbolic loss!
Last edited by Easy Street; 4th Aug 2019 at 17:54.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 1,136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I often heard folk quote the fact that losing a heavy would lead to strategic failure in Afghanistan but always considered this to be perceived wisdom perpetuated by word of mouth as opposed to policy.
It was identified as a strategic risk. That's different to saying that it would lead to a specific outcome as a matter of policy. But to calibrate: take the response to the Nimrod loss, multiply the number of deaths by 10 and introduce a 'helpless squaddie passengers' factor, and you can see that we would certainly have had a grieving PM addressing the nation from the steps of No10 with very serious questions to answer about the campaign and whether the national interests at stake justified such a price in blood and prestige. Losing a carrier would be much worse.
Last edited by Easy Street; 4th Aug 2019 at 18:37.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 1,136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We agree entirely. Losing a carrier would be horrendous. But warfare isn’t a game of absolutes.
For example: I think that Typhoon gives the U.K. a reasonable capability, but I can think of a number of systems that would make it absolutely irrelevant in a very high end conflict. I don’t think we should can it because in the more likely scenarios it gives utility.
I think we should spend our time campaigning for things like an ARM for Typhoon or some form of (actually useful) MRAD/ GBAD for the British Army rather than knocking a basing option for F-35B that seems quite useful.
For example: I think that Typhoon gives the U.K. a reasonable capability, but I can think of a number of systems that would make it absolutely irrelevant in a very high end conflict. I don’t think we should can it because in the more likely scenarios it gives utility.
I think we should spend our time campaigning for things like an ARM for Typhoon or some form of (actually useful) MRAD/ GBAD for the British Army rather than knocking a basing option for F-35B that seems quite useful.
Yes, we agree on all of that. But the trouble many of us have with the carriers are that they (and their supporting capabilities) soak up so much of the Defence budget that we can't afford ARMs, Typhoon survivability enhancements, GBAD, a sizeable surface fleet etc etc. My view is that all of that is too high a price for a basing option that may be 'useful' but is certainly not 'essential'.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 1,136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As always - it’s simply human to take different views. I completely understand yours - just disagree. I am aware that I have certain biases as well!
We can’t possibly be out of money - we have four different helicopters for battlefield lift. When we only ever seem to use one!
FWIW - I think the Argentine strategy in 82 was to resupply infantry and artillery on the islands until the Brits got bored or the weather got too bad or the RN fleet reached min assets.
I don’t think that changed with the sinking of the Belgrano - but the tactics used certainly did.
We can’t possibly be out of money - we have four different helicopters for battlefield lift. When we only ever seem to use one!
FWIW - I think the Argentine strategy in 82 was to resupply infantry and artillery on the islands until the Brits got bored or the weather got too bad or the RN fleet reached min assets.
I don’t think that changed with the sinking of the Belgrano - but the tactics used certainly did.
Thread Starter
The Argentines planned to do a pincer attack against the RN task force - Belgrano and escorts (and lots of Exocets) from the South, and the Argentine carrier coming from the North with up to ten A-4Q Skyhawks. At the same time, two Exocet armed Super Eterndard would have sortied from Rio Grande. Plans to use submarines were frustrated by the fact that as the war started, two of four were out of service, and the Santa Fe had been disabled and captured close to South Georgia.
Then the Junta planned to stop British forces from landing, but did not expect a landing at San Carlos. Despite the ferocity of the attacks, they were unable to destroy the ships carrying the troops - the defence by frigates, destroyers, and Sea Harriers worked, but not without cost.. Then the planned to stop resupply, even resorting to using Hercules to drop bombs from the teat ramp against task group shipping. It was a race against time to stop the British advance gaining momentum.
They ran out of aircraft before we ran out of ships (which were mostly repairable).
Then the Junta planned to stop British forces from landing, but did not expect a landing at San Carlos. Despite the ferocity of the attacks, they were unable to destroy the ships carrying the troops - the defence by frigates, destroyers, and Sea Harriers worked, but not without cost.. Then the planned to stop resupply, even resorting to using Hercules to drop bombs from the teat ramp against task group shipping. It was a race against time to stop the British advance gaining momentum.
They ran out of aircraft before we ran out of ships (which were mostly repairable).
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 4th Aug 2019 at 21:05.
Thread Starter
Easy Street
Take a look at this picture:
Some of these ships will act a STOVL carriers for AV-8B with F-35B replacing it, but others will not carry anything other than helicopters, landing craft/LCACs, and marines. Would you consider them to be high value units? Capital ships (not sure what the definition is)?
What do you consider to best the best way of protecting them for air attack by aircraft armed with multiple anti shop missiles (no one aircraft - one missile like the Super Eterndard), or from submarines?
Take a look at this picture:
Some of these ships will act a STOVL carriers for AV-8B with F-35B replacing it, but others will not carry anything other than helicopters, landing craft/LCACs, and marines. Would you consider them to be high value units? Capital ships (not sure what the definition is)?
What do you consider to best the best way of protecting them for air attack by aircraft armed with multiple anti shop missiles (no one aircraft - one missile like the Super Eterndard), or from submarines?
WEBF,
Where are you expecting this task group to operate?
If it’s in the Pacific then yes, history tells us that carriers are practically essential, hence my earlier reference to American and Chinese strategic requirements. But the UK has no vital strategic interest in the Pacific that justifies the investment.
If it’s a NATO Art V scenario in Europe then I’d like to know where this task force is going to be employed. If the North Sea, Baltic or Mediterranean then there are airbases all around. If it’s the North Cape then there are some useful airbases, and if Northern Norway has been overrun then a) there are probably other priorities and b) it’s an obvious place to prioritise one or more of the US carriers to; it’s an Alliance effort and NATO is pushing a ‘Smart procurement’ agenda of avoiding unnecessary duplication. If it’s out in the open Atlantic then attacking aircraft have to run the gauntlet of fighters based in Norway, Iceland and the UK, plus the air defences of any screening surface vessels before they get into range. And there will probably be another American carrier out there somewhere too.
If it’s the Gulf then I would point to dozens of airfields and Patriot batteries...
There is also the slight problem that anti-ship missiles got longer in range while our fighters were getting slower. The timelines were already challenging in the days of Phoenix-armed Tomcats. F-35B is slower and has a shorter stick in AMRAAM. If your opponent starts to field low-observable aircraft, what had previously been a challenging timeline suddenly becomes impossible as the detection range shrinks. The carrier would need to be positioned up-threat (interesting...) and could be sidestepped.
But all this is beside the point. The decline of the high-speed interceptor and the rise of the close-in weapon system (in various forms) show that the game changed on this topic a couple of decades ago. Air defence of task groups rarely used to be pushed as one of the things we sought the carrier for. Why the particular interest now?
Where are you expecting this task group to operate?
If it’s in the Pacific then yes, history tells us that carriers are practically essential, hence my earlier reference to American and Chinese strategic requirements. But the UK has no vital strategic interest in the Pacific that justifies the investment.
If it’s a NATO Art V scenario in Europe then I’d like to know where this task force is going to be employed. If the North Sea, Baltic or Mediterranean then there are airbases all around. If it’s the North Cape then there are some useful airbases, and if Northern Norway has been overrun then a) there are probably other priorities and b) it’s an obvious place to prioritise one or more of the US carriers to; it’s an Alliance effort and NATO is pushing a ‘Smart procurement’ agenda of avoiding unnecessary duplication. If it’s out in the open Atlantic then attacking aircraft have to run the gauntlet of fighters based in Norway, Iceland and the UK, plus the air defences of any screening surface vessels before they get into range. And there will probably be another American carrier out there somewhere too.
If it’s the Gulf then I would point to dozens of airfields and Patriot batteries...
There is also the slight problem that anti-ship missiles got longer in range while our fighters were getting slower. The timelines were already challenging in the days of Phoenix-armed Tomcats. F-35B is slower and has a shorter stick in AMRAAM. If your opponent starts to field low-observable aircraft, what had previously been a challenging timeline suddenly becomes impossible as the detection range shrinks. The carrier would need to be positioned up-threat (interesting...) and could be sidestepped.
But all this is beside the point. The decline of the high-speed interceptor and the rise of the close-in weapon system (in various forms) show that the game changed on this topic a couple of decades ago. Air defence of task groups rarely used to be pushed as one of the things we sought the carrier for. Why the particular interest now?
Last edited by Easy Street; 5th Aug 2019 at 23:19.
Thread Starter
Easy Street
So carriers are too vulnerable as there is too high an air/missile/submarine threat, but are not needed to counter these threats as other assets will? Is it me?
I think that the RN has always has task group operations in mind. Carrier Enabled Power Projection is so much more than jets using the carrier as a launch pad for ground attack. Assuming that someone else will defend your task force is a recipe for ships sunk, dead people, and strategic failure. You say the decline of the high speed interceptor and the rise of CIWS..... but not in the minds of top tier navies.
1. Perhaps the US Navy and the PLAN are bad examples. What about France, Spain, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore.....?
2. I posted the page from the Eisenhower Strike Group as it shows that ships other than the carrier provide capabilities in their own right, and the carrier provides fighters for air defence and helicopters for ASW.
3. The evidence suggests that without the carriers, that idiot Cameron would have demanded that another five frigates be cut. If same that idiot had not been a cowardly weasel and allowed the RN an uplift of 1500 or so bods as part of SDSR 1500, we would not be having many manpower issues. The argument that they have called the cutting of other ships, or personnel, does not hold water.
4. Is a carrier the only type of high value unit? Would losing an LPD full of marines, or a couple of STUFT/charted vessels full of troops and there equipment be any less shocking to the UK or NATO?
5. Your assertion that "With modern technology the best way is to ignore the launch aircraft and deploy an effective, sustainable counter-missile capability" does not make sense. It will get people killed. Ever heard of Kill the Archer, not the Arrows? Why on Earth do you think it is better to ignore the aircraft, and deal with a greater number of harder to hit targets, at closer range.
The former Maritime Warfare Centre Analyst I put your assertion to explained it more eloquently (and diplomatically) than I could:
The earlier you can break the "kill chain" the better. What's often overlooked is the value of shipborne fighters for taking out enemy recce: when all they know is "there's a carrier out there somewhere, and our scouts don't come back from this general areas so it's probably around there..." it's not easy to launch a co-ordinated strike when you've got only a vague idea of where your target might be.
Similarly, a co-ordinated strike with scouts, SEAD, and strikers is a nasty threat - but if the scheduling's been spoiled because different groups were dodging Meteors on the way in, that helps the ships defending (and extra warning time means more chance to optimise ASMD stationing, course and speed, and to get confusion and distraction measures in place.)
Then, there's the point that (for instance) a Su-35 can handily carry four AS-17 missiles; I'd rather splash one aircraft than have four supersonic missiles to deal with (not that we can't, but it burns through the magazine faster than you'd like). Even a failed engagement where the enemy evades and escapes, means they've jettisoned their expensive ordnance and that's four fewer missiles reaching the MEZ.
The fighters aren't likely to obliterate the entire raid, but they can make it a lot easier to survive.
6. Anti Submarine Warfare is likely to be needed to protect things like amphibious forces and crisis response shipping. This demands ASW helicopters. Due to the lack of frigate/destroyers, the communications and coordination issues of helicopters operating from different ships in ones (or twos), and the operating limits of smaller hulls in heavy seas, you tend towards operating increasing number of them from a larger ship - very much like a carrier. The Royal Navy and United States Navy consider that task group ASW is one of the roles of a carrier.
This Cold War ASW tale may interest you:Our bread & butter was the so-called "Ripple 3"; 3 aircraft airborne all the time (2 on task, with 1 in transit to / from the scene of action) 100+ miles away from the carrier / convoy, sometimes for weeks at a time. I joined 820 NAS / Ark in late-86, and the first thing we did was a major NATO exercise escorting a convoy from Norfolk VA to Harstad in Northern Norway - we had 3 aircraft on task for over 3 weeks, non-stop. I shudder to think how many sonobuoys we "spat" in a 3000+ mile line across the Atlantic. [[b]100+ miles away, by the way, because by then the Soviets had developed long-range missiles that they could fire from e.g. a Charlie class SSN, thus attacking the convoy without having to get all that close - targeting info coming from Russian aircraft, which was one of the original reasons for procuring the Sea Harrier]. It was tiring, but possible to keep it up almost indefinitely - we had 14 crews, and 9 aircraft, so even if you had, say, 4 cabs broken at any time (not uncommon!), there were enough to keep the Ripple going. You got into a rhythm: wake up; eat; brief an hour before take off; fly for 4 hours; debrief [& file your records if you'd come across any real Soviet boats]; go to bed... 6 hours later repeat... and repeat... and repeat...
But if it's an airborne frigate, why do you need 2 on task? Because it gives you much more flexibility; for instance, one of the Soviet tactics was so-called "sprint & drift" - if it thought it had been detected (and if you flew too low they would hear you), the SSN would wind up to 30kts and shoot off 50 miles or so, and then suddenly go completely silent; slow right down and use natural salinity / temperature layers in the water to interfere with sonar. If you only had one aircraft, he would have to be incredibly unlucky for you to keep up with that - effectively his boat simply disappeared. But with two, provided you were worked up and in good practice, one of you could track the boat while it was fast (& noisy) and direct the other to fly ahead... and then swap. If they didn't know you were there, then over time it was possible to get a really accurate picture of where the boat was (all passively) - so one of you would run the plot, and use the other cab as the weapon carrier. Or, if in doubt, direct the other cab into a hover ahead of the target... ping... contact... weapon in the water within seconds before he has time to react.
7. Why do you assume that the only possible hot war will be against Russia or China - ie World War Three against a nuclear armed monolith? Plenty of third world nations are potentially hostile, and busy buying Kilo class SSKs or Russian jets with anti ship missiles. Theses are far more likely threats. The likes of Saddam Hussein would love to sink an LPD full of Marines, a chartered vessel full of tanks and troops, or splash a Chinook full of troops of to harass and threaten our naval helicopters dealing with submarine and small boat threats.
You might be interested in this commentary about the tanker war in the eighties, which led to international naval deployment. Both the United States and France had carriers deployed: The Tanker War 1980 - 88
Anthony H Cordesman wrote this very analytical chapter with a look and offensive and defensive capabilities and tactics used both Iran and Iraq, and the efforts of the Western navies to counter the threat to shipping: THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT
andrewn
You do realise that most of the carrier build was in English (not Scottish) shipyards? It does not matter how times you stridently say non facts. Nor does using the word 'massive' (apologies if it was not you) change the fact that planning for CVF started in the nineties when RN carriers were operationally busy in the Adriatic and the Arabian Gulf, but their small size limited both the number of aircraft that could be operated and the sea conditions in which flying operations could be safely conducted.
Times are changing, and Western nations must once again look to protect their ability to protect both normal seaborne commerce and crisis response shipping. NATO still depends on trans-Atlantic resupply, the global economy depends of moving things by sea, and any response to a crisis will involve shipping.
So carriers are too vulnerable as there is too high an air/missile/submarine threat, but are not needed to counter these threats as other assets will? Is it me?
I think that the RN has always has task group operations in mind. Carrier Enabled Power Projection is so much more than jets using the carrier as a launch pad for ground attack. Assuming that someone else will defend your task force is a recipe for ships sunk, dead people, and strategic failure. You say the decline of the high speed interceptor and the rise of CIWS..... but not in the minds of top tier navies.
1. Perhaps the US Navy and the PLAN are bad examples. What about France, Spain, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore.....?
2. I posted the page from the Eisenhower Strike Group as it shows that ships other than the carrier provide capabilities in their own right, and the carrier provides fighters for air defence and helicopters for ASW.
3. The evidence suggests that without the carriers, that idiot Cameron would have demanded that another five frigates be cut. If same that idiot had not been a cowardly weasel and allowed the RN an uplift of 1500 or so bods as part of SDSR 1500, we would not be having many manpower issues. The argument that they have called the cutting of other ships, or personnel, does not hold water.
4. Is a carrier the only type of high value unit? Would losing an LPD full of marines, or a couple of STUFT/charted vessels full of troops and there equipment be any less shocking to the UK or NATO?
5. Your assertion that "With modern technology the best way is to ignore the launch aircraft and deploy an effective, sustainable counter-missile capability" does not make sense. It will get people killed. Ever heard of Kill the Archer, not the Arrows? Why on Earth do you think it is better to ignore the aircraft, and deal with a greater number of harder to hit targets, at closer range.
The former Maritime Warfare Centre Analyst I put your assertion to explained it more eloquently (and diplomatically) than I could:
The earlier you can break the "kill chain" the better. What's often overlooked is the value of shipborne fighters for taking out enemy recce: when all they know is "there's a carrier out there somewhere, and our scouts don't come back from this general areas so it's probably around there..." it's not easy to launch a co-ordinated strike when you've got only a vague idea of where your target might be.
Similarly, a co-ordinated strike with scouts, SEAD, and strikers is a nasty threat - but if the scheduling's been spoiled because different groups were dodging Meteors on the way in, that helps the ships defending (and extra warning time means more chance to optimise ASMD stationing, course and speed, and to get confusion and distraction measures in place.)
Then, there's the point that (for instance) a Su-35 can handily carry four AS-17 missiles; I'd rather splash one aircraft than have four supersonic missiles to deal with (not that we can't, but it burns through the magazine faster than you'd like). Even a failed engagement where the enemy evades and escapes, means they've jettisoned their expensive ordnance and that's four fewer missiles reaching the MEZ.
The fighters aren't likely to obliterate the entire raid, but they can make it a lot easier to survive.
6. Anti Submarine Warfare is likely to be needed to protect things like amphibious forces and crisis response shipping. This demands ASW helicopters. Due to the lack of frigate/destroyers, the communications and coordination issues of helicopters operating from different ships in ones (or twos), and the operating limits of smaller hulls in heavy seas, you tend towards operating increasing number of them from a larger ship - very much like a carrier. The Royal Navy and United States Navy consider that task group ASW is one of the roles of a carrier.
This Cold War ASW tale may interest you:Our bread & butter was the so-called "Ripple 3"; 3 aircraft airborne all the time (2 on task, with 1 in transit to / from the scene of action) 100+ miles away from the carrier / convoy, sometimes for weeks at a time. I joined 820 NAS / Ark in late-86, and the first thing we did was a major NATO exercise escorting a convoy from Norfolk VA to Harstad in Northern Norway - we had 3 aircraft on task for over 3 weeks, non-stop. I shudder to think how many sonobuoys we "spat" in a 3000+ mile line across the Atlantic. [[b]100+ miles away, by the way, because by then the Soviets had developed long-range missiles that they could fire from e.g. a Charlie class SSN, thus attacking the convoy without having to get all that close - targeting info coming from Russian aircraft, which was one of the original reasons for procuring the Sea Harrier]. It was tiring, but possible to keep it up almost indefinitely - we had 14 crews, and 9 aircraft, so even if you had, say, 4 cabs broken at any time (not uncommon!), there were enough to keep the Ripple going. You got into a rhythm: wake up; eat; brief an hour before take off; fly for 4 hours; debrief [& file your records if you'd come across any real Soviet boats]; go to bed... 6 hours later repeat... and repeat... and repeat...
But if it's an airborne frigate, why do you need 2 on task? Because it gives you much more flexibility; for instance, one of the Soviet tactics was so-called "sprint & drift" - if it thought it had been detected (and if you flew too low they would hear you), the SSN would wind up to 30kts and shoot off 50 miles or so, and then suddenly go completely silent; slow right down and use natural salinity / temperature layers in the water to interfere with sonar. If you only had one aircraft, he would have to be incredibly unlucky for you to keep up with that - effectively his boat simply disappeared. But with two, provided you were worked up and in good practice, one of you could track the boat while it was fast (& noisy) and direct the other to fly ahead... and then swap. If they didn't know you were there, then over time it was possible to get a really accurate picture of where the boat was (all passively) - so one of you would run the plot, and use the other cab as the weapon carrier. Or, if in doubt, direct the other cab into a hover ahead of the target... ping... contact... weapon in the water within seconds before he has time to react.
7. Why do you assume that the only possible hot war will be against Russia or China - ie World War Three against a nuclear armed monolith? Plenty of third world nations are potentially hostile, and busy buying Kilo class SSKs or Russian jets with anti ship missiles. Theses are far more likely threats. The likes of Saddam Hussein would love to sink an LPD full of Marines, a chartered vessel full of tanks and troops, or splash a Chinook full of troops of to harass and threaten our naval helicopters dealing with submarine and small boat threats.
You might be interested in this commentary about the tanker war in the eighties, which led to international naval deployment. Both the United States and France had carriers deployed: The Tanker War 1980 - 88
Anthony H Cordesman wrote this very analytical chapter with a look and offensive and defensive capabilities and tactics used both Iran and Iraq, and the efforts of the Western navies to counter the threat to shipping: THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT
andrewn
You do realise that most of the carrier build was in English (not Scottish) shipyards? It does not matter how times you stridently say non facts. Nor does using the word 'massive' (apologies if it was not you) change the fact that planning for CVF started in the nineties when RN carriers were operationally busy in the Adriatic and the Arabian Gulf, but their small size limited both the number of aircraft that could be operated and the sea conditions in which flying operations could be safely conducted.
Times are changing, and Western nations must once again look to protect their ability to protect both normal seaborne commerce and crisis response shipping. NATO still depends on trans-Atlantic resupply, the global economy depends of moving things by sea, and any response to a crisis will involve shipping.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 9th Nov 2020 at 21:37.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: cheshire
Posts: 245
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
andrewn
You do realise that most of the carrier build was in English (not Scottish) shipyards? It does not matter how times you stridently say non facts. Nor does using the word 'massive' (apologies if it was not you) change the fact that planning for CVF started in the nineties when RN carriers were operationally busy in the Adriatic and the Arabian Gulf, but their small size limited both the number of aircraft that could be operated and the sea conditions in which flying operations could be safely conducted.
Times are changing, and Western nations must once again look to protect their ability to protect both normal seaborne commerce and crisis response shipping. NATO still depends on trans-Atlantic resupply, the global economy depends of moving things by sea, and any response to a crisis will involve shipping.
As for small size and aircraft numbers the RN could barely man the existing 6 a/c SHAR squadrons, never mind any uplift. At least the Invincible class were in keeping with our ability to deploy, man, operate, maintain and protect them! These new behemoths are nothing more than a willy waving exercise, the very epitome of a "hollowed out" force.
Still I admire your resilience WEBF, against all opinion and facts to the contrary you keep dredging up theoretical guff to support your position, all credit to you
The problem for the RN is that if the carriers go anywhere OTHER than on NATO ops they will have to be supported totally by RN ships - so a substantial part of the active fleet will be in one place around the carrier. Right now you are stretched all which ways with individual ships scattered from the Falklands to the Gulf
As an absolute minimum (assuming that opposition aren't going to use subs) you'd want a T45 and a frigate and an oiler so that means at least 2 current locations can't be covered any longer.
It's not that the Carriers are useless it's just that they tilt the RN away from the bread & butter operations they carry out 98% of the time to cover a highly unlikely hot war in which (TBH) the life of any carrier is likely to be very very short. They skew the budget, the strategy, the manpower in teh wrong directions
IMHO the best thing now would be to park them at Portsmouth next to "Bristol" (another white elephant) and allow them the occasional sail around the Isle of Wight on high days and holy days................
As an absolute minimum (assuming that opposition aren't going to use subs) you'd want a T45 and a frigate and an oiler so that means at least 2 current locations can't be covered any longer.
It's not that the Carriers are useless it's just that they tilt the RN away from the bread & butter operations they carry out 98% of the time to cover a highly unlikely hot war in which (TBH) the life of any carrier is likely to be very very short. They skew the budget, the strategy, the manpower in teh wrong directions
IMHO the best thing now would be to park them at Portsmouth next to "Bristol" (another white elephant) and allow them the occasional sail around the Isle of Wight on high days and holy days................
WEBF,
I note you didn’t really engage with the important point that the timeline has favoured the attacker for some time. It’s very well for your analyst to say that it’s better to engage the launch aircraft - that’s obvious - the question is how without needing an unsustainable number of aircraft airborne on screening CAPs. Which navies have sustained a high-speed interceptor capability in the F14 mould?
I think you’re misunderstanding my post, the point of which is to show that *in the scenarios which are of sufficient importance to justify potential UK investment in carriers*, air defence can be provided adequately by other assets which have fewer acute vulnerabilities or greater redundancy or shorter recuperation times. Saying that we couldn’t rely on allies in a NATO Art V scenario just isn’t going to wash.
I don’t disagree that carriers are an effective statement of military strength, and most or all of those nations also have the same industrial imperatives as the UK. It doesn’t mean it’s the best use of their money, though, especially in the Europeans’ case (France can’t even meet its airlift requirement for national operations, which they rely on allies to fulfil through arrangements much less binding than Art V). And please don’t try to tell me that sluggish AV-8Bs provide an effective response time to incoming attackers!
You won’t find disagreement here that the really big decisions are taken in No10 with the thinnest veneer of knowledge, more care for industrial politics than military capability, and maybe a few words of partial advice from a favoured Service chief acting outwith the MOD. That’s why I drew attention to the views of the PM’s senior adviser way back in the post which started our exchange.
Yes, and more easily replaced than dozens of F-35 with crews and engineers. Indeed both of your examples happened to us in 1982. Sorry to be blunt but we are talking about a major war.
An interesting sign of the times is the US-China trade war. Trump has clearly identified asymmetric trading conditions as a threat to US national security in the widest possible (jobs/societal) sense and other western nations will have to face up to similar ideas in future as automation and AI increasingly undermine existing models of work and welfare. I think we will one day flip an old tenet of maritime security on its head and say to exporters “you want us to buy container-loads of your cheaply-manufactured products? YOU take responsibility for getting them safely to us then, and increase your prices accordingly”. That’s called alignment of incentives. Why should the West invest heavily to protect the ability of exporters to undercut its domestic industries? Building the costs of ‘delivery’ into retail prices (rather than hiding them in the Defence budget) would go a long way to levelling the playing field.
Incentives are admittedly slightly different with natural resources, but consumer nations acting globally to protect their economic interests risk conflict and avoid development of alternatives. The most obvious example is external military support to the GCC states, which has acted as a perverse incentive for tensions with Iran and dependence on Gulf oil to continue. A different strategy would encourage the GCC either to reduce tensions with Iran, to massively increase pipeline capacity bypassing Hormuz, or to invest more in its own navies. Yes, the price of oil would increase in the latter cases, which would be precisely what's needed to exploit other sources of energy (whether shale oil or non-fossil alternatives). More generally, we'd have to face up to the true geopolitical implications of dependence on resources such as Chinese rare earths. You want capable modern electronics, dear voters of the West? Then either learn to live with China's superpower status and its differing views on the world, or find ingenious (expensive) ways to make electronics with other materials, or be prepared to pay (and fight if necessary) to preserve the status quo. And I can't see the 'woke' modern West running an effective repeat of the colonial era with rare earth metals taking the place of tea, spices, silk and precious stones.
I note you didn’t really engage with the important point that the timeline has favoured the attacker for some time. It’s very well for your analyst to say that it’s better to engage the launch aircraft - that’s obvious - the question is how without needing an unsustainable number of aircraft airborne on screening CAPs. Which navies have sustained a high-speed interceptor capability in the F14 mould?
So carriers are too vulnerable as there is too high an air/missile/submarine threat, but are not need to counter theses threats as other assets will? Is it me?
1. Perhaps the US Navy and the PLAN are bad examples. What about France, Spain, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore.....?
3. The evidence suggests that without the carriers, that idiot Cameron would have demanded that another five frigates be cut. If same that idiot had not been a cowardly weasel and allowed the RN an uplift of 1500 or so bods as part of SDSR 1500, we would not be having many manpower issues. The argument that they have called the cutting of other ships, or personnel, does not hold water.
Would losing an LPD full of marines, or a couple of STUFT/charted vessels full of troops and there equipment be any less shocking to the UK or NATO?
Times are changing, and Western nations must once again look to protect their ability to protect both normal seaborne commerce and crisis response shipping. NATO still depends on trans-Atlantic resupply, the global economy depends of moving things by sea, and any response to a crisis will involve shipping.
Incentives are admittedly slightly different with natural resources, but consumer nations acting globally to protect their economic interests risk conflict and avoid development of alternatives. The most obvious example is external military support to the GCC states, which has acted as a perverse incentive for tensions with Iran and dependence on Gulf oil to continue. A different strategy would encourage the GCC either to reduce tensions with Iran, to massively increase pipeline capacity bypassing Hormuz, or to invest more in its own navies. Yes, the price of oil would increase in the latter cases, which would be precisely what's needed to exploit other sources of energy (whether shale oil or non-fossil alternatives). More generally, we'd have to face up to the true geopolitical implications of dependence on resources such as Chinese rare earths. You want capable modern electronics, dear voters of the West? Then either learn to live with China's superpower status and its differing views on the world, or find ingenious (expensive) ways to make electronics with other materials, or be prepared to pay (and fight if necessary) to preserve the status quo. And I can't see the 'woke' modern West running an effective repeat of the colonial era with rare earth metals taking the place of tea, spices, silk and precious stones.
Last edited by Easy Street; 6th Aug 2019 at 15:59.
andrewn,
Huge great hulking chunks of the two aircraft carriers were built all over the UK not just Scotland. Yards in Livepool, Tyneside, Appledore, Falmouth and Portsmouth just off the top of my head.
Huge great hulking chunks of the two aircraft carriers were built all over the UK not just Scotland. Yards in Livepool, Tyneside, Appledore, Falmouth and Portsmouth just off the top of my head.
