Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Thread Starter
HH
Who was it who criticised Woodward? Ignorant fools like Max Hastings?
Woodward conserved the fighting power of his two carriers and aircraft until the real battle he knew was coming - the landings in the face of determined air attacks. This was the critical part of the campaign, so doing so was prudent, considering the limitations the task group faced such as having no AEW, Sea Harrier with limited radar and fuel/weapon loads, Type 42 destroyers with old radars (and Argentina had T42s and could practice lobe pecking), only two Sea Wolf armed frigates being part of the task group, no CIWS.... What sense would it have made to risk losing the war being the amphibious group was there to put the troops ashore?
When the landing came, the carriers moved inshore and both Type 22s escorted the troop carriers into San Carlos water. Hermes had ventured close to the islands to support the SAS raid on Pebble Island before then, Invincible had been to the east of the islands on a special mission. Accusing Woodward or his ships' companies of lacking courage or whatever is not on.
Not only did he know about countering the threat from the Belgrano, he was also able to deal with the submarine threat, and fend off the air threat and conserve his ships and aircraft for the landings, during with the Argentines lost something like fifty aircraft in a few days, which broke their back as a fighting force. He also had to conserve ships and aircraft to support the troops after the landings. We won - remember!
Jabba
What about amphibious forces and the like? Will they be allowed near Air to Surface Missile range? Do you think a task group is better or worse defended with a carrier against air, submarine, and surface threats? Please explain you answer.
Engines
Thanks for that - I cannot understand why people struggle with that.
On other forums (fora?) when carrier topics have cropped up those who have worn dark blue and served in any kind of warship seem to have an understanding of all the parts of ship involved in aviation. An awful lot of sailors play very key roles in making it happen, in different departments aboard the carrier.
Who was it who criticised Woodward? Ignorant fools like Max Hastings?
Woodward conserved the fighting power of his two carriers and aircraft until the real battle he knew was coming - the landings in the face of determined air attacks. This was the critical part of the campaign, so doing so was prudent, considering the limitations the task group faced such as having no AEW, Sea Harrier with limited radar and fuel/weapon loads, Type 42 destroyers with old radars (and Argentina had T42s and could practice lobe pecking), only two Sea Wolf armed frigates being part of the task group, no CIWS.... What sense would it have made to risk losing the war being the amphibious group was there to put the troops ashore?
When the landing came, the carriers moved inshore and both Type 22s escorted the troop carriers into San Carlos water. Hermes had ventured close to the islands to support the SAS raid on Pebble Island before then, Invincible had been to the east of the islands on a special mission. Accusing Woodward or his ships' companies of lacking courage or whatever is not on.
Not only did he know about countering the threat from the Belgrano, he was also able to deal with the submarine threat, and fend off the air threat and conserve his ships and aircraft for the landings, during with the Argentines lost something like fifty aircraft in a few days, which broke their back as a fighting force. He also had to conserve ships and aircraft to support the troops after the landings. We won - remember!
Jabba
What about amphibious forces and the like? Will they be allowed near Air to Surface Missile range? Do you think a task group is better or worse defended with a carrier against air, submarine, and surface threats? Please explain you answer.
Engines
Thanks for that - I cannot understand why people struggle with that.
On other forums (fora?) when carrier topics have cropped up those who have worn dark blue and served in any kind of warship seem to have an understanding of all the parts of ship involved in aviation. An awful lot of sailors play very key roles in making it happen, in different departments aboard the carrier.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 3rd Jul 2018 at 08:09.
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Oddly it was NAVY friends and acquaintances that criticised Woodward - they felt he'd grossly underestimated the air threat from Day 1 (his initial briefings were especially dismissive I understand) and then panicked and pulled the T22's out to defend the carriers and moved eastward as well - thus exposing the other ships to attack. He wasn't that popular with his subordinates I believe and the Army felt he never listened to their concerns - which is probably one reason he missed out finally on the very top jobs. He did win - and that's all you can reasonably want from a General/Admiral - there are others who would have made a complete Horlicks of it - but that doesn't mean to say he was perfect or that he should never be criticised.
The Army had one or two SO'c who really didn't perform either - but compared to the opposition.........................
The Army had one or two SO'c who really didn't perform either - but compared to the opposition.........................
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Who was it who criticised Woodward? Ignorant fools like Max Hastings?
Having been present with the task task force during the Falklands War and interviewed all the major commanders both naval and army who were present I think it fair to say Sir Max Hastings is more than entitled to his views and able to defend them both personally and based on their views - unlike those bsing their opinions on books on a war which took place either before they were born or were at best in nappies.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Hastings
Now, as I was saying about irony.
Having been present with the task task force during the Falklands War and interviewed all the major commanders both naval and army who were present I think it fair to say Sir Max Hastings is more than entitled to his views and able to defend them both personally and based on their views - unlike those bsing their opinions on books on a war which took place either before they were born or were at best in nappies.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Hastings
Having been present with the task task force during the Falklands War and interviewed all the major commanders both naval and army who were present I think it fair to say Sir Max Hastings is more than entitled to his views and able to defend them both personally and based on their views - unlike those bsing their opinions on books on a war which took place either before they were born or were at best in nappies.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Hastings
This is the same gung-ho Max Hastings who, at his typically blinkered, fiercely pro-Army anti-everything-else worst, labelled the Royal Navy as cowardly for not starting a shooting match with Somali pirates holding hostages at gunpoint on board a yacht bobbing about on the ocean. He even got that wrong because it was a Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker on the scene, not a warship.
Having 'liberated' Port Stanley single-handed, he has conveniently forgotten which service delivered him to the Falklands and fought and died to protect him en route. Yet strangely, he sees little or no role for maritime capability, aircraft carriers, air superiority, CASD or much else the RN (or the RAF for that matter) has to offer. His eyes are firmly fixed on 'boots on the ground' to the exclusion of all else required to prepare the ground for them, deliver them, protect them, sustain them in theatre and provide them with vital intelligence.
Having 'liberated' Port Stanley single-handed, he has conveniently forgotten which service delivered him to the Falklands and fought and died to protect him en route. Yet strangely, he sees little or no role for maritime capability, aircraft carriers, air superiority, CASD or much else the RN (or the RAF for that matter) has to offer. His eyes are firmly fixed on 'boots on the ground' to the exclusion of all else required to prepare the ground for them, deliver them, protect them, sustain them in theatre and provide them with vital intelligence.
I think to be fair, he took agin the navy when told he couldn't have his own cabin or file his despatches over Satcom whenever he wanted.
But in any case, could we please re-inter Op Corporate? Not particularly relevant to this thread.
But in any case, could we please re-inter Op Corporate? Not particularly relevant to this thread.
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Rightly or wrongly, I see the BG or TG part of "Carrier Battle Group" or "Carrier Task Group" as being the parts that protect the key force multiplier in the package, specifically the Carrier itself. I have concerns, ill founded they may be, but concerns nonetheless, that the size of the current fleet over the next decade, maybe even slightly longer, will be such that a meaningful CBG or CTG that could, if necessary operate independently of its allies (ie, should another Corporate occur) and be able to be part of a viable solution. FF's DDGs, SSN's are all there to protect the key force multiplier from surface/sub-surface and air threats as best they can, particularly when operating at extreme range away from the kind of land based LRMPA/AEW resources that in the European or North Atlantic or near East environments may be taken relatively for granted.
One or two T45's that cant sail in warm water, that spend 80% of their year tied up alongside, Astute's that park themselves on sandbanks and a Future Frigate package that is still some way off does not exactly fill one full of confidence if the balloon goes up. I maintain my position that the carrier project has been politically successful in many respects and from an engineering/contractor/business/industrial/BAE perspective, as has the F35 project. Lots of other equally valuable projects and capabilities have been sacrificed on the altar to ensure that this project stayed alive and the same can be said of Typhoon as well, where numerous other capabilities were neglected in order to protect the pet-projects of TPTB.
Whether the carrier project has truly met the real strategic requirements of what the forces really need, is another matter and one that only time will tell. I just dont see the validity of indulging in the kind of flagwaving about how wonderful the kit is when there is no real job for it to do and a reticence at a political level to project power any other way than through either the implied threat of Trident or through the bounteous output of DFID....
Thread Starter
HH
I wonder what the intelligence briefings said? More importantly, task group operations (outside the NATO area) including using carrier aircraft as a task group weapon, had not been exercised in the years before 1982. As such they (CTG and staff) had to learn under fire. There is a wider point here - frequently the Armed Forces (and others) will have to do things for which they are not fully rehearsed, as such they need to innovate and adapt. Inevitably, things go wrong. Scapegoating is not only unfair but it prevents learning and adapting.
Woodward could easily have lost the war. He did not.
ORAC
Do you feel Sir Max Hastings is entitled to his other views - like about the RAF and fighter aircraft no longer being needed? Typhoon being a waste of money, perhaps?
You seem very keen to dismiss the education, training, service, employment etc of those who disagree with you. Learning things as part of an Engineering degree - does that count? Or learning things from publications starting with BR, JDP, ATP and so on? Or working in a joint service HQ environment? Being aboard a CVS during a period of fixed wing flying?
Perhaps you are unaware of the Whole Force Concept?
Who are these people?
Yes I did get the e-mail, but it was not for me - I am looking at other things.... I wonder if there are other things Reservists do to directly support the RN, including task group operations and exercises?
Jabba
I have no idea where to start with that! LPDs are not capital ships if we have a carrier? To be honest I am not sure what the definition is, but one full of bootnecks needs defending no? So is a LPD (and LSD(A) and so on) better defended with or without a carrier? Is she a high value unit?
Not_a_ boffin will be able to tell you what is wrong with the rest of your post. Or maybe you could try looking at the Royal Navy website to see the sorts of things ships have been doing. You might even read a news story like this. Or perhaps look at when we have tried to do a carrier role - such as commanding TF50, or the Exercise Deep Blue, without a carrier (as such)?
There have been suggestions that if it were not for the carriers, SDSR 10 would have cut frigate/destroyer numbers even more.
I wonder what the intelligence briefings said? More importantly, task group operations (outside the NATO area) including using carrier aircraft as a task group weapon, had not been exercised in the years before 1982. As such they (CTG and staff) had to learn under fire. There is a wider point here - frequently the Armed Forces (and others) will have to do things for which they are not fully rehearsed, as such they need to innovate and adapt. Inevitably, things go wrong. Scapegoating is not only unfair but it prevents learning and adapting.
Woodward could easily have lost the war. He did not.
ORAC
Do you feel Sir Max Hastings is entitled to his other views - like about the RAF and fighter aircraft no longer being needed? Typhoon being a waste of money, perhaps?
You seem very keen to dismiss the education, training, service, employment etc of those who disagree with you. Learning things as part of an Engineering degree - does that count? Or learning things from publications starting with BR, JDP, ATP and so on? Or working in a joint service HQ environment? Being aboard a CVS during a period of fixed wing flying?
Perhaps you are unaware of the Whole Force Concept?
Who are these people?
Yes I did get the e-mail, but it was not for me - I am looking at other things.... I wonder if there are other things Reservists do to directly support the RN, including task group operations and exercises?
Jabba
I have no idea where to start with that! LPDs are not capital ships if we have a carrier? To be honest I am not sure what the definition is, but one full of bootnecks needs defending no? So is a LPD (and LSD(A) and so on) better defended with or without a carrier? Is she a high value unit?
Not_a_ boffin will be able to tell you what is wrong with the rest of your post. Or maybe you could try looking at the Royal Navy website to see the sorts of things ships have been doing. You might even read a news story like this. Or perhaps look at when we have tried to do a carrier role - such as commanding TF50, or the Exercise Deep Blue, without a carrier (as such)?
There have been suggestions that if it were not for the carriers, SDSR 10 would have cut frigate/destroyer numbers even more.
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"I wonder what the intelligence briefings said? "
if there is one thing everyone agrees on it's that British Intelligence knew absolutely nothing about the Argentinean armed forces and about their tactics
It had never been on the radar
if there is one thing everyone agrees on it's that British Intelligence knew absolutely nothing about the Argentinean armed forces and about their tactics
It had never been on the radar
Thread Starter
From UK Defence Journal: Royal Navy pilot hails 'unique simulator' supporting first of class F-35 flight trials
I still think the integration facility should be named after Captain Eric Brown. And the one thing that cannot be simulated is the noise, jet blast, etc of jets on deck.
Also there is a FTRS(FC) post at FOST for a Lt/Lt Cdr Fixed Wing WAFU - amongst all the other FTRS jobs.
I still think the integration facility should be named after Captain Eric Brown. And the one thing that cannot be simulated is the noise, jet blast, etc of jets on deck.
Also there is a FTRS(FC) post at FOST for a Lt/Lt Cdr Fixed Wing WAFU - amongst all the other FTRS jobs.
I've actually seen a few people (on here likely) cite the frogman attack on the CARD to prove the "vulnerability" of the modern carrier. Not to take anything away from the sappers, but the CARD was just an old ferry at the time, and moored in downtown Saigon.
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and .the carriers will be in sunny Portsmouth...... tho you'd have to plan a long way ahead on the basis you .MIGHT want to take them out in the future... seems unlikely but I guess it wouldn't cost much
Thread Starter
HH
Have you ever thought that the RN might have an understanding of these sorts of threats and worked on ways of dealing with them?
Back to reality and the present: this was on the MOD section of the the gov.uk website the other day: QEC ship air integration
We also have more programmes by Chris Terill to look forward to:
It will great to see jets on deck again.
Have you ever thought that the RN might have an understanding of these sorts of threats and worked on ways of dealing with them?
Back to reality and the present: this was on the MOD section of the the gov.uk website the other day: QEC ship air integration
We also have more programmes by Chris Terill to look forward to:
It will great to see jets on deck again.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 23rd Jul 2018 at 08:29.
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If the MoD are going to investigate every dodgy looking person in Portsmouth & Gosport they're going to be very very busy.................. job for life I'd have thought.....
Tho it wouldn't have to be very sophisticated - sink a ship in the narrow channel off the Round Tower - it's only 220 m across
Tho it wouldn't have to be very sophisticated - sink a ship in the narrow channel off the Round Tower - it's only 220 m across
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"Have you ever thought that the RN might have an understanding of these sorts of threats and worked on ways of dealing with them?"
Actually HH makes a highly valid point.
The RN has considerable history of only hearing what it
wants to hear.
Actually HH makes a highly valid point.
The RN has considerable history of only hearing what it
wants to hear.
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Looking through military history it's a common thread that about 6-12 months after a war starts there is a root & branch clear out of SO's and the new men are a generation plus younger...... the skill sets needed to advance in peace time is rarely the one you need when the balloon goes up.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
And the rest of the surface fleet continues to disappear to enable the carrier plans of the admirals to continue........
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/c...unds-wgvvkq0p3
Contest to build a ‘budget frigate’ on hold as MoD runs out of funds
Government plans to buy a “budget frigate” within five years have been thrown into chaos after a competition to build the warship was suspended amid a funding crisis. Sources warned last night that the Type 31e frigate may never materialise. It is a serious blow for the Royal Navy, which needs at least five of the ships to maintain the size of its surface fleet.
Shipbuilders and yards in the running for the £1.25 billion contract were taken by surprise when the Ministry of Defence announced the freeze on Friday, just as they prepared to finalise their respective ship designs. Defence Equipment and Support, the branch of the MoD in charge of buying kit, claimed that there had not been enough “compliant bids”. Industry insiders disputed this, saying that a failure by Gavin Williamson, the defence secretary, to secure new money by the summer to fund his ambitions for the armed forces had thrown into doubt a range of equipment contracts.
They noted that bidders for the frigate work had been waiting to receive funding from the MoD to start the competitive design phase. This should have happened by May, with initial construction targeted for next spring. Instead there was silence then the freeze. The MoD said that the competition would be restarted soon but sources said that the delay would probably be at least a year, undermining a plan to deliver the first of the new ships by 2023.
Defence experts agreed. “It is cloud-cuckoo-land,” Admiral Lord West of Spithead, a former head of the Royal Navy, said. Francis Tusa, editor of Defence Analysis, said: “It’s impossible.” Paul Beaver, a defence analyst, said: “It has taken three years to get to a point where they appear to need to start again. This is not smart procurement.”......
Aside from the question of funding, it is understood that officials at Defence Equipment and Support were starting to realise that a cheap warship without the array of expensive radars, sensors and weapons would struggle to operate in submarine-infested waters. During Sir Michael Fallon’s time as defence secretary a funding shortage for the equipment programme worsened, scuppering plans to buy a full fleet of 13 more sophisticated but expensive Type 26 frigates. Instead he signed off on a 2015 plan to purchase eight Type 26 frigates and five cheaper versions.
A failure by the MoD to secure new warships into service by 2023 will leave the Royal Navy without 13 operational frigates as the ageing Type 23 warships start to be brought out of service.
A spokeswoman for the MoD said: “This is an early contract in a wider procurement process and we will incorporate the lessons learnt and begin again as soon as possible so the programme can continue at pace.”
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/c...unds-wgvvkq0p3
Contest to build a ‘budget frigate’ on hold as MoD runs out of funds
Government plans to buy a “budget frigate” within five years have been thrown into chaos after a competition to build the warship was suspended amid a funding crisis. Sources warned last night that the Type 31e frigate may never materialise. It is a serious blow for the Royal Navy, which needs at least five of the ships to maintain the size of its surface fleet.
Shipbuilders and yards in the running for the £1.25 billion contract were taken by surprise when the Ministry of Defence announced the freeze on Friday, just as they prepared to finalise their respective ship designs. Defence Equipment and Support, the branch of the MoD in charge of buying kit, claimed that there had not been enough “compliant bids”. Industry insiders disputed this, saying that a failure by Gavin Williamson, the defence secretary, to secure new money by the summer to fund his ambitions for the armed forces had thrown into doubt a range of equipment contracts.
They noted that bidders for the frigate work had been waiting to receive funding from the MoD to start the competitive design phase. This should have happened by May, with initial construction targeted for next spring. Instead there was silence then the freeze. The MoD said that the competition would be restarted soon but sources said that the delay would probably be at least a year, undermining a plan to deliver the first of the new ships by 2023.
Defence experts agreed. “It is cloud-cuckoo-land,” Admiral Lord West of Spithead, a former head of the Royal Navy, said. Francis Tusa, editor of Defence Analysis, said: “It’s impossible.” Paul Beaver, a defence analyst, said: “It has taken three years to get to a point where they appear to need to start again. This is not smart procurement.”......
Aside from the question of funding, it is understood that officials at Defence Equipment and Support were starting to realise that a cheap warship without the array of expensive radars, sensors and weapons would struggle to operate in submarine-infested waters. During Sir Michael Fallon’s time as defence secretary a funding shortage for the equipment programme worsened, scuppering plans to buy a full fleet of 13 more sophisticated but expensive Type 26 frigates. Instead he signed off on a 2015 plan to purchase eight Type 26 frigates and five cheaper versions.
A failure by the MoD to secure new warships into service by 2023 will leave the Royal Navy without 13 operational frigates as the ageing Type 23 warships start to be brought out of service.
A spokeswoman for the MoD said: “This is an early contract in a wider procurement process and we will incorporate the lessons learnt and begin again as soon as possible so the programme can continue at pace.”
