Future Carrier (Including Costs)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Is it really necessary to republish someone's whole post simply to make a general comment that has no direct connection with anything in thread? Jimlad is not alone in this but it destroys the flow and cut and thrust in the thread.
#5080 (permalink)
Jimlad1's AvatarJimlad1 , 17th Jun 2018 17:49
Quote:
Originally Posted by ORAC
Having tracked down the article it does not seem to be a rebuttal at all about the truth of the story - merely claiming at one point that it is “not supported by evidence”, as if any such story ever is. The rest seem to be a set of quibbles over whether only the 4 x F-35Bs which have arrived in the UK can count as being “delivered”, the number of US carriers actually currently with air wings embarked etc etc - none of which really impact on the story.
The rest being a general bitch and moan about the way the press report such things rather than printing “good news” stories about the forces - as if there was much good news to print.
And of course a good sulk about why, If originally proposed, the decision was made to cancel, with 3 paragraphs about why Trump would not find such a visit frustrating and a very positive message about the ship could have been delivered.
So so rather thanseeing of a rebuttal of the story as printed, I see it more as a defensive rebuttal of the reason given for cancellation.
Jimlad1's AvatarJimlad1 , 17th Jun 2018 17:49
Quote:
Originally Posted by ORAC
Having tracked down the article it does not seem to be a rebuttal at all about the truth of the story - merely claiming at one point that it is “not supported by evidence”, as if any such story ever is. The rest seem to be a set of quibbles over whether only the 4 x F-35Bs which have arrived in the UK can count as being “delivered”, the number of US carriers actually currently with air wings embarked etc etc - none of which really impact on the story.
The rest being a general bitch and moan about the way the press report such things rather than printing “good news” stories about the forces - as if there was much good news to print.
And of course a good sulk about why, If originally proposed, the decision was made to cancel, with 3 paragraphs about why Trump would not find such a visit frustrating and a very positive message about the ship could have been delivered.
So so rather thanseeing of a rebuttal of the story as printed, I see it more as a defensive rebuttal of the reason given for cancellation.
Thanks eeyore, you really are a cheery person aren't you!
Thank god not everyone shares your inflated sense of negativity.
Thank god not everyone shares your inflated sense of negativity.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
ORAC, your comment 're WEBF is a little wide of the mark. He started this thread 12 years ago. Then he may have been seen as naive and ill informed. Today, after 12 years and the informed comments on this thread and others, he is probably better informed than many defence journalists.
ORAC, your comment 're WEBF is a little wide of the mark. He started this thread 12 years ago. Then he may have been seen as naive and ill informed. Today, after 12 years and the informed comments on this thread and others, he is probably better informed than many defence journalists.
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Commons defence committee has pointed out the RN cannot defend the carriers adequately.
Well who'd have thought it.
Q. Why have the capability when you cannot use it unless you rely on other nations to defend your national asset.
Interesting times ahead.
Well who'd have thought it.
Q. Why have the capability when you cannot use it unless you rely on other nations to defend your national asset.
Interesting times ahead.
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I finally caught up and watched the TV programme on the Queen, the 3 parter and one thing struck me, they showed them doing a deck decontam for Nuclear fallout where sprays flood the deck to wash off any contamination. later on they did the same using the system to spray foam in case of a deck fire, they then swept the stuff overboard as it is corrosive and not good for the carrier, I sat there thinking, why on earth do you just not select water again and wash it off instead of spending hours with brushes trying to remove it, it would also flush the pipes..
To allow people to judge for themselves:
Beyond 2 per cent: A preliminary report on the Modernising Defence Programme
Beyond 2 per cent: A preliminary report on the Modernising Defence Programme
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58.With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers shortly coming into service, generation of a carrier group will become a priority task for the Royal Navy. In 2017 the Public Accounts Committee was told that a sovereign carrier group at the ‘maximum level’ of deployment would require two air defence destroyers and two ASW frigates, along with an attack submarine and attached support shipping.115 Generating such a force for any length of time is likely to put considerable strain on the Royal Navy, given the current size of the Fleet.116 The carriers are likely to be operating within larger allied groups in the future, but we disagree with the National Security Adviser that we should proceed on the basis this is inevitable.117 Operating aircraft carriers without the sovereign ability to protect them is complacent at best and potentially dangerous at worst. The UK should be able to sustain this capacity without recourse to other states.
59.We have recently reported on the continuing relevance and requirement for amphibious capability, concluding that the disposal of amphibious assault ships—reportedly being considered under the NSCR—was “militarily illiterate”.118 Written evidence to this inquiry has largely supported these conclusions.119 The Royal Navy will at some point in the next decade need to consider replacing the amphibious assault ships which are due go out of service in the early 2030s. A landing helicopter dock (LHD) design, combining the ability to operate landing craft and aircraft, should be considered.
59.We have recently reported on the continuing relevance and requirement for amphibious capability, concluding that the disposal of amphibious assault ships—reportedly being considered under the NSCR—was “militarily illiterate”.118 Written evidence to this inquiry has largely supported these conclusions.119 The Royal Navy will at some point in the next decade need to consider replacing the amphibious assault ships which are due go out of service in the early 2030s. A landing helicopter dock (LHD) design, combining the ability to operate landing craft and aircraft, should be considered.
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58.With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers shortly coming into service, generation of a carrier group will become a priority task for the Royal Navy. In 2017 the Public Accounts Committee was told that a sovereign carrier group at the ‘maximum level’ of deployment would require two air defence destroyers and two ASW frigates, along with an attack submarine and attached support shipping.115 Generating such a force for any length of time is likely to put considerable strain on the Royal Navy, given the current size of the Fleet.116 The carriers are likely to be operating within larger allied groups in the future, but we disagree with the National Security Adviser that we should proceed on the basis this is inevitable.117 Operating aircraft carrierswithout the sovereign ability to protect them is complacent at best and potentially dangerous at worst. The UK should be able to sustain this capacity without recourse to other states.
Deary me, chickens coming home to roost.
58.With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers shortly coming into service, generation of a carrier group will become a priority task for the Royal Navy. In 2017 the Public Accounts Committee was told that a sovereign carrier group at the ‘maximum level’ of deployment would require two air defence destroyers and two ASW frigates, along with an attack submarine and attached support shipping.115 Generating such a force for any length of time is likely to put considerable strain on the Royal Navy, given the current size of the Fleet.116 The carriers are likely to be operating within larger allied groups in the future, but we disagree with the National Security Adviser that we should proceed on the basis this is inevitable.117 Operating aircraft carriers without the sovereign ability to protect them is complacent at best and potentially dangerous at worst. The UK should be able to sustain this capacity without recourse to other states.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/sho...sile-defences/
Save the Royal Navy:
“At the time the QEC design was conceived, the RN expected to commission 12 Type 45s and have an escort fleet totalling around 30 vessels. As everyone is now painfully aware, there RN got just 6 Type 45s and its escort fleet is down to 19, with insufficient personnel even to man this modest number. The assumption that QEC will have plenty of escorts to protect her is in tatters. Either pretty much the entire available escort fleet must be dedicated to her protection or we are reliant on foreign escorts with the political limitations and operational challenges that brings.“......
Save the Royal Navy:
“At the time the QEC design was conceived, the RN expected to commission 12 Type 45s and have an escort fleet totalling around 30 vessels. As everyone is now painfully aware, there RN got just 6 Type 45s and its escort fleet is down to 19, with insufficient personnel even to man this modest number. The assumption that QEC will have plenty of escorts to protect her is in tatters. Either pretty much the entire available escort fleet must be dedicated to her protection or we are reliant on foreign escorts with the political limitations and operational challenges that brings.“......
58.With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers shortly coming into service, generation of a carrier group will become a priority task for the Royal Navy. In 2017 the Public Accounts Committee was told that a sovereign carrier group at the ‘maximum level’ of deployment would require two air defence destroyers and two ASW frigates, along with an attack submarine and attached support shipping.115 Generating such a force for any length of time is likely to put considerable strain on the Royal Navy, given the current size of the Fleet.116 The carriers are likely to be operating within larger allied groups in the future, but we disagree with the National Security Adviser that we should proceed on the basis this is inevitable.117 Operating aircraft carrierswithout the sovereign ability to protect them is complacent at best and potentially dangerous at worst. The UK should be able to sustain this capacity without recourse to other states.
Deary me, chickens coming home to roost.
Deary me, chickens coming home to roost.
FODPlod is right. With 6 destroyers and 13 frigates, there are enough to escort the carriers. The stated intention is to accompany them with 2xT23 and 2xT45 when in a high risk area. Long term you can expect to be able to deploy about a third of your assets - eg routinely 2xT45 and 4-5 T23. In a crisis you can "surge" in the short term to maybe two thirds - so 4xT45 and 8 or so T23. So yes the RN can escort the carriers, even in high risk areas, and have a couple left over for other things. Factor in the availability of allied assets (expect to see typically a French frigate and a US destroyer added to the group for deployments, and maybe one or two others besides) and things look better still. So it's not true to say we can't escort them.
BUT it's undeniably tight - I'm not saying everything is great, everything is too close to the limits, in common with other areas where numbers are clearly calculated by reference to the minimum needed. Take out some assets due to unforeseen circumstances (eg one of your few SSNs collides with something) and you have problems. There is an opportunity to address some of that that in the current review, especially if some modest increase in funding is secured. OK I accept that may not come about, but at the same time there is more of a political groundswell than I can remember. Committing to 8 T31 frigates (with maybe 3 of them enhanced for ASW duties) for example would be a relatively affordable way of easing the pressure considerably. Not a chance? Well, many confidently predicted there was not a chance of addressing the MPA gap, so let's see.
BUT it's undeniably tight - I'm not saying everything is great, everything is too close to the limits, in common with other areas where numbers are clearly calculated by reference to the minimum needed. Take out some assets due to unforeseen circumstances (eg one of your few SSNs collides with something) and you have problems. There is an opportunity to address some of that that in the current review, especially if some modest increase in funding is secured. OK I accept that may not come about, but at the same time there is more of a political groundswell than I can remember. Committing to 8 T31 frigates (with maybe 3 of them enhanced for ASW duties) for example would be a relatively affordable way of easing the pressure considerably. Not a chance? Well, many confidently predicted there was not a chance of addressing the MPA gap, so let's see.
Undeniably the runes aren't lining up in the most helpful way. Then again, "the papers are saying" is one thing. I suspect we'll see a smaller increase than what might otherwise have been possible (I can't see how zero will be politically acceptable, whatever the arithmetic says) and some fudge...
Thread Starter
ORAC, your comment 're WEBF is a little wide of the mark. He started this thread 12 years ago. Then he may have been seen as naive and ill informed. Today, after 12 years and the informed comments on this thread and others, he is probably better informed than many defence journalists.
I am not sure why starting this thread, or inviting learned comments from Not_a_boffin, Engines, orca et al counts as naive, but there we go. As the initial thread starting post notes, I did indeed first read of the future carrier in the media in the summer of 1995 - I think it was Flight International. A few months later I read of what was then JAST, with a V/STOL version for the US Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. Therefore the myth that carrier and aircraft were not considered at the same time is total nonsense. At this time the RN was busy in the Adriatic and the Gulf, and often had a carrier deployed with escorts. So the Navy did know something about escorting a carrier.
So why would I regard this is anything other than total nonsense?
Originally Posted by Melchett01
Rather than considering the carriers as items on their own, they should have been part of a fully integrated project that considered the carrier as the platform, the air assets as the delivery mechanism and the need for protection. If we have have considered these holistically, and I’m not convinced we have in any sense other than accidentally, I’ll be surprised.
Anyway - through the period of this thread running I have actually been in dark blue, albeit part time. This has led to learning things from people directly involved, such as the chockhead who noted that post Sea Harrier there was less opportunity to have jets on deck and skills were at risk, the Cdr(Air) aboard HMS Illustrious who made a big point of the whole ship nature of shipborne aviation (she had Harriers from IV Sqn RAF (I think) doing fixed wing work ups at the time), then a little over a year before SDSR 10 having a "state of the Navy" brief from two of the fighting arm Command Warrants, with the one for the Fleet Air Arm stating that the plan to get everyone ready to the new carriers and jets was to embark Harriers aboard Illustrious and Ark Royal as often as possible, for longer periods.
More recently I have heard the normal rumours and other things, a lot of which has turned out to be true. I have paid attention to what the Navy has been doing - such as conducting task group deployment (LPD/LPH based - and often using Ocean for what were really carrier roles) and supplying frigates and destroyers to US or French carrier groups, as well as standing deployments and dealing with Geopolitical events.
Then there is the Whole Force Concept.... Some of us are closer to the things discussed than you might think.
Anyway - this morning HMS Queen Elizabeth has returned to Portsmouth after another phase of trials, including the first RAS with RFA Tidespring.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 24th Jun 2018 at 09:55.
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WEBF - One could probably state that the genesis for the QE ships was the very rapid evolution in US combat aircraft plans post-Cold War and post-Desert Storm, including the demise of A-12, the invention of all-service STOVL/CTOL/CV fighter concepts by DARPA, Lockheed, Macs and Boeing, and the early-1993 binning of A-X and MRF.
The subsequent emergence of JAST/JSF magically "solved" the Marine/RN problem, which was not just the difficulty of defining a supersonic STOVL Harrier replacement, but the fact that funding such a thing was hard to justify in the Cold War and almost unthinkable after it. I don't think anyone would have been very excited about building new carriers to operate a Harrier III.
Of course, it was purely an accounting gimmick and not a real solution. Developing a stealthy STOVL fighter (including a monster engine you didn't otherwise need) was always going to cost a ****ton of money, but if you rolled that in with the CVs and CTOLs and projected you'd build 4000+ units, the program acquisition unit cost - (R&D + Production)/Units - didn't look ludicrous. Basically, most of the STOVL cost ended up on the USAF and CV Navy tab, which I suppose that (if you are RN or USMC) is as close to an economic miracle as you can get.
The subsequent emergence of JAST/JSF magically "solved" the Marine/RN problem, which was not just the difficulty of defining a supersonic STOVL Harrier replacement, but the fact that funding such a thing was hard to justify in the Cold War and almost unthinkable after it. I don't think anyone would have been very excited about building new carriers to operate a Harrier III.
Of course, it was purely an accounting gimmick and not a real solution. Developing a stealthy STOVL fighter (including a monster engine you didn't otherwise need) was always going to cost a ****ton of money, but if you rolled that in with the CVs and CTOLs and projected you'd build 4000+ units, the program acquisition unit cost - (R&D + Production)/Units - didn't look ludicrous. Basically, most of the STOVL cost ended up on the USAF and CV Navy tab, which I suppose that (if you are RN or USMC) is as close to an economic miracle as you can get.