Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Thanks for the replies and explanations re Harrier rolling landings.
If I may ask another question.
During combat, there will be the possibility that the VSTOL capability of the F35B will be compromised. How will it be recovered? Rolling landing and net/barrier across the deck or ditch/eject?
If I may ask another question.
During combat, there will be the possibility that the VSTOL capability of the F35B will be compromised. How will it be recovered? Rolling landing and net/barrier across the deck or ditch/eject?
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I don't think there is any way to recover to the ship unless the STOVL hardware is fully functional. I believe that was why, in the earliest days of CALF and JAST, McAir ditched their gas-driven lift-fan concept: the large, hot, high-pressure ducts that the system required represented a lot of single-fragment vulnerable area.
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Turin,
George has it right - if the aircraft can't get into the 'powered lift' mode, the only options would be divert ashore for a conventional rolling landing or, if doing full blue water ops (no short diversions) it's going to be the ejection seat route and ditch the aircraft. There's no barrier system on the UK QE class or the USN LHDs.
A cat and trap aircraft has the barrier option on the carrier if it has problems with its own systems - but it can't take the barrier if it can't get down to normal 'trap speed'.
Of course, if a land based aircraft is badly damaged, ejection is often a safer option than trying to get it down on the ground and risking the pilot.
As an aside, I got to see some of the reports from the STOVL technology studies. Vulnerability was a potential issue, but the bigger problem was the volumetric impact of the gas ducting on the packaging of the rest of the aircraft systems. Early on, it was realised that designing a stealthy STOVL aircraft (which forces many systems that are located in external pods on legacy aircraft inside the outer mould line) would lead to a densely packed airframe. Gas ducting made an already tough challenge nearly impossible.
Difficult stuff, this powered lift.
Best regards as ever to the really clever people who take this challenge on.
Engines
George has it right - if the aircraft can't get into the 'powered lift' mode, the only options would be divert ashore for a conventional rolling landing or, if doing full blue water ops (no short diversions) it's going to be the ejection seat route and ditch the aircraft. There's no barrier system on the UK QE class or the USN LHDs.
A cat and trap aircraft has the barrier option on the carrier if it has problems with its own systems - but it can't take the barrier if it can't get down to normal 'trap speed'.
Of course, if a land based aircraft is badly damaged, ejection is often a safer option than trying to get it down on the ground and risking the pilot.
As an aside, I got to see some of the reports from the STOVL technology studies. Vulnerability was a potential issue, but the bigger problem was the volumetric impact of the gas ducting on the packaging of the rest of the aircraft systems. Early on, it was realised that designing a stealthy STOVL aircraft (which forces many systems that are located in external pods on legacy aircraft inside the outer mould line) would lead to a densely packed airframe. Gas ducting made an already tough challenge nearly impossible.
Difficult stuff, this powered lift.
Best regards as ever to the really clever people who take this challenge on.
Engines
Thread Starter
Test Pilot Justin Paines talks about F-35B development work with the VAAC Harrier, including carrier trials and landing aid development.
The Forces TV report from Warton the other day.
Like many carrier aficionados, I have a copy of Wings On My Sleeve by Captain Eric 'Winkle' Brown, a man who knew a thing or two about naval aviation. One of the appendices is a 1967 article about CVA-01, the big deck carrier planned and scrapped in the sixties. Two parts of this stand out to me:
It has always been the obvious idea to have parallel and separate lanes for landing, for take off, and for parking, but somehow over the last 20 years there seems to have grown up a reluctance amongst carrier designers to pursue this ideal. Contentment seems to have set in with the advent of the partial benefits obtained by the angled deck. This latter idea has been an eminently successful development, but it has two major drawbacks. First, the angled deck layout isolates, on the port quarter, a deck area of considerable dimensions with is virtually unusable during landing operations. Such real estate on a flight deck is much too valuable to be wasted, and the parallel deck design removes this area from the port to the starboard quarter when it can be fully used. Second, during landing in conditions of low cloud or poor visibility, the pilot's first view of the deck occurs very late, so that with the high approach speeds of modern aircraft, he has little or no time to make a correction in line. Errors in lining up with the centre line of the angled deck are numerous and often led to accidents or missed approaches, particularly at night.
Interrogation of a cross section of naval pilots confirmed that the first thing a pilot sees on making a carrier approach in bad weather is the ship's wake, which is considerable from such a ship doing 30 knots, and at night is usually brilliantly phosphorescent. However, the wake coincides with the centre line of the ship, but not that of the angled deck, so is of no use as a line up datum. With a landing lane parallel to the centre line of the ship the wake is a useful line up reference.
He then explains CVA-01 was to have landing runway with an angle of 2.75 degrees to the centre line, a totally parallel deck being impossible to fit. The angled deck was needed so if aircraft landed and missed the wires, they could could open the throttles and go around again. However, the angled deck is harder to line up with.
Vertical Landing with Sea Harrier/Harrier (and F-35B) eliminated this problem. SRVL solves both problems. Not only does the landing aircraft stay parallel with the ship's centre line, but it lands with much reduced speed. I imagine there are some heavy duty mathematics and algorithms involved not just in getting the aircraft onto the deck, but stopping it once there. I think I am correct in saying the brakes and their controls are designed and built in Britain.
The other thing that stands out is:
The actual numbers of aircraft that CVA-01 was to carry cannot be revealed. Two thirds of the total total aircraft complement could be housed in the hangar and two thirds on the flight deck. The spare for the 'extra third' was to be available for for a reinforcing squadron of either carrier aircraft or land based aircraft such as the V/STOL Kestrel (P1127) strike fighter.
In other words V/STOL (ie F-35B) means you can embark on a carrier without needing constant practice, and since the UK has always intended to operate a joint RN/RAF force of F-35, it makes sense.
Aside from F-35B, the carriers have an important Anti Submarine Warfare role, by carrying a number of Merlin HM2s, which can work with the towed array equipped Type 23 (Type 26 in future) frigates to provide long range ASW for a task group.
Maritime Merlin Force Getting Ready For Carrier Strike
With the versatile Merlin Mk2 helicopter very much in demand across Defence, the decommissioning of 829 NAS, leaving two deployable frontline Merlin Squadrons and one training unit, is the first of several changes being made at the RNAS Culdrose to help the Air Station deliver all that is required of it.
Commander Mike Currie, Head of the Merlin Helicopter Force at RNAS Culdrose said: “With several key roles to deliver, including Anti-Submarine and Anti-Surface Warfare, our versatile Merlin Mk2 helicopter is integral to the Maritime Task Group and an essential part of Carrier Strike.
“The addition of Airborne Surveillance and Control, through Crowsnest in the future, will increase the capability of this already very capable airframe.”
“The Merlin Mk2 is in high demand with a number of strategic tasks to fulfill. Whilst we will continue to deliver to Operations across the Globe, we must also train and prepare for the future too.
“We have been looking at how my Force is organised to create a Squadron structure to not only deliver capability to the new Aircraft Carrier, but also sustain our current tasking.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 8th Apr 2018 at 20:17. Reason: Typo!
So why has the UK gone down this route? Because there was a late change to requirements (from the UK) to be able to carry out a VL to the ship with the same bring-back, but at more demanding weather conditions. The F-35 requirement document called out the US Mil Spec 'Tropical Day'. In 2003, the UK came up and requested that studies be carried out into how to recover to the ship on what came to be called the 'UK Hot Day', which was significantly hotter and with lower pressures - this 'UK Hot Day' reflected conditions in the summer in the Northern Gulf.
Two options were looked at. First was a 'thrust push' - basically screw 10% more thrust out of the propulsion system. The second, more feasible, was SRVL.
The UK's large decks offer the chance to exploit SRVL to do exactly what the pilots are saying - to be able to come back to the deck with more fuel and weapons, reducing the need to dump fuel and allow recoveries with external stores as well.
Two options were looked at. First was a 'thrust push' - basically screw 10% more thrust out of the propulsion system. The second, more feasible, was SRVL.
The UK's large decks offer the chance to exploit SRVL to do exactly what the pilots are saying - to be able to come back to the deck with more fuel and weapons, reducing the need to dump fuel and allow recoveries with external stores as well.
Thread Starter
Leaving the technical and practical issues aside for a minute, and thinking about the geopolitics:
The impact of HMS Queen Elizabeth on British international relations
This article is concerned with the cultural and symbolic significance of aircraft carriers in the early 21st century, and in particular HMS Queen Elizabeth. The might and innovation of the Royal Navy are symbolised in its technological and strategic assets. For years, the Royal Navy has punched above its weight while, relatively speak, British power has declined.
However, the creation of this supercarrier has rejuvenated the image of Britain as a Great Power, with global military reach. The UK already has the fifth largest military spending in the world, and this symbolism is seen in the supercarrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.
The ships former commanding officer, Captain Simon Petitt, pointed out that there is a lot of symbolism in modern warfare and that having a ship the size of HMS Queen Elizabeth, which will be the navy’s biggest ever, was significant. The sight of a heavily equipped 70,000 tonne carrier, which is almost 300 metres long, heading towards a potential enemy had a deterrent effect that is essential if the UK wants to project influence across the world Petitt claims.
“It is massively visible, you can range back in history and see the value of this. Everything from Nelson deterring Admiral Villeneuve from leaving Cadiz all the way to the big battleships of early 20th century, to what we are doing now. The Americans use it all the time. We currently haven’t got this level of carrier capability. The bigger the capability the more influence you have to bear.”
So great is the impact of larger vessels as a deterrent, they’re often used as a geopolitical chess piece. American governments have, since the second world war, moved aircraft carriers around to demonstrate American resolve.
Increasingly international relations is being governed by the power and capabilities of navies worldwide. With the rise of China, as a revisionist power in the Asia-Pacific, European Powers, such as the United Kingdom have to show they can play a vital role with cutting-edge technologies. While the Dreadnought at the beginning of the 20th century embodied naval power, it was not until the Second World War, that the aircraft carrier became the symbol of power.
As such, aircraft carriers symbolise a nation’s power. It shows its ability to project its power and is an icon of power in this new technological age. During the Second World War, the United States proved that the aircraft carrier was the most important warship of all. Maritime doctrine during the Cold War was based on aircraft carriers and also submarine warfare. In the Post – Cold War world, we are witnessing the emergence of other nations such as Japan, China, and India investing in aircraft carrier capabilities, while other nations like France, Britain and the United States, have invested money in retaining and advancing their capabilities. This is significant as all these nations place a premium on aircraft carriers.
The impact of HMS Queen Elizabeth on British international relations
This article is concerned with the cultural and symbolic significance of aircraft carriers in the early 21st century, and in particular HMS Queen Elizabeth. The might and innovation of the Royal Navy are symbolised in its technological and strategic assets. For years, the Royal Navy has punched above its weight while, relatively speak, British power has declined.
However, the creation of this supercarrier has rejuvenated the image of Britain as a Great Power, with global military reach. The UK already has the fifth largest military spending in the world, and this symbolism is seen in the supercarrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.
The ships former commanding officer, Captain Simon Petitt, pointed out that there is a lot of symbolism in modern warfare and that having a ship the size of HMS Queen Elizabeth, which will be the navy’s biggest ever, was significant. The sight of a heavily equipped 70,000 tonne carrier, which is almost 300 metres long, heading towards a potential enemy had a deterrent effect that is essential if the UK wants to project influence across the world Petitt claims.
“It is massively visible, you can range back in history and see the value of this. Everything from Nelson deterring Admiral Villeneuve from leaving Cadiz all the way to the big battleships of early 20th century, to what we are doing now. The Americans use it all the time. We currently haven’t got this level of carrier capability. The bigger the capability the more influence you have to bear.”
So great is the impact of larger vessels as a deterrent, they’re often used as a geopolitical chess piece. American governments have, since the second world war, moved aircraft carriers around to demonstrate American resolve.
Increasingly international relations is being governed by the power and capabilities of navies worldwide. With the rise of China, as a revisionist power in the Asia-Pacific, European Powers, such as the United Kingdom have to show they can play a vital role with cutting-edge technologies. While the Dreadnought at the beginning of the 20th century embodied naval power, it was not until the Second World War, that the aircraft carrier became the symbol of power.
As such, aircraft carriers symbolise a nation’s power. It shows its ability to project its power and is an icon of power in this new technological age. During the Second World War, the United States proved that the aircraft carrier was the most important warship of all. Maritime doctrine during the Cold War was based on aircraft carriers and also submarine warfare. In the Post – Cold War world, we are witnessing the emergence of other nations such as Japan, China, and India investing in aircraft carrier capabilities, while other nations like France, Britain and the United States, have invested money in retaining and advancing their capabilities. This is significant as all these nations place a premium on aircraft carriers.
Thread Starter
Why not have another YouTube video?
This one shows it in terms of the industrial achievement. All the value in life comes from integration, and integrating the work of separate yards has allowed us to remain at the fore of systems integration as well as naval aviation.
This one shows it in terms of the industrial achievement. All the value in life comes from integration, and integrating the work of separate yards has allowed us to remain at the fore of systems integration as well as naval aviation.
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I don't think there is any way to recover to the ship unless the STOVL hardware is fully functional. I believe that was why, in the earliest days of CALF and JAST, McAir ditched their gas-driven lift-fan concept: the large, hot, high-pressure ducts that the system required represented a lot of single-fragment vulnerable area.
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Outsider question:
Can both carriers put to sea at the same time with escorts and a full complement of crew and aircraft?
Is there a foreseeable need for them to do so or is the plan always to have one in refit?
Can both carriers put to sea at the same time with escorts and a full complement of crew and aircraft?
Is there a foreseeable need for them to do so or is the plan always to have one in refit?
Whilst one is running, the other will be working up and ready to take a “hot handover” from the off-going carrier. That’s what “continuous carrier strike means” - one fully worked up CVF available, with the other in either training, short term maintenance or longer term refit, but subsequently working up to become the “on-call carrier”.
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When deployed, the plan is to escort the carrier with two T45s, two T23s (later two T26s), an Astute class SSN and a Tide class tanker plus another RFA. If the second carrier is deployed, it would depend on how many other escorts were available but in such a case plenty of warning would be needed anyway so generating one or two T45s plus the frigates, an SSN and the RFAs shouldn't be beyond reason. The sticking point would be the aircraft.
Some postulate that one carrier would have the strike role and the other would be sent as an LPH. I think it more likely and more sensible to split the available aircraft evenly between the two, so each would have a sqn of F-35Bs, a Sqn of Merlins for ASW and AEW, then a force of Commandos and their support helos (Merlins and Chinooks), avoiding the 'all eggs in one basket scenario beloved of so many round these parts. Again a two carrier deployment would be a short term deal and this has always been part of the plan, though aircraft availability (mainly referring to the Lightnings) means this won't be possible until the early 2020s after the second Lightning sqn (809NAS) has stood up.
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I always thought that either Albion or Bulwark would be part of the carrier strike group.
Otherwise with the low number of escorts how are they to get to a conflict zone?
Otherwise with the low number of escorts how are they to get to a conflict zone?
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As per Obi's post a two carrier strike group would require 3-4 T45's - that's pretty much the whole force once you take out those in refit/maintenance
That's the problem with the Carriers - they skew the tasking of the whole of the rest of the surface navy
That's the problem with the Carriers - they skew the tasking of the whole of the rest of the surface navy
No it's not. High value units (not just carriers) would require similar levels of surface combatant support. Indeed, arguably they would require more as there would be no organic DCA or ASW capability to contribute to force defence and with no carriers, no force projection capability either. Smaller carriers or LHDs - what some think we "should have" bought - would also require the same level of support and before the obvious cries of "oh if they weren't so big we could have bought squillions more DD/FF" begin, you might have got one - at best two more DD/FF for a huge loss of overall capability. That's Flabbotesque logic.
If you're in a situation where you need 2 CVBG at sea, it's arguable that "the tasking" you're so concerned about is optional in any case.
If there is a problem, it's that the RN (and the rest of HMAF) have been underfunded for what they're asked to do for the best part of twenty years now. It's also well worth looking at actual programme costs to see on which programmes the existing budget was actually spent.
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We've had thsi argument before - we agree on the root cause is gross underfunding and ridiculous over-tasking
but if the few T45's we have are defending the carriers then they can't be doing the other jobs which are currently considered to be "vital"
The cretinous thing was not to order another 4 T45's once we decided we were going to build two carriers IMHO
but if the few T45's we have are defending the carriers then they can't be doing the other jobs which are currently considered to be "vital"
The cretinous thing was not to order another 4 T45's once we decided we were going to build two carriers IMHO
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Everything else they are doing for heavens sake - the FI, the Gulf, watching the N sea and the Channel..............
all these would have to go by the board because we need to send two carriers out - and note sending them out doesn't mean they'd actually fight - it might be a Blairite "Tanks to Heathrow " moment rather than the outbreak of WW3
all these would have to go by the board because we need to send two carriers out - and note sending them out doesn't mean they'd actually fight - it might be a Blairite "Tanks to Heathrow " moment rather than the outbreak of WW3
Everything else they are doing for heavens sake - the FI, the Gulf, watching the N sea and the Channel..............
all these would have to go by the board because we need to send two carriers out - and note sending them out doesn't mean they'd actually fight - it might be a Blairite "Tanks to Heathrow " moment rather than the outbreak of WW3
all these would have to go by the board because we need to send two carriers out - and note sending them out doesn't mean they'd actually fight - it might be a Blairite "Tanks to Heathrow " moment rather than the outbreak of WW3
It's called prioritising, something that happens all the time. Come the day that we need to deploy two carriers concurrently, Fleet planners will look at the likely length of the deployment, look at the commitments, prioritise them, see whether some can be covered by allies and make a decision on what (if anything) gets gapped and for how long. Deploying some CVR(T) to Heathrow is hardly equivalent to deploying a 2 CVBG force.
What you're suggesting is a bit like saying we wouldn't beef up the DCA/OCA force on Akrotiri if threatened, because we had a RF deployment, or a BALTAP mission, or a Far East det ongoing.
if we were ever in the position of finding ourselves in, or about to be in, a conflict that was considered to be so vital to the national interest that we need to send both carriers - and therefore pretty much every servicable F-35 and qualified pilot we had - i rather hope that every single asset that was capable of being sent would be.
personally i don't really care about piracy off the Horn of Africa, or the Gulf - or indeed COIN conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa or wherethe****istan, so i don't care about stripping them of a T45 in order to protect the carriers. if we need to watch the North sea, or secure Cyprus or the FI we just ramp up the Typhoon force - which will do just as good a job as a T45...
a QE with 30 F-35 and 2 T45 can look after itself far more comprehensively than a 30k Invincible 2.0 with 15 F-35 and 3 T45 - a battlegroup with 2 QE's and 60 F-35 and 2 or 3 T45 is going to be somewhere between a bloody hard target and invunerable...
personally i don't really care about piracy off the Horn of Africa, or the Gulf - or indeed COIN conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa or wherethe****istan, so i don't care about stripping them of a T45 in order to protect the carriers. if we need to watch the North sea, or secure Cyprus or the FI we just ramp up the Typhoon force - which will do just as good a job as a T45...
a QE with 30 F-35 and 2 T45 can look after itself far more comprehensively than a 30k Invincible 2.0 with 15 F-35 and 3 T45 - a battlegroup with 2 QE's and 60 F-35 and 2 or 3 T45 is going to be somewhere between a bloody hard target and invunerable...