Future Carrier (Including Costs)
If JFH isn't there to take its turn in sharing the burden of ongoing ops, then it's of no use at all.
In the current situation, blue water carrier ops are an irrelevance.
If you wanted something else to augment Tornado and Harrier in-theatre, you should have done more to speak out against the withdrawal of Jag.
In the current situation, blue water carrier ops are an irrelevance.
If you wanted something else to augment Tornado and Harrier in-theatre, you should have done more to speak out against the withdrawal of Jag.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Jacko,
The Jags were given a very expensive upgrade including new engines and avionics, but were not used because it was "too hot". I have never heard of an FJ other than those that land vertically being restricted by this so I have to assume this is bo**ocks. It doesn't seem to affect any american a/c. Also JFH is taking ALL the burden of our fixed wing ops to the detriment of all other tasking - where is the rest of Strike's contribution????
The Jags were given a very expensive upgrade including new engines and avionics, but were not used because it was "too hot". I have never heard of an FJ other than those that land vertically being restricted by this so I have to assume this is bo**ocks. It doesn't seem to affect any american a/c. Also JFH is taking ALL the burden of our fixed wing ops to the detriment of all other tasking - where is the rest of Strike's contribution????
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Engines,
I believe there's a lot of truth in what you say. (It was a cheap shot, but there might be grains of truth in there too as those three reasons are the ones I've heard whinged / bantered about the most often) On the plus side though, the FAA can use this opportunity to learn a lot about mud-moving.
In my limited experience, the SHar boys did seem to focus very heavily on the air-air role and really only played at air-ground whereas there's quite a strong body of evidence to suggest that this might be a very dated way of looking at life (dare I say it, a Falklands-era view?). Take a peek over the wall at the USAF, USN, USMC, French, Canadians, Aussies etc and just about every other 'fighter' platform has focused their training and procurement towards the attack role for a long time now.
I would hope that the F-35 will be used to project air power over the beach, rather than just sitting on CAP over Mother, for which JFH and current Ops would seem to be the perfect place for the next generation of FAA pilots to learn their trade.
Regards,
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
I believe there's a lot of truth in what you say. (It was a cheap shot, but there might be grains of truth in there too as those three reasons are the ones I've heard whinged / bantered about the most often) On the plus side though, the FAA can use this opportunity to learn a lot about mud-moving.
In my limited experience, the SHar boys did seem to focus very heavily on the air-air role and really only played at air-ground whereas there's quite a strong body of evidence to suggest that this might be a very dated way of looking at life (dare I say it, a Falklands-era view?). Take a peek over the wall at the USAF, USN, USMC, French, Canadians, Aussies etc and just about every other 'fighter' platform has focused their training and procurement towards the attack role for a long time now.
I would hope that the F-35 will be used to project air power over the beach, rather than just sitting on CAP over Mother, for which JFH and current Ops would seem to be the perfect place for the next generation of FAA pilots to learn their trade.
Regards,
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
Navaleye,
1) It was a surprisingly cheap upgrade, if truth be told.
2) The Jags were not used primarily because using them in Afghanistan would have made it much more difficult to get rid of them. Compare: "We're getting rid of the Jaguar early, we haven't deployed it to Afghanistan" with "We're getting rid of Jaguar early even though it proved to be a decisively useful tool in Afghanistan...."
3) After extensive examination and trials the Jag Force themselves judged that they could have operated from Kandahar on a 45° day, with a small but useful warload.
4) The Tornado force is manning two op deployments in the Middle East.
1) It was a surprisingly cheap upgrade, if truth be told.
2) The Jags were not used primarily because using them in Afghanistan would have made it much more difficult to get rid of them. Compare: "We're getting rid of the Jaguar early, we haven't deployed it to Afghanistan" with "We're getting rid of Jaguar early even though it proved to be a decisively useful tool in Afghanistan...."
3) After extensive examination and trials the Jag Force themselves judged that they could have operated from Kandahar on a 45° day, with a small but useful warload.
4) The Tornado force is manning two op deployments in the Middle East.
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Here's one suggestion. Dissolve JFH. Take the two navy squadrons and take them back to Yeovilton and place them on naval tasking.
I echo Engine's comments about using Tornados in Afghanistan.
I echo Engine's comments about using Tornados in Afghanistan.
The GR4s are not in Afghanistan because they are commited to TELIC and the GR7 was better suited to HERRICK when the initial deployment was to an austere base. Typhoon is scheduled to replace Harrier next year in Khandahar. Personally, I think the Typhoon would be better suited to Iraq, which would free up the GR4s to replace the Harriers in HERRICK, but that's above my pay grade.
Jags were examined to deploy to Afghanistan but funding issues got in the way and the fleet was canned early.
In fairness to the FA2 guys, they probably focused upon A-A because the jet was realistically not capable of A-G work. Lacking PGMs or a designator pod, it would have been forced to adopt (albeit accurate) dive attacks, or low level delivery. I would suggest that modern base alt, ROE, PID and CDE issues effectively preclude such tactics given typical weather.
Navaleye suggests that JFH has been a disaster for the RN. The same could arguably be said for the RAF, and more importantly Joint capability. Prior to JFH, three RAF GR7 sqns maintained around 8 years (95-03?) of constant ops over N Iraq, Bosnia or Kosovo. When they were doing Iraq, the Jags (who themselves had been in Bosnia since 94) would do Yugoslavia and vice versa. Meanwhile, the GR1s worked southern Iraq. Since the division of assets with the RN, JFH has seemingly struggled to maintain a single det in Khandahar since 04.
If JFH has hurt RN maritime capability, it seems to have denuded RAF CAS capability also.
Regards,
MM
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The FA2 was an A-A jet (Blue Vixen and AMRAAM), but ironically its only combat use (as far as I know) was in the GA role, bombing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. And as MM says, very accurate in dive attacks with unguided munitions, but only on a clear day ....
MOh
MOh
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In '82, wasn't OC 801 NAS itching to move some mud, had the submariner in HERMES understood air warfare sufficiently to authorise it?
MM, you've already touched (Srl 1263) on the current source of our problems. Cpt Pugwash also identified it at Srl 1271 and I failed to provoke discussion of same at Srl 1280. Shortly after Browne's RUSI address, 1SL issued a signal to the same effect but, annoyingly, I can't now find it. The key is that the political decision has been taken that support to HERRICK and TELIC take precedence for funding and available capability. They have openly said that if that means risk to future capability, so be it. We can conclude from that, if the docs get signed, the capital programme for CVF will be no more than build the ship(s). Nobody is committing significant resources to their eventual deployment and operation. If Naval FW aviation has breathed its last in 10 years time, it will have been categorised as fruition of an acceptable risk. As you all clearly know, it will take us a long time to get it back to life.
MM, you've already touched (Srl 1263) on the current source of our problems. Cpt Pugwash also identified it at Srl 1271 and I failed to provoke discussion of same at Srl 1280. Shortly after Browne's RUSI address, 1SL issued a signal to the same effect but, annoyingly, I can't now find it. The key is that the political decision has been taken that support to HERRICK and TELIC take precedence for funding and available capability. They have openly said that if that means risk to future capability, so be it. We can conclude from that, if the docs get signed, the capital programme for CVF will be no more than build the ship(s). Nobody is committing significant resources to their eventual deployment and operation. If Naval FW aviation has breathed its last in 10 years time, it will have been categorised as fruition of an acceptable risk. As you all clearly know, it will take us a long time to get it back to life.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Their is a very good article in WarshipsIFR by none other than Sharkey Ward who describes in his normal bullish way why JFH has been a disaster for the RN. A view which everyone else outside of light blue seems to recognise and accept. Worth a read on the train home.
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MM, SSSETOWTF and others,
Some good points seem to be coming out here. I'd be interested to know (although I know probably can't be told) how many Tornados are committed to TELIC - there should be quite a few GR4s about now.
But the key issue (for this thread anyway) has to be building the roadmap to a credible level of maritime air capability at F-35 ISD. The RN (and the FAA) certainly know that Strike is the primary mission in the future, and in that respect, getting some 'mud moving' in on JFH can only be a good thing. But...
MM's point about building N2/6 capability is well made.
This is going to be a major part of actually delivering the capability from the ships.
Perhaps we need to be looking at building true J2 and J6 people who can move smoothly from land to ship and back as the situation demands?
MM's point about lack of naval careers for aviators is probably not true for the rotary wing guys left under Fleet Command but could be for JFH. Once you take aircraft and people and send them over to another service, those people stand into danger of 'falling off the plot'.
But equally, what progress is being made in getting the RAF to embrace maritime air (CVF) as a 'core' capability, and made part of its baseline planning assumptions? I know that many feel that as long as some areas of the RAF only see CVF as a 'secondary basing option' then there will be a lack of commitment to 'naval tasking'. Current events seem to bear that out.
Regards
Some good points seem to be coming out here. I'd be interested to know (although I know probably can't be told) how many Tornados are committed to TELIC - there should be quite a few GR4s about now.
But the key issue (for this thread anyway) has to be building the roadmap to a credible level of maritime air capability at F-35 ISD. The RN (and the FAA) certainly know that Strike is the primary mission in the future, and in that respect, getting some 'mud moving' in on JFH can only be a good thing. But...
MM's point about building N2/6 capability is well made.
This is going to be a major part of actually delivering the capability from the ships.Perhaps we need to be looking at building true J2 and J6 people who can move smoothly from land to ship and back as the situation demands?
MM's point about lack of naval careers for aviators is probably not true for the rotary wing guys left under Fleet Command but could be for JFH. Once you take aircraft and people and send them over to another service, those people stand into danger of 'falling off the plot'.
But equally, what progress is being made in getting the RAF to embrace maritime air (CVF) as a 'core' capability, and made part of its baseline planning assumptions? I know that many feel that as long as some areas of the RAF only see CVF as a 'secondary basing option' then there will be a lack of commitment to 'naval tasking'. Current events seem to bear that out.
Regards
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Moh,
The FA2 'bombing the Serbs to the negotiating table'! Take your tongue out of your cheek!!!!!
If I recall correctly, it was only ever FRS1 SHARs that dropped munitions in Bosnia. One of course also got shot down when the pilot bravely/stupidly (dependant upon point of view) reattacked. I understand the SF still have a contract out on him after he then wrote a book which blew several OPSEC factors! Although the FA2 rocked up later in the campaign, I don't think it ever dropped live but I could be wrong. During the Kosovo campaign in 99, a CVF turned up late in the campaign in what a cynic would suggest was a bit of a political move by the RN to get involved. The FA2s flew around 60 mins of DCA per day on the one of the southern CAPs. No kills sadly but at least one got visual with an Orao.
Navaleye,
I'd be interested in reading Cdr Ward's views. I regret that I have yet to find anything by him which is unbiased. Having recently read the excellent book by Dave Morgan on his experiences in the Falklands, it was in stark contrast to 'Sea Harrier Over the Falklands'.
Engines,
Valid point about the number of GR4s available. I think the issue about it going to Afghanistan has been force levels. The deployment of the fin to the Stan has certainly been considered but the Tornado requires a much bigger manning footprint than the GR7. The GR4 boys are very keen to get involved but I suspect that force levels was the deciding factor in not deploying them to Khandahar. AAR sorties could be flown from Qatar (as USAF assets do), but the stresses on the strat AT (and therefore AR) fleet are well known. Additionally, XCAS at such range is somewhat more sortie intensive than GCAS from a few miles down the road. In short, the Harrier has been a victim of its own (Joint RAF/RN) success in the Stan. It's ideally suited to the environment and the current task.
As far as adopting CVF as a core capability, I think it is well accepted. On a Joint course last year, several of the highest 'sea time' guys were RAF GR7 pilots. The reality of current ops however is that focus is out of necessity upon disembarked ops. Many other capabilities are being compromised in coming years in this respect. Maritime aviation is certainly not alone in this respect, although it is probably the most visible.
Regards,
MM
The FA2 'bombing the Serbs to the negotiating table'! Take your tongue out of your cheek!!!!!
If I recall correctly, it was only ever FRS1 SHARs that dropped munitions in Bosnia. One of course also got shot down when the pilot bravely/stupidly (dependant upon point of view) reattacked. I understand the SF still have a contract out on him after he then wrote a book which blew several OPSEC factors! Although the FA2 rocked up later in the campaign, I don't think it ever dropped live but I could be wrong. During the Kosovo campaign in 99, a CVF turned up late in the campaign in what a cynic would suggest was a bit of a political move by the RN to get involved. The FA2s flew around 60 mins of DCA per day on the one of the southern CAPs. No kills sadly but at least one got visual with an Orao.
Navaleye,
I'd be interested in reading Cdr Ward's views. I regret that I have yet to find anything by him which is unbiased. Having recently read the excellent book by Dave Morgan on his experiences in the Falklands, it was in stark contrast to 'Sea Harrier Over the Falklands'.
Engines,
Valid point about the number of GR4s available. I think the issue about it going to Afghanistan has been force levels. The deployment of the fin to the Stan has certainly been considered but the Tornado requires a much bigger manning footprint than the GR7. The GR4 boys are very keen to get involved but I suspect that force levels was the deciding factor in not deploying them to Khandahar. AAR sorties could be flown from Qatar (as USAF assets do), but the stresses on the strat AT (and therefore AR) fleet are well known. Additionally, XCAS at such range is somewhat more sortie intensive than GCAS from a few miles down the road. In short, the Harrier has been a victim of its own (Joint RAF/RN) success in the Stan. It's ideally suited to the environment and the current task.
As far as adopting CVF as a core capability, I think it is well accepted. On a Joint course last year, several of the highest 'sea time' guys were RAF GR7 pilots. The reality of current ops however is that focus is out of necessity upon disembarked ops. Many other capabilities are being compromised in coming years in this respect. Maritime aviation is certainly not alone in this respect, although it is probably the most visible.
Regards,
MM
Last edited by Magic Mushroom; 20th Jul 2007 at 16:28.
Navaleye,
Well, that just about sums up how little you know about Fast Jets. 
You seem surprised that the NSW won't be deploying on the carrier again this year (even though they've already spent just under two months on it in Apr/May). Maybe that's because they are due to go out to Afghanistan for another 4 months in the near future. I'm sure it will make you happy to hear that those pilots and maintainers will come back from Afghanistan and pretty much immediately deploy onto CVS for several weeks just as they are getting used to seeing their loved ones again.
I spoke to a colleague on the NSW yesterday after reading this thread, and he tells me he is expecting to spend 9 out of the next 13 months either on Ops or on the CVS. And you expect them to do more?
It is obvious you know very little of the situation at Cottesmore/Wittering, and are still stuck with your head in the days of the Sea Harrier.
I think you'll find it's the RN that has been the "disaster" for themselves. Tell me, why exactly is the NSW about 2/3 the size of the RAF Harrier Sqns? No doubt it's a crab conspiracy to see off the RN.....
Oh, and it's no doubt you've got the attitude you have if you take anything written by Sharkey as gospel.
The Jags were given a very expensive upgrade including new engines and avionics, but were not used because it was "too hot". I have never heard of an FJ other than those that land vertically being restricted by this so I have to assume this is bo**ocks.
You seem surprised that the NSW won't be deploying on the carrier again this year (even though they've already spent just under two months on it in Apr/May). Maybe that's because they are due to go out to Afghanistan for another 4 months in the near future. I'm sure it will make you happy to hear that those pilots and maintainers will come back from Afghanistan and pretty much immediately deploy onto CVS for several weeks just as they are getting used to seeing their loved ones again.
I spoke to a colleague on the NSW yesterday after reading this thread, and he tells me he is expecting to spend 9 out of the next 13 months either on Ops or on the CVS. And you expect them to do more?
It is obvious you know very little of the situation at Cottesmore/Wittering, and are still stuck with your head in the days of the Sea Harrier.
I think you'll find it's the RN that has been the "disaster" for themselves. Tell me, why exactly is the NSW about 2/3 the size of the RAF Harrier Sqns? No doubt it's a crab conspiracy to see off the RN.....
Oh, and it's no doubt you've got the attitude you have if you take anything written by Sharkey as gospel.
Thread Starter
With less aircraft, JFH can do less. It really does appear to be a simple as that.
On 5 Jan 07, I made the following suggestion on page 99 of the Sea Jet thread.
Without wishing to restart the argument again, I note that on several occasions in recent years a CVS has embarked a Sea Harrier squadron AND a Harrier GR7 one, giving fifteen or sixteen jets to deal with as well as some helicopters. Now it seems unlikely that two GR7/9 units could embark at the same time, so the maximum number of jets on board would be six to eight.
Yet CVF will mean that flight deck personnel will have to deal with up to 42 jets.
If the aircraft sent down to SFDO at Culdrose are well looked after, then they could be used on occasion to give experience of having a crowded hangar and flight deck, in the years prior to CVF entering service.
Now it appears the number of embarked aircraft will often be zero, so perhaps this suggestion isn't so daft? Certainly cheaper than a GR9 going over the side due to lack of flight deck crew experience.
A few months ago I was talking to a Killick Chockhead. He did mention the problem of skill fade during the next few years, with the problem of the experienced ones leaving, so that when CVF arrives there are few with much experience of fixed wing operations.
As for pilots - I have mentioned before than in 1995 or 96 I read in Navy News that the Navy had about fifty Sea Harrier pilots (at the time they were doing back to back Adriatic deployments, which may have lead to morale problems). How many fixed wing pilots does the RN have now? Why has this number dropped? Why did nobody notice when it started to fall?
Another question: What if a future operation, conflict or crisis involves an enemy with an air force or a navy, ie a country that has not been subject to ten years of economic sanctions, and is not landlocked? It seems that the current thinking is that we do not not need the means to deal with airborne or seaborne threats.
On 5 Jan 07, I made the following suggestion on page 99 of the Sea Jet thread.
Without wishing to restart the argument again, I note that on several occasions in recent years a CVS has embarked a Sea Harrier squadron AND a Harrier GR7 one, giving fifteen or sixteen jets to deal with as well as some helicopters. Now it seems unlikely that two GR7/9 units could embark at the same time, so the maximum number of jets on board would be six to eight.
Yet CVF will mean that flight deck personnel will have to deal with up to 42 jets.
If the aircraft sent down to SFDO at Culdrose are well looked after, then they could be used on occasion to give experience of having a crowded hangar and flight deck, in the years prior to CVF entering service.
Now it appears the number of embarked aircraft will often be zero, so perhaps this suggestion isn't so daft? Certainly cheaper than a GR9 going over the side due to lack of flight deck crew experience.
A few months ago I was talking to a Killick Chockhead. He did mention the problem of skill fade during the next few years, with the problem of the experienced ones leaving, so that when CVF arrives there are few with much experience of fixed wing operations.
As for pilots - I have mentioned before than in 1995 or 96 I read in Navy News that the Navy had about fifty Sea Harrier pilots (at the time they were doing back to back Adriatic deployments, which may have lead to morale problems). How many fixed wing pilots does the RN have now? Why has this number dropped? Why did nobody notice when it started to fall?
Another question: What if a future operation, conflict or crisis involves an enemy with an air force or a navy, ie a country that has not been subject to ten years of economic sanctions, and is not landlocked? It seems that the current thinking is that we do not not need the means to deal with airborne or seaborne threats.
Suspicion breeds confidence
LAL et al.
I had the pleasure of dining with an IAF Sqn Leader last year and asked him directly about the "hot and high" capability of the Jag. He said they had no problem operating them in northern India (in hot conditions) in similar climatic conditions as we now encounter in Afghanistan. The IAF Jag sqns are fully prepared to operate in combat in these conditions and to the best of my knowledge do so today. Bear in mind these are less capable airframes then those recently operated by the RAF (and by the way I am sorry to see them go). Having read the posts on here, I have to ask which of these statements are factually inaccurate? Just curious.
I had the pleasure of dining with an IAF Sqn Leader last year and asked him directly about the "hot and high" capability of the Jag. He said they had no problem operating them in northern India (in hot conditions) in similar climatic conditions as we now encounter in Afghanistan. The IAF Jag sqns are fully prepared to operate in combat in these conditions and to the best of my knowledge do so today. Bear in mind these are less capable airframes then those recently operated by the RAF (and by the way I am sorry to see them go). Having read the posts on here, I have to ask which of these statements are factually inaccurate? Just curious.
Last edited by Navaleye; 20th Jul 2007 at 22:44.
I'm now confused (easily done, as MM and FB11 amongst others can testify from their time incarcerated at Shrivenham).
NE - is your contention that it's the line put about that the Jags couldn't operate when hot that's "bo**ocks", rather than the upgrade? And that this rationale meant that JFH had to take the entire burden of the AFG task?
AIUI, the Jag could have been used, albeit with some limitations - but the fact that there was a very good chance of it making a very valuable contribution in AFG meant that it would have been terribly embarrassing for Swiss Des to have to explain why the RAF had to retire such a capable platform because the cash wasn't there to get it to its projected OSD, and even more embarassing if anyone started asking why TCH had decided to bin the whole fleet of such a useful aircraft early.
Since Des and Buff do a good enough job of embarrassing themselves without anyone else's assistance, cynics would suggest the Jag was kept out of the action for two reasons alone - to avoid making Des look even more silly and people reflecting that Hoon really was utterly out of his depth as Sec of State...
Capability and necessity? When have the beancounters in MoD ever factored that into the equation?
NE - is your contention that it's the line put about that the Jags couldn't operate when hot that's "bo**ocks", rather than the upgrade? And that this rationale meant that JFH had to take the entire burden of the AFG task?
AIUI, the Jag could have been used, albeit with some limitations - but the fact that there was a very good chance of it making a very valuable contribution in AFG meant that it would have been terribly embarrassing for Swiss Des to have to explain why the RAF had to retire such a capable platform because the cash wasn't there to get it to its projected OSD, and even more embarassing if anyone started asking why TCH had decided to bin the whole fleet of such a useful aircraft early.
Since Des and Buff do a good enough job of embarrassing themselves without anyone else's assistance, cynics would suggest the Jag was kept out of the action for two reasons alone - to avoid making Des look even more silly and people reflecting that Hoon really was utterly out of his depth as Sec of State...
Capability and necessity? When have the beancounters in MoD ever factored that into the equation?
Suspicion breeds confidence
Arch,
Your points are very valid and I could not comment on the politics behind MoD decisions as I am not privvy to them. Their is no doubt that the Treasury wanted to bin the Jags and used every argument to make sure they were not used to justify their decision. If they were useful, then why get rid of them? It was the best CAS a/c operated by the UK and in the views of many could have contributed greatly to easing the burden on the Harrier force. I would be interested to hear the views of any Jag crew if they are willing to express an opinion. As I said, I have no axe to bear, I am just trying to get at the facts, not make personal attacks. I think the burden placed on JFH is unacceptable and I am surprised that the upper echelons of the RAF played along with this sham. Perhaps final salary pensions have too much do with clear decision making. Call me a cynic if you will.
Your points are very valid and I could not comment on the politics behind MoD decisions as I am not privvy to them. Their is no doubt that the Treasury wanted to bin the Jags and used every argument to make sure they were not used to justify their decision. If they were useful, then why get rid of them? It was the best CAS a/c operated by the UK and in the views of many could have contributed greatly to easing the burden on the Harrier force. I would be interested to hear the views of any Jag crew if they are willing to express an opinion. As I said, I have no axe to bear, I am just trying to get at the facts, not make personal attacks. I think the burden placed on JFH is unacceptable and I am surprised that the upper echelons of the RAF played along with this sham. Perhaps final salary pensions have too much do with clear decision making. Call me a cynic if you will.
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I am surprised that the upper echelons of the RAF played along with this sham
MM
Last edited by Magic Mushroom; 21st Jul 2007 at 17:02.
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MM,
An interesting response there:
I think the issue about it going to Afghanistan has been force levels. The deployment of the fin to the Stan has certainly been considered but the Tornado requires a much bigger manning footprint than the GR7.
So,, how many GR4s do the RAF have against the GR7? And why should the GR4 require a bigger manning footprint? My very clear recollection is that Maintenance manhours per flying hour for GR4 are significantly less than for GR7.
What I'm finding hard to understand (and I really would welcome some insight) is how JFH, with 4 front line squadrons, is overstretched by deploying 8 aircraft to theatre. Latearmlive - 9 out of 13 months on ops or the CVS? Sorry, but that sounds very much like ops normal for a Front Line Squadron to me. Hard dues, but not unusual, in my experience.
Equally, how is the Tornado fleet overstretched by one (am I right here - tell me if I'm wrong) operational deployment to Iraq.
I am not trying to chuck stones or offer disrespect to those on the front line - explanations would be welcomed.
Bottom line remains - we are building two socking great carriers, but are we getting the building blocks in place to generate the 'air' from them?
Engines
Engines
An interesting response there:
I think the issue about it going to Afghanistan has been force levels. The deployment of the fin to the Stan has certainly been considered but the Tornado requires a much bigger manning footprint than the GR7.
So,, how many GR4s do the RAF have against the GR7? And why should the GR4 require a bigger manning footprint? My very clear recollection is that Maintenance manhours per flying hour for GR4 are significantly less than for GR7.
What I'm finding hard to understand (and I really would welcome some insight) is how JFH, with 4 front line squadrons, is overstretched by deploying 8 aircraft to theatre. Latearmlive - 9 out of 13 months on ops or the CVS? Sorry, but that sounds very much like ops normal for a Front Line Squadron to me. Hard dues, but not unusual, in my experience.
Equally, how is the Tornado fleet overstretched by one (am I right here - tell me if I'm wrong) operational deployment to Iraq.
I am not trying to chuck stones or offer disrespect to those on the front line - explanations would be welcomed.
Bottom line remains - we are building two socking great carriers, but are we getting the building blocks in place to generate the 'air' from them?
Engines
Engines