Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Your points are well made JTO.
I tend to think that, the Flat Top Fanatics often miss the point that, despite the romantic allure of shipborne air power, it remains vulnerable to total negation due to its complete reliance upon the fickle support of bouyancy. 
OAP
I tend to think that, the Flat Top Fanatics often miss the point that, despite the romantic allure of shipborne air power, it remains vulnerable to total negation due to its complete reliance upon the fickle support of bouyancy. OAP
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I tend to think that, the land based airpower Fanatics often miss the point that, despite the romantic allure of land based air power, it remains vulnerable to total negation due to its complete reliance upon the fickle support of the host nation, and the fixed location of the airfield not being attacked. I wonder if anyone has ever built a weapon that can devastate a fixed location?
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The sun shelters are open-sided and of a style similar to those you'd expect to see used by the USAF in the Middle East, therefore you'd be trying to dehumidifying the planet! As I tried to explain, the jet has been tested ad nauseum in conditions far exceeding darkest Norfolk, plus those of most overseas locations we can expect to operate in. Total non-issue; "fake news" etc.
Last edited by MSOCS; 15th Apr 2017 at 06:36.
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For MAD DOGS & Englishmen to get out of the NOON DAY SUN: [they are smart Dutchies but...]
https://www.defensie.nl/binaries/lar...2/img_1211.jpg
https://www.defensie.nl/binaries/lar...2/img_1211.jpg
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 14th Apr 2017 at 23:28. Reason: dutch
I tend to think that, the land based airpower Fanatics often miss the point that, despite the romantic allure of land based air power, it remains vulnerable to total negation due to its complete reliance upon the fickle support of the host nation, and the fixed location of the airfield not being attacked. I wonder if anyone has ever built a weapon that can devastate a fixed location?
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Ken...Your 1200 km2 appears to be based on the assumption that the boat can do anything from carrying on straight ahead, to stopping dead and immediately proceeding at full speed in any direction. I have never seen an aircraft carrier do that.
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The sun shelters are open-sided and of a style similar to those you'd expect to see used by the USAF in the Middle East, therefore you'd be trying to dehumidifying the planet! As I tried to explain, the jet has been tested ad nauseum in conditions far exceeding darkest Norfolk, plus those of most overseas locations we can expect to operate in. Total non-issue; "fake news" etc.
of course as these basic models are due re manufacture shortly it wont really matter what happens to them..
However it's good to see some testing has been done on time and in budget then.....lol
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MSOCS,
Is Secretary James’ Block 3F full combat capability certification, as required by the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, still valid?
Answer by the DOT&E: For many reasons it is clear that Lot 10 aircraft that will begin delivery in 2018 will not initially have complete Block 3F capability.
- The program currently has 270 Block 3F unresolved high priority (Priority 1 & Priority 2 out of a 4 priority categorization) performance deficiencies, the majority of which cannot be addressed and verified prior to the Lot 1o aircraft deliveries.
- The program currently has 17 known and acknowledged failures to meet contract specification requirements, all of which the program is reportedly trying to get relief from the SDD contract due to lack of time and funding.
One of the items that must be redone for full Block 3F certification is retesting of the electronics in severe conditions within the flight envelope and operation theater. The new Block 3F electronics generate more heat requiring additional cooling to keep them within temperature operational limits. As time goes on, more deficiencies are bound to be discovered. All of the aircraft delivered without the full Block 3F capability will have to be reworked.
Is Secretary James’ Block 3F full combat capability certification, as required by the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, still valid?
Answer by the DOT&E: For many reasons it is clear that Lot 10 aircraft that will begin delivery in 2018 will not initially have complete Block 3F capability.
- The program currently has 270 Block 3F unresolved high priority (Priority 1 & Priority 2 out of a 4 priority categorization) performance deficiencies, the majority of which cannot be addressed and verified prior to the Lot 1o aircraft deliveries.
- The program currently has 17 known and acknowledged failures to meet contract specification requirements, all of which the program is reportedly trying to get relief from the SDD contract due to lack of time and funding.
One of the items that must be redone for full Block 3F certification is retesting of the electronics in severe conditions within the flight envelope and operation theater. The new Block 3F electronics generate more heat requiring additional cooling to keep them within temperature operational limits. As time goes on, more deficiencies are bound to be discovered. All of the aircraft delivered without the full Block 3F capability will have to be reworked.
Last edited by Turbine D; 17th Apr 2017 at 17:23. Reason: added sentence
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One can just imagine the rising outrage of the 'weight watchers' and their subsequent disappointment when it didn't noticeably affect aircraft performance.
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For those concerned about their weight - here is some old news....
F-35B Variant Quotes from DOT&E 2016
F-35B Variant Quotes from DOT&E 2016
"..."...Weight management of the F-35B aircraft is critical to meeting the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), including the Vertical Landing Bring-Back (VLBB) requirement, which will be evaluated during IOT&E. This KPP requires the F-35B to be able to fly an operationally representative profile and recover to the ship with the necessary fuel and balance of unexpended weapons (two 1,000-pound bombs and two AIM-120 missiles) to safely conduct a vertical landing.
▪▪ The program completed the final weight assessment of the F-35B air vehicle for contract specification compliance in May 2015 with the weighing of BF-44, a Lot 7 production aircraft. Actual empty aircraft weight was 32,442 pounds, only 135 pounds below the planned not-to-exceed weight of 32,577 pounds and 307 pounds (less than 1 percent) below the objective VLBB not‑to‑exceed weight of 32,749 pounds.
▪▪ The actual weights of production aircraft through Lot 8 have increased slightly, with the latest Lot 8 aircraft weighing approximately 30 pounds heavier than BF-44. Weight estimates for Lot 10 aircraft and later project weight growth of an additional 90 pounds, primarily due to additional EW equipment.
▪▪ Known modifications to the 14 Lot 2 through 4 F-35B aircraft, required to bring those aircraft to the Block 3F configuration, are expected to potentially add an additional 350 pounds, which will push their weight above the objective not-to-exceed weight to meet the VLBB KPP. This KPP will be evaluated during IOT&E with an F-35B OT aircraft.
▪▪ Estimates for FoM weight growth include an additional 250 pounds, which will exceed the vertical landing structural limit not-to-exceed weight of 33,029 pounds for the Lot 2 through Lot 4 aircraft. This additional weight may prevent these aircraft from being upgraded to the Block 4 configuration...." page 63
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/...2016f35jsf.pdf
▪▪ The program completed the final weight assessment of the F-35B air vehicle for contract specification compliance in May 2015 with the weighing of BF-44, a Lot 7 production aircraft. Actual empty aircraft weight was 32,442 pounds, only 135 pounds below the planned not-to-exceed weight of 32,577 pounds and 307 pounds (less than 1 percent) below the objective VLBB not‑to‑exceed weight of 32,749 pounds.
▪▪ The actual weights of production aircraft through Lot 8 have increased slightly, with the latest Lot 8 aircraft weighing approximately 30 pounds heavier than BF-44. Weight estimates for Lot 10 aircraft and later project weight growth of an additional 90 pounds, primarily due to additional EW equipment.
▪▪ Known modifications to the 14 Lot 2 through 4 F-35B aircraft, required to bring those aircraft to the Block 3F configuration, are expected to potentially add an additional 350 pounds, which will push their weight above the objective not-to-exceed weight to meet the VLBB KPP. This KPP will be evaluated during IOT&E with an F-35B OT aircraft.
▪▪ Estimates for FoM weight growth include an additional 250 pounds, which will exceed the vertical landing structural limit not-to-exceed weight of 33,029 pounds for the Lot 2 through Lot 4 aircraft. This additional weight may prevent these aircraft from being upgraded to the Block 4 configuration...." page 63
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/...2016f35jsf.pdf
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First, please understand I enjoy technical discussions and am not arguing against the premise of ballistic anti-ship missiles.
You have linked high speed with a precision problem, when the reverse can be true.
That depends on the nature of the warhead. I got the impression that the warhead being discussed 1) is "dumb" (no sensors, etc) and 2) is hypersonic (7000 m/s!) and derives all its killing energy from its kinetics (no explosives). For the warhead to have retained that kind of velocity all the way to its target it would have to be released/ejected from the sensor section at very high altitude, and since it's inert it must fly a ballistic trajectory from then on. That means the sensor(s) must have long range while seeing thru the heat of re-entry and simultaneously have extraordinarily high precision to direct the ballistic warhead to the distant target with any hope of hitting it. Modern main battle tanks have very high precision sensors and yet they have an effective range on the order of a few kilometers. The system being described would require orders of magnitude greater precision.
You also introduced a premise that the target position would only be known at launch and then lost over many minutes so requiring a new search. Modern targeting information can come from off-board sources and form part of the updated guidance solution.
It would appear that if tensions had escalated to the point that a hostile nation would attempt to sink a CVN, that both sides would engage in extensive EW. Maintaining a datalink to the missile during its flight in such an environment would seem to be highly unlikely. Further, the survival of the "off-board" sensor system that is tracking the CVN would also seem to be highly unlikely.
The Pershing example from nearly 50 years ago was to demonstrate the controllability and the ability for sensors to survive re-entry.
Pershing had an ablative heat shield to protect the radar sensor from a mach 8 re-entry velocity (about one third the velocity of this system's claimed terminal velocity of 7000 m/s.) The entire re-entry system did a 25G pull up maneuver after reentry to bleed speed, followed by a 30nm controlled glide. The radar did not switch on until the final terminal phase of the flight at considerably lower altitude to update the inertials so as to provide a 100m CEP for that final terminal maneuver. That is totally different than the system being described.
What was incredibly difficult all those years ago is considerably easier now - the hard miles have been done.
Indeed. But the system being described operates totally differently than the Pershing system and the resulting problem is orders of magnitude more difficult than the Pershing problem. So basically, the "miles" of this new system are much longer and immensely more difficult than the "done" miles. And BTW, the "done" miles were done by the USA, which has not shared that technology with its allies, much less its adversaries.
I would like to hope that the US could take and accept a hit on a CVN in harms way doing its job, without triggering total war - but you never know.
I believe you are correct and "hits" on various US ships over the past decades tends to confirm that. However, the system being described is of a "carrier killer", specifically designed and used not just to "hit" a carrier, but to sink it outright. Assuming it is successful, that to me is quite a different kettle of fish that will result in a rather devastating counter blow even if that blow is "proportional." For perspective, use of 59 Tomahawk missiles to destroy an air base was considered "proportional" for the use of a few chemical weapons against civilians. It would seem (but cannot be confirmed) that a "proportional" strike for the sinking of a CVN would be considerably more devastating.
The USN has flexed its muscles with CVNs rather effectively for many for peresepdecades in a rather one-sided use of firepower. It is understandable that potential adversaries have worked hard to provide a credible counter. Your point about them providing an effective area denial weapon is well-made and reflects current USN thinking.
During the cold war, the entire Soviet fleet was a sea denial system specifically designed to deny access to US carrier battle groups. In my opinion, anti ship ballistic missiles are a land based version of the same thing. They would be great for example to place CVNs in jeopardy in any kind of operation to retake Taiwan. But to prevent US projection of military power anywhere else? In my opinion, not so useful.
You have linked high speed with a precision problem, when the reverse can be true.
That depends on the nature of the warhead. I got the impression that the warhead being discussed 1) is "dumb" (no sensors, etc) and 2) is hypersonic (7000 m/s!) and derives all its killing energy from its kinetics (no explosives). For the warhead to have retained that kind of velocity all the way to its target it would have to be released/ejected from the sensor section at very high altitude, and since it's inert it must fly a ballistic trajectory from then on. That means the sensor(s) must have long range while seeing thru the heat of re-entry and simultaneously have extraordinarily high precision to direct the ballistic warhead to the distant target with any hope of hitting it. Modern main battle tanks have very high precision sensors and yet they have an effective range on the order of a few kilometers. The system being described would require orders of magnitude greater precision.
You also introduced a premise that the target position would only be known at launch and then lost over many minutes so requiring a new search. Modern targeting information can come from off-board sources and form part of the updated guidance solution.
It would appear that if tensions had escalated to the point that a hostile nation would attempt to sink a CVN, that both sides would engage in extensive EW. Maintaining a datalink to the missile during its flight in such an environment would seem to be highly unlikely. Further, the survival of the "off-board" sensor system that is tracking the CVN would also seem to be highly unlikely.
The Pershing example from nearly 50 years ago was to demonstrate the controllability and the ability for sensors to survive re-entry.
Pershing had an ablative heat shield to protect the radar sensor from a mach 8 re-entry velocity (about one third the velocity of this system's claimed terminal velocity of 7000 m/s.) The entire re-entry system did a 25G pull up maneuver after reentry to bleed speed, followed by a 30nm controlled glide. The radar did not switch on until the final terminal phase of the flight at considerably lower altitude to update the inertials so as to provide a 100m CEP for that final terminal maneuver. That is totally different than the system being described.
What was incredibly difficult all those years ago is considerably easier now - the hard miles have been done.
Indeed. But the system being described operates totally differently than the Pershing system and the resulting problem is orders of magnitude more difficult than the Pershing problem. So basically, the "miles" of this new system are much longer and immensely more difficult than the "done" miles. And BTW, the "done" miles were done by the USA, which has not shared that technology with its allies, much less its adversaries.
I would like to hope that the US could take and accept a hit on a CVN in harms way doing its job, without triggering total war - but you never know.
I believe you are correct and "hits" on various US ships over the past decades tends to confirm that. However, the system being described is of a "carrier killer", specifically designed and used not just to "hit" a carrier, but to sink it outright. Assuming it is successful, that to me is quite a different kettle of fish that will result in a rather devastating counter blow even if that blow is "proportional." For perspective, use of 59 Tomahawk missiles to destroy an air base was considered "proportional" for the use of a few chemical weapons against civilians. It would seem (but cannot be confirmed) that a "proportional" strike for the sinking of a CVN would be considerably more devastating.
The USN has flexed its muscles with CVNs rather effectively for many for peresepdecades in a rather one-sided use of firepower. It is understandable that potential adversaries have worked hard to provide a credible counter. Your point about them providing an effective area denial weapon is well-made and reflects current USN thinking.
During the cold war, the entire Soviet fleet was a sea denial system specifically designed to deny access to US carrier battle groups. In my opinion, anti ship ballistic missiles are a land based version of the same thing. They would be great for example to place CVNs in jeopardy in any kind of operation to retake Taiwan. But to prevent US projection of military power anywhere else? In my opinion, not so useful.
Last edited by KenV; 18th Apr 2017 at 18:20.
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Another Stemming SRVL / CVF/ Warty Sim Story with good pitchas: (see duck legs thrashing about - is it a bird - is it a plane - is it a STEMulator?)
F-35 fighter jet simulator training begins for pilots
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg
F-35 fighter jet simulator training begins for pilots
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg