So how vulnerable are the Falklands now ?
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So how vulnerable are the Falklands now ?
With the retirement of Ark Royal and all Naval fixed wing fighters how vulnerable are the Falklands to another uninvited Argentinian arrival.
I understand there are RAF fighters forward deployed to Stanley but would there presence be enough of a deterrent, and a powerful enough one ?
Anyone think that Argentina would be interested in 'trying again' ?
I understand there are RAF fighters forward deployed to Stanley but would there presence be enough of a deterrent, and a powerful enough one ?
Anyone think that Argentina would be interested in 'trying again' ?
A more sensible question would be - does Argentina have the capability to land and tackle a well defended outpost, and sustain themselves against any counter attack? The short answer is no.
Done to death on ARRSE, but essentially Argentina would need to massively increase its military in key areas to be able to present a credible threat to the Islands security. They don't have the ability at present to do this.
When discussed on ARRSE, this usually descends into Tom Clancyesque scenarios to try to work out how the Argentines could deny the airfield, and dislodge 1500 plus defenders, all the while having no credible amphibious capability. Suicide ninja penguins seems to be the plan...
Done to death on ARRSE, but essentially Argentina would need to massively increase its military in key areas to be able to present a credible threat to the Islands security. They don't have the ability at present to do this.
When discussed on ARRSE, this usually descends into Tom Clancyesque scenarios to try to work out how the Argentines could deny the airfield, and dislodge 1500 plus defenders, all the while having no credible amphibious capability. Suicide ninja penguins seems to be the plan...
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Without giving too much away about assets, locations and strengths:
1) Not sure that Stanley is suitable or equipped for Typhoon operations. It might have been made so, but I doubt it. Happy to stand corrected if I'm wrong.
2) I think the "1500 defenders" figure is stretching it, quite a bit. Other public arena information suggests that the figure is certainly no more than two thirds of that, possibly even half.
3) The scenario recently publicly outlined by the original Op CORPORATE TF Commander, Sandy Woodward, is viable. IIRC, Julian Thompson who also played a highly significant part (TF Land Forces Commander) also endorsed this scenario. It is plain and simple. Lose MPA, you lose the Islands.
The only way to prevent it is timely reinforcement. I'm sure the Reinforcement plan has been gone over and overhauled many many times since I last saw it in the late 1990's. Providing any warning signs are seen and acted upon promptly with no political fannying about, any immediate threat to the islands can be negated. The islands are not in any immediate danger of being over-run now or in four or five or ten years time, so long as we retain the capacity to reinforce.
What the future of the islands depends on is the political will of the Argentine and whether they see it as being achievable and do-able and desireable. I wouldnt be in a great hurry to scoff at their capabilities or what tools they have at their disposal.
We have proven on many occasions ourselves that despite the tools available to us that we are far from inviolable. We can - and have, through either lack of resources or equipment, lack of planning, lack of leadership, but never lack of courage - failed and failed badly in recent times. Incidents like HMS Cornwall's adventures in the Gulf, Nottingham being parked on top of a rock, T45's conking out mid-Atlantic, Astute being parked on a sandbank, the episode surrounding the capture of the Chandlers, Basra, setting up platoon houses in Afghan... the list goes on. We seem to have developed a highly annoying capacity for shooting ourselves in the feet.
What Argentina has to work out is where the tipping point is and whether they have the resources, the political will and the opportunity to assemble the requisite assets and carry out such a plan. They're not the same forces they were in '82, a lot has changed. It would not be wise to not only underestimate them, but also to think that we can continue reducing our resources to the point where reinforcement of the islands is jeopardised.
We do not - yet - lack the ability, the tools or the people to keep the islands. What we probably already do lack - and if we dont lack it yet, we very soon will - is the ability to recapture the islands if they were to fall.
1) Not sure that Stanley is suitable or equipped for Typhoon operations. It might have been made so, but I doubt it. Happy to stand corrected if I'm wrong.
2) I think the "1500 defenders" figure is stretching it, quite a bit. Other public arena information suggests that the figure is certainly no more than two thirds of that, possibly even half.
3) The scenario recently publicly outlined by the original Op CORPORATE TF Commander, Sandy Woodward, is viable. IIRC, Julian Thompson who also played a highly significant part (TF Land Forces Commander) also endorsed this scenario. It is plain and simple. Lose MPA, you lose the Islands.
The only way to prevent it is timely reinforcement. I'm sure the Reinforcement plan has been gone over and overhauled many many times since I last saw it in the late 1990's. Providing any warning signs are seen and acted upon promptly with no political fannying about, any immediate threat to the islands can be negated. The islands are not in any immediate danger of being over-run now or in four or five or ten years time, so long as we retain the capacity to reinforce.
What the future of the islands depends on is the political will of the Argentine and whether they see it as being achievable and do-able and desireable. I wouldnt be in a great hurry to scoff at their capabilities or what tools they have at their disposal.
We have proven on many occasions ourselves that despite the tools available to us that we are far from inviolable. We can - and have, through either lack of resources or equipment, lack of planning, lack of leadership, but never lack of courage - failed and failed badly in recent times. Incidents like HMS Cornwall's adventures in the Gulf, Nottingham being parked on top of a rock, T45's conking out mid-Atlantic, Astute being parked on a sandbank, the episode surrounding the capture of the Chandlers, Basra, setting up platoon houses in Afghan... the list goes on. We seem to have developed a highly annoying capacity for shooting ourselves in the feet.
What Argentina has to work out is where the tipping point is and whether they have the resources, the political will and the opportunity to assemble the requisite assets and carry out such a plan. They're not the same forces they were in '82, a lot has changed. It would not be wise to not only underestimate them, but also to think that we can continue reducing our resources to the point where reinforcement of the islands is jeopardised.
We do not - yet - lack the ability, the tools or the people to keep the islands. What we probably already do lack - and if we dont lack it yet, we very soon will - is the ability to recapture the islands if they were to fall.
Stilton,
RAF Mount Pleasant -- Sightseeing with Google Satellite Maps
or
Copy and paste the coords into Google Earth.
RAF Mount Pleasant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
RAF Mount Pleasant is roughly 30 miles to the west of Stanley.
TJ
RAF Mount Pleasant -- Sightseeing with Google Satellite Maps
or
Copy and paste the coords into Google Earth.
RAF Mount Pleasant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
RAF Mount Pleasant is roughly 30 miles to the west of Stanley.
TJ
Some fairly recent figures from Parliament on Falklands personnel strength.
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 12 Oct 2009 (pt 0097)
TJ
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 12 Oct 2009 (pt 0097)
TJ
Warfare has come along way in the past 30 years and fortunately for us, the Argentinian Armed Forces have not. They have received very little new equipment since the Falklands War and now have the second lowest military budget in South America. And for good reason. The last Generals in charge of Argentina were responsible for the disappearance of an estimated 30,000 people and there is serious distrust between the Army, Navy and Government (the Air Force is looked upon more favourably).
Yes, every Argentinian is taught at school that the islands are theirs and any mention of the words 'Las Malvinas' by the President will always get a rousing reception however comma, the educated person on the street realises that its nothing more than a political show piece. And no one (especially the president) is prepared to have a crack at the Falklands if it means giving the military more power.
Argentina have far bigger fish to fry at the moment, starting with the economy and corruption.
Yes, every Argentinian is taught at school that the islands are theirs and any mention of the words 'Las Malvinas' by the President will always get a rousing reception however comma, the educated person on the street realises that its nothing more than a political show piece. And no one (especially the president) is prepared to have a crack at the Falklands if it means giving the military more power.
Argentina have far bigger fish to fry at the moment, starting with the economy and corruption.
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A cloud of Tomahawks from where though, GF?
I'm assuming you know how close the sub will have to get to land to launch an effective attack?
And, you know as well that the Argentines have more MPA aircraft than we do?
Plus SSK's and other ASUW assets?
If the resident Brit sub down there is an SSGN, it could be plausible to retaliate using TLAMs, IF she's in a position to do so and IF the warheads aboard would allow for runway denial that could not be patched up in 48-72 hours.
Last time, earlier on this year we sent an SSN, Sceptre.
All of the Trafalgar class are SSGN's, likewise the Astute class, so we do, I guess, have the capability. However, given that we've barely been able to get Astute out of harbour before parking her on a sandbank and doing a couple of million quids worth of damage, I wouldnt venture that she's even had any kind of TLAM test firing yet, let alone be in a position to fire any in anger.
I guess what I'm basically saying is that last time in 82, Conqueror pretty much had the area to herself. Its a bit different now.
I'm assuming you know how close the sub will have to get to land to launch an effective attack?
And, you know as well that the Argentines have more MPA aircraft than we do?
Plus SSK's and other ASUW assets?
If the resident Brit sub down there is an SSGN, it could be plausible to retaliate using TLAMs, IF she's in a position to do so and IF the warheads aboard would allow for runway denial that could not be patched up in 48-72 hours.
Last time, earlier on this year we sent an SSN, Sceptre.
All of the Trafalgar class are SSGN's, likewise the Astute class, so we do, I guess, have the capability. However, given that we've barely been able to get Astute out of harbour before parking her on a sandbank and doing a couple of million quids worth of damage, I wouldnt venture that she's even had any kind of TLAM test firing yet, let alone be in a position to fire any in anger.
I guess what I'm basically saying is that last time in 82, Conqueror pretty much had the area to herself. Its a bit different now.
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The comments by former defence chiefs illustrate the primitive state of Whitehall thinking on the defence of the Falkland Islands. No matter that Argentina's military capability has for two decades been below the level of posing a threat to the Falklands; no matter that, despite token reassertion of their territorial claim, Argentine governments are now constitutionally pledged to respecting the way of life of the islanders: these retired officers view the South Atlantic as though nothing had changed sinced 1982.
It is to neither sides credit that UK and Argentine governments have failed to reach a lasting agreement over the territorial dispute while guaranteeing the islander's way of life. The potential is there: what is needed is a maturity and imagination on both sides. There should be no grounds for the Falklands to be a defence issue, or for anyone to be proposing that British tax payers fork out yet more for military power to be deployed to the South Atlantic
Robin Wallis, Hon Secretary, South Alantic Council
It is to neither sides credit that UK and Argentine governments have failed to reach a lasting agreement over the territorial dispute while guaranteeing the islander's way of life. The potential is there: what is needed is a maturity and imagination on both sides. There should be no grounds for the Falklands to be a defence issue, or for anyone to be proposing that British tax payers fork out yet more for military power to be deployed to the South Atlantic
Robin Wallis, Hon Secretary, South Alantic Council
I promised myself I'd stop responding to 'Oh noez Argentina can haz Malvinaz' threads, but I am too weak willed and bored to resist.
The situation the Argentines have to deal with as follows. To take the islands requires moving sufficient troop assets to be able to conduct an amphibious landing, then advancing to an airbase purpose built to be defended against external attack, across extremely difficult terrain. They will then have to conduct an assault against a base which has been waiting for just such an attack since it opened nearly 30 years ago and is well defended and designed for such an eventuality. They then have to take and hold the base, while defeating UK opposition, and then digging in against any counter attack.
The Argentines do not have any large scale amphibious shipping capability - to build this up would take years of effort to not only build the capability, but also develop the training and doctrine required to do so. Conventional military wisdom calls for a roughly 3:1 ratio of attackers - defenders. This means the Argentines will need to build enough shipping for nearly 4000 troops plus enabling elements like their J4 chain. So lets say 6000 troops all in.
Having built this, they then need to sail to the Falklands, conduct the largest amphibious landing since 1982, and disembark all their kit. They will then have to advance on MPA without being discovered in order to keep the element of surprise. If they are seen, then the reinforcement plan starts up and they are in trouble. If they try to deny the runway, then the reinforcement plan starts up and they are in trouble.
It took the UK several weeks to conduct a similar sized landing and then reorganise to advance on Stanley. Yet some people seem to think the Argentines will magically be able to do it in the same night, without being spotted and will retain the element of surprise.
There are often suggestions that the Argentines could land on the runway and do a commando raid. I would suggest that unless they've sabotaged all the air defence radars, such a raid may well be spotted and action taken to prepare for their arrival - even to the extent of temporarily denying the runway to prevent them landing.
I've often seen suggestions that somehow the Argentines will put together a massive strike package using their 20 front line aircraft and 3 C130 Tankers which will attack the runway, and deny it - ignoring the problem of how to get past the air defence radars and assorted defences. Also ignoring what the impact will be in the UK who will press the panic button and begin reinforcing.
I've also seen suggestions that the Argentines could somehow deny the runway, then maintain a CAP above Stanley and force us to surrender. This ignores the lack of sufficient tankers to do this, the small number of available aircraft, the likely presence of Rapier and an RN warship with VLS Seawolf (assuming its not been sunk) and so on.
All of these suggestions seem to have several things in common - they assume complete success by the Argentines in everything they do, which is a large assumption given they've not conducted an operation like this since 1982. It also assumes that the Argentines somehow magically break with 30 years of procurement hell and only spending about 1-2% of their budget on new kit, and somehow produce a completely new set of kit which they've never used before and then succesfully invade the islands, without the UK spotting any of this or adjusting its own defensive plans to match any change in threat in the region.
Of course all of these threads always manage to fail to answer the most important question of all - namely what reason would the Argentines have to launch the invasion? They've got one shot at pulling it off succesfully and if they fail then the president loses power, the military are humiliated and the nation as a whole looks stupid. The Falkands are a great unifying tool for any Argentine leader in trouble, but ultimately to make the leap from that to launching a hugely high risk invasion and running the risk of another war with a nuclear power seems to be a very strange thing to do. It makes no sense, and they have little to gain from it, when they could just do it peacefully and hope for the islands to be reintegrated over a few generations.
The situation the Argentines have to deal with as follows. To take the islands requires moving sufficient troop assets to be able to conduct an amphibious landing, then advancing to an airbase purpose built to be defended against external attack, across extremely difficult terrain. They will then have to conduct an assault against a base which has been waiting for just such an attack since it opened nearly 30 years ago and is well defended and designed for such an eventuality. They then have to take and hold the base, while defeating UK opposition, and then digging in against any counter attack.
The Argentines do not have any large scale amphibious shipping capability - to build this up would take years of effort to not only build the capability, but also develop the training and doctrine required to do so. Conventional military wisdom calls for a roughly 3:1 ratio of attackers - defenders. This means the Argentines will need to build enough shipping for nearly 4000 troops plus enabling elements like their J4 chain. So lets say 6000 troops all in.
Having built this, they then need to sail to the Falklands, conduct the largest amphibious landing since 1982, and disembark all their kit. They will then have to advance on MPA without being discovered in order to keep the element of surprise. If they are seen, then the reinforcement plan starts up and they are in trouble. If they try to deny the runway, then the reinforcement plan starts up and they are in trouble.
It took the UK several weeks to conduct a similar sized landing and then reorganise to advance on Stanley. Yet some people seem to think the Argentines will magically be able to do it in the same night, without being spotted and will retain the element of surprise.
There are often suggestions that the Argentines could land on the runway and do a commando raid. I would suggest that unless they've sabotaged all the air defence radars, such a raid may well be spotted and action taken to prepare for their arrival - even to the extent of temporarily denying the runway to prevent them landing.
I've often seen suggestions that somehow the Argentines will put together a massive strike package using their 20 front line aircraft and 3 C130 Tankers which will attack the runway, and deny it - ignoring the problem of how to get past the air defence radars and assorted defences. Also ignoring what the impact will be in the UK who will press the panic button and begin reinforcing.
I've also seen suggestions that the Argentines could somehow deny the runway, then maintain a CAP above Stanley and force us to surrender. This ignores the lack of sufficient tankers to do this, the small number of available aircraft, the likely presence of Rapier and an RN warship with VLS Seawolf (assuming its not been sunk) and so on.
All of these suggestions seem to have several things in common - they assume complete success by the Argentines in everything they do, which is a large assumption given they've not conducted an operation like this since 1982. It also assumes that the Argentines somehow magically break with 30 years of procurement hell and only spending about 1-2% of their budget on new kit, and somehow produce a completely new set of kit which they've never used before and then succesfully invade the islands, without the UK spotting any of this or adjusting its own defensive plans to match any change in threat in the region.
Of course all of these threads always manage to fail to answer the most important question of all - namely what reason would the Argentines have to launch the invasion? They've got one shot at pulling it off succesfully and if they fail then the president loses power, the military are humiliated and the nation as a whole looks stupid. The Falkands are a great unifying tool for any Argentine leader in trouble, but ultimately to make the leap from that to launching a hugely high risk invasion and running the risk of another war with a nuclear power seems to be a very strange thing to do. It makes no sense, and they have little to gain from it, when they could just do it peacefully and hope for the islands to be reintegrated over a few generations.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Anyone think that Argentina would be interested in 'trying again' ?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
but just using your post.The Stanley runway is only about 2800 ft therefore not suitable for GR4s.
MPA has two runways about 8500 and 5000 feet. There is almost 7000 feet of main runway after the intersection. You could get several MOS from those runways.
There are multiple exits from the aircraft shelters which would all need cutting and 16 shelters that may or may not contain aircraft.
There are so many targets that it would take a considerable time to neutralise the airfield even without an opposition and more time than it would take to reinforce them.
Not only that, the airfield hasn't got any closer to Argentina in the last 28 years.
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Thought I may add to this.
Firstly the Argies don't need to land a large initial force on the islands to secure a bridge head! Of the say 1500 military personnel on the islands only a small fraction are deployable around the islands, probably only a few hundred! How many miles of coast line and safe anchorages do the islands have? You are all forgetting the UK forces that retook the islands were able to bring ferrys and cruise ships into these anchorages so the need for amphibious ships is not that important! Mount Pleasent Airbase maybe easily defendable but all the Argies need to do is contain it! There is an airfield at Stanley which was extended for Phantom ops post 82 and although has since been shortened again I would guess that restoration of the extention wouldn't be too difficult.
The final point is that the Argies are increasing their defence spending just as we are cutting ours. Im not suggesting that we should be increasing our defence spending.
The simple matter is if the Argentine government had the political will and the Argentine people the stomach for it they probably could take the islands.
There are/were many deterrents and reasons they haven't tried since.
Firstly the Argies don't need to land a large initial force on the islands to secure a bridge head! Of the say 1500 military personnel on the islands only a small fraction are deployable around the islands, probably only a few hundred! How many miles of coast line and safe anchorages do the islands have? You are all forgetting the UK forces that retook the islands were able to bring ferrys and cruise ships into these anchorages so the need for amphibious ships is not that important! Mount Pleasent Airbase maybe easily defendable but all the Argies need to do is contain it! There is an airfield at Stanley which was extended for Phantom ops post 82 and although has since been shortened again I would guess that restoration of the extention wouldn't be too difficult.
The final point is that the Argies are increasing their defence spending just as we are cutting ours. Im not suggesting that we should be increasing our defence spending.
The simple matter is if the Argentine government had the political will and the Argentine people the stomach for it they probably could take the islands.
There are/were many deterrents and reasons they haven't tried since.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Onion, so far so good, but your Arg SF would need to neutralise MPA as an air base otherwise any attempt to utilise Stanley as an enemy base would be doomed to failure.
Return to the original campaign. The defending for never established local air superiority even before the task force arrived.
Return to the original campaign. The defending for never established local air superiority even before the task force arrived.
"How many miles of coast line and safe anchorages do the islands have? You are all forgetting the UK forces that retook the islands were able to bring ferrys and cruise ships into these anchorages so the need for amphibious ships is not that important!"
Actually the need for amphibs is critical - particularly in this sort of proposed operation. To land troops properly, you need to be able to put them on with their kit, and be able to take them off with the right kit in the right time.
You need to invest heavily in landing craft to put anything above a person ashore, you need to run decent control of the operation (hence Albion and Bulwark have very expensive C3 kit out) and you need to be able to move your people around. Ferries are great to get someone to Point A, but to move them ashore requires specific kit.
End result would be a bunch of ferries slowly putting people ashore in ships boats, with no means of moving heavier kit ashore, and then watching as the troops sit there with no support and are totally exposed.
"The final point is that the Argies are increasing their defence spending just as we are cutting ours. Im not suggesting that we should be increasing our defence spending."
The bulk of the Argentine budget is used to pay for their pay and pension costs and not capital acquisition. The bulk of their fleet has barely been to sea in decades as they cant afford the running costs.
"Mount Pleasent Airbase maybe easily defendable but all the Argies need to do is contain it"
How do you 'contain' a facility which is geographically large, has multiple capabilities and is designed to be used in this manner when you don't possess an amphibious fleet to put the equipment ashore which would be needed for this sort of business (e.g. artillery, heavy mortars etc). At best on their current laydown, the Argentines could put a light infantry group ashore. How does this 'contain' MPA?
Actually the need for amphibs is critical - particularly in this sort of proposed operation. To land troops properly, you need to be able to put them on with their kit, and be able to take them off with the right kit in the right time.
You need to invest heavily in landing craft to put anything above a person ashore, you need to run decent control of the operation (hence Albion and Bulwark have very expensive C3 kit out) and you need to be able to move your people around. Ferries are great to get someone to Point A, but to move them ashore requires specific kit.
End result would be a bunch of ferries slowly putting people ashore in ships boats, with no means of moving heavier kit ashore, and then watching as the troops sit there with no support and are totally exposed.
"The final point is that the Argies are increasing their defence spending just as we are cutting ours. Im not suggesting that we should be increasing our defence spending."
The bulk of the Argentine budget is used to pay for their pay and pension costs and not capital acquisition. The bulk of their fleet has barely been to sea in decades as they cant afford the running costs.
"Mount Pleasent Airbase maybe easily defendable but all the Argies need to do is contain it"
How do you 'contain' a facility which is geographically large, has multiple capabilities and is designed to be used in this manner when you don't possess an amphibious fleet to put the equipment ashore which would be needed for this sort of business (e.g. artillery, heavy mortars etc). At best on their current laydown, the Argentines could put a light infantry group ashore. How does this 'contain' MPA?
It is concievably possible for War to be revisited giving circumstances in other countries that require support to be dragged elsewhere.
Given the tentacles of US Intelligence within Argentina perhaps they would provide some information on this occasion as firmly believe original War was given a US nod to prevent Maggie flogging off the fleet, the US bonus was getting Cruise missiles into UK.
Given the tentacles of US Intelligence within Argentina perhaps they would provide some information on this occasion as firmly believe original War was given a US nod to prevent Maggie flogging off the fleet, the US bonus was getting Cruise missiles into UK.
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Jimlad I did not suggest that it would be done soley by ferrys and cruise ships! To secure bridgeheads you would usually land light troops, hence why we have the Royal Marines.
Containing Mount Pleasent isn't too difficult! Lets face it 4 Typhoons would be very highly tasked with invasion forces as well as trying to maintain air superiority as well. Portable air defence capabilitys can be placed to stop the comings and goings from Mount Pleasent and then you have it conatined!
We know the frontline fighting troops on the Falklands are only a fraction of the personnel based on the islands.
Yes I am assuming that intel wouldn't give us much more than 24hrs warning (in which time you would hope assets could be deployed south to reinforce) but we have been known to misinterpret intel before!
May of been vague before but what I am trying to get at is that there is an errosion of the deterrent (carrier strike force etc) while the Argies are actually increasing their defence budget and their escalation in aggressive stance on rights of passage for shipping in the area! In areas of defence I sometimes wonder if we learn!
Containing Mount Pleasent isn't too difficult! Lets face it 4 Typhoons would be very highly tasked with invasion forces as well as trying to maintain air superiority as well. Portable air defence capabilitys can be placed to stop the comings and goings from Mount Pleasent and then you have it conatined!
We know the frontline fighting troops on the Falklands are only a fraction of the personnel based on the islands.
Yes I am assuming that intel wouldn't give us much more than 24hrs warning (in which time you would hope assets could be deployed south to reinforce) but we have been known to misinterpret intel before!
May of been vague before but what I am trying to get at is that there is an errosion of the deterrent (carrier strike force etc) while the Argies are actually increasing their defence budget and their escalation in aggressive stance on rights of passage for shipping in the area! In areas of defence I sometimes wonder if we learn!