EK207 Jfk
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Jack...I have not seen the email to which you refer...but I can guess at its tone. Im wondering.."what can no longer be tolerated"? Letting Pilots be Pilots and fly aeroplanes? Pilots being "heads down" close to the ground..pushing buttons hoping that the FMC will do what its asked?...or the BS that flows from the Bouncy Castle in a continuing effort justify their positions ( What ever Sky Pixie they believe in..help them) ?
When I left, almost 3 years ago..I did not think the wheels could come off much more..but they have. Burnt one 777...tried to park a couple of A380s in a suburb or two..plus numerous other "events".
What the hell is going on..?
When I left, almost 3 years ago..I did not think the wheels could come off much more..but they have. Burnt one 777...tried to park a couple of A380s in a suburb or two..plus numerous other "events".
What the hell is going on..?
Essentially due of a lack of expertise - EK Fleet mgt are running their Dept and pilots so wound up and tight that the there is a lack of conscious and subconscious mental freedom to aviate.
That lack of expertise is not driven by a deficiency in IQ or honorable intent - but more due the fact that a few key stake holders have never worked in any other culture or corporation and thus have no reference point in how it’s done elsewhere.
The over engineering of SOPs has so dumbed down the process that the elasticity of thought in any given situation has gone from instinct of logical action - to imitating by rote what the latest FCI or Manual says.
The most important tool any experienced pilot has at his/her disposal - is gut.
EK has removed any support to the pilot who uses that ‘gut’ tool in split second decisions by initiating a policy of termination for errors.
It is obvious to most that this ill thought out policy will lead to an accident...which will inevitably lead to the Co apportioning culpability to the pilots as against the root cause - being the Co.
It’s a tainted circle that rarely ends well.
Last edited by fliion; 23rd Dec 2017 at 19:50.
short flights long nights
Thank you for that excellent reply. fliion. I would like to nominate it for post of the year.
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This summarises everything!
"Is that allowed?", "what does the book say?", "can we do that?", "can we get in trouble for this?" or "the company want's us to do it that way" shouldn't be the first things that come to mind when flying an airplane where common sense and judgement has to prevail.
"Is that allowed?", "what does the book say?", "can we do that?", "can we get in trouble for this?" or "the company want's us to do it that way" shouldn't be the first things that come to mind when flying an airplane where common sense and judgement has to prevail.
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Don't know about EK, but in my "slice of heaven" here in the sandpit, I always say : " X expects from us a high standard ops, in very low standard airports where standard is a word that only exists in the Google search..." Never been into JFK, but after OOMM southboun'....ooooooh boooy!
Merry Christmas folks!
Merry Christmas folks!
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The hilarity is a (somewhat) shortened re-brief below 10,000 and above 5000.
What is most important here is that we debate at length whether its inclusive of 10,000 and 5000 feet and is it based on QFE, QHN, GPS or some other way of determining height above the ground. Also what is very important is will there be a conversion chart made available for these altitudes for use in briefings in Chinese airspace?
As usual: BOAT=MISSED, DIRT=UNDER CARPET, PLOT= NOT AVAILABLE
Thoughts?
Last edited by The Outlaw; 26th Dec 2017 at 06:09. Reason: Missed a comma. Was afraid the post would become a Airbus vs. Boeing disaster. That's "Tractor vs. Dugong" for the OZ crowd
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Being an old duffer and therefore saddled with outdated and unwanted qualities, such as airmanship, common sense, lateral thinking etc, I find the evolving EK approach to line ops in general and post incident reaction to be very worrying. The above qualities were instilled in me when I started flying over 40 years ago and were always being refined and reinforced, by a succession of wide body airlines - until I joined Emirates.
When I agreed to join EK as a DEC I was told I was being recruited for my experience and ability to see the big picture. However, it is becoming more and more apparent that this is actually the last thing our employer wants.
More and more, I am forming the opinion that I was recruited under false pretences and I think it might be time to join the long list of people who have already voted with their feet. And that would be a shame as there are some great operators and some extremely nice people here - but nearly everyone I fly with feels 'inhibited' (their words, not mine) by company policy and culture.
A top down culture change is needed. It isn't going to happen, so either stay and make the best of it or get out. They are the only options.
When I agreed to join EK as a DEC I was told I was being recruited for my experience and ability to see the big picture. However, it is becoming more and more apparent that this is actually the last thing our employer wants.
More and more, I am forming the opinion that I was recruited under false pretences and I think it might be time to join the long list of people who have already voted with their feet. And that would be a shame as there are some great operators and some extremely nice people here - but nearly everyone I fly with feels 'inhibited' (their words, not mine) by company policy and culture.
A top down culture change is needed. It isn't going to happen, so either stay and make the best of it or get out. They are the only options.
short flights long nights
So how many briefings are required for the one approach exactly?
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What is most important here is that we debate at length whether its inclusive of 10,000 and 5000 feet and is it based on QFE, QHN, GPS or some other way of determining height above the ground. Also what is very important is will there be a conversion chart made available for these altitudes for use in briefings in Chinese airspace?
As usual: BOAT=MISSED, DIRT=UNDER CARPET, PLOT= NOT AVAILABLE
Thoughts?
As usual: BOAT=MISSED, DIRT=UNDER CARPET, PLOT= NOT AVAILABLE
Thoughts?
What we must concentrate on here is... should the long briefing be interrupted by an early descent, should you or shall you:
a. Request a climb back up to cruise level to complete the briefing
b. Enter a hold between 5,000' and 10,000' and convert the mini brief into the long brief, mate
c. Go around and/or discontinue approach when you reach the unbriefed segment of the flight.
More for your benefit than mine.
Last edited by PositiveRate876; 26th Dec 2017 at 11:47. Reason: Oz to English translator issues
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Love this place. Another brief at 5000ft is going to fix everything, and not a safety issue at all! What a bunch of Muppets.
And heaven forbid you miss the FAF call or distance check when it's cavok on your line check or PPC.
Bracing myself for the next incident, there will be even LESS looking outside now. It's all going downhill at an alarming rate.
And heaven forbid you miss the FAF call or distance check when it's cavok on your line check or PPC.
Bracing myself for the next incident, there will be even LESS looking outside now. It's all going downhill at an alarming rate.
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What we must concentrate on here is... should the long briefing be interrupted by an early descent, should you or shall you:
a. Request a climb back up to cruise level to complete the briefing
b. Enter a hold between 5,000' and 10,000' and convert the mini brief into the long brief, mate
c. Go around and/or discontinue approach when you reach the unbriefed segment of the flight.
More for your benefit than mine.
a. Request a climb back up to cruise level to complete the briefing
b. Enter a hold between 5,000' and 10,000' and convert the mini brief into the long brief, mate
c. Go around and/or discontinue approach when you reach the unbriefed segment of the flight.
More for your benefit than mine.
Definition:
brief | brēf |
adjective
of short duration: president Trump made a brief visit to Moscow - to the amount of thought exuded by managers for introspection (see below).
• concise in expression; using few words: the resignation letter was brief and concise.
• (of a piece of clothing) not covering much of the body; scanty: Ruksanna sported a pair of extremely brief black shorts briefly before briefing removal of same.
noun
a concise statement or summary: the CP-A's brief stated the captain had been resigned.
• a set of instructions given to a person about a job or task: his brief is to complicate visual approach procedures.
• US a written summary of the facts and legal points supporting one side of a case, for presentation to a court due to the first point above
• a letter from the Pope, CP-A, Dwayne or EGT to a person or community on a matter of discipline.
verb [with object]
instruct or inform (someone) thoroughly, endlessly, droning on and on and on about meaningless gestures and the obvious especially in preparation for a very simple task: she briefed him on tomorrows approach today.
introspection | ˌintrəˈspekSH(ə)n |
noun
the examination or observation of one's own mental and emotional processes despite of limitation: quiet introspection can be extremely valuable. just not here.
Guys and girls, they are trying to proceduralise common sense, they are trying to invent another layer or method of compliance because the oxygen thieves higher up just don’t get it.
I’m doing what I’ve always done, I ignore this rubbish during my normal day and apply my own common sense. It’s served me well enough over a few decades of flying and when the inevitable question asks me...”why did you do this..and not that?” The answer is always the same.
I’m doing what I’ve always done, I ignore this rubbish during my normal day and apply my own common sense. It’s served me well enough over a few decades of flying and when the inevitable question asks me...”why did you do this..and not that?” The answer is always the same.
Nothing in this manual, however carefully outlined and precisely adhered to, can replace the exercise of good judgement and the application of conservative operating practices if conditions so dictate.
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Crazy.
Airlines have sterile cockpits below 10k for a reason. If you’re now spending time rebriefing something you spoke about 20mins ago, that’s surely just increasing chances of missing/mishearing clearances in a critical phase of flight.
Mauritius springs to mind
Airlines have sterile cockpits below 10k for a reason. If you’re now spending time rebriefing something you spoke about 20mins ago, that’s surely just increasing chances of missing/mishearing clearances in a critical phase of flight.
Mauritius springs to mind
short flights long nights
I was going to ask the same thing...what happened to the OMA requirement for a sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet?
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I agree totally that over proceduralization is not going to fix these incidents. It’s like attempting to ‘program’ the brain of a human, which they have been trying over the years. You better automate then all of it and the success rate will be 100%. Since automation has a 100% success rate for the tasks it is programmed for, the minute something happens that is not programmed for its failure rate is an equal 100%!! Automation can’t think but only follows instructions to the letter perfectly, hence the need for the human brain and the extraordinary capabilities to think and come up with solutions (common sense!!!) that will save the situation. It’s very unfortunate that HR departments with all their psychologists/psychiatrists are lacking common sense and not recognizing these extraordinary capabilities!! The human brain however also has it’s limitations, one of the main problems in the industry now is fatigue and an information oversupply which continuously tests the limits of simplification in order to keep it simple in order to keep full control of the situation. Continuous involvement in order to keep the brain current is absolutely essential. I guess we all have heard of the ‘KISS’ principle!! More procedures are just complicating the situation and are making the situation more difficult of which again must be counteracted by using up more simplification capacity from the human brain.
I have posted this previously, but I think this has some relevance to it. Ignoring the basic flying skills degradation is simply sticking your head in the sand and not being honest with yourself. I know it’s a bit of a read but I think it strikes the heart of the problem!!
Recent Accidents and events are due to LACK OF BASIC FLYING SKILLS!!
AF447, Asiana B777 at SFO and EK521!! Need anymore examples??
During the last decades CEO's of major airlines have been trying to satisfy themselves and their unsatisfiable hunger for automation!! A hunger for automation so incredible that convinced the industry that this is the only way forward in order to improve the safety record of aviation?? Perhaps in the back of their minds they themselves had some doubts, but proceeded anyway and were willing to take the risk.
The whole philosophy was changed in favor for an automated approach in every aspect of the operation in the airline industry. THIS INCLUDES FLYING THE AIRPLANE! Statistics has correctly proven that the shear majority of accidents and incidents are caused by human error. So is automating the pilot out of the loop the answer? Airbus with the introduction of the A320 and it's advanced systems in the late 80's thought so? Or were they convinced in order to meet airline CEO's desire for automation? (To save money?).
In my opinion this automation philosophy and their CEO's is on track to prove itself wrong! The above mentioned accidents are just prime examples of a lack of manual flying skills. Perhaps flying skills to those who were never given the opportunity to aquire in basic training, contributed to this automation culture and philosophy.
Basic manual and physical flying skills are and supposed to be the professional foundation of any professional pilot. It is like the foundation of a building you build upon. As pilots of current automated aircraft, protection of this very professional foundation is absolutely essential. What has happened in the last decades is that this basic and manual foundation has disappeared into the background if not disappeared at all. This is a recipe for disaster! It's like you are chipping away the foundation of that very building until it collapses. And that is exactly what's happening.
Pilots are not regularly involved anymore in the physical and basic manual flying operation of the airplane. Continuous manual and physical involvement of any pilot in flying the airplane assures the maintaining of a high level of manual and physical flying ability and protects that very important professional foundation of each pilot.
The airlines and their CEO's openly declare that they desire pilots to 'think outside the box' in order to save the day which is a correct strategy to avoid potential accidents and incidents. But how do you expect a pilot to save the day if the pilot is uncomfortable to 'ACT outside the box' when required to save the day? Even worse is that basic manual flying is now considered ‘acting outside the box’. Together with this lack of physical basic flying abilities comes the even more important lack of 'anticipation ability'!!! Solid basic physical manual flying abilities allow the pilot to see threats coming far ahead of time and allows the pilot to take very effective and corrective action in aircraft trajectories even before drastic action may be required. The chance for the pilot to be put into a situation and having to mitigate a serious situation is drastically reduced.
A prime example is the Asiana crash in SFO.
The accident reports suggest that one of the primary contributing factors is the unfamiliarity of the pilot with the automatic flight control systems. In my opinion, even if the pilot didn't understand the system and if the pilot just assessed the situation from a basic flying perspective the whole accident would have been prevented. The aircraft trajectory was low and slow, so what are the corrective actions from a basic flying perspective? If this pilot was accustomed and exposed to the regular basic and physical raw data flying of the aircraft, the anticipation ability and basic instrument scans would have prevented this accident. It's the easiest way to just put the blame on each individual pilot. But we now have too many individual pilots who make similar mistakes! Now you throw in some fatigue issues and the accident chain is complete! Too tired, no anticipation abilities, don't see the threat coming and there you have it!
Now we haven't even addressed the complexity of some modern flight decks where you would have to look carefully where you can recognize the basics!! This complex interface between man and machine is another serious problem which contributes to the already overwhelming amount of present distractions on the flight deck, which again moves a pilot away from basic flying duties. Modern cockpits seriously challenge your simplification abilities in order to keep it simple in order to keep full control over the situation e.g. Situational Awareness.
Me personally, I am a widebody captain, flying with a major international carrier. Currently with my 5th airline with 27 years of total flying. I am convinced that current airline CEO's are playing a game of Russian roulette on a daily bases. They are heavily reliant on the strong basic flying skills that the older generation pilots still have from the past to save the day and to protect their automation culture and philosophy. But it's coming to an end to what they can get away with. Newer generation pilots from modern flight training programs specifically tailored to the automation desires of current airline CEO's will have very limited capacity and anticipation abilities to avoid undesirable situations. It's not the individual pilots fault! They have never been given the opportunity to develop these all important basic manual flying skills to begin with. How do you expect them to mitigate in these undesirable situations and then to 'ACT outside the box' to save the day? Split second decisions and actions are not taken consciously but instinctively! In order to make correct instinctive reactions, especially associated with physical airplane control! Instinctive reactions are the result of background and learning experiences from the past. The FAA Aviation Instructor's Handbook in an excellent source of this background info and is free online.
Anytime when there's an undesirable situation with the flying operation of the aircraft, it's so easy to blame the individual pilot instead of looking at an industry wide problem that needs to be addressed.
The current situation in the airline industry with regards to the severely degraded physical and manual flying capabilities of airline pilots needs to be addressed urgently. Leading aviation authorities such as the FAA and airline CEO's need to recognize that their automation policies and cultures have failed. Sometimes a step back to the past is actually a step forward into the future. Not recognizing this and attempting to find a solution that allows this dangerous and outdated automation culture to survive is asking for the next smoking hole with loss of life. Instead some airlines are turning to hostile and intimidating actions towards individual pilots, thinking that that is the right approach as long as their automation culture can survive. Also thinkng that a few additional manual flying simulator sessions a year will solve this problem. They couldn't be more wrong. Sometimes it just destroys the confidence a pilot has by the confirmation in the sim that his/her manual flying capabilities are severely degraded and that A LOT more training is now required to feel comfortable.
A new strategy to re-introduce manual and physical flying requires very careful planning and innovation! Turning off the autopilot immediately right now would not be a wise idea, but instead a thorough thought out training program which reverses this culture and brings back basic manual raw data flying on a regular basis is in my opinion the only answer. No matter what the size the aircraft is, C-172, A320 or B747 they all fly the same way. When flying raw data, no auto thrust or flight director keeps you associated with the basics:
- increases your own confidence in your abilities,
- increases your anticipation ability because you know what you can expect from your airplane,
- recognize early potential undesirable situations,
- increases your spare capacity when you do engage the automation since manual flying is no longer considered a workload or is acting ‘outside the box’ since you're used to it and your confidence in your colleagues.
- And not to forget the all important basic instrument scan comes back, which again becomes a second nature and will save the day to prevent further undesirable situations in the future. Extremely beneficial in the role of Pilot Monitoring, now you have 2 current pilots with an effective basic instrument scan which is most effective to prevent dangerous aircraft trajectories.
This requires a considerable financial investment and it is up to the airline CEO's if they are prepared to make that investment. Not doing this would be very short term thinking instead of a long term future investment in safety. It is not easy but a very serious challenge since we have effectively already and almost past a point of no return. We need manual flying TRAINING, TRAINING AND TRAINING!! Not a checkride!!
One previous airline CEO Stelios from easyJet said: 'If you think safety is expensive, try an accident!'
Here's another last closing statement from the ‘Children of the magenta’ by Capt. Warren Vander Bergh at American Airlines:
We are first and foremost Captains and pilots. But we must also be effective cockpit managers. On our automated flight decks we must manage the various levels of automation available to us. Clearly increasing levels of automation will reduce workload in most scenarios, however we must change the culture that drives us to operate at the highest levels at all times. Automation lacks the ability to create flexible responses in unanticipated changes in flight path requirements. So, in these circumstances, a lower level of automation should lower workload, and thereby preclude us from becoming task saturated and losing our situational awareness.
I have posted this previously, but I think this has some relevance to it. Ignoring the basic flying skills degradation is simply sticking your head in the sand and not being honest with yourself. I know it’s a bit of a read but I think it strikes the heart of the problem!!
Recent Accidents and events are due to LACK OF BASIC FLYING SKILLS!!
AF447, Asiana B777 at SFO and EK521!! Need anymore examples??
During the last decades CEO's of major airlines have been trying to satisfy themselves and their unsatisfiable hunger for automation!! A hunger for automation so incredible that convinced the industry that this is the only way forward in order to improve the safety record of aviation?? Perhaps in the back of their minds they themselves had some doubts, but proceeded anyway and were willing to take the risk.
The whole philosophy was changed in favor for an automated approach in every aspect of the operation in the airline industry. THIS INCLUDES FLYING THE AIRPLANE! Statistics has correctly proven that the shear majority of accidents and incidents are caused by human error. So is automating the pilot out of the loop the answer? Airbus with the introduction of the A320 and it's advanced systems in the late 80's thought so? Or were they convinced in order to meet airline CEO's desire for automation? (To save money?).
In my opinion this automation philosophy and their CEO's is on track to prove itself wrong! The above mentioned accidents are just prime examples of a lack of manual flying skills. Perhaps flying skills to those who were never given the opportunity to aquire in basic training, contributed to this automation culture and philosophy.
Basic manual and physical flying skills are and supposed to be the professional foundation of any professional pilot. It is like the foundation of a building you build upon. As pilots of current automated aircraft, protection of this very professional foundation is absolutely essential. What has happened in the last decades is that this basic and manual foundation has disappeared into the background if not disappeared at all. This is a recipe for disaster! It's like you are chipping away the foundation of that very building until it collapses. And that is exactly what's happening.
Pilots are not regularly involved anymore in the physical and basic manual flying operation of the airplane. Continuous manual and physical involvement of any pilot in flying the airplane assures the maintaining of a high level of manual and physical flying ability and protects that very important professional foundation of each pilot.
The airlines and their CEO's openly declare that they desire pilots to 'think outside the box' in order to save the day which is a correct strategy to avoid potential accidents and incidents. But how do you expect a pilot to save the day if the pilot is uncomfortable to 'ACT outside the box' when required to save the day? Even worse is that basic manual flying is now considered ‘acting outside the box’. Together with this lack of physical basic flying abilities comes the even more important lack of 'anticipation ability'!!! Solid basic physical manual flying abilities allow the pilot to see threats coming far ahead of time and allows the pilot to take very effective and corrective action in aircraft trajectories even before drastic action may be required. The chance for the pilot to be put into a situation and having to mitigate a serious situation is drastically reduced.
A prime example is the Asiana crash in SFO.
The accident reports suggest that one of the primary contributing factors is the unfamiliarity of the pilot with the automatic flight control systems. In my opinion, even if the pilot didn't understand the system and if the pilot just assessed the situation from a basic flying perspective the whole accident would have been prevented. The aircraft trajectory was low and slow, so what are the corrective actions from a basic flying perspective? If this pilot was accustomed and exposed to the regular basic and physical raw data flying of the aircraft, the anticipation ability and basic instrument scans would have prevented this accident. It's the easiest way to just put the blame on each individual pilot. But we now have too many individual pilots who make similar mistakes! Now you throw in some fatigue issues and the accident chain is complete! Too tired, no anticipation abilities, don't see the threat coming and there you have it!
Now we haven't even addressed the complexity of some modern flight decks where you would have to look carefully where you can recognize the basics!! This complex interface between man and machine is another serious problem which contributes to the already overwhelming amount of present distractions on the flight deck, which again moves a pilot away from basic flying duties. Modern cockpits seriously challenge your simplification abilities in order to keep it simple in order to keep full control over the situation e.g. Situational Awareness.
Me personally, I am a widebody captain, flying with a major international carrier. Currently with my 5th airline with 27 years of total flying. I am convinced that current airline CEO's are playing a game of Russian roulette on a daily bases. They are heavily reliant on the strong basic flying skills that the older generation pilots still have from the past to save the day and to protect their automation culture and philosophy. But it's coming to an end to what they can get away with. Newer generation pilots from modern flight training programs specifically tailored to the automation desires of current airline CEO's will have very limited capacity and anticipation abilities to avoid undesirable situations. It's not the individual pilots fault! They have never been given the opportunity to develop these all important basic manual flying skills to begin with. How do you expect them to mitigate in these undesirable situations and then to 'ACT outside the box' to save the day? Split second decisions and actions are not taken consciously but instinctively! In order to make correct instinctive reactions, especially associated with physical airplane control! Instinctive reactions are the result of background and learning experiences from the past. The FAA Aviation Instructor's Handbook in an excellent source of this background info and is free online.
Anytime when there's an undesirable situation with the flying operation of the aircraft, it's so easy to blame the individual pilot instead of looking at an industry wide problem that needs to be addressed.
The current situation in the airline industry with regards to the severely degraded physical and manual flying capabilities of airline pilots needs to be addressed urgently. Leading aviation authorities such as the FAA and airline CEO's need to recognize that their automation policies and cultures have failed. Sometimes a step back to the past is actually a step forward into the future. Not recognizing this and attempting to find a solution that allows this dangerous and outdated automation culture to survive is asking for the next smoking hole with loss of life. Instead some airlines are turning to hostile and intimidating actions towards individual pilots, thinking that that is the right approach as long as their automation culture can survive. Also thinkng that a few additional manual flying simulator sessions a year will solve this problem. They couldn't be more wrong. Sometimes it just destroys the confidence a pilot has by the confirmation in the sim that his/her manual flying capabilities are severely degraded and that A LOT more training is now required to feel comfortable.
A new strategy to re-introduce manual and physical flying requires very careful planning and innovation! Turning off the autopilot immediately right now would not be a wise idea, but instead a thorough thought out training program which reverses this culture and brings back basic manual raw data flying on a regular basis is in my opinion the only answer. No matter what the size the aircraft is, C-172, A320 or B747 they all fly the same way. When flying raw data, no auto thrust or flight director keeps you associated with the basics:
- increases your own confidence in your abilities,
- increases your anticipation ability because you know what you can expect from your airplane,
- recognize early potential undesirable situations,
- increases your spare capacity when you do engage the automation since manual flying is no longer considered a workload or is acting ‘outside the box’ since you're used to it and your confidence in your colleagues.
- And not to forget the all important basic instrument scan comes back, which again becomes a second nature and will save the day to prevent further undesirable situations in the future. Extremely beneficial in the role of Pilot Monitoring, now you have 2 current pilots with an effective basic instrument scan which is most effective to prevent dangerous aircraft trajectories.
This requires a considerable financial investment and it is up to the airline CEO's if they are prepared to make that investment. Not doing this would be very short term thinking instead of a long term future investment in safety. It is not easy but a very serious challenge since we have effectively already and almost past a point of no return. We need manual flying TRAINING, TRAINING AND TRAINING!! Not a checkride!!
One previous airline CEO Stelios from easyJet said: 'If you think safety is expensive, try an accident!'
Here's another last closing statement from the ‘Children of the magenta’ by Capt. Warren Vander Bergh at American Airlines:
We are first and foremost Captains and pilots. But we must also be effective cockpit managers. On our automated flight decks we must manage the various levels of automation available to us. Clearly increasing levels of automation will reduce workload in most scenarios, however we must change the culture that drives us to operate at the highest levels at all times. Automation lacks the ability to create flexible responses in unanticipated changes in flight path requirements. So, in these circumstances, a lower level of automation should lower workload, and thereby preclude us from becoming task saturated and losing our situational awareness.
Last edited by FL XXX; 27th Dec 2017 at 08:12.
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For clarity even the English would understand.
The Outlaw would like to retract:
"Ruksanna sported a pair of extremely brief black shorts briefly before briefing removal of same."
Please see the following simplified brief regarding brief briefs:
Ruksanna has now been briefly de-briefed regarding the de-briefing of her brief briefs at the briefing briefly before the grief de-briefing of the brief brief de-briefing. All briefs will now be briefed before the de-breif-breifing and rebreifed briefly at the 10,000 pre brief brief briefing.
Flight crews are expected to apply the new changes.
"Ruksanna sported a pair of extremely brief black shorts briefly before briefing removal of same."
Please see the following simplified brief regarding brief briefs:
Ruksanna has now been briefly de-briefed regarding the de-briefing of her brief briefs at the briefing briefly before the grief de-briefing of the brief brief de-briefing. All briefs will now be briefed before the de-breif-breifing and rebreifed briefly at the 10,000 pre brief brief briefing.
Flight crews are expected to apply the new changes.
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So, we are going to have the pilot flying (PF) who will be the briefing pilot (BP); the pilot monitoring (PM) will be the non-briefing pilot (NBP). At 5,000 feet, EICAS/ECAM will show a warning message if the PF-BP forgets to rebrief; then, he/she will file an ASR for not having rebriefed. Another ASR for having missed ATC call to turn onto the localizer ...