B777 Emergency DXB
Join Date: Jun 2001
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As pilots we tend to see things, understandably, from the operational point of view first and the business point of view second.
If Boeing had altered the auto speedbrake design as a direct result of the Cali tragedy (which, from an operational point of view, I think it should have) then it would be tantamount to admitting to a design flaw and leave Boeing exposed to a level of litigation and subsequent adverse publicity that it probably could not afford. As much as I hate the lack of a design change, I can understand why Boeing resisted it.
I am sure the same thing is happening now with the 737 Max, though after 2 accidents and multiple loss of life on a new type for apparently the same reason/design flaw, quite clearly a change has to be made.
The EK521 is very different in that all the information necessary to have avoided the accident was available - though it can certainly be argued that essential operating information was buried deep in the FCOM, not highlighted well enough and not taught and reinforced in either conversion or line training.
If Boeing had altered the auto speedbrake design as a direct result of the Cali tragedy (which, from an operational point of view, I think it should have) then it would be tantamount to admitting to a design flaw and leave Boeing exposed to a level of litigation and subsequent adverse publicity that it probably could not afford. As much as I hate the lack of a design change, I can understand why Boeing resisted it.
I am sure the same thing is happening now with the 737 Max, though after 2 accidents and multiple loss of life on a new type for apparently the same reason/design flaw, quite clearly a change has to be made.
The EK521 is very different in that all the information necessary to have avoided the accident was available - though it can certainly be argued that essential operating information was buried deep in the FCOM, not highlighted well enough and not taught and reinforced in either conversion or line training.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
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TOGA You little turd!
60% off ALL fuel and oil to the UK in The Battle of Britain was on Norwegian keel, Namely Nortraship.
Were the hell was the Yankee then.
Cpt B
Were the hell was the Yankee then.
Cpt B
Join Date: Aug 1998
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"If Boeing had altered the auto speedbrake design as a direct result of the Cali tragedy"
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
Join Date: Jun 2012
Location: Doctor's waiting room
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"If Boeing had altered the auto speedbrake design as a direct result of the Cali tragedy"
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
Join Date: Jun 2006
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Typical bashing of anything American. America is not a perfect place by any stretch, but a place BILLIONS would go if the gates were opened. When the stuff hits the fan who is called and who steps up?? Not Russia, Not China, Not Iran, Not Norway, Not Korea. So keep yapping!
It’s ironic that Drs bury their mistakes, we die in our mistakes but take countless others with us. We all make mistakes (readers of this forum know first hand by joining EK) but AA has more than their fair share of mistakes.
Strictly speaking, the design of how the speedbrake functions has remains unchanged, as they still need pilot action to be stowed. It's just the warning system alerting crew to speedbrake deployment with 'climb or higher thrust' set on either engine that has evolved with time.
Well done .. imo !
Join Date: Apr 2011
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"If Boeing had altered the auto speedbrake design as a direct result of the Cali tragedy"
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
They did. About four years ago. But since your average EK 777 pilot can't be arsed to read the manual almost nobody noticed.
The next time some plonker creates an ASR that indignantly reports that he got a "Config Spoilers" warning in flight when he knows that all config warnings are inhibited after V1 for the remainder of the flight the response should be.....
RTFM
RTFM 🤔🤔
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Join Date: Jan 2020
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I’m betting there were large sighs of relief in the EK muppet err training dept, roaches scattering when the light comes on springs to mind when they examined the incompetence contained within the aforementioned commanders training file.
What a joke, the guy was NEVER trained properly...no mention was made of the decision makers who decided that a robust training system was too expensive.
What a joke, the guy was NEVER trained properly...no mention was made of the decision makers who decided that a robust training system was too expensive.
Join Date: Oct 2017
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I’m betting there were large sighs of relief in the EK muppet err training dept, roaches scattering when the light comes on springs to mind when they examined the incompetence contained within the aforementioned commanders training file.
What a joke, the guy was NEVER trained properly...no mention was made of the decision makers who decided that a robust training system was too expensive.
What a joke, the guy was NEVER trained properly...no mention was made of the decision makers who decided that a robust training system was too expensive.
27 out.
Join Date: Jun 2002
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I thought it was a very thorough report. I was pleased to see them suggesting that boeing go back to the drawing board and fix their crappy autothrust system. I was flabbergasted to see that pushing thrust levers forward is not part of the go-around procedure..........and FMA annunciations not made. Right there are 2 things that could have avoided this accident.
I would also be surprised if the Fire Response Incident Commander still has his job.
On the plus side, I was particularly happy to see this line :-
I would also be surprised if the Fire Response Incident Commander still has his job.
On the plus side, I was particularly happy to see this line :-
The Investigation concludes that the cabin crew successfully managed the passenger evacuation to the highest professional standard, in line with their training, considering the numerous challenges they faced.
I thought it was a very thorough report. I was pleased to see them suggesting that boeing go back to the drawing board and fix their crappy autothrust system. I was flabbergasted to see that pushing thrust levers forward is not part of the go-around procedure..........and FMA annunciations not made. Right there are 2 things that could have avoided this accident.
When aviators are taught to rely on automation for flightpath and thrust control during critical phases and punished if they don’t comply it is inevitable that some fall into the trap of guiding rather than flying the aeroplane.
The simple fact in my view is that EK and specifically the company TREs/TRIs share a significant amount of responsibility for this accident due to their inaction, their complacency and their duplicity for not highlighting and correcting the very obvious flaws in the Initial/Transition/Recurrent training programme.
Those of us with significant 757/767/747 experience have always been aware of the Boeing AT logic, we were taught it correctly, it was also demonstrated correctly by trainers with years of experience...unlike many of the EK trainers who themselves merely regurgitate the limited and flawed knowledge EK has scared into them over their short careers.