EK407 - Tailstrike YMML 20 March
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The fact that two experienced guys made an honest mistake should ring alarm bells. The easy way out is get rid of them........and pretend the problem just went away.
As far as I'm concerned this could have happened to any one of us, has anyone from training thought of that????
Has anyone thought that this issue could well be a training issue or an issue with procedures?
As far as I'm concerned this could have happened to any one of us, has anyone from training thought of that????
Has anyone thought that this issue could well be a training issue or an issue with procedures?
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Capt Hair Y quoted
Has anyone thought that this issue could well be a training issue
If the trainers are doing their jobs correctly then it is an issue with SOP'sOR.... if the pilots made a mistake, why should training be responsible for the Human Factors error?
Trainers follow and teach SOP and they are not HF police.
Has anyone thought that this issue could well be a training issue
If the trainers are doing their jobs correctly then it is an issue with SOP'sOR.... if the pilots made a mistake, why should training be responsible for the Human Factors error?
Trainers follow and teach SOP and they are not HF police.
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So a reporter digging. If you actually work for EK why would you possibly want to talk to her. Yep good idea screw your own company so that Qantas, Etihad etc can take our pickings. Do you really think they are any better or is it just EK pilots and wannabes that feel the urge to beat the hand that feeds. Most other companies have the common sense to whinge in private and try and force the changes they need. The original article was utter sensationalist pants, perhaps we should all do TOGA take-offs to try and up the engine failure after take off stats. I have read a lot of crap about this incident yet the facts are still not in the open but might be tomorrow:
Fatigue/tiredness? - On the direct 407? One of our nicest layovers, give me a break. It is probably about the most alert you feel on any trip unless you decide not to rest.
Procedural mistake that anyone could make? - Sorry don't buy it, yep you can screw up the calculation procedure but what about a vague awareness of your aircraft's performance.
Bottom line the guys did not mean to screw up but did royally and if the numbers I have heard are to believed it is unbelievable. Flex 74, Flap 1 in Melbourne...... Before you start bleating holier than thou comments how many real EK 345 pilots that operate long haul feel the alledged lack of nouse is excusable? I feel sorry for the crew but to start slagging the whole of EK based on their mistake is a little sad. What do the aussie reporters call it? 'Tall poppy syndrome."
Fatigue/tiredness? - On the direct 407? One of our nicest layovers, give me a break. It is probably about the most alert you feel on any trip unless you decide not to rest.
Procedural mistake that anyone could make? - Sorry don't buy it, yep you can screw up the calculation procedure but what about a vague awareness of your aircraft's performance.
Bottom line the guys did not mean to screw up but did royally and if the numbers I have heard are to believed it is unbelievable. Flex 74, Flap 1 in Melbourne...... Before you start bleating holier than thou comments how many real EK 345 pilots that operate long haul feel the alledged lack of nouse is excusable? I feel sorry for the crew but to start slagging the whole of EK based on their mistake is a little sad. What do the aussie reporters call it? 'Tall poppy syndrome."
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How long do you guys want to keep going with this? The longer we keep drip feeding our opinions, the more the media get to blow it out of proportion (cos that's what they do to sell). EK loads are still good, company's still making money and new aircraft are still arriving and all it takes to lose that and our livelihoods (that means job losses for some of you) is negative media hype. Been here long enough to know that we are covered by the FOM and our own better judgement, nothing else. Pick your time chaps but now with a downturn in the global economy, swine flu and incidents, this is definitely NOT a good time! Safe flying comrades.
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Airbus Flex
In advance please excuse my Airbus/airline ignorance (corporate background) -
From previous posts, I find it quite eye opening that when you decide to 'flex' that you only have one option of maximum flex.
Can an A340 driver explain - for example, if you have a toga takeoff run required of 8500' and have a 12000' tora available on the day, does the A340 flex take your takeoff distance out to 12000' and/or max flex whichever is first?
Does it take you to the last brick at 35' or are there greater margins when you decide to use flex?
I take it that you don't/can't input a shorter TORA (than what is actually available) to give a greater margin yourselves?
From previous posts, I find it quite eye opening that when you decide to 'flex' that you only have one option of maximum flex.
Can an A340 driver explain - for example, if you have a toga takeoff run required of 8500' and have a 12000' tora available on the day, does the A340 flex take your takeoff distance out to 12000' and/or max flex whichever is first?
Does it take you to the last brick at 35' or are there greater margins when you decide to use flex?
I take it that you don't/can't input a shorter TORA (than what is actually available) to give a greater margin yourselves?
Last edited by jungle drums; 30th Apr 2009 at 07:28. Reason: spelling&grammar
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Preliminary report released
200901310
At 2231 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, an Airbus A340-500 aircraft, registered A6-ERG, commenced the take-off roll on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport on a scheduled, passenger flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates with 257 passengers, 14 cabin crew and four flight crew. The takeoff was planned as a reduced-power takeoff and the first officer was the handling pilot for the departure.
At 2231:53, the captain called for the first officer to rotate. The first officer attempted to rotate the aircraft, but it did not respond immediately with a nose-up pitch. The captain again called 'rotate' and the first officer applied a greater nose-up command. The nose of the aircraft was raised and the tail made contact with the runway surface, but the aircraft did not begin to climb. The captain then selected TOGA on the thrust levers, the engines responded immediately, and the aircraft commenced a climb.
The crew notified air traffic control of the tail strike and that they would be returning to Melbourne. While reviewing the aircraft's performance documentation in preparation for landing, the crew noticed that a take-off weight, which was 100 tonnes below the actual take-off weight of the aircraft, had inadvertently been used when completing the take-off performance calculation. The result of that incorrect take-off weight was to produce a thrust setting and take-off reference speeds that were lower than those required for the actual aircraft weight.
The aircraft subsequently landed at Melbourne with no reported injuries. The tail strike resulted in substantial damage to the tail of the aircraft and damaged some airport lighting and the instrument
landing system.
As a result of the accident, the aircraft operator has advised the Australian Transport Safety Bureau that it is reviewing a number of procedures including human factors involved in take-off performance data entry.
The investigation is continuing.
200901310
At 2231 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, an Airbus A340-500 aircraft, registered A6-ERG, commenced the take-off roll on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport on a scheduled, passenger flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates with 257 passengers, 14 cabin crew and four flight crew. The takeoff was planned as a reduced-power takeoff and the first officer was the handling pilot for the departure.
At 2231:53, the captain called for the first officer to rotate. The first officer attempted to rotate the aircraft, but it did not respond immediately with a nose-up pitch. The captain again called 'rotate' and the first officer applied a greater nose-up command. The nose of the aircraft was raised and the tail made contact with the runway surface, but the aircraft did not begin to climb. The captain then selected TOGA on the thrust levers, the engines responded immediately, and the aircraft commenced a climb.
The crew notified air traffic control of the tail strike and that they would be returning to Melbourne. While reviewing the aircraft's performance documentation in preparation for landing, the crew noticed that a take-off weight, which was 100 tonnes below the actual take-off weight of the aircraft, had inadvertently been used when completing the take-off performance calculation. The result of that incorrect take-off weight was to produce a thrust setting and take-off reference speeds that were lower than those required for the actual aircraft weight.
The aircraft subsequently landed at Melbourne with no reported injuries. The tail strike resulted in substantial damage to the tail of the aircraft and damaged some airport lighting and the instrument
landing system.
As a result of the accident, the aircraft operator has advised the Australian Transport Safety Bureau that it is reviewing a number of procedures including human factors involved in take-off performance data entry.
The investigation is continuing.
jungle drums,
At any time, the crew can always use higher power settings as they see fit.
This is normally only done when there is a reason to do so such as when adverse weather conditions exist at or near the airport etc. To use additional thrust under normal conditions is completely unnecessary due to the margins already provided. In any case, full rated thrust (and more in fact) is always readily and instantly available should the crew need it during takeoff.
To use max takeoff power always will result in significantly reduced engine life and increased risk of failure. It is akin to "flooring" the accelerator at the traffic lights in your BMW every time they turn green!
At any time, the crew can always use higher power settings as they see fit.
This is normally only done when there is a reason to do so such as when adverse weather conditions exist at or near the airport etc. To use additional thrust under normal conditions is completely unnecessary due to the margins already provided. In any case, full rated thrust (and more in fact) is always readily and instantly available should the crew need it during takeoff.
To use max takeoff power always will result in significantly reduced engine life and increased risk of failure. It is akin to "flooring" the accelerator at the traffic lights in your BMW every time they turn green!
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Certainly the crew can elect to chose a higher power, but this is NOT EK procedure. It may come to a surprise to the obedient scientologues at EK (like M 5.5) that this is practiced by many major airlines.
The procedures at EK dictate that you put in your actual weight and leave the power and flap setting to the computer, unless the MEL tell you otherwise. At no stage in the training there is mention that you can chose any other power/flap/weight etc. IT IS NOT SOP, and therefore not to be done unless you want to face quick sacking in the most minor event.
In other places you can chose to put in a higher weight margin, to receive less assumed temp (you need to trap wrong inputs differently, therefore NOT allowed at EK). You can chose a different flap setting, less for climb perf, more for runway margin (a TRE nearly failed me for doing this) etc. etc.
With such pilot flexibility you would additionally increase performance awareness, as you mentally juggle more than the strict SOP adherence. Maybe such increased awareness would have helped detect the apparently inadequate values for this MEL T/O.
Another thought:
Why bash Ellen for her question? We all know journalists, agree, but we can use this to our advantage. It's silly to pretend that any mention of EK deficits might lead to advantage for the competition. We should be completely outspoken about the deficits of the whole industry and EK. Why protect the criminals? Just because it works into our pockets as well? How hypocritical!
We should be known as to wanting to strive for the utmost safety, even if it means bashing our own managers. We should participate in building up pressure for improvement and sacking of the main culprits and not of our collegue victims.
The story of McLaren shows nicely, that cheating and lying should lead to the dismissal of the top liar and only mildly punishing the pilot, who had little choice but to abide by the rule of fear. McLaren and Hamilton will come out as the humble learners and will not lose their fans. And Ron alredha Dennis will be remembered for what he was: A cheat. Sport has won with all this.
Let's make EK, and with it us pilots, win with this near tragedy. Let's be outspoken with the deficits at our company. I agree the guys sc#ewd up badly. I agree they were not fatigued with this roster. But we all agree that there is much more to it. Distraction on the flight deck, rest facilities problems, company stress by rule of fear and middle aged leadership and CRM etc. etc.
Point this out in a professional way, give ideas how to improve and name the shame!
The procedures at EK dictate that you put in your actual weight and leave the power and flap setting to the computer, unless the MEL tell you otherwise. At no stage in the training there is mention that you can chose any other power/flap/weight etc. IT IS NOT SOP, and therefore not to be done unless you want to face quick sacking in the most minor event.
In other places you can chose to put in a higher weight margin, to receive less assumed temp (you need to trap wrong inputs differently, therefore NOT allowed at EK). You can chose a different flap setting, less for climb perf, more for runway margin (a TRE nearly failed me for doing this) etc. etc.
With such pilot flexibility you would additionally increase performance awareness, as you mentally juggle more than the strict SOP adherence. Maybe such increased awareness would have helped detect the apparently inadequate values for this MEL T/O.
Another thought:
Why bash Ellen for her question? We all know journalists, agree, but we can use this to our advantage. It's silly to pretend that any mention of EK deficits might lead to advantage for the competition. We should be completely outspoken about the deficits of the whole industry and EK. Why protect the criminals? Just because it works into our pockets as well? How hypocritical!
We should be known as to wanting to strive for the utmost safety, even if it means bashing our own managers. We should participate in building up pressure for improvement and sacking of the main culprits and not of our collegue victims.
The story of McLaren shows nicely, that cheating and lying should lead to the dismissal of the top liar and only mildly punishing the pilot, who had little choice but to abide by the rule of fear. McLaren and Hamilton will come out as the humble learners and will not lose their fans. And Ron alredha Dennis will be remembered for what he was: A cheat. Sport has won with all this.
Let's make EK, and with it us pilots, win with this near tragedy. Let's be outspoken with the deficits at our company. I agree the guys sc#ewd up badly. I agree they were not fatigued with this roster. But we all agree that there is much more to it. Distraction on the flight deck, rest facilities problems, company stress by rule of fear and middle aged leadership and CRM etc. etc.
Point this out in a professional way, give ideas how to improve and name the shame!
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Hey Pool,
as far as I know the captain is authorized by the company to apply more conservative margins if he considers it necessary. I occasionally have used a higher thrust setting or flap setting than the optimum calculated by the OPT because of a rough runway surface, possible windshear or whatever. I think what is discouraged is unnecessary conservatism and this is not an easy message to get across. Hard to draw the line sometimes. Mind you, some of these TRIs....
as far as I know the captain is authorized by the company to apply more conservative margins if he considers it necessary. I occasionally have used a higher thrust setting or flap setting than the optimum calculated by the OPT because of a rough runway surface, possible windshear or whatever. I think what is discouraged is unnecessary conservatism and this is not an easy message to get across. Hard to draw the line sometimes. Mind you, some of these TRIs....
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NO LAND 3
I basically agree, and have done it myself..... However, I challenge you doing so on your line check ......
The reason is that our laptops and SOPs do not provide for it. Maybe for a different flap setting, yes, allthough this was exactly what the TRE opposed. According to him, the flap setting in the laptop was there for a reason and therefore to be adhered to. I thought the laptop went for the most economic one and we could alter it for different safety aspects, but it seems no. Nothing is written to this aspect but the general SOP on how to use the laptop.
Concerning other conservative margins:
There would be the insertion of a different (higher) weight than actual. This results in a difference of Greendot or Vref on the FMC, thus impeding the gross error check, and not recommended. If you insert the same higher weight into the FMC, you'll get a different trim, again not recommended. Or you can insert a different (lower) ass-temp into the FMC, which in turn gives different V-speeds on the FMC, once again not recommended, as the error check with the laptop doesn't work. Unfortunately we cannot insert a lower ass-temp into the laptop, and that is precisely my criticism. Because with other methods I have come accross, this was possible and it is the only safe method, as both, laptop or other calc-means and FMC work with the same higher margin and correct weights, thus gross error check is possible.
Today at EK it's simple. The moment I am unhappy with any of the parameters, I go for full TOGA.
I basically agree, and have done it myself..... However, I challenge you doing so on your line check ......
The reason is that our laptops and SOPs do not provide for it. Maybe for a different flap setting, yes, allthough this was exactly what the TRE opposed. According to him, the flap setting in the laptop was there for a reason and therefore to be adhered to. I thought the laptop went for the most economic one and we could alter it for different safety aspects, but it seems no. Nothing is written to this aspect but the general SOP on how to use the laptop.
Concerning other conservative margins:
There would be the insertion of a different (higher) weight than actual. This results in a difference of Greendot or Vref on the FMC, thus impeding the gross error check, and not recommended. If you insert the same higher weight into the FMC, you'll get a different trim, again not recommended. Or you can insert a different (lower) ass-temp into the FMC, which in turn gives different V-speeds on the FMC, once again not recommended, as the error check with the laptop doesn't work. Unfortunately we cannot insert a lower ass-temp into the laptop, and that is precisely my criticism. Because with other methods I have come accross, this was possible and it is the only safe method, as both, laptop or other calc-means and FMC work with the same higher margin and correct weights, thus gross error check is possible.
Today at EK it's simple. The moment I am unhappy with any of the parameters, I go for full TOGA.
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Pool,
I know exactly what you mean.
I can guess where he's coming from but sometimes these guys take a principle beyond its practical application. I'd like to see him explain the latest co notam about OPT calcs with performance MELs! Or the fact that the manuals actually recommend a higher flap setting on rough runways. Another mystery: how come I can never think of these comebacks when put on the spot!
I know exactly what you mean.
I can guess where he's coming from but sometimes these guys take a principle beyond its practical application. I'd like to see him explain the latest co notam about OPT calcs with performance MELs! Or the fact that the manuals actually recommend a higher flap setting on rough runways. Another mystery: how come I can never think of these comebacks when put on the spot!
Pool,
the OPT/LPC etc software will optimise performance figures based on the greatest margin over the most limiting segment eg. field length/second segment etc. That is of course why "Optimum" is the default. If you have reason to want another flap setting etc - you force the OPT/LPC to use that, and it will spit out most likely a higher thrust setting requirement or even a MTOW weight limit if performance in that limiting segment becomes effected.
The technique that ensures all SOPs are covered is to use the optimum unless directed to use otherwise by FCOM supplementary procedures eg. possible windshear. This was the case in the current Phase 2. If you just went "optimum" in this case, you would have been marked down for it (there is no "Windshear" button on the LPC/OPT
!!!
So if you want to 'stack the odds in your favour' - (say you think the runway has rubber residue or your tyres ain't so great for example), and still follow the SOPs, then do all the figures as per correct weights - use the correct speeds, but bump the power up a little either when entering the flex (airbus/boeing) or indeed on the boeing after you've reached 80 knots on the roll. The performance figures are still valid (reference Vmcg, Vmca which are derived using TOGA) but you will reach the speeds earlier and climb at a greater rate.
The company will never send you a bill for using higher thrust settings than required, but have a reason to do so as it does effect engine life hence $$$.
My two cents worth!
the OPT/LPC etc software will optimise performance figures based on the greatest margin over the most limiting segment eg. field length/second segment etc. That is of course why "Optimum" is the default. If you have reason to want another flap setting etc - you force the OPT/LPC to use that, and it will spit out most likely a higher thrust setting requirement or even a MTOW weight limit if performance in that limiting segment becomes effected.
The technique that ensures all SOPs are covered is to use the optimum unless directed to use otherwise by FCOM supplementary procedures eg. possible windshear. This was the case in the current Phase 2. If you just went "optimum" in this case, you would have been marked down for it (there is no "Windshear" button on the LPC/OPT
!!!So if you want to 'stack the odds in your favour' - (say you think the runway has rubber residue or your tyres ain't so great for example), and still follow the SOPs, then do all the figures as per correct weights - use the correct speeds, but bump the power up a little either when entering the flex (airbus/boeing) or indeed on the boeing after you've reached 80 knots on the roll. The performance figures are still valid (reference Vmcg, Vmca which are derived using TOGA) but you will reach the speeds earlier and climb at a greater rate.
The company will never send you a bill for using higher thrust settings than required, but have a reason to do so as it does effect engine life hence $$$.
My two cents worth!
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Do explain what you mean by "marked down on rerurrent for using optimum flaps". Check FCOM 3.04.91 p4. I think you met a cranky special needs TRI on your phase 2 
Because windshear is a possibility as XXTS in the vicinity - FCOM Supp (Boeing and Airbus similar I believe) recommends a higher flap setting etc. And surprise surprise, guess what you get on takeoff!! 
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EK self-defending Article in Flight International
Blablabla..
DATE:30/04/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Emirates defends safety regime
By
Emirates today issued a statement defending its safety practices in response to the preliminary report of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into the Airbus A340-500 take-off overrun at Melbourne last month.
The statement reads as follows:
Emirates has reviewed the ATSB preliminary report on its flight EK407 from Melbourne to Dubai on 20th March 2009. Emirates accepts the contents of the report.
The Melbourne event is being treated very seriously and with the highest priority at the most senior level in the company. The safety of Emirates' passengers, crew and aircraft is the organisation's top priority and is placed before anything else.
Immediately following the event, Emirates initiated an internal investigation of the incident through a formal in-house board of enquiry. The aim is to ensure that such an event does not occur again, given the airline's rigorous and internationally-recognised safety, training and operational standards.
Emirates' existing standard operating procedures are robust; incorporate within them structured and multi-layered checks and balances; and are also in line with procedures specified by the manufacturer. Emirates ongoing investigation will focus on why the data input error, as outlined in its own investigation as well as in the ATSB report, occurred and was not detected through the safety processes.
Emirates' existing procedures - approved by the manufacturer and regulatory authority - if correctly followed are indeed very safe. However, to further enhance these procedures and to allow the ATSB investigation to run its course, Emirates has proactively put in place additional physical safeguards to perform independent performance calculations using two computers. Additional technical enhancements have also been initiated.
Under a state air safety investigation, the official investigating body (in this instance ATSB) has the legal responsibility and takes possession of relevant information and data captured through the flight data recorders. Within this framework, Emirates' ongoing internal investigation includes the review of human factors, training, fleet technical and procedures, hardware and software technology, as it is industry practice to review all aspects of the operation following an event of this nature.
Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates Group. Emirates' modern and young aircraft fleet is safely operated according to the standard operating procedures specified in the flight crew operating manual - a document supplied to Emirates by the aircraft manufacturer. Additionally, the airline's internal policies regarding operational safety are contained in the Emirates flight operations manual. Both documents are approved by the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority.
Emirates has a dedicated, independent, safety department which includes a flight safety unit. Emirates' Flight Safety comprises managers and pilots, who are experts in their respective fields, to provide investigation and safety advice. The unit proactively promotes innovative ideas and technology in the following areas in order to improve operational safety.
• Voluntarily introducing systems to improve operational safety
• Meeting international safety standards, often before these are mandated
• Setting Safety best practices
• Initiating and participating in international safety forums
At present, repair options for the aircraft are under consideration in conjunction with the manufacturer. A final decision on the form of repair of the aircraft is yet to be taken.
DATE:30/04/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Emirates defends safety regime
By
Emirates today issued a statement defending its safety practices in response to the preliminary report of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into the Airbus A340-500 take-off overrun at Melbourne last month.
The statement reads as follows:
Emirates has reviewed the ATSB preliminary report on its flight EK407 from Melbourne to Dubai on 20th March 2009. Emirates accepts the contents of the report.
The Melbourne event is being treated very seriously and with the highest priority at the most senior level in the company. The safety of Emirates' passengers, crew and aircraft is the organisation's top priority and is placed before anything else.
Immediately following the event, Emirates initiated an internal investigation of the incident through a formal in-house board of enquiry. The aim is to ensure that such an event does not occur again, given the airline's rigorous and internationally-recognised safety, training and operational standards.
Emirates' existing standard operating procedures are robust; incorporate within them structured and multi-layered checks and balances; and are also in line with procedures specified by the manufacturer. Emirates ongoing investigation will focus on why the data input error, as outlined in its own investigation as well as in the ATSB report, occurred and was not detected through the safety processes.
Emirates' existing procedures - approved by the manufacturer and regulatory authority - if correctly followed are indeed very safe. However, to further enhance these procedures and to allow the ATSB investigation to run its course, Emirates has proactively put in place additional physical safeguards to perform independent performance calculations using two computers. Additional technical enhancements have also been initiated.
Under a state air safety investigation, the official investigating body (in this instance ATSB) has the legal responsibility and takes possession of relevant information and data captured through the flight data recorders. Within this framework, Emirates' ongoing internal investigation includes the review of human factors, training, fleet technical and procedures, hardware and software technology, as it is industry practice to review all aspects of the operation following an event of this nature.
Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates Group. Emirates' modern and young aircraft fleet is safely operated according to the standard operating procedures specified in the flight crew operating manual - a document supplied to Emirates by the aircraft manufacturer. Additionally, the airline's internal policies regarding operational safety are contained in the Emirates flight operations manual. Both documents are approved by the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority.
Emirates has a dedicated, independent, safety department which includes a flight safety unit. Emirates' Flight Safety comprises managers and pilots, who are experts in their respective fields, to provide investigation and safety advice. The unit proactively promotes innovative ideas and technology in the following areas in order to improve operational safety.
• Voluntarily introducing systems to improve operational safety
• Meeting international safety standards, often before these are mandated
• Setting Safety best practices
• Initiating and participating in international safety forums
At present, repair options for the aircraft are under consideration in conjunction with the manufacturer. A final decision on the form of repair of the aircraft is yet to be taken.
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The aim is to ensure that such an event does not occur again, given the airline's rigorous and internationally-recognised safety, training and operational standards.
Emirates' existing standard operating procedures are robust
One of the most accurate statments ever made. Sack/fire those who make mistakes. Simple......
Emirates' existing standard operating procedures are robust
One of the most accurate statments ever made. Sack/fire those who make mistakes. Simple......
Interesting that the "Tailstrike" is technically an Accident. Not good for EK's record and reputation. In my view the Preliminary Report was "soft" on EK.
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Safety comprises managers and pilots, who are experts in their respective fields, to provide investigation and safety advice. The unit proactively promotes innovative ideas and technology in the following areas in order to improve operational safety.
• Voluntarily introducing systems to improve operational safety
• Meeting international safety standards, often before these are mandated
• Setting Safety best practices
• Initiating and participating in international safety forums
• Voluntarily introducing systems to improve operational safety
• Meeting international safety standards, often before these are mandated
• Setting Safety best practices
• Initiating and participating in international safety forums
As for setting the best safety practices well they may set them but don't implement them.
If they had been more proactive we would probably not have had the incident in the first place. The fact that they accept no responsibility at all for a systemic failure is unbelievable, unless you actually work here that is.
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following SOP's
Firstly we all make mistakes. I haven't read all the posts and perhaps somebody has already commented on the way in which the two LPC's are used.
However good SOP's are there to trap human errors when they occur. What happens when SOP's are bad? Who is to blame for incidents or accidents then? If SOP's are bad, it requires extra vigilance from the pilots.
When looking for the reasons of this incidence/mishap, I think it will be found that the SOP's used were/are flawed. That is also why it was not appropriate to ask the pilots to resign when in fact they were dealing with dodgy SOP's.
What's the point of having two LPC's on board when only one is being used? Why do the takeoff performance on the LPC and then hand it over to the Capt if he's anyway going to just enter what he gets given (if he's tired/fatigued/distracted etc). This is where extra vigilence is needed. Maybe the data is duff gen. That is the SOP issue that needs to be looked at.
Rather use both LPC's and independently enter the weight and airfield data from ATIS and compare them later. The chances of both pilots getting the weight (mass) wrong is lessened. Only using one LPC invites a whole host of possible errors.
Different airlines use different FLEX procedures, some airlines allow crews to choose max or intermediate or min FLEX by scrolling up the or down the FLEX temps. Some airlines only use max FLEX or TOGA.
We can all learn from this mistake and it has happened before with some sad and some lucky outcomes. It probably will happen again. But having good SOP's and sticking to them will help to avoid them... ATM.
The bottom line is... change the SOP and use both LPC's. This should not be seen as criticism. It's a mere discussion and I hope we can learn something from this incident.
However good SOP's are there to trap human errors when they occur. What happens when SOP's are bad? Who is to blame for incidents or accidents then? If SOP's are bad, it requires extra vigilance from the pilots.
When looking for the reasons of this incidence/mishap, I think it will be found that the SOP's used were/are flawed. That is also why it was not appropriate to ask the pilots to resign when in fact they were dealing with dodgy SOP's.
What's the point of having two LPC's on board when only one is being used? Why do the takeoff performance on the LPC and then hand it over to the Capt if he's anyway going to just enter what he gets given (if he's tired/fatigued/distracted etc). This is where extra vigilence is needed. Maybe the data is duff gen. That is the SOP issue that needs to be looked at.
Rather use both LPC's and independently enter the weight and airfield data from ATIS and compare them later. The chances of both pilots getting the weight (mass) wrong is lessened. Only using one LPC invites a whole host of possible errors.
Different airlines use different FLEX procedures, some airlines allow crews to choose max or intermediate or min FLEX by scrolling up the or down the FLEX temps. Some airlines only use max FLEX or TOGA.
We can all learn from this mistake and it has happened before with some sad and some lucky outcomes. It probably will happen again. But having good SOP's and sticking to them will help to avoid them... ATM.
The bottom line is... change the SOP and use both LPC's. This should not be seen as criticism. It's a mere discussion and I hope we can learn something from this incident.
Join Date: May 2008
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Different airlines use different FLEX procedures, some airlines allow crews to choose max or intermediate or min FLEX by scrolling up the or down the FLEX temps. Some airlines only use max FLEX or TOGA.
EK should revert to the first option.
We can all learn from this mistake and it has happened before with some sad and some lucky outcomes. It probably will happen again.
But having good SOP's and sticking to them will help to avoid them...
Cheap travel seems to just do the trick ..... everyone is so hypocritical until it's their own or their peers a$$ in the tube .....
The bottom line is... change the SOP and use both LPC's.
You can add ten more LPCs, a hundred more lines in the SOPs, you will not cure the underlying and most threatening problem: Management by greed and fear. This is because greed erodes the necessary selection and training of the tech crew. It determines the T&Cs and we all agree that they have been diluted to a very, very low standard. To enforce all these changes, which directly attack your wallet, living and working conditions AND your safety, they need threat and fear, otherwise no real professional would allow them to be imposed. They need some form of corruption, otherwise no regulator would sign off such BS, no postholder would fill in his signature.
We should not go down the nicely presented road of discussing if and how much the crew have screwed up, how good the trapping and SOPs are.
DON'T TAKE THAT BAIT.
We should emphasize relentlessly that we do accept that there has been a huge blunder, and the crew might face consequences. But we want to point the gun onto the surrounding and contributing factors just as much, because they are leading us to making more mistakes than we humanly do already. We don't need that.
DON'T LET THEM OFF THE HOOK.