Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > PPRuNe Worldwide > Italian Forum
Reload this Page >

Incidente Ethiopian ET302 B737 MAX 8

Incidente Ethiopian ET302 B737 MAX 8

Old 13th Mar 2019, 17:51
  #41 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Sky
Posts: 37
Nel frattempo in Etiopia:

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/worl...-737-max-8-to/
TheEdge is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 18:20
  #42 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Sky
Posts: 37
e nel mentre in Germania:

AP is reporting Germany refuses to take black box from crash

QUOTE:

"A spokesman for Germany’s Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation is telling The Associated Press that the agency was asked by Ethiopian authorities to analyze the black boxes from Sunday’s plane crash but declined because it lacked the necessary software.

Spokesman Germout Freitag said Wednesday that he doesn’t know where the black boxes will be sent next."

https://www.apnews.com/eb1c441cd6ba47e8845bd80e27efcd10
TheEdge is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 18:24
  #43 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: BLQ
Posts: 1,066
Soltanto a me sembra che tutta questa faccenda stia prendendo una piega surreale?
EI-PAUL is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 18:27
  #44 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: BLQ
Posts: 1,066
Originally Posted by TheEdge View Post
Riporto extract dal main thread nel forum internazionale, effettivamente ci sono stati diversi problemi riscontrati molto simili, ma risolti in maniera ottimale:

Here's a couple of extracts to look at

REPORT- trim after AP is turned on: December 2018

Quote:
Noted on preflight, a write up, for a cycling trim situation on the inbound leg. With no faults noted by maintenance, it was cleared. First Officer (FO) and I discussed the situation as one of the threats possible, with emphasis on being alert for the cycling trim situation to possibly repeat. Reviewed applicable procedure for a possible runaway trim scenario. Upon takeoff, Autopilot A was engaged at approximately 1,200 FT AGL. As flaps were retracted and airspeed began to increase, additional trim inputs were immediately noticed by both pilots. With flaps now up, FMC called for 250 KTS. Aircraft pitched to 260 KTS with trim inputs, then re-pitched to 240 KTS. The trim system would activate for 1-2 seconds and then immediately reverse itself, trimming in opposite direction. I directed FO to ask for intermediate stop on climb, where we then stopped at FL230. Advised ATC we were experiencing a trim system problem, but the aircraft was stable and trim stopped fluctuating once a stable and level pitch was attained. I chose not to declare an emergency at this time as we did have a stable aircraft, but contacted dispatch via radio, and informed dispatcher of the situation, that it was a reoccurring event, and that I was not comfortable taking the aircraft to ZZZ1 with a primary flight control system not operating properly. Therefore I would return to ZZZ. Dispatcher brought Maintenance Control in I believe at that point and I gave them a description of the problem. We then completed those calls, informed ATC of our desire to return to ZZZ, and no emergency being declared at this time. The trim problem immediately reappeared when given a descent to 11,000, executed via Level Change on the Mode Control Panel. I was flying and at that point disconnected the autopilot, and hand flew the remainder of the approach to the landing. No trim problems were noted with autopilot disconnected. Maintenance ACARSed us several times, requesting us to attempt to troubleshoot the failure and gather information. I elected to not do this. I knew I had a failed trim system and did not wish to engage a deeper problem if something else went wrong with the system while troubleshooting. In addition we [were] now under 15000 FT, in the terminal area, and I was hand flying the aircraft. Too many distractions, as well as a potential bigger problem if something else went wrong. We both put on the table the trim motor / elevator jackscrew failure a few years back that happened to another carrier. That situation was perhaps the final reason I did not want to troubleshoot the failure. We finally told Maintenance Control via ACARS. "We are busy ", as they were now a distraction with their requests as we were near or under 10,000 FT. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. That is what I start every brief off with a new pilot at the beginning of a trip.

REPORT- trim after AP is turned on: November 2018

Quote:
It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat.

Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+.

Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"

I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one).

With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on "descending" was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue.

From FO perspective
Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively.
Grazie, questo è molto interessante.
EI-PAUL is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 18:39
  #45 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2018
Location: Sky
Posts: 37
Appena arrivata la news, anche negli USA il MAX è grounded.
TheEdge is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 19:08
  #46 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: Just Around The Corner
Posts: 1,094
Che cosa cambio’ dopo l’ AF 447 ? Scambiarono di posto due item , una presa visione veloce al simulatore di 10 minuti , stallo a 370, stallo a10.000 Ft e va bene cosi ‘ perche’ non c’e’ mai abbastanza tempo .
Sarebbe ora , di cominciare a trovarlo il tempo per usare i simulatori .
Nick 1 is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 20:51
  #47 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: SS
Posts: 471
Adesso giornalisti scrivete sulle testate i motivi esposti dai professionisti, scrivete quello detto da Ramones, EI PAUL ed altri...
45ACP is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 21:28
  #48 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: BLQ
Posts: 1,066
Originally Posted by soloroma95 View Post
Si mette a terra la macchina, la casa madre provvede a risolvere quanto prima il difetto e comunque si deve provvedere a preparare gli equipaggi nell'eventualità che questo errore si ripresenti. A questo punto anche io considererei 737-8 MAX come un missile V1, un missile che però si attiva random e non ti avvisa mica prima di decollare...
Concordo ma*solo parzialmente; SE e*ribadisco SE le cose sono andate come sembra allora il problema non è tanto l’aereo, quanto piuttosto*il modo in cui viene o NON viene operato. E non certo per colpa degli operatori finali che l’addestramento*lo ricevono ma non hanno molta voce in capitolo.*E qui*le falle potrebbero essere molteplici: a partire dal Costruttore, fino ad arrivare alle Autorità che non hanno mai saputo cogliere a fondo segnali di disagio che si protraggono da anni ed inerenti anche ad altri episodi che hanno visto coinvolti altri costruttori,*fino ad alcuni Operatori che si limitano a fare il*minimo sindacale almeno sin quando non accada qualcosa di eclatante ...
EI-PAUL is offline  
Old 13th Mar 2019, 21:54
  #49 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Age: 99
Posts: 999
FAA ORDER OF PROHIBITION
sonicbum is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 06:40
  #50 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Back in the green
Posts: 684
Originally Posted by sonicbum View Post
e le scatole nere stanno andando in Francia ...🤔🤔🤔 chissà se saranno felici di questo alla Boeing
Ramones is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 07:28
  #51 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Back in the green
Posts: 684
Originally Posted by EI-PAUL View Post
Soltanto a me sembra che tutta questa faccenda stia prendendo una piega surreale?
si hai ragione , e non ne vedo una conclusione logica.
Si stanno giocando interessi talmente grandi che la vera verità mi Sa ‘ non la sapremo mai
Ramones is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 10:47
  #52 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Required field missing
Posts: 464
Montare un sistema per correggere una caratteristica di volo lontano dall'essere ideale e poi non dirlo: checked
Fare outing ingegneristico dopo il primo botto e dire che il sistema c'è ma che poco male, c'è già una checklist se si rompe, sarebbe per un'altra avaria a dire il vero, ma non importa, più o meno è uguale: checked
Dopo il secondo botto fare finta di niente, va tutto bene, ossia tradotto: saranno come sempre i piloti rimbambiti: checked
L'aereo va sempre bene, ma aspetta, pur andando bene, siccome abbiamo del tempo libero, dobbiamo solo fare il roll out dell'altro nuovo aereo ma basta spingerlo fuori dall'hangar, roba di poco, dai facciamo un piccolo aggiornamento software, ma non c'é fretta, va tutto bene te l'ho già detto, lo distribuiamo nei classici tempi di progettazione aeronautica, il prossimo mese: checked
Dopo che metà mondo ti ha già messo a terra l'aereo, infine farlo pure tu, ma solo perché 'abbiamo nuovi dati': checked
E ora le scatole nere che vanno in Francia.
Interessante in effetti
TheWrightBrother&Son is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 13:30
  #53 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Krug departure, Merlot transition
Posts: 511
La Boeing ci sta facendo una discreta figura di m€&@ effettivamente. Le accuse assomigliano ad alcune rivolte negli anni ai prodotti dei loro concorrenti...
main_dog is online now  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 15:34
  #54 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Age: 99
Posts: 999
Boeing’s automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots
sonicbum is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 17:00
  #55 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Italy
Posts: 124
Sarà che ......

Sempre di più è per ME evidente nella quotidianità, l'utilizzo degli automatismi quale interfaccia per pilotare un'aereo.
Non vi è dubbio che gli iter addestrativi siano MOLTO differenti per le connotate caratteristiche "economiche" dei vari continenti,
La legislazione del vecchio continente non aiuta, lo stesso anche le asiatiche .
PILOTI , non operatori di sistemi.
Se vuoi un guardia caccia, cercalo tra i bracconieri .

psandb is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 17:05
  #56 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Italy
Posts: 124
Sarà che ......

Sempre di più è per ME evidente nella quotidianità, l'utilizzo degli automatismi quale interfaccia per pilotare un'aereo.
Non vi è dubbio che gli iter addestrativi siano MOLTO differenti per le connotate caratteristiche "economiche" dei vari continenti,
La legislazione del vecchio continente non aiuta, lo stesso anche le asiatiche .
PILOTI , non operatori di sistemi.
Se vuoi un guardia caccia, cercalo tra i bracconieri .

All'interno di queste parole vi è l'essenza del Pilota, ma se sei solo un'entusista della professione di queste parole hai PAURA.
The flight crew must be aware that checklists cannot be created for all conceivable situations and are not intended to replace good judgment. In some situations, at the captain's discretion, deviation from a checklist can be needed.
psandb is offline  
Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:27
  #57 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: BLQ
Posts: 1,066
Originally Posted by TheWrightBrother&Son View Post
Montare un sistema per correggere una caratteristica di volo lontano dall'essere ideale e poi non dirlo: checked
Condivido sostanzialmente tutto, ma trovo che questo sia l’aspetto più inquietante della vicenda e a mia volta mi auguro sia un punto di svolta per un cambio di mentalità.
Allo stesso modo però leggo un po’ ovunque servizi ed articoli di un qualunquismo incredibile, come se un aeroplano che ha passato collaudo e certificazione ed ha volato per quasi due anni sia improvvisamente diventato un ferro da stilo volante ... boh.
EI-PAUL is offline  
Old 15th Mar 2019, 06:50
  #58 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Back in the green
Posts: 684
Scritto poca fa da Capt “Sully” Sullenberger

We do not yet know what caused the tragic crash of Ethiopian 302 that sadly claimed the lives of all passengers and crew, though there are many similarities between this flight and Lion Air 610, in which the design of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 is a factor. It has been obvious since the Lion Air crash that a redesign of the 737 MAX 8 has been urgently needed, yet has still not been done, and the announced proposed fixes do not go far enough. I feel sure that the Ethiopian crew would have tried to do everything they were able to do to avoid the accident. It has been reported that the first officer on that flight had only 200 hours of flight experience, a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner. A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. Airlines have a corporate obligation not to put pilots in that position of great responsibility before they are able to be fully ready. While we don’t know what role, if any, pilot experience played in this most recent tragedy, it should always remain a top priority at every airline. Everyone who flies depends upon it.
Ramones is offline  
Old 15th Mar 2019, 09:06
  #59 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Worldwide
Posts: 1,407
Originally Posted by EI-PAUL View Post
Allo stesso modo però leggo un po’ ovunque servizi ed articoli di un qualunquismo incredibile, come se un aeroplano che ha passato collaudo e certificazione ed ha volato per quasi due anni sia improvvisamente diventato un ferro da stilo volante ... boh.
Come è successo ad altri aerei in passato.
*
flydive1 is offline  
Old 15th Mar 2019, 11:05
  #60 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Italy
Posts: 124
Originally Posted by Ramones View Post
Scritto poca fa da Capt “Sully” Sullenberger

We do not yet know what caused the tragic crash of Ethiopian 302 that sadly claimed the lives of all passengers and crew, though there are many similarities between this flight and Lion Air 610, in which the design of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 is a factor. It has been obvious since the Lion Air crash that a redesign of the 737 MAX 8 has been urgently needed, yet has still not been done, and the announced proposed fixes do not go far enough. I feel sure that the Ethiopian crew would have tried to do everything they were able to do to avoid the accident. It has been reported that the first officer on that flight had only 200 hours of flight experience, a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner. A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. Airlines have a corporate obligation not to put pilots in that position of great responsibility before they are able to be fully ready. While we don’t know what role, if any, pilot experience played in this most recent tragedy, it should always remain a top priority at every airline. Everyone who flies depends upon it.
Come volevasi dimostrare .............il problema è nella legislazione che permette ciò !!
psandb is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us Archive Advertising Cookie Policy Privacy Statement Terms of Service

Copyright © 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.