FBW e upset recovery
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FBW e upset recovery
Salve visti gli ultimi interessanti trd che invece di vederci a scannarci du p2f o noccioline e aperitivi ho pensato di tornare su qualche cosa di più "volativo"
A voi e buona lettura:
Stephan Hickman
Stephan Hickman
Managing Director - Aviation & Aerospace Resourcing Solutions
Aircraft Upset Prevention and Recovery skills and FBW aircraft - is there a difference?
June 24, 2016 • 10
A common characteristic of all true digital Fly-By-Wire (FBW) aircraft is the replacement of manually actuated primary flight controls with an electronic interface incorporating a closed feedback system. Flight control computers can send signals to flight control actuators without any pilot input to automatically stabilize flight path in pitch, roll and yaw and to keep an aircraft within a given flight envelope. Digital systems operating at the speed of light on many modern aircraft can manipulate flight controls independently in almost any combination as required to maintain a given flight trajectory in the most efficient manner. Software can also be included that stabilise the flight-control inputs to avoid pilot-induced oscillations.
This technology has been a game changer for many reasons. Provided a FBW system is not degraded in any way it has significant potential to improve safety through flight envelope protection and other programs and control laws that alter flight dynamics for particular phases of flight. The technology facilitates design and development of aircraft that are inherently less stable but with very good handling qualities (design characteristics that add stability can also add drag), it allows manufacturers to build a family of aircraft of significantly different sizes and configurations that exhibit common handling characteristics, it can eliminate the need for traditional stall protection systems (shakers and pushers) it facilitates consistent handling qualities irrespective of CG or aircraft loading. It is fair to assume that as aircraft manufacturers continue to be under pressure to develop products that push boundaries, conventional wires and pulleys will eventually be discarded altogether and digital and electrical FBW technology will only become more prevalent as a primary means of aircraft control.
There is a general concern in the airline industry that a significant number of the piloting community have developed a dependency and reliance on automation, but crucially without the knowledge and practical training provided to them that gives them the required skills to be able to recognise and recover from a situation when those same systems do not function as they are supposed to. A key question is whether or not FBW aggravates this issue or if it is just a bi-product of automation. Arguably it is the latter as aircraft with conventional controls are generally equipped with a range of systems which include, aural, visual and physical protection (shakers and pushers), aside from tactile feedback. In essence the argument being that these are a form of flight envelope protection in their own right.
In number of incidents involving LOC in FBW equipped aircraft the upset has occurred after there has been some sort of degradation affecting the FBW system itself. Once this level of protection is lost then more traditional stall warning systems will continue to operate as these largely operate autonomously in order to mitigate failures, for example, through the use of Angle of Attack vanes, but remaining within the flight envelope is firmly in the hands of the pilot.
The one accident that bought home the stark reality of this perhaps more than any other was the loss of Air France flight 447 (AF447) over the South Atlantic on the 1st June 2009. Although the aircraft went missing in June 2009 the real impact of what actually occurred would not be felt until information was eventually retrieved from the aircraft’s damaged Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR), after they were recovered from the ocean floor in May 2011. Ultimately the official BEA accident investigation published in July 2012 concluded that the aircraft suffered an aerodynamic stall from which it failed to recover. But what made this accident ‘seminal’ were the events that led to the initial inflight upset and the reaction to and actions of the crew as the situation progressively deteriorated to a full LOC.
Air France Flight 447
AF447 operated by an A330 departed Rio de Janeiro Galeao (GIG) bound for Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG). The aircraft was in contact with the Brazilian ATLANTICO control centre on the INTOL – SALPOL – ORARU – TASIL route at FL350. Weather conditions were normal for the time of year in the ITCZ with known thunderstorms and turbulence present in the airspace the aircraft would be transiting through. At around 2h 02 into the flight the captain left the cockpit. At around 2h 08 the aircraft made a change in course to the left of about 12 degrees and reduced speed (to Mach 0.8 – recommended turbulence penetration speed), probably in response to avoid returns detected by the weather radar. At 2h 10 and as likely consequence of the blockage of the pitot tubes by a build-up of ice crystals, an airspeed inconsistency led to the autopilot disengaging and the aircraft’s FBW system reverting from Normal law to Alternate law 2. In Alternate law 2 on the A330, all pitch attitude protection, bank angle protection and low energy protection is lost. The pilot flying made a number of abrupt nose-up control inputs which led to activation of the stall warning device on two occasions. Speed dropped sharply as the aircraft climbed at one point at a rate of nearly 7000ft/per min. At around 2h 11 the aircraft reached its maximum altitude of FL380 and suffered an aerodynamic stall. The aircraft would not recover from this and the FDR and CVR stopped recording at around 2h 14 when the aircraft impacted the water. The final accident report summarised that following the switch to Alternate law 2 the pilot’s actions de-stabilised the flight path, that the pilots failed to follow correct procedure in relation to unreliable airspeed data and crucially that the crew lacked understanding of the approach to stall and failed to recognise when the aircraft had actually stalled. No control inputs were made at any time that would indicate the crew ever fully understood their predicament. The accident claimed 228 lives.
At the opposite end of the spectrum another recent event highlighted why practical skills matter so much. In February this year the BEA (French accident investigation bureau) released a report into an incident affecting a Falcon 7X (full FBW aircraft) that suffered a flight control failure. The failure was a nose-up pitch-trim runaway that lasted for a number of minutes. During this time the aircraft climbed from FL130 to FL220 at times experiencing in excess of 40% pitch-up with a resulting significant drop in airspeed. In this instance one of the pilots used a high bank angle rolling manoeuvre that he had learned from his air force training in order to bring pitch under control and stabilise speed before control was lost of the aircraft.
What both these events demonstrate, without question, is the fact that whether an aircraft is controlled by FBW or a more conventional flight control system, the skills of a pilot are a critical factor in whether or not an upset develops into a LOC scenario. In fact specific and identifiable skills are required to deal with a developing or developed upset and these same identifiable skills apply in the vast majority of upset situations/conditions irrespective of type or control system. Accurate and early recognition of an approaching stall are critical.
LOC is certainly not a new topic and has been a high profile topic for a long-time but the AF447 accident was a wake-up call; the initial mysterious disappearance over the ocean, an aircraft with an impeccable safety record, the sheer numbers who lost their lives and the fact that the aircraft was operated by a major European flag carrier. When analysing the reaction of policy makers and their approach to trying to come to terms with the issue, it is important to understand the notion of un-intentionality as well as the notion of timeliness. It is taken for granted that an aircraft upset is unintentional. From a pilot’s perspective the aircraft is not doing what he/she believes is commanding it to do. The notion of timeliness concerns taking prompt action so that a fully developed and definable upset does not occur. From this the industry has converged on the concept of Awareness, Recognition and Recovery (ARR) as the required approach to dealing with the problem. From this concept flows the required elements of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT).
The ARR approach comprises both tactical and strategic actions and the objective of this approach is to ensure that recovery is a last resort. At the point that recovery is required the risk of an accident and associated loss of life is unacceptably high. Nevertheless the awareness, recognition and recovery elements are not mutually exclusive, hence the importance of practical training.
Flight Simulation
The practical training element of UPRT involves the use of flight simulation devices. The fidelity of simulators is reliant upon data provided by aircraft manufacturers and mathematical models. Manufacturers validate simulators using flight data acquired from a flight test program. A lot of aircraft upsets involve G forces not normally encountered during routine flight and the devices themselves have not been designed to replicate upsets. Startle effect is minimised and without a device that can produce sustained g loads flight control inputs during the recovery from a full aerodynamic stall may not represent a real aircraft. The result of this is that for any manoeuvring that involves vertical or lateral loading there is a degradation in realism, a key instructional input should include the acknowledgement of these limitations so that trainees are not given a false sense of confidence.
Practical Airborne Training
With these limitations in mind there is a final consideration toward the benefits of actual airborne in-aircraft training. Although not a requirement of the new EASA regulations there is a wide consensus that there is significant benefit in improving ARR skills. UPRT in-aircraft training will typically be conducted in a suitable light aircraft. Such an aircraft will normally have a high power to weight ratio and the ability to recover from just about any situation that can be encountered in flight. A very important consideration is that the training being conducted is done so by a suitably qualified instructor. Recovery training from an aerodynamic stall should constantly stress the primary importance of a smooth and deliberate reduction in angle of attack that is sufficient to break the stalled condition with due consideration of the effect of thrust on pitch control. There is little doubt that a pilot that has been exposed to unusual attitudes and different energy states in a real aircraft is more aware and better placed to deal with a developing or developed upset so it is fair to conclude that airborne practical training will significantly reinforce UPRT training.
Already mandated by the FAA, EASA and now also the UAE GCAA, UPRT is a major contemporary topic and a challenge for airline and other operator training departments that have to implement this into their training cycles. Resource Group’s Flight Crew Services business has (in conjunction with a major UK operator) developed a modular eLearning course covering all the ground school requirements of the published regulations. In addition it can support operators with the development of a practical simulator syllabus and, working with partner companies, provide integrated solutions to include in aircraft training.
For more information contact [email protected]
Autore
Stephan Hickman
Stephan Hickman
Managing Director - Aviation & Aerospace Resourcing Solutions
l
A voi e buona lettura:
Stephan Hickman
Stephan Hickman
Managing Director - Aviation & Aerospace Resourcing Solutions
Aircraft Upset Prevention and Recovery skills and FBW aircraft - is there a difference?
June 24, 2016 • 10
A common characteristic of all true digital Fly-By-Wire (FBW) aircraft is the replacement of manually actuated primary flight controls with an electronic interface incorporating a closed feedback system. Flight control computers can send signals to flight control actuators without any pilot input to automatically stabilize flight path in pitch, roll and yaw and to keep an aircraft within a given flight envelope. Digital systems operating at the speed of light on many modern aircraft can manipulate flight controls independently in almost any combination as required to maintain a given flight trajectory in the most efficient manner. Software can also be included that stabilise the flight-control inputs to avoid pilot-induced oscillations.
This technology has been a game changer for many reasons. Provided a FBW system is not degraded in any way it has significant potential to improve safety through flight envelope protection and other programs and control laws that alter flight dynamics for particular phases of flight. The technology facilitates design and development of aircraft that are inherently less stable but with very good handling qualities (design characteristics that add stability can also add drag), it allows manufacturers to build a family of aircraft of significantly different sizes and configurations that exhibit common handling characteristics, it can eliminate the need for traditional stall protection systems (shakers and pushers) it facilitates consistent handling qualities irrespective of CG or aircraft loading. It is fair to assume that as aircraft manufacturers continue to be under pressure to develop products that push boundaries, conventional wires and pulleys will eventually be discarded altogether and digital and electrical FBW technology will only become more prevalent as a primary means of aircraft control.
There is a general concern in the airline industry that a significant number of the piloting community have developed a dependency and reliance on automation, but crucially without the knowledge and practical training provided to them that gives them the required skills to be able to recognise and recover from a situation when those same systems do not function as they are supposed to. A key question is whether or not FBW aggravates this issue or if it is just a bi-product of automation. Arguably it is the latter as aircraft with conventional controls are generally equipped with a range of systems which include, aural, visual and physical protection (shakers and pushers), aside from tactile feedback. In essence the argument being that these are a form of flight envelope protection in their own right.
In number of incidents involving LOC in FBW equipped aircraft the upset has occurred after there has been some sort of degradation affecting the FBW system itself. Once this level of protection is lost then more traditional stall warning systems will continue to operate as these largely operate autonomously in order to mitigate failures, for example, through the use of Angle of Attack vanes, but remaining within the flight envelope is firmly in the hands of the pilot.
The one accident that bought home the stark reality of this perhaps more than any other was the loss of Air France flight 447 (AF447) over the South Atlantic on the 1st June 2009. Although the aircraft went missing in June 2009 the real impact of what actually occurred would not be felt until information was eventually retrieved from the aircraft’s damaged Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR), after they were recovered from the ocean floor in May 2011. Ultimately the official BEA accident investigation published in July 2012 concluded that the aircraft suffered an aerodynamic stall from which it failed to recover. But what made this accident ‘seminal’ were the events that led to the initial inflight upset and the reaction to and actions of the crew as the situation progressively deteriorated to a full LOC.
Air France Flight 447
AF447 operated by an A330 departed Rio de Janeiro Galeao (GIG) bound for Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG). The aircraft was in contact with the Brazilian ATLANTICO control centre on the INTOL – SALPOL – ORARU – TASIL route at FL350. Weather conditions were normal for the time of year in the ITCZ with known thunderstorms and turbulence present in the airspace the aircraft would be transiting through. At around 2h 02 into the flight the captain left the cockpit. At around 2h 08 the aircraft made a change in course to the left of about 12 degrees and reduced speed (to Mach 0.8 – recommended turbulence penetration speed), probably in response to avoid returns detected by the weather radar. At 2h 10 and as likely consequence of the blockage of the pitot tubes by a build-up of ice crystals, an airspeed inconsistency led to the autopilot disengaging and the aircraft’s FBW system reverting from Normal law to Alternate law 2. In Alternate law 2 on the A330, all pitch attitude protection, bank angle protection and low energy protection is lost. The pilot flying made a number of abrupt nose-up control inputs which led to activation of the stall warning device on two occasions. Speed dropped sharply as the aircraft climbed at one point at a rate of nearly 7000ft/per min. At around 2h 11 the aircraft reached its maximum altitude of FL380 and suffered an aerodynamic stall. The aircraft would not recover from this and the FDR and CVR stopped recording at around 2h 14 when the aircraft impacted the water. The final accident report summarised that following the switch to Alternate law 2 the pilot’s actions de-stabilised the flight path, that the pilots failed to follow correct procedure in relation to unreliable airspeed data and crucially that the crew lacked understanding of the approach to stall and failed to recognise when the aircraft had actually stalled. No control inputs were made at any time that would indicate the crew ever fully understood their predicament. The accident claimed 228 lives.
At the opposite end of the spectrum another recent event highlighted why practical skills matter so much. In February this year the BEA (French accident investigation bureau) released a report into an incident affecting a Falcon 7X (full FBW aircraft) that suffered a flight control failure. The failure was a nose-up pitch-trim runaway that lasted for a number of minutes. During this time the aircraft climbed from FL130 to FL220 at times experiencing in excess of 40% pitch-up with a resulting significant drop in airspeed. In this instance one of the pilots used a high bank angle rolling manoeuvre that he had learned from his air force training in order to bring pitch under control and stabilise speed before control was lost of the aircraft.
What both these events demonstrate, without question, is the fact that whether an aircraft is controlled by FBW or a more conventional flight control system, the skills of a pilot are a critical factor in whether or not an upset develops into a LOC scenario. In fact specific and identifiable skills are required to deal with a developing or developed upset and these same identifiable skills apply in the vast majority of upset situations/conditions irrespective of type or control system. Accurate and early recognition of an approaching stall are critical.
LOC is certainly not a new topic and has been a high profile topic for a long-time but the AF447 accident was a wake-up call; the initial mysterious disappearance over the ocean, an aircraft with an impeccable safety record, the sheer numbers who lost their lives and the fact that the aircraft was operated by a major European flag carrier. When analysing the reaction of policy makers and their approach to trying to come to terms with the issue, it is important to understand the notion of un-intentionality as well as the notion of timeliness. It is taken for granted that an aircraft upset is unintentional. From a pilot’s perspective the aircraft is not doing what he/she believes is commanding it to do. The notion of timeliness concerns taking prompt action so that a fully developed and definable upset does not occur. From this the industry has converged on the concept of Awareness, Recognition and Recovery (ARR) as the required approach to dealing with the problem. From this concept flows the required elements of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT).
The ARR approach comprises both tactical and strategic actions and the objective of this approach is to ensure that recovery is a last resort. At the point that recovery is required the risk of an accident and associated loss of life is unacceptably high. Nevertheless the awareness, recognition and recovery elements are not mutually exclusive, hence the importance of practical training.
Flight Simulation
The practical training element of UPRT involves the use of flight simulation devices. The fidelity of simulators is reliant upon data provided by aircraft manufacturers and mathematical models. Manufacturers validate simulators using flight data acquired from a flight test program. A lot of aircraft upsets involve G forces not normally encountered during routine flight and the devices themselves have not been designed to replicate upsets. Startle effect is minimised and without a device that can produce sustained g loads flight control inputs during the recovery from a full aerodynamic stall may not represent a real aircraft. The result of this is that for any manoeuvring that involves vertical or lateral loading there is a degradation in realism, a key instructional input should include the acknowledgement of these limitations so that trainees are not given a false sense of confidence.
Practical Airborne Training
With these limitations in mind there is a final consideration toward the benefits of actual airborne in-aircraft training. Although not a requirement of the new EASA regulations there is a wide consensus that there is significant benefit in improving ARR skills. UPRT in-aircraft training will typically be conducted in a suitable light aircraft. Such an aircraft will normally have a high power to weight ratio and the ability to recover from just about any situation that can be encountered in flight. A very important consideration is that the training being conducted is done so by a suitably qualified instructor. Recovery training from an aerodynamic stall should constantly stress the primary importance of a smooth and deliberate reduction in angle of attack that is sufficient to break the stalled condition with due consideration of the effect of thrust on pitch control. There is little doubt that a pilot that has been exposed to unusual attitudes and different energy states in a real aircraft is more aware and better placed to deal with a developing or developed upset so it is fair to conclude that airborne practical training will significantly reinforce UPRT training.
Already mandated by the FAA, EASA and now also the UAE GCAA, UPRT is a major contemporary topic and a challenge for airline and other operator training departments that have to implement this into their training cycles. Resource Group’s Flight Crew Services business has (in conjunction with a major UK operator) developed a modular eLearning course covering all the ground school requirements of the published regulations. In addition it can support operators with the development of a practical simulator syllabus and, working with partner companies, provide integrated solutions to include in aircraft training.
For more information contact [email protected]
Autore
Stephan Hickman
Stephan Hickman
Managing Director - Aviation & Aerospace Resourcing Solutions
l
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Per collegarci ai temi già trattati in altri thread, il diminuire dell'esperienza ed il massiccio afflusso di giovani aquilotti MPL nei prossimi anni renderebbe un programma del genere quanto meno auspicabile. Detto questo, vale la pena ricordare che due dei tre colleghi sul volo AF citato nell'articolo avevano avuto una formazione "classica", quindi evidentemente l'iniziativa farebbe bene a tutti, a prescindere dall'esperienza. Ma ho paura che in commissione, una volta svelati i budget, la maggioranza delle compagnie opporrebbero il veto ...
Last edited by EI-PAUL; 1st Jul 2016 at 06:52.
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Credo che il progetto sia già stato studiato e addirittura, se non erro, tempo fa ci sia stato un trial in una major europea, ma poi tutto è sfumato in nome nel superiore interesse economico, ovviamente.
Per collegarci ai temi già trattati in altri thread, il diminuire dell'esperienza ed il massiccio afflusso di giovani aquilotti MPL nei prossimi anni renderebbe un programma del genere quanto meno auspicabile. Detto questo, vale la pena ricordare che due dei tre colleghi sul volo AF citato nell'articolo avevano avuto una formazione "classica", quindi evidentemente l'iniziativa farebbe bene a tutti, a prescindere dall'esperienza. Ma ho paura che in commissione, una volta svelati i budget, la maggioranza delle compagnie opporrebbero il veto ...
Per collegarci ai temi già trattati in altri thread, il diminuire dell'esperienza ed il massiccio afflusso di giovani aquilotti MPL nei prossimi anni renderebbe un programma del genere quanto meno auspicabile. Detto questo, vale la pena ricordare che due dei tre colleghi sul volo AF citato nell'articolo avevano avuto una formazione "classica", quindi evidentemente l'iniziativa farebbe bene a tutti, a prescindere dall'esperienza. Ma ho paura che in commissione, una volta svelati i budget, la maggioranza delle compagnie opporrebbero il veto ...
Ha rifatto gli assetti inusuali 2 anni fa al SIM visto che avevamo tempo , ci siamo sbizzarriti per quasi 40 minuti e mi ha fatto molto bene
Il collega proveniente da una grossa compagnia Indonesiana aveva 2000 ore di volo delle quali 1600 su 737 e non aveva mai fatto queste manovre e a dire la verità non gli interessava neanche farle.
Ora ad ogni SIM , visto che rimane sempre una mezzoretta , chiedo sempre di farne qualcuna
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Sicuramente e' applicabile a tutti quale Che sia la esperienza pregressa o le ore di volo totali
Ha rifatto gli assetti inusuali 2 anni fa al SIM visto che avevamo tempo , ci siamo sbizzarriti per quasi 40 minuti e mi ha fatto molto bene
Il collega proveniente da una grossa compagnia Indonesiana aveva 2000 ore di volo delle quali 1600 su 737 e non aveva mai fatto queste manovre e a dire la verità non gli interessava neanche farle.
Ora ad ogni SIM , visto che rimane sempre una mezzoretta , chiedo sempre di farne qualcuna
Ha rifatto gli assetti inusuali 2 anni fa al SIM visto che avevamo tempo , ci siamo sbizzarriti per quasi 40 minuti e mi ha fatto molto bene
Il collega proveniente da una grossa compagnia Indonesiana aveva 2000 ore di volo delle quali 1600 su 737 e non aveva mai fatto queste manovre e a dire la verità non gli interessava neanche farle.
Ora ad ogni SIM , visto che rimane sempre una mezzoretta , chiedo sempre di farne qualcuna
Non so per quel che riguarda il 737, ma quando iniziai il type sul bus era di moda dire che era una macchina che non si poteva stallare. Ora sappiamo che non è così, quindi a maggior ragione certi programmi sarebbero una vera manna dal cielo.
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Io provai al SIM una situazione simile a quella in cui, purtroppo, incorse il volo AF. Unreliable speed con 2 ADR falsate, perdita delle protezioni e conseguente stallo. Devo dire che le informazioni "visive" sono completamente fuorvianti all'inizio (almeno che non si sia volato il G91) e quindi si rimane completamente disorientati, in primis credo perché è qualcosa che non ci si aspetta ... Non mi vergogno ad ammettere che ho dovuto faticare per la rimessa, nonostante sapessi esattamente cosa stava per accadere. Non oso immaginare quindi come si siano trovati i colleghi di quel volo.
Non so per quel che riguarda il 737, ma quando iniziai il type sul bus era di moda dire che era una macchina che non si poteva stallare. Ora sappiamo che non è così, quindi a maggior ragione certi programmi sarebbero una vera manna dal cielo.
Non so per quel che riguarda il 737, ma quando iniziai il type sul bus era di moda dire che era una macchina che non si poteva stallare. Ora sappiamo che non è così, quindi a maggior ragione certi programmi sarebbero una vera manna dal cielo.
Anche qui nel sabbione Durante Occ stessa cosa , quindi per fortuna qualcosa si sta facendo anche se si può fare di più
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Easa proposed amendment for UPRT - LOC
Il paper finale verrà prodotto a fine anno, il corso ad hoc reso obbligatorio per il 2018 presso le varie ATO. Ore di simulatore e di volo.
Le grandi scuole CTC, Oxford, FTE Jerez già offrono il corso in anteprima, per la parte in volo su addestratori Slingsby e Extra 300. l'APS training in USA con Extra 300 fa la parte del leone:
Upset Prevention & Recovery Training UPRT: The Full Story
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/fi...ssue%202_0.pdf
Il paper finale verrà prodotto a fine anno, il corso ad hoc reso obbligatorio per il 2018 presso le varie ATO. Ore di simulatore e di volo.
Le grandi scuole CTC, Oxford, FTE Jerez già offrono il corso in anteprima, per la parte in volo su addestratori Slingsby e Extra 300. l'APS training in USA con Extra 300 fa la parte del leone:
Upset Prevention & Recovery Training UPRT: The Full Story
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/fi...ssue%202_0.pdf
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Yes APS europe, netherlands
Netherlands Location - Training Center
Etihad flight academy, dove si addestrano anche i piloti Alitalia con 2 extra 300 ed un istruttrice......
http://www.myowndubai.com/wp-content...lege-plane.jpg
Netherlands Location - Training Center
Etihad flight academy, dove si addestrano anche i piloti Alitalia con 2 extra 300 ed un istruttrice......
http://www.myowndubai.com/wp-content...lege-plane.jpg
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http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A333,_Kathmandu_Nepal,_2015?utm_source=SKYbrary&utm_campaign =8a340b97e8-422_Automation_Accuracy_04_07_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term =0_e405169b04-8a340b97e8-276545289
Caro Romano
A proposito di magenta line e Kathmandu
Caro Romano
A proposito di magenta line e Kathmandu
