japanam
 

Not a Yank, but more respect for the crew than you will ever learn in you'r lifetime.:=

A mysterious airliner mishap & rumor of "suicide"
 

From a few slots above, a news story repeats the usual post-mishap rumor:

"... it may have been suicide ..."

So, here it is again. Same old rumor. How many of our Respected Pilot Gossips will tell this rumor to friends & relatives -- who later repeat it, "SUICIDE! An airline pilot told me."

And once spoken by an airline pilot, he will forever defend his rumor, for decades.

Just SLF but also have lived 12 years as an expat in Korea. There may be lots of 'issues' here regarding management of Korean companies, to the point that I will not fly a Korean airline - BUT the insurance thing notes above is not an issue as it is common for Koreans to buy insurance (which are really just a kind of savings plans that have a tiny insurance portion so that they can legally be sold by insurance companies). Basically, the captain buying insurance is a lead to be checked, but most likely nothing unusual.

UPS6 and AF447 both had automatic status and failure messages sent from the planes. Hopefully, the same is true here, and there will be some early information.

http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/04-26.pdf DOT/FAA/AR-03/44 and www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1193.pdf "Halon 1301 is ineffective in suppressing or extinguishing a primary lithium battery fire ...."

ankh,
Thanks for the info.

(Note to self: Don't take out anymore insurance policies.)

00

Why not? If you don't have any plan to kill yourself within the next month or so it shouldn't be a problem.

I doubt that this crash was suicide. No pilot can be so stupid that he doesn't realize that the FDR and voice recorder will tell if there's been a fire or not. However, I don't get upset because the investigation will look into the matter. Coincidences like this are rare and will of course be subject to speculation.

Investigate "accident"? Or "crime"?
 

Observation, just above:
"... I doubt that this crash was suicide. ... don't get upset ... investigation will look into the matter...."

In decades past, sometimes, a core-group of "accident" investigators embraced a rumored scenario -- "pilot suicide", sabotage, the "Boeing Scenario", the missile scenario.

Investigator-err does happen: the investigators NEVER study investigator-err. [But they want you to study pilot-err.]

The main idea for investigators should be to focus on the direct evidence (trail of debris, examination of wreckage, recorded data, observations of witness-crew); discard or suspect manufacturer's created-scenario, "analysis", simulator trials. Accident investigators are not "crime" investigators.

One can speculate that a pilot could have started the fire himself. This would make the accident look authentic to investigators, and it can be done by one pilot without the cooperation of another, which makes the conspiration theory a little bit more believable...

More details on the Captain's very recent multiple insurance policies from the Korean press:

INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily

Quite possibly just a coincidence in timing and I'm sure it will be checked out.

Another potential clue to the cause of the crash in this morning's Seoul paper:

INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily

Never heard of the shorter "SP" airframe being configured as a Combi.

The Helderberg (ZS-SAS) was a 747-244B Combi, not an SP.

B744F QRH - Main Deck Fire
 

I see that the revised procedures for FIRE MAIN DECK have been released by Boeing in an Operations Manual Bulletin

Among the changes is this:

"Expedite a climb or descent to 25,000 when conditions and terrain allow. Plan to stay at 25,000 for as long as conditions allow. After the descent has been started, do not delay the approach and landing"

Presumably this procedure is based in part on a 2009 FAA Fire Safety Highlight

"CARGO FIRE CONTROL BY DEPRESSURIZATION"

which compared the effectiveness of cargo fire suppression by depressurization with that of an extinguishing agent (Halon 1301), to wit:

"...Series two test results showed that although depressurization reduced the initial burning, the fire intensity on decent was greatly accelerated. The highest depressurization altitude evaluated (25,000 feet) produced the best initial results but the largest fire on decent..."

Clearly, remaining at altitude for as long as possible before effecting a minimum time descent to approach and landing is indicated

Setting aside for now the very legitimate questions of possible structural damage, or whether an 'immediate landing' (downwind, overweight, off-airport, or ditching) may be warranted, my questions (related to the Boeing OMB and QRH change) are these:

1) Preferred 'min time' descent profile from FL250 to sea level 'clean' or 'dirty'?; that is,

- extend speed brakes and descend at Vmo/Mmo, or

- extend speed brakes, decelerate in level flight to 270K / .82M, extend gear, descend and accelerate to 320K / .82M

and

2) Approximate 'no-wind' time and distance required for each method

I would book some sim time and try it myself, but will be at home on vacation and days off until late in the month

Very interested in to hear your responses and opinions

WIth thanks to all

This was also discussed in the SR111 thread (fastest way to get down and land)

Fastest way to get down in the 744 was to lower the gear and use the speed brake during the descent. Issues to consider were the rising min manoeuvre margin (yellow line) on the speed tape.

The answer for me was to lower the speed brake (stow it) as you get near the gear out speed, lower the gear and simultaneously start the descent in FLCH to build up speed. You needed to get momentum as once that airspeed started to bleed off, it was hard to get it back.

Once the descent was underway and the speed building up, pop the brakes out to 'flight' and sink like a stone.

Any turning would see rising of the min manoeuver margin on the tape, but that was ok as actual airspeed would build up during the descent beyond the min manoeuvre and gear extension speed (extend speed was above extension speed).

The above action was for a rapid depressurization, not a fire in which you might not give a toss about the gear extension speed in the first place. It was also found unfavorable for the depress case and, soon after I joined that company, the procedure was removed from the QRH as an option for Rapid D descents.

Given we're considering depressurized flight at 25,000' after a fire warning in a cargo aircraft while motoring at best speed towards a landing zone (preferably a suitable airport, but not essential if still ablaze), then I guess there is a lot to be said for:

1. follow checklist
2. depressurized flight at high speed to a landing 'zone'
3. if actually on fire, flames confirmed, time since warning +10 mins
4. big call, but must get on ground or water asap
5. if not confirmed on fire, fly to landing zone at FL250 fast as you can go
6. on reaching TOD for selected landing, slow down
7. lower gear
8. simultaneously speed up and descend
9. when suitable margin exists beyond min manoeuvre margin, extend speedbrakes, dive toward airport, extend flaps on schedule or land flapless.

Tough call.

Whatever happens, there'd be no need to keep it pretty.

The Korean Times is reporting that the investigating authorities have located the plane in 80 meters of water.

Body of crashed Asiana cargo plane located

"The Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board that is investigating the case has identified the locations of 39 parts of the aircraft," Kim Han-young, an official from the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, told reporters.
"They (located parts) including the plane's tail, which will likely contain the aircraft's black box," he said.

...

"Meanwhile, the ministry official dismissed suspicions the crash may have been intentional as one of the two missing pilots was said to have taken out a number of life and property insurance policies totaling more than 3 billion won (US$2.8 million), just a month before the accident."


Body of crashed Asiana cargo plane located

No it's not. Look at the Boeing FCTM. From normal cruise speed clean is the fastest way.

Bodies recovered
 

The wreckage of an Asiana Boeing 747-400 Freighter that crashed into the waters off South Korea has been found almost three months after the incident.

South Korean and Asiana officials said that rescue teams retrieved the bodies of the two pilots on Saturday, and brought them to shore on Sunday morning.

The search for the cockpit data recorder and the voice recorder continues, they added. There was no information on the state of the airframe.

The aircraft, with the registration HL-7604, went missing off Jeju Island on 28 July while en-route from South Korea's capital Seoul to Shanghai's Pudong International airport.

Why no news!!

Wouldn't the Asiana 747 send ACARS reports of malfunctions (or lack of malfunctions...) as the UPS cargo fire aircraft did?

No news, no loss of face!:ugh:

Wheres the Boeing investigation?
Why was it up to Asiana to retrieve the bodies?
Where's the FDR/CVR?
Where's the ACARS data?
Whats the truth behind the $29 M insurance policy and suicide rumour?
Where is the NTSB assigned accredited representative preliminary report?

Seems to be a LOT of missing information and news. Typically when this happens there is something very suspicious?

The Boeing investigation continues. Asiana is contracting with the same compaony that discovered and raised parts of the AF aircraft from the S. Atlantic. Visibility is extremely poor in these waters and the actual continuence
of the recovery effort for the black boxes will resume in a few months when conditions improve.

Sad that because this was a freighter that the world's media is paying it no attention.....

Salvage of Asiana 991..
 

Crash: Asiana B744 near Jeju on Jul 28th 2011, fire in cargo hold

Don't know if this has been posted before, but this caught my eye:

'The aircraft had been carrying 39,331 kg of cargo, 18,934 kg of which were loaded at Incheon Airport. A total of 2,092 kg was declared as dangerous goods, loaded near the left cargo door on the main deck. These goods consisted of flammable liquids, corrosive liquids and lithium-ion batteries, the shipment consisting of 198 cells rated at 25Ah at 3.65V. All dangerous cargo had been placed onto 2 palletes and had been loaded without problems, no observation of damage or leakages. The goods had been previously stored according to regulations. The captain had supervised the transport from the warehouse and loading of the two palettes onto position ML and PR on the aircraft.':confused: Seems especially strange in light of speculation about possible suicide of the captain...

seems an odd statement , 'Captain supervised transport from warehouse and loading' !!! Never heard of this before, maybe check that its loaded correctly etc when on main deck .

Interim Report available here:

Ç×°ø¤ýöµµ»ç°íÁ¶»çÀ§¿øȸ

"http://www.araib.go.kr"

(There is an English option but the .pdf may take a couple of attempts to download correctly):8

CargoFlyer11 & bvcu
 

I think some misinterpretation of the report is responsible for the statement.

The report says:-

It is not unusual for the Captain or F/O to observe the loading of DG pallets next to the main cargo door. Part of the normal pre-flight inspection involves a walk around all accessible areas of the Main Deck cargo area after loading is completed.

(Total cargo weight was 65,938kg)

Report I've seen quoted mentions main area of fire damage to be around the main-deck cargo door, with sooth traces running all the way forward to around the CL/CR position. This indicates the fire was strongest at the PL (door) position, but it does not necessarily follow that's where the fire started - though it is likely to be the case.

The report states two pallets with DGR, including flammable liquids (Class 3), corrosives (Cl. 8) and Li-Io batteries (Cl. 9), were loaded on MR and PL, but it does not state how the DG was spread over the two. According to IATA separation criteria you can load Cl. 9 with anything, and there's no requirement to keep Cl. 3 and 8 separated. There's a nice 2.2 tons cocktail for you to ponder, and it's worth mentioning that those separation criteria apply equally to pax and cargo aircraft. And while such a thing as "Cargo Aircraft Only" shipment does exist, what makes a particular substance liable to that restriction is governed largely by quantity per package. Thus if you need to ship 200kg of "nasty" you could do it in 2 x 100kg packages and that would be CAO, or you could do 100 x 2kg packages and that would be acceptable on a pax aircraft.

Still, the biggest danger is not the declared DG but all the unknown and nu-declared shyte we're unknowingly carrying. My position has always been that no cargo carrying aircraft, be it full cargo or lower-deck on a slave boat, departs without some kind of nu-declared DG onboard.

Why put lithium batteries on the maindeck?
 

The fire started on the main deck near the side cargo door. Which is where two pallets with DG were loaded in position ML & PR. The pallets contained, among other DG; lithium batteries and photo-resist/IC, a highly flammable fluid.

I question the practice of loading lithium batteries on the maindeck, which is a class E compartment on the B747. Firefighting in a class E compartment is by depressurizing it to 25.000 feet. The FAA has reported that depressurization is ineffective in extinguishing lithium fires. The bellies of a B747 are class C compartments, with halon fire extinguishing. The halon may not put out the lithium fire itself, but it will certainly help to keep the fire down in the surrounding packaging material such as cardboard boxes, plastic sheeting and other flammable material.

And smoke from a lower belly fire would take longer to reach the cockpit.

An added advantage of stowing Lithium batteries in the lower belly would be the extra distance from the vulnerable flight control cables, which run above the ceiling of the main deck.

In the UPS B747 crash at Dubai pitch control was affected within mere minutes of the fire warning. The Asiana crew did not report loss of rudder control untill 12 minutes after reporting a cargo fire, possibly because the fire started much further aft. Allthough from the altitude graph it appears their altitude varied quite a bit.

All this could buy the flight crew extra time to divert, ditch or make an off-airport landing.

ASAP.

I know of one cargo carrier (B777F) who has banned lithium batteries from the main-deck, consigning them to lower-deck Class C compartments only. A rather prudent step, if you ask me.

In an ideal world these batteries should, perhaps, be subject to an outright ban. But if you do that you might as well turn the lights out for air cargo. Thus a more safe way must be found to transport these units, and Class C compartment only is one component of a risk mitigating strategy.