Typhoon Pakhar
 

Well, I'm going to take a wild guess that CX are kicking themselves for not shutting down ops for this typhoon.

Aircraft, crews and passengers dispersed to all points. Clearly a chaotic situation.

And then the mangement (sic) come out begging for help. Airbus office with a special issue of The Bagel. GMO own at dispatch asking people to hang around, even though screw control (sorry - screw operations) has given the standard 1 or 2 hr RPT.

Officially the contract compliance suspension from the last typhoon ends this afternoon sometime. oh dear....

And of note, the suspension of CC doesn't mean you're being asked to help, or to answer your phone, or check crew direct. It merely means you can, if you feel it is appropriate.......

How many people already at dispatch will stick around if asked? Quite a few id say, hard to say no to the face rather than on the phone

I wonder how many heroes used discretion?

Walked off with pax aboard, another crew called out.

Sorry. It's not hard. No discretion. Ever.

Kudos to you Freeman! :D

This goodwill bollocks has to end, who TF came up with cancelling CC after service suspension? :ugh::ugh::ugh: Why does anybody buy into this turd of an idea

It was based on the usual "let's be nice and show we are cooperative" mindset. A mindset that the company uses to it's full advantage every chance they get, meanwhile using all their office time to design and implement policies that destroy our careers. But hey, think of the warm fuzzy feeling we all get knowing we 'care' about the operation....that beats a pay raise, medical and decent retirement anytime don't you think...?? :ugh:

"CX 238 Takes the cake at the moment with 5 approaches-3 into VHHH , one into RCKH, and another successful one into VHHH just a few minutes ago. "
Well , I'll take my hat off to this hero.
Along with Captain Madrid.
Good too see that their are heroes alive and well at Cx

3 approaches into HKG?!?

3 approaches ?
 

Spearing Britney said:
http://www.pprune.org/questions/1200...pproaches.html

"Rather unhelpfuly I can recall neither the numbers or their source but I do remember the lesson! Statistical data shows that the probability of an accident rises greatly on the third attempt hence the 2 tries and run rule applied in all 3 operators I have flown with."

Uh, you are wrong. 4 approaches into HKG. The 4th after a diversion and well into discretion.

But don't worry, the crew would have been taken care of in case of any mishaps.

:ugh::hmm:

Lets check this number of approaches on flight radar 24 before paid CX idea prevails . CX , what kind of airline now ? Desperate Management?

Absolute moron. At least you will get a nice letter on your file. That will pay the bills.

It will be interesting to (hopefully) hear of more details.

In general aviation, many IFR accidents occur due to the pilot pressing multiple approaches to a destination despite an unsuccessful (properly flown) first approach and no substantial (or worsening) change in weather conditions. It's kind of like the old saw about the definition of insanity and expecting a different result. But obviously the G/A pilot THINKS that things will be different even though he or she has no reason to rationally expect this. And then perhaps gets in a bind due fuel or worsening conditions (or traffic) at the potential alternate. So the decision gets made for him or her and turns out poorly.

One would like to think professional air carrier pilots can become devoid of this thought process and can distance themselves from external pressures to exercise bad judgment. Then again the AA Little Rock accident would demonstrate it can creep in despite what should have been better judgment. When you're looking at a 'can of worms' this should be a warning signal that you might want to avoid the can and come back under a position of strength. After you poke a few hornets' nests (or hear of others' experience in poking hornets nests) the savvy aviator usually learns to avoid finding himself in this situation again--and in being proactive toward avoiding hornets in the first place. And that everything else is secondary to making the right decision from (solely) an airmanship perspective.

But it's tough to second guess what really happened without knowing all the facts in a dynamic situation. The goal is to get there if safe and go somewheres else if not.

I DO know the situation as presented sounds strange; if for nothing else from a passenger assurance perspective. Sitting in the back after multiple weather related go-arounds is at best disconcerting and doesn't inspire confidence that all is well or safe (hence the informal 'two and go' rule of thumb). Hopefully there was good information flow and sound decision making involved. And hopefully this sound decision making was devoid of commercial pressures and involved the 'right thing to do' from (solely) an airmanship perspective.

Guess we'll see.

Don't care what the company wants or what the Capt would deem a desirable outcome from such an exercise; how bout a thought for the scared ****less passengers in the back... The ones that "paid" for the ticket‼️

Exactly, if I were sitting in the back I would be very concerned. On the 3rd approach I would be thinking how much fuel do we have left and are we now committed to hong kong, otherwise why we they be having another go? 3rd approach never a good idea. Why be a hero?

To get a pat on the back or a rub behind the ears like a dog. Just like the guy who publicly thanked MH and GL for their effective comms.

It is said that the fuel policy is statistically driven, but so are accidents.

Most of you should be in your hated management as you are very happy to act like the 'Monday morning quarterback'. All my career I have also thought that the third approach was statistically the most dangerous so I did some online research and could not find anything to support that for commercial airlines. How many approaches do we do in a SIM session? Is the third or fourth statistically your worst?

What if you were flying and the scenario was that you went MAP due to wind shear. As you were being vectored and considering the best option you were advised that three CX aircraft had just landed and not reported a W/S warning. You have ample fuel for another approach before diverting? Do you divert?

Don't criticise another Captain and crew for their decisions, made in real time, unless you have all the facts and they were clearly outside SOPs.

I don't get you iPad!!

I don't think I ever will ;)

Never more than two when the go-around decision was windshear. And only return for a second approach if there is an improvement. Pretty sure Part A has restrictions on attempting even one approach into known severe windshear.

And a gas-and-go diversion should never be an option when the weather that caused the goaround is still in force. At the very least there should be a trend of improvement. This sort of risk taking is indicative of having profit oriented people in operational decision making roles. Their judgement is impaired and must be questioned. There should be a firewall between management and operational decisions. Most regulatory authorities would be pretty strict against this common practice at CPA.

But you are right into second guessing the crew. We weren't there. We can only guess as to what information was being passed on to the crew by the heros up in IOC. They've already demonstrated that they are happy to put commercial in front of safety, multiple times. So I guess everyone should really question their advise during operational decisions.

Maybe it's better to keep the advise restricted to the operating crew; so the Captain and FO can always turn around and ask the two SOs sitting behind them what they think. After all this is the crew complement chosen by the people giving advise during a typhoon.