Shuttle Columbia 1 February 2003
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Shuttle Columbia 1 February 2003
As most will know, this morning shortly after entering communications blackout, the Shuttle Columbia seems to have broken up during atmpospheric re-entry at about 200,000 ft over Texas, USA.
Whilst test flying and it's close relative spaceflight have always been very hazardous activities, that does not make this anything less than a huge tragedy, for the crew, for their families, for all their colleagues around the world who knew them, and for everybody in the flight test and spaceflight communities.
Our thoughts and prayers go with 7 brave people who died stretching the boundaries of knowledge, their families, friends, and colleagues.
G
Whilst test flying and it's close relative spaceflight have always been very hazardous activities, that does not make this anything less than a huge tragedy, for the crew, for their families, for all their colleagues around the world who knew them, and for everybody in the flight test and spaceflight communities.
Our thoughts and prayers go with 7 brave people who died stretching the boundaries of knowledge, their families, friends, and colleagues.
G
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It goes without saying that their loss is a tragedy beyond description for their families, friends, and colleagues. It should not be hi-jacked by a nation on the brink of war as a means of finding binding grief.
That said, the gulfs between spaceflight, test flying in its various guises (all of which occupy their individual places in this sliding scale), and operational flying, continue to widen.
Does this reflect better safety in operational flying, or a failure of those managing spaceflight and testing to learn the appropriate lessons and take forward the right principles from the huge leaps in operational flying safety in recent decades? Does the developing difference between operational flying and testing mean that safety lessons will reach the testing world less frequently and in more dilute form? What will the consequences be?
That said, the gulfs between spaceflight, test flying in its various guises (all of which occupy their individual places in this sliding scale), and operational flying, continue to widen.
Does this reflect better safety in operational flying, or a failure of those managing spaceflight and testing to learn the appropriate lessons and take forward the right principles from the huge leaps in operational flying safety in recent decades? Does the developing difference between operational flying and testing mean that safety lessons will reach the testing world less frequently and in more dilute form? What will the consequences be?
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I'm not sure I agree with you Rumbo. Whilst test flying is, and almost inevitably always will be, considerably more hazardous than operational flying, I don't believe the gulf has widened. All of my experience is that both have over the years improved markedly, usually for the same reasons - good management practice, good education of professionals, better reliability of equipment. So on the whole, I think the difference between the two remains similar to it always has done.
Eurofighter has recently lost it's 5th(?) prototype with no loss of life after a very long test programme. Columbia's loss is tragic, but comes at the end of a long series of (barring one exception) highly successful missions. I was recently reading Sir Geoffrey de Havilland's autobiography and the accounts of losses in routine test flying were far worse than anything we see today. I've been working in test flying amateur built aeroplanes for the last 5 years, and have yet to encounter a test flying fatality - which I'm quite certain would not have been true of an equivalent period in the 1950s, or certainly the 1930s.
So, no I think you are wrong. The gulf is clearly there, and large - but I don't think it has grown, I believe all forms of aviation have become safer over the years. I do hope this trend continues.
Now another question might be what one might do to bring test flying to the same safety level as operational flying. I think it's something we should be constantly trying to do - but equally I think that we must accept that we will never succeed. However, could I ask if you'd like to discuss this further that perhaps you could start another thread for the purpose.
G
Eurofighter has recently lost it's 5th(?) prototype with no loss of life after a very long test programme. Columbia's loss is tragic, but comes at the end of a long series of (barring one exception) highly successful missions. I was recently reading Sir Geoffrey de Havilland's autobiography and the accounts of losses in routine test flying were far worse than anything we see today. I've been working in test flying amateur built aeroplanes for the last 5 years, and have yet to encounter a test flying fatality - which I'm quite certain would not have been true of an equivalent period in the 1950s, or certainly the 1930s.
So, no I think you are wrong. The gulf is clearly there, and large - but I don't think it has grown, I believe all forms of aviation have become safer over the years. I do hope this trend continues.
Now another question might be what one might do to bring test flying to the same safety level as operational flying. I think it's something we should be constantly trying to do - but equally I think that we must accept that we will never succeed. However, could I ask if you'd like to discuss this further that perhaps you could start another thread for the purpose.
G
Last edited by Genghis the Engineer; 8th Feb 2003 at 17:03.
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Grew up as a youngster in the shadow of Muroc (Edwards) and can remember many of the early test flights in the 1950's.
Aeroplanes were pranged left, right and center, yet the programs continued.
My Dad worked for Douglas for a very long time and some of these test pilots were dinner guests on a regular basis (as was Donald Douglas Sr). They ALL knew the dangers involved, yet never lost sight of the objective.
In many cases, no matter how carefully the program has been managed....s--t happens.
Aeroplanes were pranged left, right and center, yet the programs continued.
My Dad worked for Douglas for a very long time and some of these test pilots were dinner guests on a regular basis (as was Donald Douglas Sr). They ALL knew the dangers involved, yet never lost sight of the objective.
In many cases, no matter how carefully the program has been managed....s--t happens.
Rumbo, Genghis,
Re test flying safety standards and moving towards operational safety standards.
I recall that for civil flight testing the last UK test aircraft to be lost with fatalities was a Trident; in Europe the unfortunate A330 accident, but before that a Dornier (trim) and a VFW614 (flutter). The first two accidents could equally have occurred in operational flight, the Trident was a production flight test involving stalling, an activity that may still be encountered during annual air tests. The A330 had many human factors issues, most of which are still seen in civil accidents; but I accept that there were design issues at the edge of the flight envelope. This evidence could support the view that at least civil flight test safety has improved. When was Boeing’s last incident? MD-80 landing? However, the more recent experiences of Bombardier may suggest otherwise.
I suspect that if we examined flight test safety statistics (accidents per test flying hour or number of flights) there would be no sensible comparison with civil accident rates; neither should there be. It is the activities that the test teams undertake that provide the basis for good operational safety. When was the last British designed aircraft involved in a design-related operational accident? Touching a lot of wood and consulting the ‘anoraks’ probably a 1950’s HS748 (door fell off). For those at the edge, or outside the test world, it is not the taking of risks during testing that is the issue it is the management of risk.
Thus whilst it is a very commendable aim to achieve the same level of safety during testing as seen in operational flying, in reality the test industry must continue to monitor and manage the ever present risks of flight testing. The test industry must guard against complacency, take note of the changes in the operational world, and maintain high standards of risk management for the ultimate benefit of the operators.
It would be inappropriate to include the unfortunate Columbia accident in any of the categories above. Although image-makers would have us believe that the shuttle undertakes routine operational flights, it is still experimental, representing the leading edge of science. If we were to equate manned space flight with conventional aviation, the Shuttle is hardly into the De Havilland era. Ahhh … de H
Re test flying safety standards and moving towards operational safety standards.
I recall that for civil flight testing the last UK test aircraft to be lost with fatalities was a Trident; in Europe the unfortunate A330 accident, but before that a Dornier (trim) and a VFW614 (flutter). The first two accidents could equally have occurred in operational flight, the Trident was a production flight test involving stalling, an activity that may still be encountered during annual air tests. The A330 had many human factors issues, most of which are still seen in civil accidents; but I accept that there were design issues at the edge of the flight envelope. This evidence could support the view that at least civil flight test safety has improved. When was Boeing’s last incident? MD-80 landing? However, the more recent experiences of Bombardier may suggest otherwise.
I suspect that if we examined flight test safety statistics (accidents per test flying hour or number of flights) there would be no sensible comparison with civil accident rates; neither should there be. It is the activities that the test teams undertake that provide the basis for good operational safety. When was the last British designed aircraft involved in a design-related operational accident? Touching a lot of wood and consulting the ‘anoraks’ probably a 1950’s HS748 (door fell off). For those at the edge, or outside the test world, it is not the taking of risks during testing that is the issue it is the management of risk.
Thus whilst it is a very commendable aim to achieve the same level of safety during testing as seen in operational flying, in reality the test industry must continue to monitor and manage the ever present risks of flight testing. The test industry must guard against complacency, take note of the changes in the operational world, and maintain high standards of risk management for the ultimate benefit of the operators.
It would be inappropriate to include the unfortunate Columbia accident in any of the categories above. Although image-makers would have us believe that the shuttle undertakes routine operational flights, it is still experimental, representing the leading edge of science. If we were to equate manned space flight with conventional aviation, the Shuttle is hardly into the De Havilland era. Ahhh … de H
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Whilst your arguments are reasonable safetypee and I broadly agree, civil test flying fatalities do still occur in the UK. In recent years they have tended to be at the GA end - John Hudson in the prototype Excalibur being an obvious example about ten years ago and more recently the crew of a Puma on a post maintenance air test in 1998. The fact that they're not in the high value end of aviation only reduces their public visibility, not their seriousness.
G
G
