Russian Airbus crash
The Reverend
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Sydney,NSW,Australia
Posts: 2,020
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So can a l.ocked out MEL'd Thrust Reverser produce forward thrust (if the pilot uses both for reverse - forgetting about the MEL)?
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: A oneworld lounge near you
Posts: 145
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Updated stuff
OK, can somebody help me out with the more recent stuff please?
The Interstate Aviation Committe has given indications that the touchdown was within the touchdown zone, but was there a special displacement of the runway threshold on the day, and was it marked, were the TDZ markings moved and were the PAPIs moved?
The statement has been given that the selected approach speed was around 138 knots, which feels right, but are there any A310 pilots that find that unusual?
The autopilot and autothrust were disconnected at radalt 300 feet, but my knowledge of type lets me down here, most times I have flown the heavy metals, it is more usual to disconnect somewhat higher. Was this unusual?
The autobrake gave around 0.2g deceleration, which is consistent with the LO button setting of demanding -0.17g.
One reverser was locked out, as allowed per MEL, and did not activate. The other did, was operating at full reverse and then stowed OK. Can anybody give me the standard speed for deselecting reverse in an A310. Usual jet speeds would be around 70 kts. Not given in the IAC statement, just want to get to implication speed here, then I can do some distance calcs.
Engine One then accelerated to full power. The aircraft departed the runway at 95 kts, having been kept running relatively straight by rudder and steering. No indication that engine 2 went beyond idle. Implication that brakes were applied manually.
So, questions that pop up included:
1. Is there some form of drill for this event and would the PNF check the engine instruments at this point. Is it trained in the sim or classroom?
2. Does this look similar to the TAROM loss and does anybody have a link to that report? (to be honest I have not checked the BEA website to see if it was French registered)
3. Is it practical to switch off the engine at this point (both engines would lead to issues with hydraulics and braking, but the acumulator would work, but is this a 1000 psi system like the 320?)
4. If you were down, and reversers stowed, can you then go around in this condition? Would a stowed light come on? What flap setting would you have to select?
5. Does anybody have some performance graphs for take off so that I could have a ponder at doing some calculations in relation to landing point, go-around decision making, acceleration distances and clearways etc?
6. Retraction of spoilers on the ground, how and when....
7. OK, what have I missed?
I do have a significant interest in this case.
Many thanks.
Discount.
PS, Any 310 pilots and engineers around LGW (or I guess LTN) area that could help me out by PM?
The Interstate Aviation Committe has given indications that the touchdown was within the touchdown zone, but was there a special displacement of the runway threshold on the day, and was it marked, were the TDZ markings moved and were the PAPIs moved?
The statement has been given that the selected approach speed was around 138 knots, which feels right, but are there any A310 pilots that find that unusual?
The autopilot and autothrust were disconnected at radalt 300 feet, but my knowledge of type lets me down here, most times I have flown the heavy metals, it is more usual to disconnect somewhat higher. Was this unusual?
The autobrake gave around 0.2g deceleration, which is consistent with the LO button setting of demanding -0.17g.
One reverser was locked out, as allowed per MEL, and did not activate. The other did, was operating at full reverse and then stowed OK. Can anybody give me the standard speed for deselecting reverse in an A310. Usual jet speeds would be around 70 kts. Not given in the IAC statement, just want to get to implication speed here, then I can do some distance calcs.
Engine One then accelerated to full power. The aircraft departed the runway at 95 kts, having been kept running relatively straight by rudder and steering. No indication that engine 2 went beyond idle. Implication that brakes were applied manually.
So, questions that pop up included:
1. Is there some form of drill for this event and would the PNF check the engine instruments at this point. Is it trained in the sim or classroom?
2. Does this look similar to the TAROM loss and does anybody have a link to that report? (to be honest I have not checked the BEA website to see if it was French registered)
3. Is it practical to switch off the engine at this point (both engines would lead to issues with hydraulics and braking, but the acumulator would work, but is this a 1000 psi system like the 320?)
4. If you were down, and reversers stowed, can you then go around in this condition? Would a stowed light come on? What flap setting would you have to select?
5. Does anybody have some performance graphs for take off so that I could have a ponder at doing some calculations in relation to landing point, go-around decision making, acceleration distances and clearways etc?
6. Retraction of spoilers on the ground, how and when....
7. OK, what have I missed?
I do have a significant interest in this case.
Many thanks.
Discount.
PS, Any 310 pilots and engineers around LGW (or I guess LTN) area that could help me out by PM?
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: A oneworld lounge near you
Posts: 145
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interest?
I am an independent accident investigator who is contracted by a variety of organisations to work as a specialist on airport and ATC related accidents. I have worked on a variety of cases that are well known to this forum. In addition, I am one of the few accident investigators who has very detailed knowledge of safety management systems and risk assessment. I have worked on ICAO Annex 13 investigations, insurance investigations, CAA and operator investigations as well as criminal investigations.
Given the personal security situation in the country of the accident, and given that I have been subject to attack by one of their nationals before whilst executing my role during an Annex 13 investigation, I do not wish to discuss my exact role further on-air, as it were.
Given the personal security situation in the country of the accident, and given that I have been subject to attack by one of their nationals before whilst executing my role during an Annex 13 investigation, I do not wish to discuss my exact role further on-air, as it were.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: England
Posts: 242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For DiscountInvestigator
Airbusses do this sort of thing all the time.
.
Just a variation on the same fingerfumble theme as:
.
"The Grip on the Galaxy Go-Levers"
.
.
www.asc.gov.tw/acd_files/GE536_Report_en.pdf
OVERTALK
.
Just a variation on the same fingerfumble theme as:
.
"The Grip on the Galaxy Go-Levers"
.
.
www.asc.gov.tw/acd_files/GE536_Report_en.pdf
OVERTALK
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: zz plural 5
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The A310 is of course very similiar to the A300-600.From what you have posted the approach and speed seem normal.What kind of approach was it?ILS on non -prec?That would determine the ap modes in use and when to disconnect.Was the engine a fadec engine and what type was it?The cables have been known to cause problems on non-fadec cf-6s and lead to thrust being frozen but i have never heard of a thrust increase.The mod state of the engine would need to be looked at to see if it had a tertiary lock.normal cancel speed is around 80kt aiming to be back at idle by 60kt at the latest.Pnf should look at the light sequence above the engine instruments for proper deployment and cancellation
You could shut down the engine if you were aware quickly enough of the problem.Number 2 provides yellow system pressure plus green so brake pressure should not have been a problem.I have only practiced this in the sim once and that was on a take-off scenario.This incident reminds me more of the 747 that went off the end in a pacific island than the tarom one.Pm me if I can help you any further.
You could shut down the engine if you were aware quickly enough of the problem.Number 2 provides yellow system pressure plus green so brake pressure should not have been a problem.I have only practiced this in the sim once and that was on a take-off scenario.This incident reminds me more of the 747 that went off the end in a pacific island than the tarom one.Pm me if I can help you any further.
Coppula eam se non posit acceptera jocularum
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Northumberland, UK
Age: 61
Posts: 293
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Russian Airbus crash Irkutsk - update
Update on a story. Tucked away in a tiny corner of today's Moscow Times:
Even to humble SLF that is clearly very thin, and "edited conclusion" certainly merits a raised eyebrow.
The crew of an Airbus A310 that crashed in July, killing 125 people, was to blame for the incident, investigators said in a report [published on] Wednesday.
But the investigators, in an edited conclusion of the report, also blamed an "unintentional and uncontrolled" movement in one of the engines, which was not detected by the crew in time.
But the investigators, in an edited conclusion of the report, also blamed an "unintentional and uncontrolled" movement in one of the engines, which was not detected by the crew in time.
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: London
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Coppula eam se non posit acceptera jocularum
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Northumberland, UK
Age: 61
Posts: 293
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Some reporting with a little bit more information from Novosti: "Crew at fault in crash of A310 at Irkutsk". Rough translation of key points are that after landing the commander, during putting the starboard engine into reverse, involuntary moved the control lever [literal translation?] of the thrust of the port engine while reverse was deactivated. The report goes onto to say that in the absence of proper monitoring by the copilot of the engine setting parameters, the crew did not properly monitor [I think, please bear with my translation!] measures to control the port engine.
Edit to add an English language version. Note that this version actually contains more information, including quotes from the anonymous A310 commander, than the Russian original!
Edit to add an English language version. Note that this version actually contains more information, including quotes from the anonymous A310 commander, than the Russian original!
Last edited by Evening Star; 23rd Nov 2006 at 20:40. Reason: Add more information
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: Ireland
Posts: 1,621
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another fairly detailed article in English (with some additional info) from Kommersant.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: England
Posts: 303
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Confusing terminology
Surely here they're not saying that the Captain accidentally pressed TOGA (and got a result) whilst on rollout with the right engine reversing and the Left eng at idle? Is that possible in an A310 or other Airbus?
When he pressed the switch for the reversing system, located between the pilots' seats, with one finger of his right hand, Shibanov most likely bumped the handle that controlled the left, deactivated engine, located only centimeters away, with his other fingers. As a result, he simultaneously turned on the right reversing system and left takeoff system and the plane picked up speed, turning to the right, hitting garages and bursting into flames.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Germany
Posts: 6
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just curious, but what was the reported (i.e. crosswind) wind just before the crew began their approach? Was the runway reported to be wet?
These will be quite important next time we have a thrust reverser or autospoiler MEL'd this winter, or whenever.
We can always refuse the aircraft when the limitations with certain conditions appear unsafe. The "armchair quarterbacks" sitting on the ground can always second-guess it.
Can you easily refuse an airplane (under unsafe circumstances) for more than
just 1) inop APU, 2) eng. generator, or 3) auto-pressurization?
We are NOT on a vital military or civilian mission-at least not when we are "bush flying" with a 118,000 lb jet from ORD or ATL etc.
If pilots accept almost any airplane without really questioning the present situation, they are only creating profits for their stockholders
and Upper Mgmt 
: by risking their careers and safety.
The tail-mounted engines on planes which we fly can reduce rudder effectiveness up to about about 70 %, with both reversers operating.
And having inter-mixed engines with different engine acceleration rates creates other results on landing.
Last night on a nice 1-day trip (4 legs), one reverser blue light came on at least two seconds before the other blue light as the other pilot pulls firmly back on both reverser levers. We had no intermixed engines.
Any or all of these characteristics happen with ALL systems operational-whether the runway is dry, wet, or with a thin, fresh coating of dry snow and a 15-knot crosswind etc.
These will be quite important next time we have a thrust reverser or autospoiler MEL'd this winter, or whenever.
We can always refuse the aircraft when the limitations with certain conditions appear unsafe. The "armchair quarterbacks" sitting on the ground can always second-guess it.
Can you easily refuse an airplane (under unsafe circumstances) for more than
just 1) inop APU, 2) eng. generator, or 3) auto-pressurization?
We are NOT on a vital military or civilian mission-at least not when we are "bush flying" with a 118,000 lb jet from ORD or ATL etc.
If pilots accept almost any airplane without really questioning the present situation, they are only creating profits for their stockholders
and Upper Mgmt : by risking their careers and safety.The tail-mounted engines on planes which we fly can reduce rudder effectiveness up to about about 70 %, with both reversers operating.
And having inter-mixed engines with different engine acceleration rates creates other results on landing.
Last night on a nice 1-day trip (4 legs), one reverser blue light came on at least two seconds before the other blue light as the other pilot pulls firmly back on both reverser levers. We had no intermixed engines.
Any or all of these characteristics happen with ALL systems operational-whether the runway is dry, wet, or with a thin, fresh coating of dry snow and a 15-knot crosswind etc.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 2nd Dec 2007 at 03:24.
