F-104 Accidents
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F-104 Accidents
Reading the threads on the Meteor and Canberra accident history prompts the question. Were they a result of role, unreliable engine, a particular handling quirk, or what? Certainly earned itself a reputation.
Thanks in advance.
Thanks in advance.
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For me, I would do a quick goggle at Google for North American Eagle, which allegedly is an attempt to snatch back the World land speed record. And Yes - it still has a bang seat, though I only hope that it is up rather than down.
I somehow don't feel very happy about this one...
Conan
I somehow don't feel very happy about this one...
Conan
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If I recall well, this aircraft was a bit touchy to handle and the rate of attrition and killed pilots was particulatily high in the German Luftwaffe due to a combination of factors:
-F104 Initial ejection seat had pretty poor perfomances
-F104 in the luftwaffe was primarily used as a groud attack A/C (more risky)
-many of the F104 killed pilots were young inexperienced pilots (less prone to react quickly in the case of serious trouble)
Completely different from the problems of the F105 in Vietnam were the loss incured mainly due to the architecture of the hydraulic circuit.
-F104 Initial ejection seat had pretty poor perfomances
-F104 in the luftwaffe was primarily used as a groud attack A/C (more risky)
-many of the F104 killed pilots were young inexperienced pilots (less prone to react quickly in the case of serious trouble)
Completely different from the problems of the F105 in Vietnam were the loss incured mainly due to the architecture of the hydraulic circuit.
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Spoke to a Belgian friend who flew the 104 out of Kleine Brogel in the early 1980s. He told me that it was dangerous to operate them below 300 kts at low level because of the relatively poor control response. I also recall him speaking of the strong roll/yaw couple because of the adverse B/A ratio (long fuselage/very short wings).
Best beat up I ever saw was by a departing 104 going past the ATC tower at Gutersloh after the 1982 Tiger Meet, below roof level and at what must have been very close to Mach 1. The aircraft went straight over the Ops block (the tower was part of the same building) - I was standing a few feet away, on the roof and nearly got blown off!
Best beat up I ever saw was by a departing 104 going past the ATC tower at Gutersloh after the 1982 Tiger Meet, below roof level and at what must have been very close to Mach 1. The aircraft went straight over the Ops block (the tower was part of the same building) - I was standing a few feet away, on the roof and nearly got blown off!
Last edited by ShyTorque; 25th Dec 2005 at 19:27.
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Just to settle the downward ejection seat topic first, the initial F104As were fitted with downward-firing ejector seats because it was thought that at high speeds the seat would probably be unable to clear the tall fin and tailplane. Hmmmm – nice thinking Bloggs! I wonder where most accidents happen historically? Is it perhaps during take-offs and landings and at low level? Just imagine: “ Bugga – here I am on short finals and the bleedin’ donk’s just lost loadsa power. Oh well – no snags – I’ll just pull up with all my excess energy, roll upside down and eject through the bottom of the aircraft. No worries.” Common sense very soon prevailed and the more conventional form of exiting through the roof was installed. Some 20-odd pilots were killed in the early stages as a direct result of the downward firing seat.
The early J79 engines also caused some rather exciting problems, not least of which was the tendency of the afterburner nozzles to remain stuck in the fully-open (burners lit) position, when the burner was deselected. As I’m sure you can imagine, with the nozzles stuck open and the burners not lit, you would get more thrust out of the back by farting than you were getting from the engine. This caused a distinct tendency for pilots to leave the aircraft to its own devices while they tried to steer the parachute towards a pub car park.
So much for the early aircraft problems. For the overall picture, the basic design led to some interesting flying characteristics. (I apologise to people like John Farley and Lomcevak if my memory of aerodynamics is somewhat rusty, but it has been a while since I had to think too much about that topic very deeply.) The first was the relatively huge length of the aircraft when compared with the tiny 22 foot wingspan, leading to some attention-grabbing, undemanded manoeuvres when playing around with rolling and pulling at the same time (B over A rules OK). This would have been particularly true if you were one of those nutters who believed that the best way of ridge-crossing was to roll upside down as you approached the ridge and pull down over it, then roll the right way up as you entered the next valley. Incidentally, this basically flawed technique also killed several Jaguar pilots.
The next fascinating design feature was the fact that at high angles of attack, the high-set tailplane tended to stall in the downwash from the wing. When this happened the aircraft would almost certainly “swap ends” and would then be quite likely to end up in a distinctly senses-stimulating flat spin. Because of the somewhat exhilarating nature of this possible result of too high an angle of attack, the aircraft had a “stick-shaker/kicker” installed. As you reached an angle of attack that was approaching the possibility of you enjoying a free Alton Towers experience, the stick would start to shake in your hands. If you ignored the shaker, or hit the override paddle on the stick (which disenabled the system) or if you had applied the angle of attack at a very rapid rate, the stick would then be forcibly “kicked” forwards to prevent you causing the aircraft to depart. Now then, the 104 was latterly used in the mud-moving role. So – imagine the scenario: on a range in peacetime sliding gently down the strafe pattern pointing at the target and determined to beat old Fred’s last good score. “Not quite on --- that’s better --- squeeze that trigger --- yesssss --- oh jeez that ground’s a bit close – heave ------“ …… KICK ….. “Bleedin’ ‘ell --- ground’s even closer now!” Choices? Pull harder and get kicker again and hit ground? Hit the override paddle and pull harder and swap ends and then eventually hit the ground after a stirring low level aerobatic display?
As far as losses are concerned, there were nearly 2600 aircraft built in total, and the average percentage loss rate over all the countries that used the Starfighter was probably around 30% to 35%. The early losses could almost certainly be blamed as much on inadequate and insufficient training for the change from the preceding aircraft, and also on low experience levels of maintenance crews and aircrew, as they could be blamed on inherent faults with the aircraft. That sentence is purely my own opinion but – for example – if you buy 916 aircraft (Germany), then service this relatively complex aircraft (when compared with what they replaced) using conscripts, then fly them using inexperienced aircrew then --- as they say --- “you’re bound to lose a few”.
A partial breakdown is: Germany = 32% (although it is worthy of note that their loss rate on the F84/RF84 was rather worse than that); Holland = 31%; Belgium = 37%; Italy = 37%; Canada = 45%; and Japan = 15%. I’m sorry but I couldn’t find an overall loss percentage for the USA. This overall percentage loss statistic is perhaps a bit too broad a figure to be of much use other than to say (“Blooming heck – they lost a lot didn’t they”), as it does not indicate a rate per year of operating the aircraft. I suspect (but haven’t even started to look at proving) that the percentage loss rate per year in the early days of the Gnat, Lightning and Harrier may have been comparable with the equivalent statistics for the 104s. I’m sure that John Farley will be able to either confirm this or raise the “bull****” flag on this statement. Even then, percentage loss rate per year is not nearly as useful as a breakdown of percentage loss rate per flying hour broken down by roles. But that's far too difficult and time-consuming for Boxing Day!
One statistic that I am not even sure is totally correct (but I love to quote it anyway ‘cos it sounds great!) is that it was more dangerous for an American pilot to do an exchange tour with the RAF in the 60s and 70s than it was for him to do 3 whole tours in Vietnam!!
Not sure if any of that helps with the original question, but I enjoyed writing it.
The early J79 engines also caused some rather exciting problems, not least of which was the tendency of the afterburner nozzles to remain stuck in the fully-open (burners lit) position, when the burner was deselected. As I’m sure you can imagine, with the nozzles stuck open and the burners not lit, you would get more thrust out of the back by farting than you were getting from the engine. This caused a distinct tendency for pilots to leave the aircraft to its own devices while they tried to steer the parachute towards a pub car park.
So much for the early aircraft problems. For the overall picture, the basic design led to some interesting flying characteristics. (I apologise to people like John Farley and Lomcevak if my memory of aerodynamics is somewhat rusty, but it has been a while since I had to think too much about that topic very deeply.) The first was the relatively huge length of the aircraft when compared with the tiny 22 foot wingspan, leading to some attention-grabbing, undemanded manoeuvres when playing around with rolling and pulling at the same time (B over A rules OK). This would have been particularly true if you were one of those nutters who believed that the best way of ridge-crossing was to roll upside down as you approached the ridge and pull down over it, then roll the right way up as you entered the next valley. Incidentally, this basically flawed technique also killed several Jaguar pilots.
The next fascinating design feature was the fact that at high angles of attack, the high-set tailplane tended to stall in the downwash from the wing. When this happened the aircraft would almost certainly “swap ends” and would then be quite likely to end up in a distinctly senses-stimulating flat spin. Because of the somewhat exhilarating nature of this possible result of too high an angle of attack, the aircraft had a “stick-shaker/kicker” installed. As you reached an angle of attack that was approaching the possibility of you enjoying a free Alton Towers experience, the stick would start to shake in your hands. If you ignored the shaker, or hit the override paddle on the stick (which disenabled the system) or if you had applied the angle of attack at a very rapid rate, the stick would then be forcibly “kicked” forwards to prevent you causing the aircraft to depart. Now then, the 104 was latterly used in the mud-moving role. So – imagine the scenario: on a range in peacetime sliding gently down the strafe pattern pointing at the target and determined to beat old Fred’s last good score. “Not quite on --- that’s better --- squeeze that trigger --- yesssss --- oh jeez that ground’s a bit close – heave ------“ …… KICK ….. “Bleedin’ ‘ell --- ground’s even closer now!” Choices? Pull harder and get kicker again and hit ground? Hit the override paddle and pull harder and swap ends and then eventually hit the ground after a stirring low level aerobatic display?
As far as losses are concerned, there were nearly 2600 aircraft built in total, and the average percentage loss rate over all the countries that used the Starfighter was probably around 30% to 35%. The early losses could almost certainly be blamed as much on inadequate and insufficient training for the change from the preceding aircraft, and also on low experience levels of maintenance crews and aircrew, as they could be blamed on inherent faults with the aircraft. That sentence is purely my own opinion but – for example – if you buy 916 aircraft (Germany), then service this relatively complex aircraft (when compared with what they replaced) using conscripts, then fly them using inexperienced aircrew then --- as they say --- “you’re bound to lose a few”.
A partial breakdown is: Germany = 32% (although it is worthy of note that their loss rate on the F84/RF84 was rather worse than that); Holland = 31%; Belgium = 37%; Italy = 37%; Canada = 45%; and Japan = 15%. I’m sorry but I couldn’t find an overall loss percentage for the USA. This overall percentage loss statistic is perhaps a bit too broad a figure to be of much use other than to say (“Blooming heck – they lost a lot didn’t they”), as it does not indicate a rate per year of operating the aircraft. I suspect (but haven’t even started to look at proving) that the percentage loss rate per year in the early days of the Gnat, Lightning and Harrier may have been comparable with the equivalent statistics for the 104s. I’m sure that John Farley will be able to either confirm this or raise the “bull****” flag on this statement. Even then, percentage loss rate per year is not nearly as useful as a breakdown of percentage loss rate per flying hour broken down by roles. But that's far too difficult and time-consuming for Boxing Day!
One statistic that I am not even sure is totally correct (but I love to quote it anyway ‘cos it sounds great!) is that it was more dangerous for an American pilot to do an exchange tour with the RAF in the 60s and 70s than it was for him to do 3 whole tours in Vietnam!!
Not sure if any of that helps with the original question, but I enjoyed writing it.
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There are many people who are convinced that the main reason for the high F104 loss rate in the Luftwaffe was the rapid expansion of that air force. If overnight one tries to grow too quickly one ends up with a relatively inexperienced cadre of air and groundcrew. Add an aircraft much more advanced than they had before in large numbers and with some distinctly dangerous handling characteristics and you can sit back and count the losses.
In the USAF Luftwaffe training programme there were also losses - several in the mid-70s due to flap problems. However, the RCAF operated the aircraft with great success and a low loss rate.
In the USAF Luftwaffe training programme there were also losses - several in the mid-70s due to flap problems. However, the RCAF operated the aircraft with great success and a low loss rate.
Drain Bamaged
As the 45% lost rate might sound high, I just want to point out that the Canadian CF-104s probably had the highest flying time of any country operating the Starfighter.
At the time of retirement, average airframe times were of the order of 6000 hours as compared to 2000 hours for the Luftwaffe.
At the time of retirement, average airframe times were of the order of 6000 hours as compared to 2000 hours for the Luftwaffe.
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quote:
...that it was more dangerous for an American pilot to do an exchange tour with the RAF in the 60s and 70s than it was for him to do 3 whole tours in Vietnam!!
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Not disputing or agreeing with the line or stats, but as an interesting aside, I've interviewd US exchange pilots/navs who flew Lightnings, Jaguars and Buccaneers and each says his turn with the RAF was the highlight of his military career.
Not necessarily the jet involved (each gave me his pro/cons regarding the particular RAF jet), but for sheer flying and squadron fun, each gave his experience a big
Any ppruners have comments? I can see this thread turning to a 'banter' type if so......
...that it was more dangerous for an American pilot to do an exchange tour with the RAF in the 60s and 70s than it was for him to do 3 whole tours in Vietnam!!
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not disputing or agreeing with the line or stats, but as an interesting aside, I've interviewd US exchange pilots/navs who flew Lightnings, Jaguars and Buccaneers and each says his turn with the RAF was the highlight of his military career.
Not necessarily the jet involved (each gave me his pro/cons regarding the particular RAF jet), but for sheer flying and squadron fun, each gave his experience a big
Any ppruners have comments? I can see this thread turning to a 'banter' type if so......
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Fortunately the Tanker exchange programme with the USAF through the seventies and eighties did not lose any participants but it was very noticeable how hard the guys, with one outstanding exception, found it to work to our style of operating. They were obviously controlled far more tightly from some form of central organisation and took some time to feel free to make their own decisions. The different styles of the two air forces were most noticeable when operating together, with RAF tankers almost always the preferred choice.
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Inverted Crossing of Ridges
Firstly, the supposed reason for “ridge rolling” was to stay out of sight of enemy radars. I know that – personally – I can stay much closer to the ground when upright crossing a ridge than I ever could when inverted and pulling. That alone should make the inverted method less effective, considering that you can ease up to almost level with the crest (staying out of radar coverage) just before the ridge, and then push down into the valley. Of course, you don’t want to be rolling much while you are pushing either. Remember that this tactic was proposed in the 60s to 80s, with relatively ineffective ground radar cover and zero airborne radar cover. If you are flying an aircraft with some dodgy characteristics when simultaneously rolling and pulling, and if you envisage just a slight overcooking of the inverted pull down into the valley, the chances of “building a box” get quite high. Both the 104 and the Jaguar had a rather disadvantageous B over A ratio and – furthermore – the design of the Jaguar meant that you actually had to destroy lift on one wing in order to roll the aircraft. Having flown both types and having tried both methods and having seen the findings of several boards of inquiry into Jaguar losses, before I “saw the light”, I merely know which method I prefer.
I also agree with ehwatezedoing that the Canadian statistics do not tell the whole story. As I said before, the bald overall percentage loss rates are pretty meaningless.
Firstly, the supposed reason for “ridge rolling” was to stay out of sight of enemy radars. I know that – personally – I can stay much closer to the ground when upright crossing a ridge than I ever could when inverted and pulling. That alone should make the inverted method less effective, considering that you can ease up to almost level with the crest (staying out of radar coverage) just before the ridge, and then push down into the valley. Of course, you don’t want to be rolling much while you are pushing either. Remember that this tactic was proposed in the 60s to 80s, with relatively ineffective ground radar cover and zero airborne radar cover. If you are flying an aircraft with some dodgy characteristics when simultaneously rolling and pulling, and if you envisage just a slight overcooking of the inverted pull down into the valley, the chances of “building a box” get quite high. Both the 104 and the Jaguar had a rather disadvantageous B over A ratio and – furthermore – the design of the Jaguar meant that you actually had to destroy lift on one wing in order to roll the aircraft. Having flown both types and having tried both methods and having seen the findings of several boards of inquiry into Jaguar losses, before I “saw the light”, I merely know which method I prefer.
I also agree with ehwatezedoing that the Canadian statistics do not tell the whole story. As I said before, the bald overall percentage loss rates are pretty meaningless.
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Not disputing or agreeing with the line or stats, but as an interesting aside, I've interviewd US exchange pilots/navs who flew Lightnings, Jaguars and Buccaneers and each says his turn with the RAF was the highlight of his military career.
I was lucky enough to fly the Hawk for three years at Valley and Chivenor as a French exchange officer, and these were definitely the best years of my air force time...
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For what's worth, it had it's little "quirks" on the ground as well. Having done the X servicing course at Memmigen I was introduced to the "7 finger check" as I recall--could have been 5 though, can't remember now----anyway, one of these I DO recall, the one where you had to slowly move the A.o.A vein throughout the range of travel---said vein is, of course heated and the driver is supposed to pull the CB and then reset afterwards. The vein itself was located on the right hand side and a bit too close to the intake as I recall. Obviously, on the course all was fine. Then came the day one lobbed into sunny Bruggen for a "day or two" and I was tasked with handling it along with a couple of others. Come the first start up--go to the vein and "ooops" from inside the cockpit as he er, "read my lips". CB hastily pulled and back to the checks.
I declined to sue the West German Gov't as I was bought off by several bottles of alcohol that evening from said driver
I declined to sue the West German Gov't as I was bought off by several bottles of alcohol that evening from said driver
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In the early 1980s, after an overnight stop at a GAF base, I was waiting to depart to Gutersloh in my Puma, after waiting for the F-104 "weathership" to land. ATC had heard him call finals but he didn't appear on the runway or go around. After a short time it was announced that he had "landed" short of the runway, in decreasing visibility turning to very shallow fog. We were asked to get airborne and search the approach path to the threshold to see if we could find the pilot as the fire trucks hadn't yet arrived on the scene; he was outside the airfield perimeter.
I climbed to about 400 or 500 feet and we could see straight down through the fog, it was very shallow. We found the aircraft straight away.
Unfortunately, it was immediately obvious that he had hit the substantial wooden approach light poles at a very shallow angle, the aircraft was in very small pieces and his remains were still in the cockpit. The fog was very shallow and it appeared to us that he had begun a visual approach, but become disorientated in the poor vis about a mile out as he entered the fog. He then got too low, hit a pole and it was all over for him. The weather was gin clear except for that small area of shallow fog on the aproach. Shame he didn't land in the other direction; the wind was very light.
The annoying thing is, I do recall the airfield was south of the RAF "Clutch" stations but just can't remember the name of it. I do remember that at the other (western) end of the runway, there was a very steep drop where the naturally falling ground had been infilled to extend the original runway length.
Anyone help with that one?
I climbed to about 400 or 500 feet and we could see straight down through the fog, it was very shallow. We found the aircraft straight away.
Unfortunately, it was immediately obvious that he had hit the substantial wooden approach light poles at a very shallow angle, the aircraft was in very small pieces and his remains were still in the cockpit. The fog was very shallow and it appeared to us that he had begun a visual approach, but become disorientated in the poor vis about a mile out as he entered the fog. He then got too low, hit a pole and it was all over for him. The weather was gin clear except for that small area of shallow fog on the aproach. Shame he didn't land in the other direction; the wind was very light.
The annoying thing is, I do recall the airfield was south of the RAF "Clutch" stations but just can't remember the name of it. I do remember that at the other (western) end of the runway, there was a very steep drop where the naturally falling ground had been infilled to extend the original runway length.
Anyone help with that one?