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With hindsight the aircraft should not have made the approach due the combination of runway / airport conditions and aircraft configuration. Thus a conclusion could be that there was a failure in risk assessment.
Recent posts focussed on error prevention and recovery (systems failure), but these depend on error detection which suffers from a wide range of human limitations – focussed attention, reduced hearing, or not able to recall memory items. There was a dual human failure in the overall operating system – both pilots ‘failed’ to notice, to act, react, etc.

The reasons for many of the human contributions might be found in a wider view of ‘automation/technology’ and everyday operations.
Auto brake (in part) originated from a need to improve human performance during RTOs (incorrect application of brakes). In this sense, autobrake is an essential safety system. Its subsequent use for passenger comfort – landing braking levels, and the attempt to calculate runway distance remaining (Boeing computer / 737 Midway accident) can create a false perception of the system’s capability. The emphasis on braking for comfort might bias pilots from full manual brake when required.
The routine use of auto thrust with manual flight can also lead to a false sense of security in unusual situations – expecting the ‘auto’ system to look after the thrust levers; familiarity or laziness?
Were the conditions for operation of the ‘fully automatic’ spoiler system really understood; were the implications of any remote failure known – a deficiency of SOPs, training, memory, or recall?
Was the challenge of this ‘carrier sized’ airport (fun, exciting, and demanding even on a good day), transferred into a subconscious ‘press-on’ attitude, strengthened by the presence of two Captains neither whishing to fail or be outdone? Were the crew conditioned to always land at this familiar airport irrespective of the differences in this situation; did anyone with a controlling influence in this operation stop to think?

Much has been said about landing distances, but how often do crews assess their landings against the requirements? Do crews routinely assess if the aircraft was capable of stopping within the safety margins provided for a limiting runway? Do crews check what % of max landing weight they are at, or how much additional runway they have/have not for a normal landing? Most landings are made on non limiting runways thus crews have few references as to how close they were to the required limiting performance, particularly in less than ideal conditions. This too can bias pilot’s judgement to a false sense of security.
Do crews check the validity of computerised landing data or the dispatcher’s advice; or like some aspects of regulation or management do crews also pass down their accountability for these aspects of safety to a lower level – other people/computers – a form of pre-emptive blame?
The lack of accurate (meaningful) runway braking reports further complicates the issue. 3 mm of water is neither safe/unsafe; once the runway is wet the safety margin is literally on a ‘downhill slide’. The ill-defined Boeing ‘slippery’ runway has merit when considered as the range braking conditions between wet and icy - the view taken in some documents where decreasing mu is correlated with descriptions ranging ‘good’ to ‘poor’. On a wet slippery runway how wet is wet, how slippery is slippery in comparison with a normal operation? Then we tend to forget aquaplaning – “you don’t notice it on grooved runways” myth or mystery? (And the critical speed may be nearer 7xSQR P than 9xSQR P).

Normal operations set the ‘comparative’ ground rules for human assessment and behaviour. Management and pilots rarely consider that the many assumptions they make in forming their idea of ‘normal’ operations (habit / expectation) will not apply in adverse conditions, particularly with the already reduced safety margins hidden in regulation. This enables opportunities for errors of judgement, mistakes in decision making – and that’s even before the start the approach and any other erroneous opportunities. Did everyone in the decision process fail to think – were they self satisfied (complacent) with their normal operation?

Reconsidering the circumstances of this accident without hindsight, it could be concluded there were sufficient cues available to both management and crew to indicate that this specific operation should not have been conducted. The investigation (and thread speculation) should focus on why these cues were not recognised or why judgement failed; were these deficiencies in individual, organisational, regulatory or industry-wide knowledge and thinking.

Recent activities appear to be ‘closing the stable door’, but at least they recognise some of the problems. Crews might learn from these and redatum their habits and take more notice of normal operations – build experience. Operators must consider the risks at all airports and their use of MEL – clear / accurate SOPs which everyone understands and has been exposed to in training – training which encourages change or removal of previous habits.
Every runway end should have a safety area, but the call for special nets, etc, could also be met by further reducing landing weight or limiting the conditions in which operations occur e.g. LCY no tailwind (RJ100) and no contaminated ops, or touchdown by a specific point. Change requires thought, and thinking requires a change in the way we behave.

People have to take more responsibility for safety in their operation – be accountable before the fact; if they don’t then unfortunately we have these sad opportunities to learn from their errors – that’s hindsight.