Unusual attitudes
PaulH1, have a look at this - I went to some of the joint Boeing / Airbus presentations on this work, and they are not in agreement with you (and are in agreement with CAA).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journ...B54C7CCEFB6ABF
G
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journ...B54C7CCEFB6ABF
G
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(Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, 1965, p.78)
A straight rectangular wing with no washout stalls inboard first
rarelyathome, to teach understanding should always be paramount in my view but 'Pavlovs dog' techniques are too often the method used with stalling. The required "recognition" will come from the understanding. I'm sure that you have also noticed the word "prevent" which follows and to be effective requires recognition. In the full brief you will, of course, have a section subtitled 'recognition' or 'signs' and this will also include the specific characteristics of the aeroplane being used. The onset signs vary enormously from one aircraft type to another. Understanding the stall and separately the particular characteristics of the aeroplane being used should be clearly emphasised.
On a wider issue, some years ago a young Flight Instructor who worked for me attended an interview with a UK major airline. In answer to a specific question with regard to the approach he answered that his priority would be to ensure against a potential stall. One of the interview panel, a senior captain, responded curtly: "we do not stall in this company, nor speak of it". Perhaps the word "upset" is to his liking.
What is rarely emphasised is that the aircraft will not stall itself, it is an inanimate thing. The aeroplane is not a horse with its own mind. It is therefore the pilot who brings about a stall. This must also include auto-pilots and flight management computerised systems. Airlines are keen to rid themselves of expensive pilots and increasingly moved toward automation: the pilot is seen as unreliable and a weak link in the system. Many of the auto systems in large transport aircraft drop out when the aircraft goes outside certain parameters. The designers are desperate to widen the parameters and keep the pilot out of it. The stall requires responsibility but if the pilot does not have control until the bitter end then the designers are in the firing line. Too much to bear so get rid of the word stall. Lets find a word less definable, "upset" is indefinable and convenient enough to use when we can't blame the pilot. But that interpretation is very possibly unfair and simply wrong.
On a wider issue, some years ago a young Flight Instructor who worked for me attended an interview with a UK major airline. In answer to a specific question with regard to the approach he answered that his priority would be to ensure against a potential stall. One of the interview panel, a senior captain, responded curtly: "we do not stall in this company, nor speak of it". Perhaps the word "upset" is to his liking.
What is rarely emphasised is that the aircraft will not stall itself, it is an inanimate thing. The aeroplane is not a horse with its own mind. It is therefore the pilot who brings about a stall. This must also include auto-pilots and flight management computerised systems. Airlines are keen to rid themselves of expensive pilots and increasingly moved toward automation: the pilot is seen as unreliable and a weak link in the system. Many of the auto systems in large transport aircraft drop out when the aircraft goes outside certain parameters. The designers are desperate to widen the parameters and keep the pilot out of it. The stall requires responsibility but if the pilot does not have control until the bitter end then the designers are in the firing line. Too much to bear so get rid of the word stall. Lets find a word less definable, "upset" is indefinable and convenient enough to use when we can't blame the pilot. But that interpretation is very possibly unfair and simply wrong.
Last edited by Fl1ingfrog; 6th Dec 2020 at 15:06.
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But the concern is areas such as spiral dive recovery where differences in technique may be insisted upon when they are not justified by differences in handling various types of aircraft.
At last I have in my quest to find an official definition of "upset" it is here in the following document which is worth careful reading.
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/avia...overy_book.pdf
An airplane upset is defined as an airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally experienced in line operations or training. In other words, the airplane is not doing what it was commanded to do and is approaching unsafe parameters.
A few examples amongst many in this document:
In another high altitude situation, the crew decided to use heading select mode to avoid weather while experiencing turbulence. The steep bank angle that resulted from this mode quickly caused slow speed buffeting. The crew’s rapid inappropriate response to disconnect the autopilot and over-control the airplane into a rapid descent in poor weather exacerbated the situation. These real world examples provide evidence towards the need for more detailed training in high altitude operations.
For example, a recent incident occurred where an airplane experienced an environmental situation where airspeed slowly decayed at altitude. The crew only selected maximum cruise thrust, instead of maximum available thrust, and that did not arrest the slowdown. The crew decided to descend but delayed to get ATC clearance. Airplane slow speed buffet started, the crew selected an inappropriate automation mode, the throttles were inadvertently reduced to idle, and the situation decayed into a large uncontrolled altitude loss. This incident may easily have been prevented had the flight crew acted with knowledge of information and techniques as contained in this supplement.
and this most extraordinary example:
An airplane was approaching an airfield and appeared to break off to the right for a left downwind to the opposite runway. On downwind at approximately 1500 ft, the airplane pitched up to nearly 60 deg and climbed to an altitude of nearly 4500 ft, with the airspeed deteriorating to almost 0 kn. The airplane then tail-slid, pitched down, and seemingly recovered. However, it continued into another steep pitch up of 70 deg. This time as it tail-slid, it fell off toward the right wing. As it pitched down and descended again, seemingly recovering, the airplane impacted the ground in a flat pitch, slightly right wing down. The digital flight data recorder indicated that the stabilizer trim was more than 13 units nose up. The flight crew had discussed a trim problem during the descent but made no move to cut out the electric trim or to manually trim. The accident was survivable if the pilot had responded properly.
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/avia...overy_book.pdf
An airplane upset is defined as an airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally experienced in line operations or training. In other words, the airplane is not doing what it was commanded to do and is approaching unsafe parameters.
A few examples amongst many in this document:
In another high altitude situation, the crew decided to use heading select mode to avoid weather while experiencing turbulence. The steep bank angle that resulted from this mode quickly caused slow speed buffeting. The crew’s rapid inappropriate response to disconnect the autopilot and over-control the airplane into a rapid descent in poor weather exacerbated the situation. These real world examples provide evidence towards the need for more detailed training in high altitude operations.
For example, a recent incident occurred where an airplane experienced an environmental situation where airspeed slowly decayed at altitude. The crew only selected maximum cruise thrust, instead of maximum available thrust, and that did not arrest the slowdown. The crew decided to descend but delayed to get ATC clearance. Airplane slow speed buffet started, the crew selected an inappropriate automation mode, the throttles were inadvertently reduced to idle, and the situation decayed into a large uncontrolled altitude loss. This incident may easily have been prevented had the flight crew acted with knowledge of information and techniques as contained in this supplement.
and this most extraordinary example:
An airplane was approaching an airfield and appeared to break off to the right for a left downwind to the opposite runway. On downwind at approximately 1500 ft, the airplane pitched up to nearly 60 deg and climbed to an altitude of nearly 4500 ft, with the airspeed deteriorating to almost 0 kn. The airplane then tail-slid, pitched down, and seemingly recovered. However, it continued into another steep pitch up of 70 deg. This time as it tail-slid, it fell off toward the right wing. As it pitched down and descended again, seemingly recovering, the airplane impacted the ground in a flat pitch, slightly right wing down. The digital flight data recorder indicated that the stabilizer trim was more than 13 units nose up. The flight crew had discussed a trim problem during the descent but made no move to cut out the electric trim or to manually trim. The accident was survivable if the pilot had responded properly.
(An advantage of being somewhat academic is having tools on my laptop that find the routes around the paywalls!)
G
I agree with GtE absolutely. Not only the G issue but applying aileron increases the AoA of both wings and if there is G or AoA present the application of aileron may well cause one or both wings to exceed the stalling AoA. This could well be why civilian aircraft, particularly business jets, have been known to flick during turbulence recovery. Every single time I have encountered turbulence when a civilian trained pilot was flying the first thing they did was to apply aileron, absolutely without fail.
The traditional Hight, Speed, G, Roll, Pitch (without the Height as you can not abandon a civilian aircraft) works perfectly every time for every aircraft you will ever fly.
I also hear pilots who were trained in civilian simulators suggesting that it is correct to first assess your attitude and then you can rudder the nose down before rolling and pulling, please never ever do this.
Also to add to GtE comment above, not only are the wings not designed to sustain the additional G forces of roiling and pulling but the fin is not designed for significant sideways loads.
Please stick to the traditional way mentioned above and taught by well trained instructors every time.
SPEED, high and increasing close the throttle, low and decreasing apply power.
G, unload to approximately 1g
ROLL, the wings to the nearest horizon
Then centralise the ailerons before;
PITCH, to the horizon
Then
Check height, climb to above MSA if necessary, establish normal S+L flight, check your instruments, check your O2/pressurisation, establish why you got into the upset or unusual position.
All of the above are completely separate manoeuvres and you must NEVER attempt to complete more than one item at a time.
MM
The traditional Hight, Speed, G, Roll, Pitch (without the Height as you can not abandon a civilian aircraft) works perfectly every time for every aircraft you will ever fly.
I also hear pilots who were trained in civilian simulators suggesting that it is correct to first assess your attitude and then you can rudder the nose down before rolling and pulling, please never ever do this.
Also to add to GtE comment above, not only are the wings not designed to sustain the additional G forces of roiling and pulling but the fin is not designed for significant sideways loads.
Please stick to the traditional way mentioned above and taught by well trained instructors every time.
SPEED, high and increasing close the throttle, low and decreasing apply power.
G, unload to approximately 1g
ROLL, the wings to the nearest horizon
Then centralise the ailerons before;
PITCH, to the horizon
Then
Check height, climb to above MSA if necessary, establish normal S+L flight, check your instruments, check your O2/pressurisation, establish why you got into the upset or unusual position.
All of the above are completely separate manoeuvres and you must NEVER attempt to complete more than one item at a time.
MM
A swept wing tends to stall outboard first unless it has clever design features to prevent it
(Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, 1965, p.78)
A straight rectangular wing with no washout stalls inboard first
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECTCVgiBHjA
(Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, 1965, p.78)
A straight rectangular wing with no washout stalls inboard first
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECTCVgiBHjA
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A straight rectangular wing with no washout and no stall strips stalls root first
As an aerobatic instructor I usually teach a 10-15 hour introductory aerobatic course. However occasionally I get pilots asking for UPRT. My response is to suggest they do the full aerobatic course as by the end of it, it won't matter to them if the airplane is pointed straight up, straight down inverted whatever, they will have the skills to recover.
I still ended up doing a few just upset training events, most before UPRT became a thing, but what I taught was pretty much in line with UPRT SOP's as they are the logical actions. However 2 things that I think does not get enough attention in todays UPRT SOP are
1) The surprise element. UPRT by definition is an unplanned and unexpected event. Looking at the syllabuses of a few UPRT training providers it appears to be to be very "canned " training. This is great if you are teaching the go-around in an A320 but, I believe, is a disservice to the UPRT student. There needs to be "test" at the end of he formal training which IMO should involved random instructor led departures from controlled flight, that is undesired aircraft states, followed by successful recoveries by the student. Instead I see a tick the box maneuver set for exactly 3.0 hrs and then the rubber stamp, UPRT done !
2) One of my early UPRT students ended up chatting with me one sunny day about a year after the course and I suggested that we go up and do a quick flight to see how much he remembered from my training. The short answer was zero. He froze on the first maneuver ( inverted after a simulated wake turbulence encounter ) and I had to take over to save the aircraft. So IMO UPRT training is fine but unless there is regular recurrent training it will provide a false sense of security to pilots and operators.
I still ended up doing a few just upset training events, most before UPRT became a thing, but what I taught was pretty much in line with UPRT SOP's as they are the logical actions. However 2 things that I think does not get enough attention in todays UPRT SOP are
1) The surprise element. UPRT by definition is an unplanned and unexpected event. Looking at the syllabuses of a few UPRT training providers it appears to be to be very "canned " training. This is great if you are teaching the go-around in an A320 but, I believe, is a disservice to the UPRT student. There needs to be "test" at the end of he formal training which IMO should involved random instructor led departures from controlled flight, that is undesired aircraft states, followed by successful recoveries by the student. Instead I see a tick the box maneuver set for exactly 3.0 hrs and then the rubber stamp, UPRT done !
2) One of my early UPRT students ended up chatting with me one sunny day about a year after the course and I suggested that we go up and do a quick flight to see how much he remembered from my training. The short answer was zero. He froze on the first maneuver ( inverted after a simulated wake turbulence encounter ) and I had to take over to save the aircraft. So IMO UPRT training is fine but unless there is regular recurrent training it will provide a false sense of security to pilots and operators.
In a steep descending spiral, G coming on ?
Sounds like a recipe for disaster..
Never, ever saw or even heard of that in my RAF QFI days, but what did we, and CFS know ?
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Therefore this would be considered unsatisfactory performance on a UPRT course.
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Except that closing the throttle as the first action in recovery from a nose low banked attitude is contrary to EASA GM1 FCL.745.A (g) (3) (E) and contrary to the nose low recovery templates in the AUPRTA and FAA AC 120-111.
Therefore this would be considered unsatisfactory performance on a UPRT course.
Therefore this would be considered unsatisfactory performance on a UPRT course.
[QUOTE=Rivet gun;10941776]Except that closing the throttle as the first action in recovery from a nose low banked attitude is contrary to EASA GM1 FCL.745.A (g) (3) (E) and contrary to the nose low recovery templates in the AUPRTA and FAA AC 120-111.
Therefore this would be considered unsatisfactory performance on a UPRT course.[/QUOTE
Perhaps EASA knows better than the RAF CFS who have rather more experience and expertise in these matters !
I rather doubt it !
Therefore this would be considered unsatisfactory performance on a UPRT course.[/QUOTE
Perhaps EASA knows better than the RAF CFS who have rather more experience and expertise in these matters !
I rather doubt it !
Rivet G
I understand what you have written and perhaps should have included more detailed instruction for teaching the element in my comment.
The EASA reference is a regulation and not a technique. Speed high and increasing means that if you are about to exceed limits then you must close the throttle to avoid doing so as manoeuvring above Vne or possibly even Va may cause structural failure.
I, in my personal opinion of over 40 years of instructing and unit test flying, strongly disagree with "(E) accept the priority of rolling to wings level first, before reducing power and before pulling." as it is quite likely to lead to a situation where the average pilot exceeds limitations, causes structural failure or is unable to handle the developing situation. Personal opinion just as the way stall recovery used to be taught dangerously incorrect in the civilian environment.
I once did actually have to recover from an unexpected inverted attitude at low level in the dark in cloud, and believe me the process I stated works very well indeed. I have used the process in in fast pointy things, big four engine things and most things in between.
I do not wish to get into an internet spat, but there are times when experience is valuable and attached is a copy from one of the best instructors manuals ever written. Take it for the good will in which it is intended or reject it as you please.19. Unusual Positions.
a.Definition. An unusual position (UP) is defined as any attitude which is different from the one the pilot expected the aircraft to be in. This does not necessarily mean that the aircraft is in an extreme attitude, but it does mean by definition that the pilot is disorientated - i.e. the attitude is other than the one the pilot sensed or was last aware of.
b. Height Awareness. The first action in any UP must be to assess the height available for recovery. Considerable height may be lost during recovery from a UP, and it is therefore equally important to continually monitor the height as the recovery progresses, in order to make a timely abandonment decision if necessary. Always carry out the HASELL checks before practising UP recoveries.
c. Causes of a UP. The most likely reason for being in a UP is inattention to attitude control while carrying out cockpit tasks. Less likely but possible reasons are an insidious AH failure which has gone unnoticed, or inadvertently entering cloud from aerobatics or a spin recovery. In these cases limited panel techniques will need to be used.
d. Recovery. When teaching recovery from UPS, build up progressively from gentle UPS to the more extreme attitudes. Make the student's initial practises direct repeats of your demonstrations. The recovery from a UP should be taught as follows:
(1) Monitor height.
(2) Check speed.
If low or decreasing, apply full power.
If high or increasing, throttle to idle.
(3) Bank. Roll wings level on the AH.
(4) Pitch. Pitch to the level flight attitude on the AH.
(5) Adjust power as required and trim.
(6) Cross check the performance instruments to confirm S&L.
(7) Throughout the recovery monitor height. Check safety altitude and climb if necessary.
e.After Recovery. After recovery, teach the student to check height again and ensure this above safety altitude. He should then determine how he got into a UP (and resolve not to repeat it). Finally, remember that the toppling limits of the DI may have been exceeded, so synchronise the DI before correcting to a quadrantal flight level.
MM
I understand what you have written and perhaps should have included more detailed instruction for teaching the element in my comment.
The EASA reference is a regulation and not a technique. Speed high and increasing means that if you are about to exceed limits then you must close the throttle to avoid doing so as manoeuvring above Vne or possibly even Va may cause structural failure.
I, in my personal opinion of over 40 years of instructing and unit test flying, strongly disagree with "(E) accept the priority of rolling to wings level first, before reducing power and before pulling." as it is quite likely to lead to a situation where the average pilot exceeds limitations, causes structural failure or is unable to handle the developing situation. Personal opinion just as the way stall recovery used to be taught dangerously incorrect in the civilian environment.
I once did actually have to recover from an unexpected inverted attitude at low level in the dark in cloud, and believe me the process I stated works very well indeed. I have used the process in in fast pointy things, big four engine things and most things in between.
I do not wish to get into an internet spat, but there are times when experience is valuable and attached is a copy from one of the best instructors manuals ever written. Take it for the good will in which it is intended or reject it as you please.19. Unusual Positions.
a.Definition. An unusual position (UP) is defined as any attitude which is different from the one the pilot expected the aircraft to be in. This does not necessarily mean that the aircraft is in an extreme attitude, but it does mean by definition that the pilot is disorientated - i.e. the attitude is other than the one the pilot sensed or was last aware of.
b. Height Awareness. The first action in any UP must be to assess the height available for recovery. Considerable height may be lost during recovery from a UP, and it is therefore equally important to continually monitor the height as the recovery progresses, in order to make a timely abandonment decision if necessary. Always carry out the HASELL checks before practising UP recoveries.
c. Causes of a UP. The most likely reason for being in a UP is inattention to attitude control while carrying out cockpit tasks. Less likely but possible reasons are an insidious AH failure which has gone unnoticed, or inadvertently entering cloud from aerobatics or a spin recovery. In these cases limited panel techniques will need to be used.
d. Recovery. When teaching recovery from UPS, build up progressively from gentle UPS to the more extreme attitudes. Make the student's initial practises direct repeats of your demonstrations. The recovery from a UP should be taught as follows:
(1) Monitor height.
(2) Check speed.
If low or decreasing, apply full power.
If high or increasing, throttle to idle.
(3) Bank. Roll wings level on the AH.
(4) Pitch. Pitch to the level flight attitude on the AH.
(5) Adjust power as required and trim.
(6) Cross check the performance instruments to confirm S&L.
(7) Throughout the recovery monitor height. Check safety altitude and climb if necessary.
e.After Recovery. After recovery, teach the student to check height again and ensure this above safety altitude. He should then determine how he got into a UP (and resolve not to repeat it). Finally, remember that the toppling limits of the DI may have been exceeded, so synchronise the DI before correcting to a quadrantal flight level.
MM
Last edited by Miles Magister; 6th Dec 2020 at 20:37.
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AUPRTA revision 2 has "Simultaneously reduce thrust and roll the shortest direction to wings level" but this seems to be missing from revision 3.
If we consider initiating the roll and reducing power as essentially simultaneous I think this can still be interpreted as consistent with the AUPRTA templates, leaving just the EASA GM to FCL.745.A as controversial. It is guidance material not regulation, though I suspect it may have found its way into the training manuals of ATOs approved to train FCL.745.A (since copying the guidance material may be the easiest way to get a training manual accepted by the CAA)
Having said that, the 737 QRH Nose Low Recovery has
• Disconnect autopilot and autothrottle
• Recover from stall, if required
• * Roll in shortest direction to wings level
(unload and roll if bank angle is more
than 90 degrees)
• Recover to level flight:
- Apply nose up elevator
- *Apply nose up trim, if required
- Adjust thrust and drag as required.
Thrust only gets a mention in the last line
Any current TREs / TRIs like to contribute to this thread?
Last edited by Rivet gun; 6th Dec 2020 at 23:02.
UPRT is a response to the handling of large aircraft with complex flight control systems that much is clear. It is not appropriate guidance for light singles or twins. It makes no sense to me to attempt to mimic heavy aircraft handling using a light aircraft: an Extra 300 or a C152 aerobat. The training is bound to be inadequate. In all the documents referred to earlier in this debate and others none refer to simulating heavy aircraft handling in anything other than the aircraft itself or in its approved simulator. To revisit the basics of the stall and the incipient spin is, of course, valuable for any pilot at any time. As an aside: the underlying principle for all skill tests is that the POH is the overriding document for the aircraft in use. The CAA are right to complain when the candidate is deviating from this. It is also unfair on the candidate who may be failed.
It is naïve to claim as EASA does that "startle" or "surprise" once experienced can be replicated in all circumstances. If this claim is based on qualified guidance I would like to see it. The human does not automatically transfer skills but requires specific training for each event.
I can't see the purpose of a disagreement over the low nose recovery between whether to power or roll first or apply simultaneously. Terra firma and VNE must be paramount surely. If speed is allowed to increase then there is an increase in stability making it harder to recover with the possibility of airframe failure,
I'm not happy with UPRT being applied to light aircraft handling and which is superficially different from what is already well understood.
It is naïve to claim as EASA does that "startle" or "surprise" once experienced can be replicated in all circumstances. If this claim is based on qualified guidance I would like to see it. The human does not automatically transfer skills but requires specific training for each event.
I can't see the purpose of a disagreement over the low nose recovery between whether to power or roll first or apply simultaneously. Terra firma and VNE must be paramount surely. If speed is allowed to increase then there is an increase in stability making it harder to recover with the possibility of airframe failure,
I'm not happy with UPRT being applied to light aircraft handling and which is superficially different from what is already well understood.
Flying Frog makes a good comment. I was taught all of the FCL.745 elements before I went solo, and subsequently taught them to my students before they went solo. it was in the syllabus and ensured that the techniques were established as standard practice early on and were teh natural reaction.
This is a good book about large aircraft UPRT. Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid It was commissioned by the FAA and signed by the Chief Pilots of major manufacturers.
MM
This is a good book about large aircraft UPRT. Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid It was commissioned by the FAA and signed by the Chief Pilots of major manufacturers.
MM