Perhaps a new thread on "Emergency Response" would be appropriate. I'm tiered of hearing the whining about this when what I want to know about is what caused the fire.

I tend to agree with grumpy.

As to the aircraft - I will await the results of the investigation into the incident with interest. I have confidence that the AAIB will conduct a thorough investigation and present the outcome clearly. I also hope that a clear cause can be found and that subsequent events can be fully identified. Like many other aviation professionals, I have some possible event scenarios in mind that may have been involved. Some may be right, some will not be. Informed 'rumour' such as one might find on this site is interesting but it's not my areas of expertise and I have nothing of substance to add to the discussion - so I read and think about the points raised whilst I await the investigation report.

On the topic of CFR/RFFS response, I do have some expertise and it is frightening to read some of the drivel here, especially from those who purport to have knowledge of the subject.

In response to Chu Chu (and I recognise he/she claims no particular knowledge), whilst you are quite correct that if there is no possibility of the Ethiopian aircraft re-igniting nothing physical would have stopped units standing by at the 787 fire from redeploying somewhere else. But without replenishing water and foam concentrate supplies (along with anything other media and equipment that might have been used), the immediate response capability would be so severely limited as to make the presence of the vehicles almost irrelevant. If hoses had been run out to hydrants for the first event, repacking them will take time and tenders without water/extinguishing media and without hoses to draw additional water are of even less value.

CFR/RFFS cover requirements involves many complexities and there are many sources of relevant information. Maybe it would be a good idea for some posters to look for some of it before spouting misleading rubbish.

Nightmareliner
 

I'm with you JW411. I probably will never get on one, but certainly will not get on one for a very long time. That will involve me choosing airlines and route timings carefully to avoid the 787 and I guess if one turns up unexpectedly deciding not to fly on it.

The thing is, Boeing have probably fixed the battery issue, in that they have modified the cell spacing and encased what could be a fire into a containment vessel and vented that to the outside. But it looks to me like it is still possible the battery could fail and anyway the maintenance of that vessel and connections looks to be a hazard; potentially another accident waiting to happen.

Its not my idea of a safe airplane with a reliable safety record, at least for a very long time without further serious incident.

Looks like 1, possibly 2 firetrucks deployed any hoses, the rest, along with their crew are standing around twiddling their thumbs. Meanwhile an entire airport is shut down. Totally unacceptable.

http://i.imgur.com/1gwQTRa.jpg

Well don't accept it then. Thcweam and thcweam and thcweam about it until you are thick! Go sit in the middle of a taxiway and have a paddy! Boycott Heathrow!

That'll show them!

I'm reasonably sure that Ethiopian Airways, & Boeing, are both very glad that Heathrow Fire Service decided to wait around ready to get stuck in again until it was certain that the fire was out and wouldn't be re-igniting any time soon. The only thing more expensive than forking out the cost of a new Dreamliner because your fire service didn't hang around to make sure the plane wasn't going to burst into flames again, is being sued for the value of the lost Boeing market cap because nobody can prove from a pile of ash that the batteries didn't catch fire...

How many firemen does it take to check that a fire they put out stays out?

Apparently the heathrow firedept think the answer is 80 firemen and 12 firetrucks.

Not very confident with the expertise or abilitys by the looks.

Normal people would think 1 (if any) with a hand extinguisher might actually suffice, although being right next to the fire station, in a remote area away from the runways/terminals wouldn't impact that decision at all either.

Im an active vol firefighter and I've also been embedded at Gatwick airport and other UK stations attending callouts.

I'd say that the majority of the smaller trucks in the aerial view are from neighbouring non airport fire stations and are not airport service trucks.

In respect to activity after the smoke has cleared.
Some of the thumb twidling was a debrief.
Debriefs are vital for ongoing training and improvement of response, especially given that a typical airport fire service has very few actual fires compared to a city station.
Non airport fire service vehicles may need escorting in and out.
The fire service also has to be available to respond to numerous calls within terminals and hangers.
A fire on any vehicle that potentially contains thousands of gallons of fuel that is located near a building occupied by thousands of members of public is always going to be dealt with on a worst case scenario.
How long does it take to be assured that fuel tanks have not been compromised and the source of ignition has been found and extinguished/made safe?
There are a myriad of odd bizzare and low probability risks that have to be factored. ie who is to say that an electrical problem on the damaged 787 would start unwanted fuel dumping?
None of the above tasks is easy to fully investigate in a complex craft with numerous batteries and fuel tanks.
Also a little time taken to deal with contaminated turnout kit and replenishing foam and water all add up.

So that the airport was closed for an hour is not surprising.

The simple solution is to have significant extra capacity of vehicles and crew at a significant extra cost rather than to suggest poor practice and management are to blame for a one hour closure.

Exactly who above has had any formal fire department experience ?

Exactly who above has extinguished a fire on a composite aircaft ?

Some types of portable fire extinguisher produce lethal gas when applied to burning metals as well as producing corrosive residue and an exothermic reaction.

"Flame retardant treatments such as brominated ploymers release dioxins and dibenzofurans and chlorinated polymers produce hydrogen chloride dioxin volotile compounds that are hazardous".Fire Properties of Polymer Composite Materials By Adrian P. Mouritz, Arthur Geoff Gibson


The crap left after the fire, given it is in a confined space is itself a hazard, it is no surprise that emergency crews should hang around to secure the scene and have breathing apparatus to hand to effect further response or rescue.
Numerous fire crews and accident investigators responding to military jet crashes have been hospitalised even though they were wearing PPE.

20% to 40% of impact survivable fatalities are caused not by flame but toxic gasses.

The first gulp of carbon monoxide disorientates the second gas incapacitates and prevents your escape.

So think about that before you run into a smokey airframe.

I suspect the fire crew will have remembered the last time a 787 caught fire on the ground (it does seem to happen rather regularly ;) ) and planned for a rather long episode.

Unckle Fred
 

So Fritz did not shut down FRA, just one runway? THAT was a smart decision. LHR have shut down several times, even when one or both runways were available.
In this day and age we can fly into two runway airports without using an alternate. When you shut down a major airport you risk getting several fuel emergencies.
Who decides to shut down LHR, the operational management, or fire and rescue?

Looking at photos of the 777 at SFO - I cannot imagine the condition of a 787 and the survivability in a similar accident. Not good I suspect.

Not sure that I would fancy getting on a 787

AAIB PRESS RELEASE & FIRE COVER
 

PRESS RELEASE

Date: 13 July 2013
Serious Incident to Boeing 787-8, ET-AOP,

at London Heathrow Airport on 12 July 2013

Date & Time: 12 July 2013 at approx 1550 hrs UTC

Location: London Heathrow Airport

Aircraft Type: Boeing 787-8

Operator: Ethiopian Airlines

At approximately 1550 hrs UTC on 12 July 2013 a Boeing 787-8 of Ethiopian Airlines, registration ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow whilst the aircraft was parked on stand, with no persons on board. The initial witness and physical evidence shows that this event resulted in smoke throughout the fuselage and extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear fuselage.

In exercise of his powers the Chief Inspector of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has ordered that an investigation into this serious incident be carried out, in accordance with the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 and the Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The sole objective of the investigation is to determine the causal and contributory factors of this serious incident, with the intention of preventing a recurrence. It is not the purpose to apportion blame or liability.

In accordance with these international standards and recommended practices, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA, representing the State of Design and Manufacture, and the Civil Aviation Authority of Ethiopia, representing the State of Registry and Operator, have been invited to appoint Accredited Representatives to participate in the investigation, along with advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Ethiopian Airlines. The AAIB has also invited the participation of the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) and the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) as advisors to the investigation.

This team, under the direction of the AAIB, has initiated the technical investigation into the event. The aircraft is currently located in a hangar at London Heathrow. There has been extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear fuselage, a complex part of the aircraft, and the initial investigation is likely to take several days. However, it is clear that this heat damage is remote from the area in which the aircraft main and APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) batteries are located, and, at this stage, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...%20Release.pdf

As to criticism of the actions of the fire crew, fellow PPRuners, please remember the Heathrow Fire Team are especially trained to deal with aircraft fires and their managers will be under no illusion as to the cost of keeping the airport closed. They will also have studied the causes of past disastrous aircraft fires on the ground. Before the scene of a fire is vacated, the fire team have to sure there is no chance of re-ignition, and until then, they need to be able to deal with the worst case scenario.

Not a coin-size damage
 

The extend of the damage in the upper skin area is far beyond the size of the high glossy composite 59 minutes repair brochure under laboratory conditions.
We have here to consider the 1 piece section integral manufacturing process, wide heat damage, spherical shaped surfaces (funny for Ti-repair), the highest loaded fuselage area, ...
For me it looks like a "rear section replacement". Forget about the "metal type repair" out of the sales brochure and face CFRP reality beyond coin size damage.
Mr. Steven F. Udvar-Házy and others will learn a lot in the coming months.

Seems to me that everybody is very tight lipped about the source of the fire. By now a large number of people would have inspected the plane and it would be obvious where the fire originated, even if they cant ascertain why.

Boeing really need to quickly calm the world concern as a matter of protecting their reputation and the future of the 787.

Being a composite fuselage, the 787 fuselage has the potential to be MUCH stronger than the 777 fuselage, and hence more able to withstand higher impact forces...it depends on how they used the carbon fiber in making the 787 fuselage.

As to how well the 787 fuselage compares to the 777 fuselage in fire-resistance, I have no idea.

No criticism of the fire crew or procedures here. An unattended aircraft caught fire. I regard that as serious.
I'm glad to see, (as I expected,) that the AAIB will be heading up the investigation. Their report will be both thorough and made available to the public so whatever the truth, we shall be told it. (Anathema to a rumour network, I know but preferable to a
Boeing press statement that would not be trusted by many.)

@ p.j.m - Australia.

You have no idea how comforting it is to have 'armchair-experts', like yourself, ever ready to give profound and insightful comments such as those you have made. I am in shock and awe.

On second thoughts, no, I'm not.

If I recollect correctly, the aircraft was being prepped for towing when the fired was noted. It may be pure coincidence but the "Grounding 787's" thread also makes mention of towing being an issue with the battery fire.

Regarding the discussion about the fire response. Several pages back, and on other sites on the internet, multiple people have stated there were also fire trucks called out to a separate incident (from memory, a Boeing PIA). So when you're making your expert analysis - seemingly based solely on a picture of a few trucks - do remember that you're probably not privy to everything that was going on at the time.

TWT, I am aware of that. Never suggested it had anything to do with the battery per se, but as the cause of the battery malfunction has never been accurately determined, and this fire seems to be when the aircraft is undergoing similar activity, namely towing related, there could be some connection.

"no evidence of a direct causal relationship"

I fully understand that this needs to be investigated thoroughly and this will take time, but this carefully loose phrase does not reassure me about the entire battery and electrical system.

Add to this the fact that Boeing seems to have declined strong advice to insulate the roof structure, and that the Manchester 787 had electrical faults relating to toilets and galleys all leaves me very uneasy.

The Dreamliner reminds me of the British Advanced Passenger Train, in which every single component was new, radical and unproven. The project ended up seriously behind schedule, massively over-budget, and was then pressed into trial service too soon. It was technically superb, but unreliable and a failure. For the time being this is one Boeing in which I am NOT going.

Hear Hear!
 

1a fast asleep: Hear hear! I would only add that the entire aviation industry is harmed in such cases, especially now that there is essentially a global duopoly for the manufacture of advanced passenger jets.

Unfortunately, if you go through every speculation as to cause, in this thread, not one is likely to have a good outcome. A faulty coffee-maker? Yikes....that's arguably the most frightening of all.

"Quoting Mark Mangooni, Ethiopian Airlines' senior manager in Britain, the Financial Times reported that airline staff had discovered a problem with the aircraft's air conditioning system during a routine inspection and had seen sparks but no flames."

Now I really feel comfortable. The maintenance staff only saw sparks but no flames. The fire may have come from the air-conditioning ducting routed above the galley.

Once the public get a negative mind set. It is difficult to recover a positive one.

What happens when the negativity is reinforced by another incident?

I am not convinced by the battery 'fix'. Putting it in a metal box with a venting tube if it should overheat again. Is not a solution.

It may have been the only solution ?

I am sure Boeing will get there in the end?

To those who declare this hull to be a writeoff.

Like you, I'm not a Composites expert,however,I do have background knowledge.

Boats/ships have a long history of all-composite construction and remember the medium in which they're immersed ,is somewhat denser than air and a lot more turbulent -hence the vessel is a lot more highly stressed and suffers continual impact-stresses. (waves hitting! )

Manufacturers will always make more sections than they need....why?
Because some will be rejects, others will be required , complete, for repairs.
Rveryone seems to be fixated on "complete section" replacement....it's just not needed...in the case above ,of a reject, the faulty area can be hacked-out and the rest used to supply a part-panel.

There is no technical reason why a repair could not be pieced-in without loss of structural integrity.
The bigger problem, is the repair being TOO STRONG and transferring stresses to other areas not designed to absorb them!
(something that emerged in the development of motor-body crumple-zones.)
All this B/s about"holding up production" and " all sections already assigned to a build"....sheesh!

I wouldn't fly on one either, but it's got nothing to do with the structural integrity of "patched composites" FFS, that's how it's built in the first place!...."Airfix Kit " was nearer the mark than you realise ;)

@ManaAdaSystem

Quote:
At least four times in my flying career I have had to "roll the trucks." Two of these times there was actual smoke in the cockpit (once closing down runway 18 in FRA much to the delight of the gents behind us...)

So Fritz did not shut down FRA, just one runway? THAT was a smart decision. LHR have shut down several times, even when one or both runways were available.


You know the layout of FRA? Closing rwy 18 for an incident at it's rear end does not necessarily require to close 25L/R. It's a very large distance between the end of rwy 18 and the traffic on 25 L/R. So if they didn't went out of emergency services it was easy to let open the airport.

Where do I start?
 

Geez, Cockney Steve

Where do I start? Firstly, remember the "Phillips Explorer", the multi-hull vessel that was designed to circumnavigate the world in 80 days and then had a "structural malfunction" in the English Channel just after Lizzie launched her, and then sank in the Atlantic on her maiden voyage? (Shades of the Titanic).

There are vast differences between structures restricted to water travel where weight is not as critical and margins of safety are far more generous and aircraft where margins are much more finely managed. In a marine environment, a bad repair may involve a desperate resort to a dinghy and activation of an EPERB but in aircraft a bad repair may have far more significant ramifications. You have no life raft and you can not swim for long in air.

As for the "air-fix" comment, it is difficult for most people to comprehend that almost every aircraft anywhere has some adhesive bonded structure and in my (extensive) experience in adhesive bond failure forensics there have been an inordinate number of adhesive bond failures to metallic structures, so casting aspersions towards a "plastic" or "bin-liner" structure shows a neanderthalic ignorance of structural materials. There are even more significant deficiencies in bonded metallic structures than there are associated with fibre composites.

Next the "too-strong" comment. In reality, the problem of load transfer is not strength related, it is stiffness related. A compliant-but-strong material (like fibre-glass, high strength but low elastic modulus) will not cause as much load interaction as a stiff-but-weak material such as mild steel (low strength but high elastic modulus). Stiffness causes load redistribution problems, not strength.

While I'm only a PPL, I do seem to know more about electrics than some posters on here, so I feel I should point out some items: Circuit Breakers and fuses that are away from the device being protected will only respond to an electrical overload - an overheating boiler, oven, whatever, would only have its circuit interrupted by a thermal device on the thing itself, not by an overcuttent breaker in a panel somewhere else. An overheating "heater" draws roughly the same current as one that's working normally, so nothing in the electrical system will "notice" the problem. Any heating device should have thermal overload protection, and if it turns out that something in the galley had been left on and resulted in this fire, then the thermal cutout must have malfunctioned. A friend of mine used to work in a domestic electrical appliance test laboratory, and they test thermal runaway to prove that the cutout will do the job, and also do "special" tests where the thermal cutout is disabled, to find out what happens then. (Anything from melting the element or the wiring to it, so disconnecting the circuit, to exploding and showing plastic everywhere!). I inadvertently tested my own automatic electric kettle recently, by leaving the lid open so the steam-sensor didn't work. Came back later to find damp wallpaper for the top three feet of the walls, and the kettle empty and turned off by its thermal trip. If a £15 kettle does this, £thousands of aircraft galley equipment will (should) too!

Heat from lightning strikes - composite material
 

Whilst watching the news footage of the heat damage to the outer body on the 787 I wondered if anyone knows how lightning strikes are dissipated around the airframe on composite bodies compared to the older alloy airframes?
Plastic doesnt conduct but I would ahve thought the extreme voltage and heat would damage any plastic material?

I found some information on the wiki site about lightning strikes but wondered about its effects on composite material if anyone had any ideas?
Lightning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Some of its comments.
"As a result of their greater power, as well as lack of warning, positive lightning strikes are considerably more dangerous. At the present time, aircraft are not designed to withstand such strikes, since their existence was unknown at the time standards were set, and the dangers unappreciated until the destruction of a glider in 1999.[37] The standard in force at the time of the crash, Advisory Circular AC 20-53A, was replaced by Advisory Circular AC 20-53B in 2006,[38] however it is unclear whether adequate protection against positive lightning was incorporated.[39][40]Positive lightning is also now believed to have been responsible for the 1963 in-flight explosion and subsequent crash of Pan Am Flight 214, a Boeing 707.[41] Due to the dangers of lightning, aircraft operating in U.S. airspace have been required to have static discharge wicks to reduce the possibility of attracting a lightning strike, as well as to mitigate radio interference due to static buildup through friction with the air, but these measures may be insufficient for positive lightning.[42]"

Even the BBC today seems to be tiptoeing around this thing: "Fire-retardant foam was sprayed at the airliner and an area on top of the fuselage in front of the tail appeared to be scorched." :mad:

Oh well may as well put my pennies worth in to mix also:

By looking at the limited quality of the photographs of the damage to this aircraft. a full section replacement will most probably be carried out.
As the Aircraft is manufactured as a complete section by section structure (not panelised) any permanent repair would obviously in my opinion have to the same.
Nobody is debating that this could or could not be an electrical fault causing the fire. If it is an electrical fault then the batteries are related as they are the primary electrical system. We will just have to wait see what the AAIB investigation throws up....

as for the Fire Service. If they had 2 incidents ongoing the OIC would close the Airport as he could not guarantee response times. Also as stated before once the larger tenders were emptied they would have to be topped up again before any decent CAT level could be restored. So bravo to the OIC for taking what would have been a very challenged decision but the I believe to the correct one:ok:

Are they tiptoeing around or are they (unusually) doing what we often complain journalists don't do, ie not speculating and waiting 'till they have some facts?

Repairing the damage
 

Cockney Steve,
You appear to be knowledgeable on the subject, and also dismissive of comments made by others.
You read my post, and therefore will have seen that I suggested Boeing have TWO options; I further discussed the pros and cons of both. Whilst a patch repair may appear to be the best option, it is not necessarily straight forward, and requires a team of design, static and fatigue stress engineers to ensure all aspects (including attracting load) are covered.

I stand by all my previous comments, including what I said about Boeing being very unlikely to have available large fuselage sections to cater for repairs. Time will tell.

Can the ET 787 Be Patched Repaired
 

If not why not?

Bonding ?

Load Carry?

I'm interested in how the military handles this as well.

Of course I will be surprised if Boeing says it can't

With all the opinions on here maybe the technical answers should be moved to the Technical Questions forum

RE # 280 AND LIGHTNING STRIKES
 

Its not an issue to be discussed here- and its not an issue PERIOD.
777 have been flying for over a decade with composite tail fin. US Navy planes like A6(E) have had composite wings for over a decade. Airbus has used a composite fin-rudder for nearly two decades. I'm sure all have been hit by lightning at least once in several decades.

techniques include built in ' screen' into layups, sealant caps on fastener penetration of fuel tank areas, plating of tank penetrations for larger parts,, etc etc etc.

Direct damage for strike area is minimal.

Spend UR time on the boeing site for example or on industy sites looking up the magic word ' lightning strikes damage repair etc .

this one clearly isn't going away. I made some of this point very early on in this thread but the post got deleted - presumably because it was considered to be deviating from the main topic - but now I have a couple of minutes so I'll try again.

Here is how an airport fire service works in very general terms - what I'm describing is the case for the UK, but there are variations in other countries. An airport decides that it wants to offer itself to particular types and, importantly, sizes of aircraft. Depending upon the size of the largest aircraft that it wants to be able to accommodate, a certain level of fire fighting and rescue facilities are required. These are defined in ICAO Annex 14. Many airports that provide cover or higher categories - bigger - aircraft will actually exceed the minimum requirements for a variety of reasons.

Amongst the other requirements for an airport fire service is to be able to attend an incident anywhere on the airport within a certain period of time. It's important to note that this does not mean every fire vehicle and fireman has to get to the aircraft within that period. Usually what happens is that all the fire vehicles will head out to the incident when called, but a rapid intervention vehicle carrying a senior fire officer will quickly get to the incident and will assess whether some or all of the other vehicles on their way are required.

In the event of a serious incident the external fire services (and indeed hospitals, ambulances and so on) will also be called. In theory the airport fire service is there to provide immediate fire fighting and rescue service with particular expertise for the airport and aircraft environment. As soon as the external services arrive, they start to relieve the airport fire service who are then able to return to their base, replenish their media and in other ways prepare to provide the airport with its published level of fire cover again. During the turnout, as was the case at Heathrow recently, while an incident is being attended by the airport fire service, the level of fire cover available for other movements is reduced, perhaps to zero. In practice, it's likely that any aircraft on the approach or taking off will continue as normal but subsequent movements that require fire cover will quickly be advised of the situation and, we'll need to go somewhere else in accordance with their SOPs.

Those who were astonished, stunned, amazed, indignant and so on, at the picture posted earlier showing lots of fire engines surrounding the ETH aircraft, as was pointed out by another poster earlier, most of the fire vehicles look like they are from external services - as will no doubt be the case for the personnel 'twiddling their thumbs'. A quick glance suggests there are 6 external fire appliances and one or two senior police and fire service personnel cars along with one mobile incident control room (probably part of the airport fire service), two airport appliances, the airport fire boss's car and an airside ops vehicle. All standard fayre after a serious incident at a major airport.

By the way, note that not all aircraft require to have fire cover available. That will not be the case at Heathrow, but there are some situations where movements can continue without fire cover. Unless the runway is blocked, and even that is moot by some interpretations, the airport does not close - it merely cannot provide fire cover.

Return to the situation where the senior fire officer reaches an incident and determines that only a minimum level of response is required and that the majority of the vehicles can return to the station. There's no need to close the airport, it's just that the level of fire cover may be reduced temporarily. At Heathrow this week, it seems highly probable that with two incidents in progress either coincidently or in quick succession, fire cover was reduced to zero.

That the mainstream media cannot distinguish between this situation and the airport being closed may not be surprising. But some supposedly professional aviation people don't know the difference is worrying.

I mentioned early on that sometimes large airport the level of cover is greater than the minimum required in some circumstances. One example is to be able to maintain full, published level of cover for aircraft movements and still to be able to respond to minor incidents or to provide a limited level of cover the public buildings that tend to get put up at an airport. Another situation that is quite common is that of a large airport which requires more than one fire station in order to be able to provide the response required to meet the regulations. For anyone who is interested, there are situations, although not in the UK as far as I am aware, where an airport fire service may leave the airport to attend a fire in nearby areas because the external fire service is far distant - this arises for remote areas where the airport is providing, perhaps, the only access to the area.

This is the general situation. I, of course, would welcome clarification or correction from anyone intimately aware of the current procedures at Heathrow.

Fire cover is determined by strict parameters, if those parameters can't be met then there is insufficient fire cover.
In the event of insufficient fire cover, it appears that LHR is not open for business, for low fuel state aircraft LTN/STN/SEN and LGW are viable alternatives with minimal additional flight time.

We don't know who calls the shots, whether it's the chief fire officer or higher up, triggered by the insufficient fire cover call from the fire services?

Statistically, the chances of an accident are slim if it remains open, but ATC sorted it out and re-directed aircraft to airports with fire cover without too much drama, maybe those operatives who dispatch without alternatives should rethink their policies rather than Heathrow?

Multiple posters have complained (or expressed bewilderment) that Boeing did not quickly issue a statement regarding the cause of the fire.

One factor may be that Boeing is a publicly traded company. My understanding of United States securities laws is rusty, but my recollection is that publicly traded companies can be sued for making statements that later are alleged to have been false or misleading and thereby impacted the stock market. A small army of American lawyers grew very wealthy by filing many such claims, whether meritorious or not (the cost of defending the claim can be so great that a company pays just to stop the bleeding).

The law governing such claims has changed considerably in recent years, and is now less favorable to claimaints (and their lawyers), yet it surely remains a consideration.

No doubt Boeing's lawyers are carefully reviewing any prospective public statement with that in mind (along with other potential legal issues).

Just to note that considering the large number of CCTV cameras which almost certainly covered the incident it is quite amazing that no video footage has surfaced of the discovery and initial fire response.

It would seem that Fleet Street HAS cleaned up its act.