It's been a long time but I believe the TSB report also stated that there was a strong likelihood that the loss of control may have been due to crew incapacitation because they were exposed to extreme heat and noxious fumes. Cockpit ceiling panels were exposed to heat in excess of 1400 degrees C and there was evidence of molten metal falling from those panels.

So contrary to my optimistic earlier assessment, in the event that it is found that the Ethiopian 787 fire was caused by a spontaneous ELT battery meltdown, had the same incident occurred in flight, one would expect:

1. Numerous passengers and cabin crew to die of asphyxia and/or cyanide poisoning, although flight crew possibly protected by crew oxygen.

2. They will need to try to get on the ground in single digit minutes because otherwise there will be catastrophic structural failure driven by merely heat, e.g. the tail will fall off...

3. But thery won't make it because the skin itself will burn like a firework in the airflow round the plane..

Sure. The point I was trying to make was that in both of the cases he was citing, the presence of the material he considers such a risk played a relatively minor role.

Yeah, probably the end result would not have been far from what would have happened if this was an aluminium plane. Since the said identical ELT is installed on many other conventional aircraft I bet that if ultimately there is any regulatory action - it will affect all aircraft who carry this antenna/battery regardless of the type of the material the fuselage was made from.

DozyWannabe,
Obviously, and that is why back in the 70's I was working on design andtesting of CF fire blockers with Celanese for all A/C seats. They were not fitted to Airtours 737 seats due to very slow regulatory pace at FAA. and aluminum fuselage had zero influence re Airtours fatalities.
I was discussing banning of epoxies from A/C interiors and kindly check and read all Piper Alpha fire reports too, a steel structure with epoxy components and subsequent edicts concerning substituting phenolics for epoxies on offshore oil platforms in North Sea.

Re ELT battery life in general.

I have understood the oft-repeated 'non-rechargeable' nature of the battery, but what is the ELT useful battery limit and what happens when these reach the end of their battery life? Presumably they are swapped out on a regular basis, say once every five years (?), but are they easy to swap out? Does anyone know?

The 121.6/243 elt's were a 2 year replacement for the most part. The 406's are usually 7 years (not sure on the Honeywell) The longer life is do to the switch to lithium batteries.

Changing the battery pack itself only takes a few minutes, most of the time involved is removing the elt, testing, and reinstalling and doing a functional test in the aircraft.

In my time time-ex ELT batteries were used to power the 'hanger radio' until flat and then treated as toxic waste. Never saw one do anything other than power the radio for a long time.

Strange as it may seem, most airports have what we, in Army Aviation, called a "Pre-Accident Plan" that carefully scripts the response to emergency situations. In developing the plan for the two airfields I was fortunate to command, these very items were addressed, as the directives for a Pre-Accident Plan required it. Each player in the response plan is given specific duties and responsibilities, and rehearsals and dry runs are held to keep the players current. At one of those two airfields (actually a very busy heliport with a typical population of 80 to 120 aircraft tenant on the field), our plan was coordinated with the nearby commercial airport (3.1 miles away) and the National Guard F-4 squadron there, local civilian fire departments, hospitals, ambulance services and ATC.

BTW, part of that Pre-Accident Plan was a direct link between our Range Control Office and civilian ATC to provide for shutting down all artillery firing to enable the massive restricted area to be released to civilian ATC as available airspace to make handling an emergency a bit easier.

I am quite confident that when the fire brigade at LHR was launched, it involved a hell of a lot more agencies than one would initially imagine, executing a well thought out, pre-determined plan that addressed virtually all the contingencies being worried about here. There really are intelligent life forms out there beyond the wing tips. :)

At least for this recent Honeywell ELT model, the specs say:

- battery service life 10 years
- battery replacement without removing transmitter unit from aircraft

.. so changing the battery should not be too hard?

http://www51.honeywell.com/aero/comm...06_AFN_ELT.pdf

There is a legally defined number of fire and other emergency vehicles that are required to be available for operation of Heathrow. Obviously, they have only enough to deal with one incident, in this case a localized fire on an empty aircraft, or they would have continued flying. This is a cause for concern as there is an obvious possibility (probability) that two incidents could occur at the same time or there could be a really major accident- and Heathrow is demonstrably unable to cope.

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...cons/laugh.gif
I think an important point in all of this is whether one would prefer that a well thought out and documented plan (that all affected parties understand) be followed or that "common sense" and "everyone knows that" based actions prevail.

Emergencies can pretty much be counted on to have chaos and confusion, having a plan -and- sticking to it is the best way to minimize the risks including responders working at cross purposes.

If problems or ideas for better response are found in a post incident review then the plan can be updated for -next time- with all changes reviewed by affected parties.

I agree, Ian W - it is concerning. Perhaps "787" and "fire" have a ?temporary? extra weighting in the contingency plan:hmm: (http://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/518987-lhr-r-t.html.) As far as I can see, reducing to single runway landings only, and letting the Airfix kit burn out if need be (since it was empty and on a remote stand) would have been a more acceptable solution.

A salutary lesson to those enthused by the "2 runways, nice day, no div" mantra beloved by EASA and accountants to do what NoD does and I did and have 'something up your sleeve'?

I thought the fire crews were also responding to an incident on a PIA 777 on stand too, and so had inadequate cover due to 2 simultaneous situations to keep the runways open?

I agree that it is inadequate cover. Or possibly over-reaction to the incidents rather than keep something back for operations to continue.

So you think they should be able to respond to to 3 worst case scenarios simultaneously? Because all fires are treated equally. I'm sure we all know how quickly a fire on board an aircraft full of fuel can escalate, especially when you add in hazardous materials like Lithium and Carbon Fibre

I think you MAY have a point. I assume each fire station in LHR is responsible for 1 runway and the gates/terminals/hangars are assigned to whichever station is closest?

When was the last time LHR had 2 fires at the same time? I also wonder how long it takes to turn around the airport fire vehicles after they have discharged their foam and get them ready to roll again

Una Due tfc

The bold, italic is one of the very concerns a Pre-Accident Plan takes into account. An empty foam unit is of very little value to fire fighting efforts.;)

If every vehicle is committed (or enough of them that the remaining would be insufficient to handle another response), you close operations until you can restore the appropriate level of operational equipment available for immediate response.

I suspect the 787 is causing a re-write of contingency plans around the globe.

Tilnextime
 

Thanks for that

I think all aircraft fires should be treated equal ie as if she is burning nose to tail. If the Ethiopian had been left to burn an awful lot of nasty/cancerous material would have been released in a residential area. Not nice. Also we may never have been able to find out what caused it in the first place.

The fire crews were correct to close the airport IMO with the resources they had. There may be an argument now to give them more resources so as to keep at least 1 runway open during 2 fire incidents

Just out of interest: What was the PIA incident that was ongoing at the same time?