Repairing the damage
 

FWIW my guess is that Boeing are looking at 2 repair options for the fuselage.
The first would be to perform a complex bolted repair, I don't believe a bonded repair would be permissable. The repair plate would be (guessing) at least 12 ft by 3 ft, and possibly compound curvature. If EA accepted a non-flush repair then it could be fitted on the outside, a much easier option, but with some drag, and therefore performance, penalty. And it would be visible. If they demanded a flush repair (i.e. non visible), then the plate goes on the inside, and has to accomodate all the other fuselage structure, frames, stringers and whatever, as well as whatever systems are there, much more difficult. This supposes that the only structure damaged is the fuselage. It seems to me the fin (VS) may well also be affected . . .

The other option is to replace the damaged fuselage sections completely. This would appear to be the aft fuselage and tailcone sections, all 75 ft of it. The big advantage would be that all the fire and smoke damaged items would be replaced, with no concerns for repair integrity, future maintenance, inspections, etc. But it would be a massive job indeed, including the need to jig the fuselage, remove and replace the empennage, all the systems, interior fittings, etc. And to add to the problems would be sourcing these sections; I would have thought that all major components like these are already assigned to specific aircraft in build or planned, for some years ahead.

My guess is that the 2nd option is completely unviable financially, but who knows what Boeing are thinking. As someone has already said, the bad PR from writing off an aircraft so early may be too bitter a pill to swallow.

Just my thoughts, with no deep knowledge of Boeing or their aircraft.

Nonsense and 787 is autoclave cured and is , I note again FLAMMABLE.

As most spotters who were at LHR know, this was by no means the only emergency on the go at the time. However, I don't intend to feed the media.

Fenland 787,
I said that self ignition temperature of the Toray 3900-2 resin is 580 degrees F not 540 thereby releasing dreaded FST. This is from Toray, FAA and Boeing, so don't try and spin, it won't work. It is flammable, end of story, and top half of 787 is not insulated via Boeing lobbying of the FAA asi stated a while back.
Defending the indefensible is neither pretty nor useful.

NOT BATTERY RELATED
 

At approximately 1550 hrs UTC on 12 July 2013 a Boeing 787-8 of Ethiopian Airlines, registration
ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow whilst the aircraft was parked on stand, with no
persons on board. The initial witness and physical evidence shows that this event resulted in
smoke throughout the fuselage and extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear
fuselage.
In exercise of his powers the Chief Inspector of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has
ordered that an investigation into this serious incident be carried out, in accordance with the Civil
Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 and the Standards and
Recommended Practices of Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The
sole objective of the investigation is to determine the causal and contributory factors of this serious
incident, with the intention of preventing a recurrence. It is not the purpose to apportion blame or
liability.
In accordance with these international standards and recommended practices, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA, representing the State of Design and Manufacture, and
the Civil Aviation Authority of Ethiopia, representing the State of Registry and Operator, have been
invited to appoint Accredited Representatives to participate in the investigation, along with
advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Ethiopian
Airlines. The AAIB has also invited the participation of the EASA (European Aviation Safety
Agency) and the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) as advisors to the investigation.
This team, under the direction of the AAIB, has initiated the technical investigation into the event.
The aircraft is currently located in a hangar at London Heathrow. There has been extensive heat
damage in the upper portion of the rear fuselage, a complex part of the aircraft, and the initial
investigation is likely to take several days. However, it is clear that this heat damage is remote
from the area in which the aircraft main and APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) batteries are located, and,
at this stage, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...%20Release.pdf

Repairing the Damage;

Does anyone else remember the Boeing repair scheme for the 707 when they started to turn into bananas?

The answer was to fit straps to the outside of the fuselage, usually at the back of the fuselage behind the wing trailing edge. The straps were about ten feet long.

Really bad ones had straps rivetted onto the front roof as well.

I have some photographs somewhere in the attic that I took of a TWA 707-131 that I got into in Denver (?) which had straps front and back. Being a short fuselage 707, it looked horrific but the bucks fizz in first class helped to divert my attention.

This doesn't read as a simple coffee pot left on, or discarded cigarette: AAIB

deggers, I agree: a battery problem - already known - would be the best for Boeing. A new, previously unknown, problem with the Dreamliner, also causing a fire hazard, will develop a nightmare for Boeing.

What happened at LHR is a huge disaster for Boeing and all airlines that operate the B787. A lot of passengers are scared of travelling on a Dreamliner for a long time.

The initial AAIB report mentioned extensive heat damage at the rear of the a/c a complex part of the struture. This is going to take a while to fully evalulate.
I would be very worried about the potential, outcome, How do these plastic beams etc cope with heat stress. The fin & tailplane put a lot of forces into the structure at this point.

@quentinc:

I don't see how you arrived at that surmise ... are you supposing that because damage is extensive, the origin of the fire is not small or simple?

It's in the nature of fire that small and mundane origins (e.g., a cigarette) can lead to vast destruction.

One of the important questions for safety: had the same situation occurred in flight, in what time frame would it be likely for the fire to be detected and (if feasible) suppressed. This won't be answerable, until the origin has been identified.

If the fire likely would have been stopped early in its evolution, then its safety implications would be less worrisome.

Maybe the same in principle, but the layout of the servicing points would seem to reduce the safety of this operation. At the risk of getting rather off topic, it seems that this aspect of 787 ops is significantly non-standard. The 777 has a similar layout to all derivatives of the 737 and also the 767 and 757. The pneumatic connection is close to the fuselage centreline just aft of the leading edge of the wing root. The air cart is parked forward of the wing, on the LHS. I would expect the tug driver has good visibility of the ground staff and I imagine that the flight deck has visibility of the air cart.

For the 787 the aft electrical connection is under the trailing edge of the wing, significantly left of centreline. The power cart is parked behind the wing outboard of the engine.I understand from previous Boeing documents, when there were two aft connectors, that this design was for applying ground power during hangar maintenance. The aft connector is at 2.2m, the forward connector is at 2.7m. The steps can be seen on the photo I posted earlier.

My observations are that apart from being aft of a line drawn behind the tailpipe, instead of mid-engine, the ground staff are basically working in a blind spot. The flight deck may be unable to see if the power cart is clear. At a height of 2.2m, it is possible that steps may be required to remove the cable. the ground staff has to walk behind the main gear to retrieve the cable and steps. In my mind there is a risk of conflict, especially if the ground cart is removed and a worker goes back for the steps. It would require vigilance not to start push-back as soon as the cart is seen to move clear.

I am glad to see that the A350 have not broken with convention and has the air cart forward. I am aware that rear engined types such as B727, MD-90, F100 and the E-jets have the pneumatic below the engines, but still forward of the tailpipes.Hence, my question of do actual airline ops allow the use of this, or do operators accept the longer start time and dispense with the third power source.

The implications of trying to support this with fixed installations is even worse. Seems to be the option of either a ground pit, between the undercarriage track, or the use of a very long cable on an articulated system. Both with the inherent risk of ground damage.I would question if this is covered in AHM 33, Chapter 4 Ground Ops Manual, I only see references to ASU engine starts. Maybe you are right and everyone assumes that the protocol is the same, I see a few holes in alignment .

787 Cabin Crew Uniform

http://i586.photobucket.com/albums/s...ps84fa241b.jpg

At approximately 1550 hrs UTC on 12 July 2013 a Boeing 787-8 of Ethiopian Airlines, registration ET-AOP, suffered an event at London Heathrow

Nearly had an "event" in my pants when I read that description!:ok:

Jack

Indeed - if the aircraft had no-one on board then the fire would not have been detected until it burnt through the outer skin of the fuselage (and with no steps and no airbridge then this is pretty much the only way the fire would have become known about as nobody going on board when it's "ready for towing" could have discovered it as there's no access for them) which means the fire probably had quite some time for the fire to propogate internally prior to discovery.

After all it takes almost no time at all for a fire to propogate and develop


Note in that video the fire is ignited at 00:40. By 1.10 (30s after ignition) the bed and table are already well ablaze (you can see the fire on the underside of the bed) and that by 1.25 (45s after ignition) the room has already reached flashover.

If anything, in this situation, the low burn temp of the Composites and lack of fire insulation has saved the aircraft from more extensive damage as it caused the fire to become visible much sooner (and therefore with less internal damage) whereas a metal skin with insulation would have contained the fire leading to much more extensive internal damage prior to the fire becoming externally visible.

JW411 Boeing Teams became expert at replacing whole skin sections down route with pre planned kits.
But I am sure with this B787 damage, a temp reinforcing for ferry flight and the aft fuselage section will be de-mated at the Production joint, providing it is forward of the damage and replaced.
One issue, will there be a heap of in-line crimps or are there suitable disconnect points in the precious wiring looms.
When I 1st heard about the manufacturing technique for the B787, I ventured one of my 'line' nightmares: when a fork lift driver misses the cargo door and forks the fuselage;
sure Boeing have also thought through similar scenarios.
Lets hope so!

@Burnie5204: I wonder if PR have the nuts to spin it that it's better to fly in aircraft that a fire burns big holes in - so everyone's alerted that there is a fire - than in an ally fuselage a/c aboard which the fire would stay inside far longer*

(*where the extinguishers are kept).

I suppose if they had the balls they would try to argue that fires wouldn't have time to develop onboard - mid-air when cabin crews have access to extinguishers and are able to enact immediate action drills.

They'd have to have serious balls though.


As I said though - it may have helped in this specific situation making the difference between a repair job to the rear end and a hull loss

Practically thinking, it would never have happened in flight.
A flight attendant would just have said... 'OOH the Coffee boiler has been left switched on, anyone for a coffee?'

And if it was not the coffee brewer, but another cause? In any case, frightening.

What impact on range
 

Hi JW411, sadly I suspect that they were left off to save weight.The very reason for distributing the electrical system, is to reduce the heavy cables fanning out from a central point. I guess it would also not be too convenient for the flight crew to be digging around in the aft cabin ceiling, during flight, to reset a few breakers.