Ethiopean 787 fire at Heathrow

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by J.O.

It's been a long time but I believe...

Sure. The point I was trying to make was that in both of the cases he was citing, the presence of the material he considers such a risk played a relatively minor role.

[olasek]

had the same incident occurred in flight, one would expect:

Yeah, probably the end result would not have been far from what would have happened if this was an aluminium plane. Since the said identical ELT is installed on many other conventional aircraft I bet that if ultimately there is any regulatory action - it will affect all aircraft who carry this antenna/battery regardless of the type of the material the fuselage was made from.

[amicus]

DozyWannabe,
Obviously, and that is why back in the 70's I was working on design andtesting of CF fire blockers with Celanese for all A/C seats. They were not fitted to Airtours 737 seats due to very slow regulatory pace at FAA. and aluminum fuselage had zero influence re Airtours fatalities.
I was discussing banning of epoxies from A/C interiors and kindly check and read all Piper Alpha fire reports too, a steel structure with epoxy components and subsequent edicts concerning substituting phenolics for epoxies on offshore oil platforms in North Sea.

[jolihokistix]

Re ELT battery life in general.

I have understood the oft-repeated 'non-rechargeable' nature of the battery, but what is the ELT useful battery limit and what happens when these reach the end of their battery life? Presumably they are swapped out on a regular basis, say once every five years (?), but are they easy to swap out? Does anyone know?

[LASJayhawk]

The 121.6/243 elt's were a 2 year replacement for the most part. The 406's are usually 7 years (not sure on the Honeywell) The longer life is do to the switch to lithium batteries.

Changing the battery pack itself only takes a few minutes, most of the time involved is removing the elt, testing, and reinstalling and doing a functional test in the aircraft.

[Sevarg]

In my time time-ex ELT batteries were used to power the 'hanger radio' until flat and then treated as toxic waste. Never saw one do anything other than power the radio for a long time.

[tilnextime]

I am wondering too, if LHR should have been shut for so long. I understand the immediate concerns of supervisors dealing directly with incident(s) but what about the wider operational issues? Are decision makers aware of many operators fuel policy, such as dispensing with alternates? If any diversions involved Pan/Mayday calls, it means that the closure decision generated emergencies in its own right. To have large numbers of aircraft with low fuel states diverting is a serious matter in itself.

Strange as it may seem, most airports have what we, in Army Aviation, called a "Pre-Accident Plan" that carefully scripts the response to emergency situations. In developing the plan for the two airfields I was fortunate to command, these very items were addressed, as the directives for a Pre-Accident Plan required it. Each player in the response plan is given specific duties and responsibilities, and rehearsals and dry runs are held to keep the players current. At one of those two airfields (actually a very busy heliport with a typical population of 80 to 120 aircraft tenant on the field), our plan was coordinated with the nearby commercial airport (3.1 miles away) and the National Guard F-4 squadron there, local civilian fire departments, hospitals, ambulance services and ATC.

BTW, part of that Pre-Accident Plan was a direct link between our Range Control Office and civilian ATC to provide for shutting down all artillery firing to enable the massive restricted area to be released to civilian ATC as available airspace to make handling an emergency a bit easier.

I am quite confident that when the fire brigade at LHR was launched, it involved a hell of a lot more agencies than one would initially imagine, executing a well thought out, pre-determined plan that addressed virtually all the contingencies being worried about here. There really are intelligent life forms out there beyond the wing tips.

[Finn47]

At least for this recent Honeywell ELT model, the specs say:

- battery service life 10 years
- battery replacement without removing transmitter unit from aircraft

.. so changing the battery should not be too hard?

http://www51.honeywell.com/aero/comm...06_AFN_ELT.pdf

[Ian W]

I am wondering too, if LHR should have been shut for so long. I understand the immediate concerns of supervisors dealing directly with incident(s) but what about the wider operational issues? Are decision makers aware of many operators fuel policy, such as dispensing with alternates? If any diversions involved Pan/Mayday calls, it means that the closure decision generated emergencies in its own right. To have large numbers of aircraft with low fuel states diverting is a serious matter in itself.

There is a legally defined number of fire and other emergency vehicles that are required to be available for operation of Heathrow. Obviously, they have only enough to deal with one incident, in this case a localized fire on an empty aircraft, or they would have continued flying. This is a cause for concern as there is an obvious possibility (probability) that two incidents could occur at the same time or there could be a really major accident- and Heathrow is demonstrably unable to cope.

[MurphyWasRight]

Quote:
I am wondering too, if LHR should have been shut for so long. I understand the immediate concerns of supervisors dealing directly with incident(s) but what about the wider operational issues? Are decision makers aware of many operators fuel policy, such as dispensing with alternates? If any diversions involved Pan/Mayday calls, it means that the closure decision generated emergencies in its own right. To have large numbers of aircraft with low fuel states diverting is a serious matter in itself.

Strange as it may seem, most airports have what we, in Army Aviation, called a "Pre-Accident Plan" that carefully scripts the response to emergency situations.

I think an important point in all of this is whether one would prefer that a well thought out and documented plan (that all affected parties understand) be followed or that "common sense" and "everyone knows that" based actions prevail.

Emergencies can pretty much be counted on to have chaos and confusion, having a plan -and- sticking to it is the best way to minimize the risks including responders working at cross purposes.

If problems or ideas for better response are found in a post incident review then the plan can be updated for -next time- with all changes reviewed by affected parties.

[BOAC]

I agree, Ian W - it is concerning. Perhaps "787" and "fire" have a ?temporary? extra weighting in the contingency plan (http://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/518987-lhr-r-t.html.) As far as I can see, reducing to single runway landings only, and letting the Airfix kit burn out if need be (since it was empty and on a remote stand) would have been a more acceptable solution.

A salutary lesson to those enthused by the "2 runways, nice day, no div" mantra beloved by EASA and accountants to do what NoD does and I did and have 'something up your sleeve'?

[Una Due Tfc]

I thought the fire crews were also responding to an incident on a PIA 777 on stand too, and so had inadequate cover due to 2 simultaneous situations to keep the runways open?

[Ian W]

I thought the fire crews were also responding to an incident on a PIA 777 on stand too, and so had inadequate cover due to 2 simultaneous situations to keep the runways open?

I agree that it is inadequate cover. Or possibly over-reaction to the incidents rather than keep something back for operations to continue.

[Una Due Tfc]

So you think they should be able to respond to to 3 worst case scenarios simultaneously? Because all fires are treated equally. I'm sure we all know how quickly a fire on board an aircraft full of fuel can escalate, especially when you add in hazardous materials like Lithium and Carbon Fibre

I think you MAY have a point. I assume each fire station in LHR is responsible for 1 runway and the gates/terminals/hangars are assigned to whichever station is closest?

When was the last time LHR had 2 fires at the same time? I also wonder how long it takes to turn around the airport fire vehicles after they have discharged their foam and get them ready to roll again

[tilnextime]

Una Due tfc

When was the last time LHR had 2 fires at the same time? I also wonder how long it takes to turn around the airport fire vehicles after they have discharged their foam and get them ready to roll again

The bold, italic is one of the very concerns a Pre-Accident Plan takes into account. An empty foam unit is of very little value to fire fighting efforts.

If every vehicle is committed (or enough of them that the remaining would be insufficient to handle another response), you close operations until you can restore the appropriate level of operational equipment available for immediate response.

[BOAC]

I suspect the 787 is causing a re-write of contingency plans around the globe.

[Una Due Tfc]

Tilnextime

Thanks for that

I think all aircraft fires should be treated equal ie as if she is burning nose to tail. If the Ethiopian had been left to burn an awful lot of nasty/cancerous material would have been released in a residential area. Not nice. Also we may never have been able to find out what caused it in the first place.

The fire crews were correct to close the airport IMO with the resources they had. There may be an argument now to give them more resources so as to keep at least 1 runway open during 2 fire incidents

[Nemrytter]

Just out of interest: What was the PIA incident that was ongoing at the same time?

[BOAC]

There may be an argument now to give them more resources so as to keep at least 1 runway open during 2 fire incidents

- anyone able to post the assets at LHR? Was extinguishant discharged at the PIA incident?

[JW411]

So what happens to those aircraft who have creatively "committed to Heathrow" due to a shortage of fuel (on the basis that Heathrow has two runways and the weather is reasonable) when both runways suddenly shut?

Do they land at Heathrow without fire cover or do they now demand priority over everyone else who is diverting at the same time?

I would not like to be in that situation.

You could end up in deep sh*t just because a coffee cup or an ELT has caught fire in a Boeing 787 on a remote stand at Heathrow.