TAIC report on P68 double engine failure in Hawkes Bay
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: The World
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TAIC report on P68 double engine failure in Hawkes Bay
I see the TAIC report has been published on the Wings Flight Training Part-Banana that had the fuel exhaustion double engine failure between Napier and Palmerston North.
Seems a good move that the "instructor" involved now flys a desk rather than an aircraft
Link to report
Seems a good move that the "instructor" involved now flys a desk rather than an aircraft
Link to report
Last edited by NDB Alpha; 24th Oct 2007 at 20:51. Reason: Added link to report
fuel exhaustion double engine failure between Napier and Palmerston North
No, seems like he just messed up - one tank completely empty & as a result of fiddling with the selectors he managed to introduce air into the fuel line from the other tank which had around 60l remaining. Slightly surprising as the pilot had > 10,000 hrs, albeit just 5 or 6 on this type.
It's not the first time something similar has happened with Partenavias in NZ, I seem to recall reading of a couple of instances where the fuel selectors were mis-handled which resulted in fuel being shut off completely. In the cases I can think of the fuel wasn't successfully returned and a forced landing resulted. None of these particular reports mentioned anything about stiff selectors but IIRC one did say something about the selector being slightly between detents which was an exacerbating, but not primary, factor in the resulting accident.
I've never flown one but it seems to me the fuel handling is something that should be underlined with these machines - whenever I read of a Partenavia issue it almost inevitably involves fuel issues in one form or another.
It's not the first time something similar has happened with Partenavias in NZ, I seem to recall reading of a couple of instances where the fuel selectors were mis-handled which resulted in fuel being shut off completely. In the cases I can think of the fuel wasn't successfully returned and a forced landing resulted. None of these particular reports mentioned anything about stiff selectors but IIRC one did say something about the selector being slightly between detents which was an exacerbating, but not primary, factor in the resulting accident.
I've never flown one but it seems to me the fuel handling is something that should be underlined with these machines - whenever I read of a Partenavia issue it almost inevitably involves fuel issues in one form or another.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: The World
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Extracted from the report Findings...
How often are knee jurk reactions taken for the lowest common denominator...why raise the required standard of instructor experience and competency for one that obviously didn't meet current standards??
3.4 ZK-MYF departed Napier with insufficient fuel to complete the return flight with the requiredreserve, resulting in the left engine failing due to fuel starvation.
3.5 The instructor induced air to the right engine fuel system by incorrectly selecting the engine to the empty left tank, effectively causing a double engine failure.
3.6 Had the instructor promptly feathered the left propeller or restored power to the left engine by the correct positioning of the fuel selectors, he could have flown the aircraft to a suitable alternative aerodrome.
3.7 The instructor’s mindset of having sufficient fuel, his high workload and low experience on the aircraft contributed to his being unable to identify promptly the cause of the initial power loss, and rectify the problem.
3.8 The instructor was correctly qualified to conduct the flight, but his minimal experience on the aircraft type contributed to his mishandling of the emergency.
3.9 Instructor experience and competency requirements need to be set at a higher level to ensure training is to the highest standard possible.
3.5 The instructor induced air to the right engine fuel system by incorrectly selecting the engine to the empty left tank, effectively causing a double engine failure.
3.6 Had the instructor promptly feathered the left propeller or restored power to the left engine by the correct positioning of the fuel selectors, he could have flown the aircraft to a suitable alternative aerodrome.
3.7 The instructor’s mindset of having sufficient fuel, his high workload and low experience on the aircraft contributed to his being unable to identify promptly the cause of the initial power loss, and rectify the problem.
3.8 The instructor was correctly qualified to conduct the flight, but his minimal experience on the aircraft type contributed to his mishandling of the emergency.
3.9 Instructor experience and competency requirements need to be set at a higher level to ensure training is to the highest standard possible.
Gear Up?
From the report:
ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE
CONTROL………… …………………YAWAIRSPEED……………ABOVE BLUE LINE
POWER…………… RICH, PITCH, POWER
UNDERCARRIAGE… …………………..UP
FLAPS…………………………………….UP
IDENTIFY…..DEAD LEG – DEAD ENGINE
CONFIRM……..CLOSE DEAD THROTTLE
POWER…………… RICH, PITCH, POWER
UNDERCARRIAGE… …………………..UP
FLAPS…………………………………….UP
IDENTIFY…..DEAD LEG – DEAD ENGINE
CONFIRM……..CLOSE DEAD THROTTLE
TRIM……………..RUDDER & ELEVATOR
He was obviously distracted trying to get the gear up?
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: New Zealand
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
" Seems a good move that the "instructor" involved now flys a desk rather than an aircraft"
I happen to know that's not entirely accurate. Also the new CFI is no longer there.
I happen to know that's not entirely accurate. Also the new CFI is no longer there.