Citation 750 down in Egelsbach.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: California
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Westwind1950
Thanks for the clarification re BFU report on the 2009 King Air crash at Egelsbach. I agree that speculation can lead one up the wrong path. This forum though does provide me with perspectives from experienced pilots that I won't otherwise have, so I read them, knowing that evidence turned up in the investigation might prove the speculation wrong.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 122
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@searchingforanswers and @lostourlovedone
The Mayday Foundation ("Stiftung Mayday") is helping the families of crew that perished in aviation accidents. If you are facing financial hardship due to your loss, you may want to get in touch with them. Their web page is currently only available in German, but the English version should be on-line again in May.
www.english.stiftung-mayday.de/index.php
The Mayday Foundation ("Stiftung Mayday") is helping the families of crew that perished in aviation accidents. If you are facing financial hardship due to your loss, you may want to get in touch with them. Their web page is currently only available in German, but the English version should be on-line again in May.
www.english.stiftung-mayday.de/index.php
Guest
Posts: n/a
Stiftung Mayday
Correct Links:
Stiftung Mayday - English version (English Home, no content at this time)
Stiftung Mayday (German Home)
Stiftung Mayday - English version (English Home, no content at this time)
Stiftung Mayday (German Home)
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: Hamburg, Germany
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I was interested to read this article posted by the Pilot who has been mentioned on this thread. Very sad reading, such an industrious, driven chap who realised the constraints of time and money on his chosen career, but persevered and had seemed to get the chance to fulfill his dream.
I'm sure Captain Jose's experiences are not unique, and that other aviators have experienced similar adversity in attaining their chosen profession, but I find his brief but very honest account of how he reached the position he had most poignant given the circumstances of what happened at Egelsbach.
Harry
Jon Jose
I'm sure Captain Jose's experiences are not unique, and that other aviators have experienced similar adversity in attaining their chosen profession, but I find his brief but very honest account of how he reached the position he had most poignant given the circumstances of what happened at Egelsbach.
Harry
Jon Jose
I would like to see some serious research done into the impact of commercial pressures on the safety of small-fleet business jet operations.
Small companies with only one or two aircraft on an AOC often have serious cash-flow problems, meaning the company can go under even if one or two sectors are loss-making (eg having to divert to an alternate, ore even de-ice). When a captain faces the prospect of losing his employment if he diverts, then he has a large incentive to take an unacceptable risk. If the captain also has a stake in the business (as here) then the incentive is even higher.
I myself have been put in such a position before, but luckily am still here to tell the tale. I've now made a personal decision to never again fly for small-fleet companies, as I don't ever want to be put into that situation again.
Small companies with only one or two aircraft on an AOC often have serious cash-flow problems, meaning the company can go under even if one or two sectors are loss-making (eg having to divert to an alternate, ore even de-ice). When a captain faces the prospect of losing his employment if he diverts, then he has a large incentive to take an unacceptable risk. If the captain also has a stake in the business (as here) then the incentive is even higher.
I myself have been put in such a position before, but luckily am still here to tell the tale. I've now made a personal decision to never again fly for small-fleet companies, as I don't ever want to be put into that situation again.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Who cares? ;-)
Age: 74
Posts: 676
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Trim Stab... I think you missed something. In this case, the PIC was the owner/operator himself so any pressure here he put on himself. At least, that's the way things look at the moment. Final details are not out yet and may not be for some weeks/months to come.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Small companies with only one or two aircraft on an AOC often have serious cash-flow problems, meaning the company can go under even if one or two sectors are loss-making
I have managed a 1 and later 2 A/C company for 4 years and was involved in doing so for 14 years and we NEVER were close to shutdown for the loss of de/cing etc. Gear overhaul, engine overhauls...that could get you in trouble, surely, but 2 sectors with a loss? When a company is so close to being bankrupt, than it is too late already IMO.
I didn't make any allegations so there is no need for "proof". I simply suggested that it would be an interesting topic for further research.
I can certainly give from my own experience of flying with a small-fleet operator examples of situations where the captain/AOC stakeholder has taken substantial (and illegal) risks due to commercial pressure.
I can certainly give from my own experience of flying with a small-fleet operator examples of situations where the captain/AOC stakeholder has taken substantial (and illegal) risks due to commercial pressure.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You didn´t?
so is
fact or fiction ?
How about:
Fact? Fiction? Not an allegation?
so is
Small companies with only one or two aircraft on an AOC often have serious cash-flow problems
How about:
meaning the company can go under even if one or two sectors are loss-making
You're being pedantic. Maybe your company is an icon of perfect management, but many small companies in any industry sector struggle from month to month. As I wrote, it would be an interesting topic for further research in aviation human factors.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You're being pedantic.
many small companies in any industry sector struggle from month to month.
Maybe your company is an icon of perfect management
Let's don't argue over semantics. I think everyone understood what "Trim Stab" wanted to say and also that "The Dude" 
luckily never had to work for such an outfit. It also depends on the country that your company is based in etc.
luckily never had to work for such an outfit. It also depends on the country that your company is based in etc.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Gone sailing
Age: 58
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Intermediate report
BFU (German Air Accident Investigation Bureau) has just released a first intermediate report in German, see page 16.
Can some experienced bizjet driver shed some light on the events, as I don´t know about Citation SOPs ?
His dudeness, you have control.
Can some experienced bizjet driver shed some light on the events, as I don´t know about Citation SOPs ?
His dudeness, you have control.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Near Stuttgart, Germany
Posts: 1,095
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Hello!
I think you can best understand what went on, when you read the safety recommendations issued by the BFU on pages 45 and 46. A short translation:
11/2012: Until recommendations 12/2012, 13/2012 and 14/2012 have been put in place, VFR night approaches for high performance aircraft to Egelsbach shall be suspended.
12/2012: The visual approach procedures to and from Egelsbach shall be revised. The description shall be simple, easily understandable and free of contradictions.
13/2012: The definition of High Performance Aircraft (HPA) with relation to Egelsbach shall be supplemented by the speed term Vref. It shall be guaranteed that HPA aircraft can fly procedures and traffic patterns safely with their relative Vref.
14/2012: From the visual approach charts of Egelsbach it shall be evident that due to the obstacle situation the final approach must to be flown at an angle of 4.4 degrees. The obstacles shall be clearly marked on the chart.
I do not know about any „Citation SOPs“ (although I fly Citations myself, but not this model). We fly according to our company SOPs. Therefore I do not know whether their high approach speed (285kt initially - the AIP entry for Egelsbach gives a maximum approach speed of 160kt), their late configuration and their excessive descent rate on final approach (> 2500ft/min) was in accordance with _their_ standard way of operating this aeroplane or not. I also do not know why they entered a different waypoint (ECHO) into their FMS when instructed to follow the published HPA approach via Yankee One and Yankee 2 (they read back this instruction!). Not that it matters much, both routes cross the same ridge of obstacles.
So as usual we will have to wait for the final report.
Can some experienced bizjet driver shed some light on the events, as I don´t know about Citation SOPs ?
11/2012: Until recommendations 12/2012, 13/2012 and 14/2012 have been put in place, VFR night approaches for high performance aircraft to Egelsbach shall be suspended.
12/2012: The visual approach procedures to and from Egelsbach shall be revised. The description shall be simple, easily understandable and free of contradictions.
13/2012: The definition of High Performance Aircraft (HPA) with relation to Egelsbach shall be supplemented by the speed term Vref. It shall be guaranteed that HPA aircraft can fly procedures and traffic patterns safely with their relative Vref.
14/2012: From the visual approach charts of Egelsbach it shall be evident that due to the obstacle situation the final approach must to be flown at an angle of 4.4 degrees. The obstacles shall be clearly marked on the chart.
I do not know about any „Citation SOPs“ (although I fly Citations myself, but not this model). We fly according to our company SOPs. Therefore I do not know whether their high approach speed (285kt initially - the AIP entry for Egelsbach gives a maximum approach speed of 160kt), their late configuration and their excessive descent rate on final approach (> 2500ft/min) was in accordance with _their_ standard way of operating this aeroplane or not. I also do not know why they entered a different waypoint (ECHO) into their FMS when instructed to follow the published HPA approach via Yankee One and Yankee 2 (they read back this instruction!). Not that it matters much, both routes cross the same ridge of obstacles.
So as usual we will have to wait for the final report.
Last edited by what next; 14th May 2012 at 14:10.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Near Stuttgart, Germany
Posts: 1,095
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Hello!
???
I fail to see the connection of your statement with this interim report.
But had they been operating on an AOC, there would have been some minimal common training/operating standards and some very basic operating procedures at least. Whether or not the crews adhere to those is something completely different of course. Like flight preparation (Egelsbach really is an airfield that one has to familiarise himself with _before_ flying there at night in marginal weather) stability criteria for continuing the final approach or reaction to GPWS warnings: The power settings for both engines remained at 34% (idle?) after they had heard first "SINKRATE PULL UP" and then "TOO LOW TERRAIN". (BTW: The timeline given in the interim report regarding the GPWS warnings does not make sense.)
But operators with an AOC ar the safest operators FACT.
The CAA say it is so.
The CAA say it is so.
I fail to see the connection of your statement with this interim report.
But had they been operating on an AOC, there would have been some minimal common training/operating standards and some very basic operating procedures at least. Whether or not the crews adhere to those is something completely different of course. Like flight preparation (Egelsbach really is an airfield that one has to familiarise himself with _before_ flying there at night in marginal weather) stability criteria for continuing the final approach or reaction to GPWS warnings: The power settings for both engines remained at 34% (idle?) after they had heard first "SINKRATE PULL UP" and then "TOO LOW TERRAIN". (BTW: The timeline given in the interim report regarding the GPWS warnings does not make sense.)
Last edited by what next; 14th May 2012 at 15:18.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: England
Posts: 130
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
EGPWS
I picked up the throttles staying at 34%, rather than TOGA (or equivalent) being selected. What should have been the proper timeline for the EGPWS to function as expected?
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Near Stuttgart, Germany
Posts: 1,095
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Hello!
The manual of "our" EGPWS (Honeywell MK V and MK VII - don't know if the Citation X has the same one on board) says (not aircraft specific!):
In case of
(PULL UP and WINDSHEAR are warning alerts):
These manoeuvers are practised on every recurrent training in the simulator. Yet they never increased power and they did not disengage the autopilot, but used the pitch wheel instead to slowly raise the nose of the aircraft. Who knows why.
I picked up the throttles staying at 34%, rather than TOGA (or equivalent) being selected. What should have been the proper timeline for the EGPWS to function as expected?
In case of
WARNING ALERTS
1. Aggressively position throttles for maximum rated thrust. Apply maximum available power as determined by emergency need. The pilot not flying (if applicable) should set power and ensure that TO/GA power and modes are set.
2. If engaged, disengage the autopilot and smoothly but aggressively increase pitch towards "stick shaker" or Pitch Limit Indicators (PLI) to obtain maximum climb performance.
3. Continue climbing until the warning is eliminated and safe flight is assured.
4. Advise ATC of the situation.
NOTE: Climbing is the only recommended response unless operating in visual conditions and/or pilot determines, based on all available information, that turning in addition to the climbing is the safest course of action. Follow established operating procedures.
2. If engaged, disengage the autopilot and smoothly but aggressively increase pitch towards "stick shaker" or Pitch Limit Indicators (PLI) to obtain maximum climb performance.
3. Continue climbing until the warning is eliminated and safe flight is assured.
4. Advise ATC of the situation.
NOTE: Climbing is the only recommended response unless operating in visual conditions and/or pilot determines, based on all available information, that turning in addition to the climbing is the safest course of action. Follow established operating procedures.
These manoeuvers are practised on every recurrent training in the simulator. Yet they never increased power and they did not disengage the autopilot, but used the pitch wheel instead to slowly raise the nose of the aircraft. Who knows why.
Last edited by what next; 15th May 2012 at 12:31.
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Europe
Posts: 651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What I find most curious is that towards the end of the summary, when they struck the trees, the BFU noted "The autopilot was engaged at this point".
How comes there was no sign to do an AP disconnect and execute a GA?!?
Basic airmanship should tell any pilot that if you have the AP on in a descent and the EGPWS shouts at you, disconnect the damn thing and execute a GA.
It seems that they just self-constructed an IFR approach where there was none, why otherwise would they have the AP engaged so close to the field and not hand-fly it.
That's just a sad fact apparently, but again the fact that they had the AP engaged right until impact puzzles me the most.
How comes there was no sign to do an AP disconnect and execute a GA?!?
Basic airmanship should tell any pilot that if you have the AP on in a descent and the EGPWS shouts at you, disconnect the damn thing and execute a GA.
It seems that they just self-constructed an IFR approach where there was none, why otherwise would they have the AP engaged so close to the field and not hand-fly it.
That's just a sad fact apparently, but again the fact that they had the AP engaged right until impact puzzles me the most.
Last edited by INNflight; 15th May 2012 at 12:37.