Map showing the crash site at Auchinweet Farm, Tarbolton in relation to Runway 26 (long since closed) at Prestwick:

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....49fade7358.jpg

Note the HT lines running N-S across the farmland at Langlands, which were the ones that the aircraft hit.

Thanks Dave, apparently he was heading N40E and more or less completed a circle over Tarbolton. Oddly, if he hadn't have kept going in the port turn he would've been not too badly lined up for 26.

One person survived for several days before succumbing to their injuries.

It seems the emergency services were very slow getting there. Seems very odd as at least one policeman saw it over Tarbolton. You'd think that a burning airliner barely above rooftop height would attract some attention as well as a little curiosity at prestwick airport.

Says a lot about the world that the flight deck drew outnumbered the cabin-talk about productivity.

As to the two radio ops aside from the fact that away from land it was all HF radio much of it was W/T wireless telegraphy. And back then while pilots could understand Morse code I am not sure they could send it . Also the Radio Ops would be required to keep a listening watch so having a pilot spell on operator means he isnt getting his rest as apilot . The radio sets were nothing like today's digital frequency selection , they required a lot of experienced and deft fingers to tune the frequency precisely and know when certain frequencies work and when they dont. HF is a very funny medium in terms of propagation you could often hear a station thousands of miles away and not hear one 200 miles away . Keeping a listening watch with all the background noise on HF is mentally very tiring as well and I am sure the whole flight crew were pretty darnn tired at the end of a transatlantic trip at 300 odd knots on a very small flight deck with four great piston props rumbling and vibrating away

As a young lad used to fly as a pax in a corporate Lockheed 12, it had a morse key mounted on the co-pilots right. Up until a few years ago in Oz for an instrument rating you had to be able to read morse at 10wpm to pass.

Don't forget the accident flight was westbound, the accident happening just at the end of the first short leg from Amsterdam. Heavy crews going all the way was the norm then, like on a ship, they did not slip until they got to New York, in part because the intermediate points were so unreliable and weather-dependent that you couldn't be sure which ones might get used. Sometimes they didn't even slip at the destination, aircraft layovers of a couple of days before returning can be seen in timetables of the era.

W/O crew were different to radio operators as their principal Wireless role was sending and receiving Morse, communicated by notes with the flying crew. Again, practice just like a ship.

The legends did seem to come to unfortunate ends. BOAC's O P Jones landed a Strat short at Goose Bay in the 1950s (no injuries) and said, actually quite commendably, "that's it for me".

It would appear that KLM used the radio operators up through the 1957 time period. I use to fly a former KLM L1049H that had the aft facing RO station right behind the Capt. seat. As I recall these aircraft were built in the 1956/57 time period. I suppose they would have seen service down in Africa as well as Indonesia. Also, these were the first aircraft I recall seeing with SELCAL installed although I do not recall whether it was HF or VHF only.

I've been reading through the accident report and it certainly becomes apparent that the organisation at Prestwick, and I suspect further up the chain was a bit of a mess. I think the key question that may well have answered the mystery as to why Parmentier was still even in that area was impossible to answer because of so many errors in the log of R/T messages. These were supposed to be recorded on a minute by minute basis and they were not. There was a separate room in the tower at Prestwick as well as staff who's sole job was to write up the R/T exchanges. The person recording these seems to have been so confused that we are unable to really know if the crew thought the ceiling was 7,000 feet, as recorded.... not the 700 feet it was. At 2308 she recorded the vis at 300 yds instead of 3900 yds that it was. When questioned she said she thought it was 3,000 yds. The point is.... if it could be established that the pilot was informed at 2316 that vis was 2,000 yds (which it was by that time, but no one informed the a/c, despite a message being passed to PH-TEN at that time) that would have been a material fact in determining the cause. That was quite clearly below the KLM minima for runway 26.

I've gone through this quite carefully and it is a very odd accident indeed. One comes away with the distinct impression that something out of the ordinary must have occurred on the downwind leg to distract the pilots from the altimeter.
On a slightly different tangent, the Wikpedia entry has quite a few errors and I wonder if it's worth the trouble correcting. The references are to a book, Barker 1988, whereas I would use the Official Enquiry Report.

If you're interested in historical accuracy then, yes, you should do.

Bear in mind that factual edits to Wikipedia articles tend to get reverted unless accompanied by an authoritative citation (obviously the official report would qualify as one).

Yes Dave,
I did cite the Official Report in the couple of things I've altered so far. But some bits need more extensive work I think.