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-   -   Did Concorde kill TSR2? (https://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/549761-did-concorde-kill-tsr2.html)

ZeBedie 21st Oct 2014 15:31

Did Concorde kill TSR2?
 
If Concorde development had not been soaking up so much money, is it likely that TSR2 could have survived? In terms of what was best for the UK aircraft industry, did Labour kill the wrong aircraft?

BEagle 21st Oct 2014 15:55

It was always suspected that Wislon and his fellow travellers had been told by the US that opposition to Concorde would be considerably less if TSR2 was canned......:ugh:

So Wislon, Healey and the rest of those wretched communists duly obliged.

WHBM 21st Oct 2014 16:12

In a way it did kill it.

TSR-2 built in Weybridge, good Conservative territory.

Concorde built in Bristol, Tony Benn's constituency.

Government needed to reduce overspending, which really boils down to putting people out of work because that is what much of the money is spent on. One project has to go.

VC10man 21st Oct 2014 16:13

Well said, BEagle. Wilson cancelled the P1154 as well, this would have been the supersonic Harrier.

They not only cancelled the TSR2 project, they also broke up the assembly tools so it couldn't be made in case a decent government got in. But it didn't matter because Ted Heath became PM and was as useless, if not more so, than Wilson.

I loved looking at Concorde and watched her land at Filton for the last time. Sadly I never flew on her, I couldn't afford it. I wish I'd tried a bit harder!

But even more sadly Concorde was a huge white elephant, it cost an amazing amount just to "sell" them for £1 each.

And then they blame Maggie for ruining industry!!!!!!!!

surely not 21st Oct 2014 18:26

Would the TSR2 have been a bit of a one trick pony with no possibility to expand its roles. It struck me whilst walking around the Cosford TSR2 last month that it wasn't going to be easy to upgrade it to new weapons systems or re task it with IR pods etc as it would have been next to impossible to hang anything off the incredibly small wings, and the fuselage didn't have much room for any add ons either.

Is it likely that as radar and weapons systems evolved the TSR2 capability would have been left behind? I realise that to many this idea is heresay but with the way we have hung all manner of additional kit under/over the Harrier, Jaguar, Tornado and Typhoon that wasn't thought of originally, would the TSR2 have been a good airframe to keep up to date?

dixi188 21st Oct 2014 19:01

Don't know about Concorde killing TSR-2 but I think it killed the BAC 3-11.

The governments attitude when BAC wanted a loan of £50 million for development was "You've had enough already".

Shaggy Sheep Driver 21st Oct 2014 19:08

I think the potential of TSR2 has been vastly overstated, not least by its chief test pilot who hung his hat on it instead of on Concorde. He thought Concorde would be cancelled and TSR2 would be built, but he backed the wrong horse.

Also, UK couldn't just cancel Concorde as Julian Amery had had written into the 1962 Anglo French agreement a binding clause which meant cancellation would require both Britain and France to agree to that.

By getting Concorde for 27 glorious years of M2 transatlantic flight (3 hour flight time!) when USA and USSR tried and failed to do the same was IMO a far better legacy for UK than a military aeroplane of dubious promise.

Oh, and BA did NOT get them for £1.

ZeBedie 21st Oct 2014 19:10


Don't know about Concorde killing TSR-2 but I think it killed the BAC 3-11.
Should the question have been 'did Concorde kill the British aircraft industry'?

Shaggy Sheep Driver 21st Oct 2014 19:49


Should the question have been 'did Concorde kill the British aircraft industry'?
No, it didn't. It proved what the British industry was capable of when excellence was the goal, and before the accountants were let out of their box.

The US aircraft industry killed the British aircraft industry by producing aeroplanes down to a price instead of up to a standard, and matched to a researched market instead of to a technical ideal or the requirements of just one unique customer.

Mr Oleo Strut 21st Oct 2014 20:34

Putting it all to bed...
 
Just been reading 'TSR2 - bombing the myth', on the Hush Kit site. A fascinating account of what happened and might have happened to that glorious-looking aircraft had it been allowed to continue. How could it all have happened? Why did it happen? The consequences of it all ripple on down the decades...

I was a Handley Page apprentice at the time and well remember the shock of the TSR cancellation and the upheaval it caused. I suppose that we can start by pointing the finger of accusation at WW2, which not only stimulated all aeronautics, but bankrupted the country, leaving the USA the major post-war beneficiary in aviation (and most other) knowledge and commercial know-how. The miracle is that old war-torn GB was able to innovate and produce such brilliant new aircraft as the Comet and TSR2 at all, but it did. HP took over Miles at Reading and when I much later learnt about the brilliant Miles supersonic jet aircraft well on the way to completion before the end of the war, and the shabby way it was cancelled and destroyed by the politicians, to the direct benefit of the Americans and their supersonic aircraft, I was sickened and angered. But then of course old HP itself was soon to be sacrificed on the same altar of political expediency.

That seems to be the British way, so it is probably just as well that the Tornado, Jaguar, Harrier and Concorde programmes were international efforts and that the Typhoon still is. All this is now beginning to gather layers of dust on the library shelves of history, but when I look around at the poor state of UK aviation research, development and production today, I am proud to have lived through the heady days when old GB was up there with the best of the workd's aviation greats.

cvg2iln 21st Oct 2014 23:19


So Wislon, Healey and the rest of those wretched communists duly obliged.
Possibly true - but it wasn't just commie input that pulled the plug. I recall Mountbatten spouting off along the lines of "four of these for one of those" with ref to the Buccaneer v/s TSR2 on a sales pitch.

Some unsavoury things he may have been but communist probably wasn't among them.

FlightlessParrot 22nd Oct 2014 02:59


Some unsavoury things he may have been but communist probably wasn't among them.
Quite. One of the first things that happened of a big kind when Wilson was PM was that the merchant seamen went on strike for a pay rise. The claim was modest, and it was clear that British merchant seamen had poor conditions by European standards. Wilson regarded fighting the strike as a matter of national priority. If he was a Communist, he was a bloody devious one; easier to regard him as just devious.

TSR2 was obviously on its last legs, anyway; convenient for the Cons to leave it to the Labs to put it out of its misery. Communists certainly helped kill the British car industry by strikes, but British management was capable of wrecking British manufacturing industry all by itself.

Something that flies well is not necessarily a good weapon, or a good commercial prospect.

Blacksheep 22nd Oct 2014 07:14

Mountbatten was right. The Buccaneer was far superior to the TSR2 and the cancellation of the great white elephant allowed the RAF to finally get its hands on one of the best low level strike aircraft every built.

BEagle 22nd Oct 2014 08:08

Mountbottom was totally wrong about TSR2! He once I asked me what I flew and I told him that I was doing the Bucc course - but would have far preferred to be on a TSR2 course! He gave me a withering look and turned away - which at least meant that I didn't have to risk turning my back to him....:ooh:

Heathrow Harry 22nd Oct 2014 08:16

I've never seen a hint that the two desicions were linked

TSR2 looked fine and it promised a lot but in fact the development programme was in a real mess - the engines weren't right for a start - and there was no way anyone, even its supporters, could give any indication of what the final cost was likely to be or when it was going to be in service

Concorde was relatively trouble free AND we were sharing the cost with our French friends -

Heathrow Harry 22nd Oct 2014 08:19

"cancellation of the great white elephant allowed the RAF to finally get its hands on one of the best low level strike aircraft every built."

hmmm - those of us that were around at the time remember the RAF did everything it could NOT to adopt the Bucc. It was only when they were offered Buccaneers or nothing they very grudgingly adopted them

Allan Lupton 22nd Oct 2014 08:39

Quote
Should the question have been 'did Concorde kill the British aircraft industry'?

I think a better line of thought is that the massive and poorly controlled spend on Concorde was responsible for the nationalisation of the British aircraft industry.
We who were nothing to do with it were appalled at the ease with which expensive equipment (e.g. mainframe computers) could be acquired for the Concorde programme compared to our lack of government backing for Airbus which led to Hawker Siddeley's internally funded continuation as partner.

We were also not impressed that the Minister of Technology (not without pro-Concorde bias as MP for Bristol South East) was the former Lord Stansgate (Anthony Wedgwood-Benn in those days) who was rumoured to write the meeting minutes before holding the meetings, pressurising the participants into conforming with what he thought they should.

tornadoken 22nd Oct 2014 08:40

No.

When the new lot got in, 10/64, UK was trying to do: the SSBNs, their warhead, an interim RAF big bucket (to be WE177B), TSR.2 plus its ASM plus its smaller bucket (WE177A), P.1154(RAF), HS681 V/STOL lifter, RR was starting RB178 (to become RB211), and we handled 50% of Concorde. Overload. Oh, and the outgoing Chancellor told his successor: “Sorry to leave such a mess, old cock”. Broke, again. So the new lot did a zero-base scrutiny of everything.

Concorde would have gone first, but Cabinet was told that France had the right to press on and charge us 50% of whatever they might choose to spend, mostly in France. One by one all the others were tested against time, Spec: US provided a menu of kit we could take on credit, so, sensibly, we took much of it. Wilson, an odd commie who confirmed SSBN and WE177B, offered BAC £500Mn. for 50 TSR.2. They said no thanks, but we will take no profit on the uncapped overrun of that number. So, we added 50 fixed price F-111K to McNamara's planned 3,000. What would you have done?

cockney steve 22nd Oct 2014 09:01

Not being a Military type, I can see, from a commercial aspect, it makes damned good sense to have commonality with your Allies.......the crunch comes,of course,when some party falls out with the rest and is lumbered with a load of kit that they may-or may not be able to support themselves.....OTOH, they have intimate knowledge of their former allies' kit and capabilities Having seen how the forces continue to horse-trade, squabble, empire-build and prevaricate among themselves, it's not surprising that policy and procurement are the shamble they are and have been for many a year.
Development of 21st. CenturyMilitary kit is far beyond sensible financial and time constraints for any small country.
The rising cost of fuel made Concorde into a Vanity project.
Yes, we can be proud of what was achieved,technically, As a passenger-carrying commercial aircraft,it was a total economic disaster.
So, looking back, Blue streak, TSR2 and other cancellations were probably a good thing.........but I'm still mystified, why we jobbed -off our Harrier fleet to countries who continue to successfully use them for their intended purpose.

WHBM 22nd Oct 2014 11:06


Originally Posted by Shaggy Sheep Driver (Post 8707705)
The US aircraft industry killed the British aircraft industry by producing aeroplanes down to a price instead of up to a standard, and matched to a researched market instead of to a technical ideal or the requirements of just one unique customer.

The US industry was also pretty good at things which the UK industry left behind. Worldwide product support was one where they understood that what the customer wanted didn't end at the handover. This can be still seen today where newer manufacturers like Sukhoi just cannot get to the level of parts and knowledge availability that the US understands. Embraer is one of the few new names to break through this, in no small part down to experienced US personnel being involved.

UK designs of the era seem to be conceptually advanced, too small for the job (both airframe and engine), good airframe design, but poorer systems, especially electrics, and double especially if they were from Smiths.

Shaggy Sheep Driver 22nd Oct 2014 11:50


The rising cost of fuel made Concorde into a Vanity project.
You have to bear in mind that up until quite late in the Concorde project most of the world's leading airlines had options on a Concorde fleet. The industry truly believed that the future of passenger air transport would be supersonic, which is why Boeing themselves were skeptical that they could sell the 747 as an airliner (it had been designed as a freighter for the US military, but lost that contract to the Galaxy).

If you wanted a supersonic airliner, Concorde was the only game in town. The TU144 had a hopelessly short range and the US SST had got no further than a wooden mock-up. Unfortunately the prospect of hundreds of Concordes on the world's airline routes brought about the banning of supersonic flight over land around 1970 (so very late in the Concorde program), because of the sonic boom.

About the same time, the cost of oil (and therefore fuel) rocketed. But perhaps the most significant factor by far in sealing Concorde's financial doom was actually Boeing selling the 747 as an airliner; it brought about a fundamental change in the airline industry.

Wide bodied airliners enabled airlines to reduce the seat / mile cost, and therefore target a customer base who previously were not considered wealthy enough to pursue. The focus of the industry changed from luxury and speed, to economy. And economy has been the industry driver ever since.

That killed Concorde's chances of financial success, either in its original form or as the enhanced 'Model B' (which was of course never built). It found a niche market on the North Atlantic where the 14 production aeroplanes served that small but profitable market (for privatised BA at least - not for pre-privatisation BA and maybe Air France) for 27 glorious years.

Of course, with only 14 commercial airframes produced most of the development and some of the production costs were met by the British and French taxpayers. And I'm pretty sure my dad didn't disapprove of his tax pounds being spent on that beautiful white bird!

Financial disaster, sure. But so was the US Apollo space program. But both stem from a time when we did magnificent things just because we could - before the accountants started running everything.

Mr Oleo Strut 22nd Oct 2014 13:24

So, Did Concorde kill TSR2...contintinued
 
Many years ago I remember going to an airshow at Cranfield, or was it Cosford, and seeing in the back of a hanger a beautiful white aircraft covered in dust - TSR2. I also remember as a boy being taken up to the airport at Nairobi to see the Britannia and Comet out on proving trials. Much later, long after Handley Page had crashed, when I worked at Heathrow I well remember the intense feeling of pride at seeing Concorde, and when it passed over Reading my old Dad would stand up in his garden and salute. Sad fact is, though they were all brilliant aircraft, they were not commercially successful. Why? Could the fault lie with the very poor record of us British in terms of development, sales and production. True, we were brilliant innovators but after that, not so good. Think about Penecillin, nuclear power and all the other things we have given the world only to have to buy them back. To think that we rely upon our French neighbours to run our electricity network whilst we jeer,rant and criticise them and other Europeans is beyond me. So, did Concorde polish off the TSR2? Probably not, perhaps we just weren't rich, powerful or organised enough to take on all those challenges at the time.

Molemot 22nd Oct 2014 13:44

All thise with an interest in the TSR 2 and it's cancellation ought to read this...

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/document...-Hindsight.pdf

It's 200 pages and as authoritative as one could wish.

Mr Oleo Strut 22nd Oct 2014 18:09

Deep in it, Molemot...
 
...and many thanks for suggesting a read of the RAF Historical Society report. I'm only one third of the way thru, but what a story of incompetence and chicanery at the highest levels. Its surprising any aircraft were made at all. Can't wait to get back to the big read.

A30yoyo 22nd Oct 2014 20:05

I reckon BAC/Sepecat Jaguar was the production version of TSR.2

Peter-RB 23rd Oct 2014 05:57

I do think that all these posts must also add a mix of "US dollars in pockets" ala the F104G debacle, cash in bent politico's pockets straightens out most wrinkles!..:suspect:

P R-B

Mr Oleo Strut 23rd Oct 2014 15:52

Not only dollars...
 
Peter-RB. I've read claims that the huge BAC/Saudi Arabia Lightning deal some years ago was liberally sprinkled with the stardust of loose cash, and that fingers were pointed at a number of highly-placed British government representatives. Grease and palms have a magnetic attraction, I suppose, no matter what the rules say.

Shaggy Sheep Driver 23rd Oct 2014 16:10

In certain parts of the world, deals don't get done unless palms are greased. They call them 'commissions', not bribes, of course. It's no good being sniffy about it - no grease, no contract.

Usually, responsible western companies cannot participate in such arrangements, but they do need to do business in those countries. Which is why they usually work through a 'local agent' who takes care of all that sort of stuff.

Thud105 23rd Oct 2014 18:32

I don't think the TSR2 would've worked very well at high speed and low-level. The cockpit is a long way from the center of pressure - it would've been a very bouncy ride, like riding along on a springboard mounted on the front of a car driving over rough terrain.

Shaggy Sheep Driver 23rd Oct 2014 20:41

Tiny wing as well. Doesn't make for agile maneuverability (ask any F104 pilot).

BEagle 23rd Oct 2014 21:05

On the contrary. The TSR2 had an excellent ride at low level - and there was no need for such a low level high speed strike bomber to have much in the way of 'dogfighting' manoeuvrability.

Shaggy Sheep Driver 23rd Oct 2014 21:32


On the contrary. The TSR2 had an excellent ride at low level - and there was no need for such a low level high speed strike bomber to have much in the way of 'dogfighting' manoeuvrability.
What do you mean 'on the contrary'? A high wing loading (tiny wings) WILL give a smooth ride. That, and good straight-line speed, is their advantage. But there's a big downside, which is why few aeroplanes have ever had such dimensionaly challenged wings.

Just don't try turning much at that speed! Or rapid climb / descents either, as in following terrain at low level. You need more wing to do that, at the expense of rough air comfort and straight line efficiency.

Thud105 24th Oct 2014 14:52

The TSR2 is very similar in configuration to the A-5 Vigilante. The Vigilante was not a success at low-level. I don't believe the TSR2 would've been either.

WH904 24th Oct 2014 21:54

Just been reading 'TSR2 - bombing the myth'

Might I suggest the "Aeroplane Icons" TSR2 special or my book on TSR2 (published by Ian Allan/Classic). In both publications you can read the real story of TSR2, rather than the nonsensical tales that have been peddled for fifty years.

There was absolutely no link between TSR2 and Concorde. The US never made any hints about favouring Concorde if TSR2 was cancelled. In fact, McNamara was in favour of TSR2 being built, because it supported US foreign policy at that time.

TSR2 was cancelled because it was costing a fortune and the UK defence budget was struggling, because so much money had been diverted to the nuclear deterrent. It was this factor that drove the infamous 1957 Defence White Paper, rather than the much-quoted "obsession with missiles" that Sandys supposedly suffered from. The basic fact was that Britain couldn't afford the defence procurement programme as it stood, and TSR2 was hugely over-budget and still getting more expensive to the tune of millions, every week.

Healey tried to find an alternative that suited the RAF (he asked the RAF what they wanted). The RAF asked for TFX (F-111) and Healey managed to secure a favourable deal with the US. The trump card was the knowledge that TFX could be paid-for on credit, and spread over successive budgets.

The "Supersonic Harrier" was cancelled simply because the Navy lost interest in it. Mountbatten fell in love with the Phantom because it required large aircraft carriers, and would therefore ensure that Mountbatten got his romantic global carrier force that he was fighting for. The fact that the Supersonic Harrier would probably have never worked in any case (thanks to its plenum chamber burning system that would have destroyed the carrier decks) was simply an additional factor. Even so, Healey fought to keep the subsonic Harrier alive after this project was terminated.

Ultimately it was the RAF that abandoned TSR2. CAS decided to dump it weeks before the Government met to debate it and abandon it. F-111 was a much better proposition on cost grounds, and promised to be just as good as TSR2. The fact that the role for which TSR2 (and F-111) was being bought for disappeared (when Britain withdrew from East of Suez) simply proved that both aircraft would have been pointless in any case. There is no evidence to indicate whether TSR2 would have been a huge success or a dismal failure. All that is known is that it handled well in terms of flying qualities. Everything else is a matter of debate. Many of the aircraft's systems were still under development, some were distinctly crude, and there's every reason to imagine that some would have failed to deliver.

The story of TSR2 jigs being destroyed to prevent possible further development is an old one, and it's rubbish. This never happened. The jigs (and everything else) were simply destroyed as a matter of standard practise after the programme ended. The Government had no interest in destroying every trace of TSR2. In fact, they agreed to allow the two airworthy examples to continue flying, but only at BAC's expense. It was BAC that refused to continue development at a fixed price and it was BAC that refused to pay to continue flying the two aircraft on research duties.

There are countless stories about TSR2 that have been regurgitated in books and magazines for fifty years. Sadly, they are almost all based on the nonsense that was written shortly after TSR2's cancellation, in an infamous book written by Stephen Hastings. In that book, Hastings peddled a lot of ill-informed assertions that supported his political agenda, and most of this material was used as the basis of every subsequent TSR2 story. Sadly, a lot of the "facts" were simply not true.

Hope this helps to clear up a few points :)


Incidentally, it's not The TSR2, it's TSR2. It was the project name (in much the same way that Tornado was MRCA). The actual aeroplane was the Vickers-Supermarine Type 571 :)

TSR-2 25th Oct 2014 21:33

Beagle, thanks for that. I would be really interested in your opinion as an operator as to how TSR-2 would have compared with the Bucc, the Tornado and the F-111, particularly from the airframe standpoint.



Mountbottom was totally wrong about TSR2! He once I asked me what I flew and I told him that I was doing the Bucc course - but would have far preferred to be on a TSR2 course! He gave me a withering look and turned away - which at least meant that I didn't have to risk turning my back to him....


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