Greater production and use of the Mosquito is a good point. We should remember, though, that Messrs de Havilland’s original intention was to use “not war essential” cabinet making capacity and “not war essential” wood to make a useful contribution to the war effort. From the skilled workforce available, there was a limit to production capacity. Additionally, much of the wood needed started life across the Atlantic. This had to be transported by sea as sheets or finished sub assemblies, thus competing with other essential material in limited convoy capacity.

Perhaps more useful would have been the abandonment of Stirling and Wellington production much sooner and turning the capacity over to Lancasters.

Butch Harris
 

Further to the question as to whether bombing oil installations was safer by night or day, we attacked them four times at night during March '45 and twice in April. One attack was made in daylight on Farge on 27th March.

It's certain that the Red Army advance would have been slower if the Bomber Command offensive had been reduced, additional 88s for the Eastern Front is a primary reason. But did the Red Army require assistance from Bomber Command to defeat the Wehrmacht? Probably not, very little in the way of meaningful assistance available in December 1941 outside Moscow. Would the Red army have reached Berlin in 1945 without the efforts of Bomber Command? Absolutely not, but perhaps by 1947?

The "what-if" scenario of Bomber Command crushing Germany in mid/late 1943 can only occur if Speer's view is accepted, and this would mean 6 (or more) successive 1000 bomber raids during the short window when Window was effective, which could only occur if sufficient resource was available, and no-one other than Harris would have approved sufficient resource in -say - early 1943 to achieve this.

If the 6+ raids are as effective as Hamburg then there is little in the way of industry to relocate and very little to relocate it with. I can't envisage Italy standing alone against the Allies if Germany collapses.

If Mossie output is to be increased without reducing convoy resource then build them in Canada and fly them over, recognising that there will be losses on transit.

All written with the wonders of hindsight..

Hugh Spencer. I've read your profile. My respects Sir; the real story from someone who did it.

Mike7777777. Nearly 1100 Mosquitoes were built in Canada and, as I understand it, that was to industrial capacity. There were significant ferry losses and pre delivery test flying hours were extended in an attempt to reduce it.

Now, had there been a "metal" mosquito?

I think it's irrelevant - if the RAF only had Mosquitoes the Nazis would have concentrated only on high speed night fighters. The mixed forces flying in day and night must have been an utter pain in the backside for defence planners.

regarding that point. If the RAF only had Mossies (and therefore no way to deliver anything bigger than a cookie, remember). Wouldn't the Germans have needed the 2 seat Me 262 Nachtjager to intercept them at height? Or have I oversimplified that?

I have also seen it argued elsewhere (sorry if this has been mentioned already, the thought has just popped into my head with mention of the Mossie) that deletion of the defensive guns would have made such as the Lancaster fast enough to avoid interception. Doesn't the 310mph max speed of the Lancastrian destroy that argument?

Butch Harris
 

Thanks, Herod.

Ah, but the Germans adapted 'planes to become night fighters and if there were only high speed bombers operating at night - they would only have had to concentrate on high speed night fighters and radars. The He 219 wasn't bad and not the only 'plane the Germans had available or in development.

Yes, I see what you are saying regarding other high speed types, but would any of the piston fighters available for conversion/development have had sufficient speed in the climb to get to the Mossies in time? Wasn't this a perpetual thorn in the Luftwaffes side throughout the Mosquito's wartime career?

I don't doubt that they had aircraft equal to or even slightly ahead of the Mossies performance by 1944. But was the margin enough to effect an interception of a high flying high speed threat?

I suppose much would depend on warning times.

I didnt mean to replace all heavy bombers with mossies LOL,but they were very difficult to intercept,the germans seemed to be having trouble developing any useful a/c,their whole procurement procedure seems quite chaotic and riddled with politics (even more than ours !!),luckily for us they spent the entire war fiddling with a/c to try and make them suitable for some impossible specifications,imo they would never have been able to get enough high speed night fighters into service for that reason.
Istr that the mossie had a very high cruising speed,and I absolutely agree that the 'round the clock' bombing must have been a real pain and drain on the hun resources.

The main criticism of Harris was his unswerving belief in city bombing to win the war. Once the allied armies were safely established in France he received a new directive in September 1944 making the petroleum industry his "first priority".

However Harris continued to devote the majority of his effort to city bombing so for the last 3 months of 1944 only 14% of attacks were on oil targets whilst cities received some 53%.

Not surprisingly this led to deterioration in his relations with higher command with Harris writing to the Chief of Air Staff to "..consider whether it was best....that I should remain.."

In the end the CAS declined to accept his resignation offer. The official historian commenting that "no other course at this stage of the war was open.....which would not have been a remedy worse than the disease."

This book about the lancaster, by Leo Mckinstry (excellent read btw) contains a lot of background about Harris's views and his battles with the hierarchy over the direction of the offensive.





Lancaster: The Second World War's Greatest Bomber: Amazon.co.uk: Leo McKinstry: Books

I'm reading that book now having recieved it for christmas. Not very far in yet but I'm very impressed and still enthralled so far. His earlier Spitfire book covered lots of fascinating stuff that didn't appear in other histories of the Spit I've read, so I'm hoping for similar again

Mr. Spencer,

I salute you Sir.

Butch Harris
 

Thanks, Lightning Mate

This book: Lancaster: The Second World War's Greatest Bomber: Amazon.co.uk: Leo McKinstry: Books Recounts Harris' continued efforts to see the end of Stirling and Halifax production and retool for Lancasters. But, it seems, HP and Shorts insisted on being allowed to continue to manufacture their own designs.
Harris was quite scathing with regard to even the Halifax as he felt that his needs would be better served with a whole Lancaster force. Even in wartime he seems to have come up against vested, comercial interests.

Yes Jim...I am afraid nothing much ever changes !!
I fact the Lancaster was almost put out of production in its early days by lobbying from the other manufacturers,Chadwick did some super quick mods (istr mostly weight reduction by removing non essential gear).
I have read a little of the internal politics vis a vis german aircraft procurement/production...it was even worse than ours (lucky for us)

rgds LR

I wouldn't know about that LR.

Incidentally, this book: From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde: The Authorised Biography of Aviation Pioneer Sir George Edwards OM: Amazon.co.uk: Robert Gardner: Books describes a 'Metal Mosquito', designed and flown by Vickers. Sir George Edwards stated that as long as the wooden Mosquito was in production the metal version would get nowhere, it didn't.

The essential charcteristic of the Mossie was not so much its woodeness, more the fact that it was fast, unarmed and high flying. Turrets, the bizarre, expensive and finally useless notion, (conceived, perhaps by someone who saw aircraft as airborne battleships) undoubtedly cost many more lives, in British night bombers, than it saved.

Ernst Heinkel's Autobiography is a very illuminating read !!