Mutiny at RAF Manston?

[ColinB]

During some research there has appeared a persistent legend or urban myth that there was a mutiny at RAF Manston in August 1940. It is reported that there were isolated occasions of ground crew LMF where they refused to leave their slit trenches to rearm and service aircraft during some raids.
Does anyone have any further information?

[stackedup]

There is a mention of it in Len Deighton's book "Fighter" on page 188 . They must have been very scared as there were not enough men above ground to hold a pay parade ! ( It wasn't slit trenches but air raid shelters. )

[Brewster Buffalo]

Reportly took place on the 9th August. Manston was the nearest Fighter Command to the Luftwaffe and was attacked again and again. On this day Me 110s strafed and Do17 bombed dropping some 150 high explosive and fragmentation bombs sending a mushroom cloud of debris thousands of feet high and lead to some ground crew to refuse to come out of their shelters.

No idea if this lead to any disciplinary action..

[alisoncc]

Don't know what's special about a mutiny. We used to get read the riot act on a regular basis at Finningley.

[ColinB]

Manston Mutiny occurred in August 1940 during the Battle of Britain. Manston was one of RAF Fighter Command's forward airfields in Kent and was subjected to persistent attack by the Luftwaffe. At the height of the bombing, some 100 new ground staff had arrived, but there was no opportunity to get them settled. Consequently, they and others sought shelter in the labyrinth of caves under the airfield and refused to come out. Officers, too, succumbed to the strain of the ceaseless raids on Manston.
"By now, after four all-out raids, few building;, were even tenable. With all water cut off, men shaved at the pre-war swimming pool - if they shaved at all. Many were close to breaking point; in the nick of time Squadron Leader James Leathart, 54 Squadron, stopped an overwrought technical officer firing blind down the shelters to flush the scrimshankers out. Mansion's chaplain, the Reverend Cecil King, acted as promptly. Near-berserk, another officer had burst wild-eyed into the mess. a revolver trembling in his hand, threatening to finish off himself and every man present. Gently, King led him from the room, talking of God’s infinite mercy, until the man broke down and surrendered his gun”
The Stress of Battle: Quantifying Human Performance in Combat by David Rowland, Great Britain: Ministry of Defence. Page 188

It appears that the internal quotation was from page 144 of Eagle Day by Richard Collier

[StbdD]

I wouldn't go as far as to call it mutiny. Mutiny involves direct rebellion against authority. These lads, and lads they were, merely panicked.

I find it hard to believe it spread to large numbers

Human dynamics suggest that lacking a stronger force of compulsion in a confusing, high adrenaline situation most people will follow the example of anyone who seems to be taking action, whether that action be 'proper' or not. Those lads were probably well trained in maintaining, arming and fueling aircraft. They were not well trained in being bombed by tactical aircraft and the discipline required to do it under fire. Heading for shelter may have been the most reasonable of the options they perceived. Nor apparently were they led very well. Being bombed tacticly takes on a very personal air and requires some training, experience and leadership to overcome. Novice jack tars did no better against the broadside and grape unless trained and led properly.

Air forces as a rule are not trained in that manner IMO.

As I think of it, flip the psychology around by provide proper leadership and you may have the basis for most successful bayonet charges. Adrenaline channeled by training and a leader taking positive action....

[ian16th]

To refer to whatever happened at Manston as 'Mutiny', maybe stretching the use of the word. I dunno, I wasn't there. The people involved were obviously under the sort of pressure and in the sort of danger I thankfully never was.

The one ‘real’ mutiny in the RAF that I have heard of is this: Mutiny in the RAF - Chapter 1

I am totally unaware of the accuracy. The title of the site guarantees that the report has a left wing bias.

In fact I would like to read any other reports of the incident, without the political bias.

[papajuliet]

The book "Eastward, a History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East 1945-1972" gives an insight into what happened there in 1946. It seems that the word "mutiny" was, for diplomatic reasons, avoided but there was certainly widespread disaffection within the RAF with demonstrations at Mauripur,Negombo,Koggala,Colombo and Ratmalana. Later there were stoppages of work at Palam,DumDum,Poona,Cawnpore and Vizagapatan. Most were of short duration, orderly and respectful but,nevertheless, determined.To make matters worse the Royal Indian Air Force became infected.The disaffection then spread to Singapore.
The most vocal agitators were those who had been sent to the Far East after VJ day.
A certain LAC Cymbalist was court martialled - his prison sentence was later reduced to a nominal period.
Airmen on 194sqd. in Burma, stopped work on 29 Jan 1946. The sqd. was disbanded earlier than planned as a result.
There was a high level enquiry into the situation and, gradually, as the year went on,everything returned to normal.
It must have been a very disturbing time for all concerned.

[ColinB]

More About Manston

In the Battle of Britain, many squadrons used Manston as a forward air base. Though under the control of Fighter Command, the only regular squadron based at Manston was No 600, which flew Blenheims. These aeroplanes had suffered greatly at the hands of the Me-109 – the Luftwaffe’s mainstay fighter at this time – and had been shifted to night time patrols.

The Luftwaffe first attacked Manston on August 12th. Much damage was done to the hangers and to the runways. Spitfires from No 65 Squadron were actually taking off when the bombs first started to hit. However, they found the space on the ground to land once the fighting was over before flying off to their home base at Hornchurch. There were over 100 bomb craters in the runways but they were only out of action for 24 hours before they were deemed useable again.

A second raid on August 15th also left the base badly damaged. Further raids on August 20th, 22nd and 24th nearly destroyed the base. By the end of the raid on the 24th, Manston had no means of communicating with anyone else and the runways were littered with unexploded bombs. It was decided by No 11 Group Fighter Command, that the damage at Manston was so great that the base had to be downgraded to ELG – an emergency landing ground only.

The above is from the History Learning Site

My recollection of part of the Battle of Britain was that German bombers used the Thames estuary as a navigation point and when they got “bounced” they dropped their bombs on the closest target of opportunity, often Manston, to lighten their load and become more manoeuvrable before they returned to their bases on the continent.
The previous input concerning untrained recruits being posted in from Blackpool may not be relevant as it is doubtful if they would have been involved in the servicing of front-line aircraft. Surely specialist tradesmen from the parent bases would have provided the maintenance, re-fuelling and re-arming skills on the Spitfires as this was a Blenheim base.
I do not think that anyone could not have been terrified by the incessant bombing of an easy target in open ground.
Does anyone know if there are caves actually on the airfield?

[PPRuNe Pop]

When Len Deighton made the comment in his book FIGHTER a furious Sdn Ldr Cardew said that he would sue Deighton unless he produced chapter an verse about the incident. He didn't get a reply. But then Deighton did show a propensity for a little romancing! No doubt there were frightened men in the shelters, and wouldn't you be if you being strafed by Me109s and bombing at low level, Dornier 17s and Ju88 the same - and some of it went on for hours - best place was the shelters.

I personally spoke to Bee Beamont in 2003 about this, knowing that he commanded 609 Sdn. His reply was that it was 'utter tosh.' No incident of that nature ever appeared in the official archives of the time. Nuff said.

[Double Zero]

Pprune Pop,


Me109's ?!

Still I would probably not be too much of a pedant if the pointy end of the thing was coming in my direction with cannon & guns blazing...

Your comments about L.Deighton etc sound spot-on to me, there would certainly be a lot of frightened people, ( and I'd probably be one of them ) but an actual mass mutiny sounds a bit of a stretch.

I thought Stbd's comments about leadership and bayonet charges very true and well observed though.

[ColinB]

Len Deighton Replies

The following message was recently posted on your site concerning the topic of RAF Manston.

When Len Deighton made the comment in his book FIGHTER a furious Sdn Ldr Cardew said that he would sue Deighton unless he produced chapter an verse about the incident. He didn't get a reply. But then Deighton did show a propensity for a little romancing! No doubt there were frightened men in the shelters, and wouldn't you be if you being strafed by Me109s and bombing at low level, Dornier 17s and Ju88 the same - and some of it went on for hours - best place was the shelters.
I personally spoke to Bee Beamont in 2003 about this, knowing that he commanded 609 Sdn. His reply was that it was 'utter tosh.' No incident of that nature ever appeared in the official archives of the time. Nuff said.

I forwarded the message to Len Deighton for his comments.
His reply is listed below, I am sure that in the interests of balance and fairness that you will wish his reply to be recorded.

Dear Colin,
After 'Fighter' was published I did get about half a dozen letters
confirming the incident in one way or another.
It wasn't anything like a mutiny. It was simply RAF men refusing to come
out of the air raid shelter when ordered to do so. Apparently the men
were young recruits who had just arrived from square bashing training in
the North of England where they had never suffered air raids. Manston
was of course at the very 'front line' of the German attacks.
I believe some of the civilians employed at Manston did the same.
I have never heard of Squadron Ldr Cardew .
With every good wish
Yours truly

Len Deighton

[Brewster Buffalo]

..knowing that he commanded 609 Sdn....

My reference book has 609 Sqn at Northolt/Middle Wallop & Warmwell but not at Manston during the BoB.

[PPRuNe Pop]

BB, I didn't say that 609 were at Manston. I merely said that 'Bee' Beamont commanded 609 and he was at Manston - in any case many aquadrons were temps at Manston at the height of the battle and some go unrecorded.

As far as the 'mutiny' was concerned it is clear that as Len Deighton says, the guys would not come out of the shelters.

The reference to Sdn/Ldr Cardew was taken from the write up in the Squadron history on Google. Often not case perfect I have to admit.

[ColinB]

I originally started this thread as a question Mutiny at RAF Manston? The original source was an academic book The Stress of Battle printed by the Stationary Office and sourced from DSTL and the MOD. Pretty impeccable credentials.
I did not at any point refer Len Deighton or quote Fighter.
I did receive from this website and other sources many interesting leads one of which was a brief quote from Al Deere's book Nine Lives which stated that James Leathart had mentioned the incident to him in conversation.
I believe that the main source of information, which has been quoted by others, on the affairs at Manston in BoB is Eagle Day by Richard Collier, who employed thirteen researchers to prepare the book. It was printed in 1954 and they had the opportunity to interview participants. I have left in the preceding and succeeding paragraphs to the part on Manston because I think it establishes credibility. I think it can be seen that the source is people who were actually present and it does not have a message or an agenda.
I do not believe that this version could be improved upon and it has the ring of veracity.
It seems probable that there were mutinous acts perpetrated but in 1940 with imminent threat of invasion I am sure no one wished to pursue the matter. The traumatic plight of the people actually in the shelters must have marked them emotionally for life.

To C.B.C.'s Ed Murrow, their calm unflinching demeanour was what impressed him most: the question he and other U.S. newsmen had asked themselves— could the British people take it?—seemed answered now. Only two days back, in a Sussex village street, he had marvelled; a police loudspeaker had suddenly announced, "Clear the streets for His Majesty the King. Hold that horse's head," and King George VI’s big maroon car purred sedately past. Though the country was on the brink of invasion, Murrow noted the King's sole escort was a lone patrolman on a motor cycle.
Today, outside Kenley airfield, Murrow marvelled again: a company of uniformed WA A.F.S had marched with drill-ground precision through the airfield's main gates, ranks steady, every girl smiling. Eight men had died and eight—among them a W.A.A.F.—had been wounded in that lunch-time raid, but the clerks, cooks and waitresses were going on duty just the same.
Not all were heroes. At Manston, on the Kent coast, the morale of many was at lowest ebb, their officers' example notwithstand¬ing; for six days many airmen had not ventured forth from the deep chalk shelters. To the pilots of 266 Spitfire Squadron, operational flights from Charlie Three spelt frustration from start to finish— the first devastating Eastchurch raid had cost them their Mae Wests and parachutes, and at Manston no storeman came on duty to replace them.
Only today Flight Lieutenant Dennis Armitage had spent a dusty half-hour groping through the labyrinth of caves, vainly seeking a station electrician he'd entrusted to complete a job. Finally, blinking in the strong sun-light, he emerged to check on the squadron's Spitfires—and cursed forcefully. Though no Ger¬man aircraft had been sighted in two hours, the man hadn't even started. Patiently, holding himself in check, Armitage bent to the task himself.
Across the airfield's 500 acres, every officer could tell the same story. At 600 Squadron's dispersal, Pilot Officer Henry Jacobs just had to chuckle: though it was Sunday, the station accountant officer had wandered disconsolately by yet again, weighed down

by two bags of chinking silver, vainly seeking enough airmen above ground to organise a pay parade.
By now, after four all-out raids, few buildings were even tenable. With all water cut off, men shaved at the pre-war swim¬ming pool—if they shaved at all. Many were close to breaking-point; in the nick of time Squadron Leader James Leathart, 54 Squadron, stopped an overwrought technical officer firing blind down the shelters to flush the scrimshankers out. Mansion's chaplain, the Reverend Cecil King, acted as promptly. Near-berserk, another officer had burst wild-eyed into the mess, a revolver trembling in his hand, threatening to finish off himself and every man present. Gently, King led him from the room, talking of God's infinite mercy, until the man broke down and surrendered his gun.
In Manston's smoke-filled horror and confusion, the thirty-four-year-old chaplain was an inspiration to all who saw him. Armed for safety's sake with his uncle's Webley revolver—which he later found would have blown up after one round—King had helped to organise every detail of the shattered station's routine. Often, he'd noticed the Germans zoomed in from Cap Gris Nez at meal¬times, when many airmen were queuing outside their dining halls; his suggestion that all mealtimes were put back an hour kept casualties low. Even burial services needed careful planning; for German airmen he had thoughtfully procured a German flag, captured at Narvik, to drape the coffins. And few would forget King's dispersal-hut services, his text from Psalm 63 hand-picked for pilots: "In the shadow of Thy wings will I rejoice."
But King and all of them divined the bleak truth; for Mansion, now, the end was very near. Pilot Officer Henry Jacobs still recalls bitterly, "Manston was literally taken from us piece by piece"; it had needed more than the brave primitive armament of 600 Squadron to stop the Luftwaffe.
At 3.30 p.m. on August 18, Mansion was again, without warn¬ing, under fire. The Spitfires of 266 Squadron were still on the ground, being serviced by the flight crews, when sixteen ME 109s burst from the sun, machine-guns hammering. Planes took fire with a white incandescent flame, and everywhere men fell wounded.
There was no time for anything but evasive action. Spitfire
pilot Dick Trousdale, a canny New Zealander, too weighed down by flying kit to run for it, presented his rear-end to the raiders like a Moslem at prayer; obligingly, his low-slung parachute stopped three bullets. Sergeant Don Kingaby, hitting the deck, saw the earth spout ahead of him and marked the line of fire; rolling rhythmically back and forth for five minutes, gauging the spouts, he escaped with a nicked thumb.
Others sought shelter as and where they could. Pilot Officer Henry Jacobs, at the base of an apple tree while Squadron Leader Graham Deverley tossed down fruit to him, dived with¬out hesitation for a bed of stinging-nettles; when Deverley fell clean on top of him he judged himself amply screened. Flying Officer David Clackson and six others lay prone beneath the mess billiard table—while raking shots sheared the baize from the slate as cleanly as a knife might have done.
Crawling from beneath the table they stared, unbelieving: it was as if the Germans had meant to do that. They felt a sudden unutterable sense of helplessness.

The full text of Eagle Day can be downloaded as a pdf from this link

http://ia331336.us.archive.org/1/ite...y001398mbp.pdf

[PPRuNe Pop]

CB, can't get that link to work. However, that is indeed a very lucid account of what must have been a very hairy day. I have read it, and other references to it before - all very descriptive and no matter which way you look at it you have to face the fact that when the pressure is on many things are understandable.

The 'mutiny' factor was as described, utter tosh, but simply an instance that must have re-enacted many times during the course of the war, in many theatres of war, in all three services. Almost inevitable really.

I left the link open and it finally loaded.

Thanks for your input.

PPP

[ColinB]

One question which must be asked is why did they keep on using such a vulnerable airfield like Manston? One reply came from Jeffrey Quill in Scramble, Norman Gelb's oral history of BoB

Flying Officer Jeffrey Quill
I didn't want to stay at being a Spitfire test pilot when the war began hotting up. I went to see Air Vice Marshal Keith Park and persuaded him to post me to 65 Squadron. The squadron commander was killed the day I arrived. We were based at Rochford, but went every day to Manston, right down on the south-eastern tip of England, so close to the Germans across the Channel that we never spent the night at Manston. It would have been easy for them to pull a surprise raid on us. We'd fly to Rochford. But we operated out of Manston and sometimes got beaten up there, often on take-off.
When the bloody great bombing raids started forming up over northern France, with their fighter escorts taking off from different fields to join them, our Controllers would know what was happen¬ing. The radar would pick them up. We'd sit at dispersal at Manston and the telephone would ring. The Controller - they were usually very chatty - would say, 'There's something big brewing up over Abbeville, so be ready.1 sometimes they'd tell us to get into our cockpits. We'd get all strapped in and be ready to take off. Taking off from Manston, we were too close to the incoming raids to go climbing out to sea for a direct interception. We'd never have been able to get enough height. So we'd take off and climb inland before we could get into position to turn back and attack from above. We got fed up with this. We used to ask, 'Why the bloody hell do we have to start from here?' They'd say, 'You've got to be at Manston because if we start pulling the fighters out of southeast England, local people might think we're evacuating the area.' Public morale was a big factor in keeping us there. In fact, when we went in to land at Manston around 5.30 in the morning, we were instructed to fly low over the nearby towns and give them a jolly good buzz. I don't know what people thought about being awakened by the noise at that time of day, but at least they knew we were there. If it had suddenly
ceased, with all the invasion scare going on, it would have been bad.
There was another reason why we stayed at Manston. The air force said, 'This is our airfield. We're bloody well not going to be moved from it by the ruddy Germans.' People weren't going to be pushed around. But for us, tactically, it would have been better to be based further back. This was especially true when it came to the squadron forming up after take-off, which was quite a business. It involved a lot of chatter on the R/T. Somebody might get left behind. And the squadron leader got a bit tetchy because people weren't forming up more quickly, so we thought it was much better to form up in squadron formation on the ground. When the squadron commander said go, we all went. We took off in formation and got back into combat position once we were in the air. It was quicker and neater -when we had the time - but it was more unwieldy, particularly when you were on the ground.
That's how we got comprehensively dive bombed while we were still stationary one day. We were waiting there, all engines running, everybody watching the squadron commander, waiting for the whole thing to start rolling. The next thing we knew we were being bombed by 110s. We all, of course, opened up and took off and to hell with the formation! We were very lucky to survive. Everybody got up except one. He was a New Zealander called Wigg. He was a bit slow getting started. Perhaps his engine was slightly on the choke situation. A bomb dropped right behind him and the blast from the bomb, coming from behind, blew his propeller around backwards and stopped his engine. He nipped out of the cockpit and had to run like hell to get clear. Bloody bombs were dropping all over. It was funny because he was usually a deliberate, slow-moving sort of chap who'd never hurry for anything.

Another question is were the occurrences at Manston a one off or were they widespread? The following quote from the same source is interesting.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, Chief of the Air Staff and Secretary to the War Cabinet 29 August 1940
I was much concerned on visiting Manston Aerodrome yesterday to find that although more than four clear days have passed since it was last raided the greater part of the craters on the landing ground remained unfilled and the aerodrome was barely serviceable. When you remember what the Germans did at the Stavanger aerodrome and the enormous rapidity with which craters were filled I must protest emphatically against this feeble method of repairing damage. Altogether there were one hundred and fifty people available to work, including those that could be provided from the Air Force personnel. These were doing their best. No effective appliances were available, and the whole process appeared disproportionate to the value of maintaining this fighting vantage ground.
All craters should be filled within twenty-four hours at most, and every case where a crater is unfilled for a longer period should be reported to higher authorities ... After the craters had been refilled
camouflage effort might be made to pretend they had not been, but this is a refinement.
Air Commodore Gerald Gibbs, Senior Staff Officer, 11 Group
We had trouble with the civilian labour employed to repair runways and so keep our vital airfields in action at this critical time. Every time there was an 'alert' at some of these airfields, the labour would go into the shelter and refuse to carry on. Victor Beamish, that fine character, killed a little later... tried everything with them - bland¬ishments, exhortation, rewards, insults, all to no avail. They said this was a free country and they weren't going to work. Victor pointed out that it wouldn't be a free country much longer if we didn't get the airfield going, but no good. We put parties of our airmen on the job.