Falklands Crash Sites
I do remember the MoD releasing TV tracker footage from one or more of the ships in Falkland sound of events that took place on 21st May 1982. Some of the footage is quite common in programmes about the conflict and include....
A Dagger being hit by a SAM.
Two A-4's releasing bombs.
HMS Ardent on fire and sinking.
However there is one piece of footage originally shown on the footage broadcast on British TV News back then that I have not seen since, and that is of a SHAR shooting down an A-4 with a Sidewinder.
The camera crosshair was on the SHAR when there was a flash under one of the wings (port one if memory serves, it's over 26 years since I last saw the film), Sidewinder departs the aircraft and the tracker follows it across the sky until it explodes in the rear of what looked like a Skyhawk, the footage released didn't show the Skyhawk crashing into the sea.
As a guess I would say that footage was of Lt Morrell shooting down Capitan de Corbeta Philippi.
The BBC or ITV may still have it in their news archives somewhere.
A Dagger being hit by a SAM.
Two A-4's releasing bombs.
HMS Ardent on fire and sinking.
However there is one piece of footage originally shown on the footage broadcast on British TV News back then that I have not seen since, and that is of a SHAR shooting down an A-4 with a Sidewinder.
The camera crosshair was on the SHAR when there was a flash under one of the wings (port one if memory serves, it's over 26 years since I last saw the film), Sidewinder departs the aircraft and the tracker follows it across the sky until it explodes in the rear of what looked like a Skyhawk, the footage released didn't show the Skyhawk crashing into the sea.
As a guess I would say that footage was of Lt Morrell shooting down Capitan de Corbeta Philippi.
The BBC or ITV may still have it in their news archives somewhere.
The camera crosshair was on the SHAR
A few years back I saw some footage taken of an Argentinian aircraft crashing onto a small peninsula (I'd never seen this before). The footage was taken at extreme range hence was hard to distinguish what aircraft was involved. Not sure who filmed this - it may have been one of the 'embedded' TV crews.
Incidentally, the HMS Broadsword website has some gun-camera stills from the Argentinian aircraft which strafed it.
Indeed having just found the footage in a BBC on line archive as part of the 'Task Force South' series made just after the war, The SAM hitting the Dagger footage is mostly likely that taken from the TV tracker of the Sea Wolf system which did the engagement. Sea Harrier engagement is also on the footage (I remember it being described as a SHAR shooting down a Skyhawk on the news reports at the time, but you're right in saying that the aircraft are dots in sky), as well as the 'Skyhawks' dropping bombs, that at second glance look like they are actually Daggers.
Link to BBC ‘Task Force South’ series is Here. Tracker footage is in ’Beach Head’ link from approximately 08:30 to 10:00 into the programme.
Link to BBC ‘Task Force South’ series is Here. Tracker footage is in ’Beach Head’ link from approximately 08:30 to 10:00 into the programme.
Bombs problems
The principal bomb used by the A4B/C during the war was the Mk-17.
The Dagger used also Mk-17 and Spanish built BR-250.
Finally the A4Q (Navy Aviation) were using Mk-82 with Snake tail.
Most of the Mk-17 did not explode after impact. One of the reasons was the high mass of the bomb wich after hitting the not so strong ships go through it to the sea.
As you can remember during May 25th attack to the HMS Broadboard at least one bomb hit the ship helicopter hangar, distroyed the helicopter and made a hole before exploding in the sea.
The other problem was the very very low level at the pilots were flying before lunching the bombs. So the fuses could not have time to arm the bomb.
The Mk-82 were more effective, those were disign for the job and the Navy Pilots were trained for the job well before the war.
I don't understand why my country army forces didn't cooperate giving the Navy Mk-82 Snake to the Air Force....
The Dagger used also Mk-17 and Spanish built BR-250.
Finally the A4Q (Navy Aviation) were using Mk-82 with Snake tail.
Most of the Mk-17 did not explode after impact. One of the reasons was the high mass of the bomb wich after hitting the not so strong ships go through it to the sea.
As you can remember during May 25th attack to the HMS Broadboard at least one bomb hit the ship helicopter hangar, distroyed the helicopter and made a hole before exploding in the sea.
The other problem was the very very low level at the pilots were flying before lunching the bombs. So the fuses could not have time to arm the bomb.
The Mk-82 were more effective, those were disign for the job and the Navy Pilots were trained for the job well before the war.
I don't understand why my country army forces didn't cooperate giving the Navy Mk-82 Snake to the Air Force....
Dead pan wrote
That would be the footage of Captain Garcia Cuerva's Mirage.
TJ
A few years back I saw some footage taken of an Argentinian aircraft crashing onto a small peninsula (I'd never seen this before). The footage was taken at extreme range hence was hard to distinguish what aircraft was involved. Not sure who filmed this - it may have been one of the 'embedded' TV crews.
TJ
I ve never seen any photo sequence about the My (PM) Garcia Cuerva crash.
Cuerva was coming to land after fighting with 2 Sea Harrier on May 1st.
His wingman, 1st Lieutenant Carlos Perona was shotted down but he could eyect and come back to the continent.
Apparently, Cuerva kept fighting with the SH without hitting or been hitted, so both sides broke the engage.
The Argentinian pilot was run out of fuel for returning to his base in Patagonia.
So, he tried to land in Pto Argentino-Pt Stanley airport, but friendly fire shotted him down.
He couldn't eyect.
Cuerva was coming to land after fighting with 2 Sea Harrier on May 1st.
His wingman, 1st Lieutenant Carlos Perona was shotted down but he could eyect and come back to the continent.
Apparently, Cuerva kept fighting with the SH without hitting or been hitted, so both sides broke the engage.
The Argentinian pilot was run out of fuel for returning to his base in Patagonia.
So, he tried to land in Pto Argentino-Pt Stanley airport, but friendly fire shotted him down.
He couldn't eyect.
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Many years ago I went to school with a good friend related to Lt Danilo Bolzan, who died in the conflict, I got to hear a lot of conversations recorded by the Air Force in Stanley....one of them (very short) was of Garcia Cuerva screaming "No Me Tiren, No Me Tiren"...which translated means "Don't Shoot Me, Don't Shoot Me"...and shortly after there was an abrupt end to the transmission.
I used to have the books Exocet and War In the Malvinas, published in Argentina, one of the notes is from an officer who saw Garcia Cuerva approach, and yes, they all say they saw something drop from the aircraft, which was interpreted as bombs, and AAA started up. This officer soon recognised the markings in the plane and started yelling at everyone to stop firing, but it was too late....elation soon turned to despair as the news came that they had shot one of their own, people were in tears.
I still have my old copy of "Dios y los Halcones" by Pablo Carballo and the 1986 Falklands Air War, as well as "Fight for the Malvinas", which is an excellent account of the Argentinian side of the war, if you need detail from any of those books, more than happy to provide what I have.
I used to have the books Exocet and War In the Malvinas, published in Argentina, one of the notes is from an officer who saw Garcia Cuerva approach, and yes, they all say they saw something drop from the aircraft, which was interpreted as bombs, and AAA started up. This officer soon recognised the markings in the plane and started yelling at everyone to stop firing, but it was too late....elation soon turned to despair as the news came that they had shot one of their own, people were in tears.
I still have my old copy of "Dios y los Halcones" by Pablo Carballo and the 1986 Falklands Air War, as well as "Fight for the Malvinas", which is an excellent account of the Argentinian side of the war, if you need detail from any of those books, more than happy to provide what I have.
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Many thanks for this, Willoz.
I regret I was the one who shot down Danilo Bolzan.
Regarding Cuerva, we have been trying to establish whether or not he was damaged by Steve Thomas' missile before he attempted his landing at Stanley. Most Argentinean reports say he reported his Mirage as 'Pristine' but Steve reports seeing the detonation of his missile just as Cuerva dived into cloud. Witnesses on the ground saw him in deep wing rock and observed this mysterious prolonged burst of cannon fire either just before or just after he was shot at by his own AAA.
Without being able to examine the wreckage (it apparently landed in a minefield) we will not know if he had suffered any sidewinder damage from his encounter with Steve Thomas.
Allan White who lives in the Falklands has looked into it and reckons the mines will not be cleared for some time yet so the area is very much off limits.
ES
I regret I was the one who shot down Danilo Bolzan.
Regarding Cuerva, we have been trying to establish whether or not he was damaged by Steve Thomas' missile before he attempted his landing at Stanley. Most Argentinean reports say he reported his Mirage as 'Pristine' but Steve reports seeing the detonation of his missile just as Cuerva dived into cloud. Witnesses on the ground saw him in deep wing rock and observed this mysterious prolonged burst of cannon fire either just before or just after he was shot at by his own AAA.
Without being able to examine the wreckage (it apparently landed in a minefield) we will not know if he had suffered any sidewinder damage from his encounter with Steve Thomas.
Allan White who lives in the Falklands has looked into it and reckons the mines will not be cleared for some time yet so the area is very much off limits.
ES
Edmund
Interested to know if you've ever read Sandy Woodward's account of the war (100 Days)? His account of the attack on Sheffield is the most gripping texts I've ever read in a war memoir.
DP
Interested to know if you've ever read Sandy Woodward's account of the war (100 Days)? His account of the attack on Sheffield is the most gripping texts I've ever read in a war memoir.
DP
Suspicion breeds confidence
I would like ask our welcome Argentine guests how Morale held up with the pilots as aircraft losses went up. It cant have been easy to lose a flight of aircraft on a single mission.
MIIIEA and Dagger AA wepons
My dear friends, as far as I know the Mirage IIIEA has never flown in combat sorties over MLV/Falklands equipped with MATRA 530.
The Argentine's Air Force was always very aware about the poor performance of that missile for combat against fighters.
The 8 single seater / 2 two seaters MIIIEA/BAs were bought in 1971, but those first batch airplanes were equipped with MATRA 530 and 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons for AA combat.
A second MIIIEA batch was deliver in 1981, but those were Matra 550 Magic I capable.
Only those second batch were Magic ready, those were deployed to Rio Gallegos AFB.
The First Batch airplanes were kept in Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and very few in Mariano Moreno AFB near Buenos Aires.
So, the MATRA 530 was only intend to be use against the VULCAN.
The other point is the Cirano II radar was not LOOK DOWN capable, so in most of those first combats the MIIIEA and Dagger were higher than the Sea Harrier.
It was impossible for the Cirano to LOCK ON to a SH from above.
The Nesher/Dagger's airplanes were delivered in two batches.
The first one in 1978 and the second in 1981.
A total of 39 airplanes were delivered before the war, but two were lost during training.
For AA, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 Shafrir Mk-4 + 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons.
At the beginning of the war, they were using 3 1300 lts fuel drop tanks.
Usually, the two wing drop tanks were dropped after been depleted, keeping the central one just before engaging usually 5 NM before crossing the SH.
But due the 1300 lts tanks shortege, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 1700 lts tanks.
The total fuel quantity was lower but the drag also was lower.
Cheers from TPE.
The Argentine's Air Force was always very aware about the poor performance of that missile for combat against fighters.
The 8 single seater / 2 two seaters MIIIEA/BAs were bought in 1971, but those first batch airplanes were equipped with MATRA 530 and 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons for AA combat.
A second MIIIEA batch was deliver in 1981, but those were Matra 550 Magic I capable.
Only those second batch were Magic ready, those were deployed to Rio Gallegos AFB.
The First Batch airplanes were kept in Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and very few in Mariano Moreno AFB near Buenos Aires.
So, the MATRA 530 was only intend to be use against the VULCAN.
The other point is the Cirano II radar was not LOOK DOWN capable, so in most of those first combats the MIIIEA and Dagger were higher than the Sea Harrier.
It was impossible for the Cirano to LOCK ON to a SH from above.
The Nesher/Dagger's airplanes were delivered in two batches.
The first one in 1978 and the second in 1981.
A total of 39 airplanes were delivered before the war, but two were lost during training.
For AA, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 Shafrir Mk-4 + 2 DEFA 30 mm cannons.
At the beginning of the war, they were using 3 1300 lts fuel drop tanks.
Usually, the two wing drop tanks were dropped after been depleted, keeping the central one just before engaging usually 5 NM before crossing the SH.
But due the 1300 lts tanks shortege, the Dagger's were fitted with 2 1700 lts tanks.
The total fuel quantity was lower but the drag also was lower.
Cheers from TPE.
Suspicion breeds confidence
ES,
Circling back your original question, the serial number on that Dagger wreck is definately 430 if that helps clear up anything. A quick zoom shows the number clearly.
Circling back your original question, the serial number on that Dagger wreck is definately 430 if that helps clear up anything. A quick zoom shows the number clearly.
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Thanks, Navaleye. This has been confirmed my Allan White in the Falklands and by Colonel Raul Diaz himself.
Dead Pan. Yes, to answer your question and a very good read IMHO.
ES
Dead Pan. Yes, to answer your question and a very good read IMHO.
ES
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Andy Aulds HUD footage
Ref the brief clip in 'One of Our Aircraft is missing ( see #72) - - it worthy of note for the anoraks that the HUD is in REV - good old NAVHARS dumped again !!
(Additional anorak note: The camera is referred to as PDR and runs when the stick top safety flap was raised prior to firing missile/dropping bomb)
(Additional anorak note: The camera is referred to as PDR and runs when the stick top safety flap was raised prior to firing missile/dropping bomb)
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Having returned from the Falklands recently, there is a very good map on the wall of the Sea-King crewroom, which pinpoints each and every one of the wreck sites on the islands, together with an aircaft ID and dates of crash, including helicopters, herc, mirages, harries etc.
Don't know if the VC10 nav's crash charts still exist on 1312 though. Certainly no sign of them in the det.
Don't know if the VC10 nav's crash charts still exist on 1312 though. Certainly no sign of them in the det.
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Greetings everyone!
I was invited to this forum by Enrique (reydelcastillo) as he told me somebody was researching the incident involving Argentine Air Force Captain García Cueva being engaged and shot down over Port Stanley by friendly anti-air defences on May 1, 1982. I'm not a professional historian but I could find a few accounts on various publications and submited them to cross-referencing. I posted my findings on Militaryphotos.net but I'll post them again here, in case they could prove useful to anyone.
The following is part of an article titled "Dagger en Malvinas" (Dagger in the Falklands) that I got from "Aeroespacio" magazine (an Argentine aviation-related publication). It contains recollections by Argentine Air Force pilots involved in the incident. The article is in Spanish but I did a quick translation to English, so here it is:
Testimonies by:
Torno Flight:
- Comandante Roberto Rubén Dimeglio
- Comandante César Fernando Román
- Vice-comandante Gustavo Aguirre Faget
Fortín Flight:
- Brigadier Guillermo Adolfo Donadille
- Comandante Jorge Daniel Senn
(by that moment, Capt Cueva's aircraft had been damaged by a near-detonation of an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. His wing man, 1st Lt Perona, had been shot down and managed to eject safely. Captain Cueva's Mirage is damaged and low on fuel...)
Now, this account renders Captain Cueva's aircraft as a Mirage Dagger, whereas other sources claim it to be a Mirage IIIEA. In "Air War over the Falklands 1982", the encounter is related by the two British pilots (Flt Lt Paul Barton and Lt Steve Thomas) who engaged Perona and Cueva. Lt Thomas recollection on the events follows:
The author, Christopher Chant, describes the shooting down of Cueva as follows:
Again, British pilots seem to have identified the aircraft as a Mirage IIIEA while Argentine pilots said it was a Dagger. That's the only significative discrepancy I found while cross-referencing the stories on both sides.
I cross-checked with "The British Aerospace Sea Harrier" by Andy Evans and the Harrier Special Interest Group (SIG) and both of them acknowledge García Cueva's bird as a Mirage IIIEA (registration number I-019 of Grupo 8 de Caza, damaged by an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile lauched by Sea Harrier XZ453 flown by Lt Steve Thomas on the 1st of May) and recognise the loss of the aircraft due to friendly fire by Argentine air defences.
Hope this helps
I was invited to this forum by Enrique (reydelcastillo) as he told me somebody was researching the incident involving Argentine Air Force Captain García Cueva being engaged and shot down over Port Stanley by friendly anti-air defences on May 1, 1982. I'm not a professional historian but I could find a few accounts on various publications and submited them to cross-referencing. I posted my findings on Militaryphotos.net but I'll post them again here, in case they could prove useful to anyone.
The following is part of an article titled "Dagger en Malvinas" (Dagger in the Falklands) that I got from "Aeroespacio" magazine (an Argentine aviation-related publication). It contains recollections by Argentine Air Force pilots involved in the incident. The article is in Spanish but I did a quick translation to English, so here it is:
Testimonies by:
Torno Flight:
- Comandante Roberto Rubén Dimeglio
- Comandante César Fernando Román
- Vice-comandante Gustavo Aguirre Faget
Fortín Flight:
- Brigadier Guillermo Adolfo Donadille
- Comandante Jorge Daniel Senn
DARDO IN COMBAT
Over isla Borbón (Pebble Island) at low-level flight, callsign Torno II, Lt Aguirre Faget, watching the right sector of the formation, relays to his flight leader - Attention! Harrier at 3 o'clock! - Captain Dimeglio observes in the indicated direction as he spots a Harrier climbing toward the clouds. He figures that it should be one of the British aircraft engaging Escuadrilla Dardo (Dardo Flight) integrated by Cap García Cueva and 1st Lt Perona. Ignoring whether the enemy pilot had spotted them or not, they continue flying.
Com Senn - on the CIC (Centro de Información y Control/Combat Information Centre) frequency, all of us, Torno and Fortín flights, could listen García and Perona yelling instructions at each other as they engaged the Sea Harriers.
Brig Donadille - on the events of that day, I could forget many details, but what happened to García Cueva, I will never forget.
Over isla Borbón (Pebble Island) at low-level flight, callsign Torno II, Lt Aguirre Faget, watching the right sector of the formation, relays to his flight leader - Attention! Harrier at 3 o'clock! - Captain Dimeglio observes in the indicated direction as he spots a Harrier climbing toward the clouds. He figures that it should be one of the British aircraft engaging Escuadrilla Dardo (Dardo Flight) integrated by Cap García Cueva and 1st Lt Perona. Ignoring whether the enemy pilot had spotted them or not, they continue flying.
Com Senn - on the CIC (Centro de Información y Control/Combat Information Centre) frequency, all of us, Torno and Fortín flights, could listen García and Perona yelling instructions at each other as they engaged the Sea Harriers.
Brig Donadille - on the events of that day, I could forget many details, but what happened to García Cueva, I will never forget.
Captain García Cueva reports to CIC the shooting down and ejection of 1st Lt Perona as well as the safe opening of his parachute and his descent over Pebble Island. CIC advises immediately to Cueva a vector for for his egress and return to base, but he does not answer; he's low on fuel and plans to land at BAM Malvinas (Port Stanley airport). CIC reports back to him:
- Negative; Base is currently under enemy naval bombardment
The vessels bombarding the airport were precisely those Cap Dimeglio is tasked to attack. García Cueva insists on his current status, saying that he cannot return to base given his aircraft being low on fuel, as he is presented by CIC with the opportunity of ejecting. Confronted by the possibility of losing his aircraft, García Cueva replies:
That's too bad. It's a brand new aircraft, spotless
After a brief interchange of assessments, CIC allows Dardo I to approach BAM Malvinas.
Meanwhile, for Torno flight, the first uncertainty for them is presented north, right at the mouth of Falkland Sound. There, straight ahead, a faint sillouhette of what seems to be a large vessel appears to their eyes. It turns out not to be such a thing but the impressive Roca Remolinos (Eddystone Rock), which they overfly safely. They fly over the Sound at 420 knots, between 50 and 100 feet in altitude, having a cloud cover at about 2000 and 3000 feet, altitude that they must keep an eye on without help of a radio altimeter, coming around north of Isla Soledad (East Falkland) about 3 miles off shore.
Meanwhile, Dardo I, Captain Cueva's aircraft, prepares to land. The lookout at the control tower, helplessly and without radio communications to warn the artillery positions, witnesses a drama of war: anti-aircraft defences open fire uppon Dardo I and, hit by a barrage of fire, the Dagger, turned into a flaming wreck, plummets out of the sky and hits the ocean. Pilot never manages to eject.
Vcom Aguirre Faget - Flying north of East Falkland, before reaching our target area, I could hear desperate cries from BAM Malvinas' control tower: - Don't shoot! It's one of ours! Hold your fire! - I figured that happened when the lookout saw our anti-aircraft artillery opening fire upon García Cueva's Mirage while he was trying to land. We could see, farther away, tracer rounds streaking through the cloud cover.
Com Senn - When García Cueva indicated his intentions to attempt to salvage the aircraft, I was about to ask him to eject, but for the sake of discipline, I didn't. It was his personal decision; we all knew the dangers existing around BAM Malvinas: they were on red alert, receiving heavy enemy naval bombardment and there was no communication between the control tower and the anti-aircraft artillery positions. The runway was 1500 metres long and it was difficult to perform an emergency landing there, but García Cueva was an experienced and highly skilled pilot and he could have been able to land and slow down his Mirage in 700 metres using the aerobraking parachute.
Brig Donadille - the last words of García Cueva, as Senn and I heard them, were textually: ¡Me están tirando a mi... carajo! (They are shooting at me... damn it!)
- Negative; Base is currently under enemy naval bombardment
The vessels bombarding the airport were precisely those Cap Dimeglio is tasked to attack. García Cueva insists on his current status, saying that he cannot return to base given his aircraft being low on fuel, as he is presented by CIC with the opportunity of ejecting. Confronted by the possibility of losing his aircraft, García Cueva replies:
That's too bad. It's a brand new aircraft, spotless
After a brief interchange of assessments, CIC allows Dardo I to approach BAM Malvinas.
Meanwhile, for Torno flight, the first uncertainty for them is presented north, right at the mouth of Falkland Sound. There, straight ahead, a faint sillouhette of what seems to be a large vessel appears to their eyes. It turns out not to be such a thing but the impressive Roca Remolinos (Eddystone Rock), which they overfly safely. They fly over the Sound at 420 knots, between 50 and 100 feet in altitude, having a cloud cover at about 2000 and 3000 feet, altitude that they must keep an eye on without help of a radio altimeter, coming around north of Isla Soledad (East Falkland) about 3 miles off shore.
Meanwhile, Dardo I, Captain Cueva's aircraft, prepares to land. The lookout at the control tower, helplessly and without radio communications to warn the artillery positions, witnesses a drama of war: anti-aircraft defences open fire uppon Dardo I and, hit by a barrage of fire, the Dagger, turned into a flaming wreck, plummets out of the sky and hits the ocean. Pilot never manages to eject.
Vcom Aguirre Faget - Flying north of East Falkland, before reaching our target area, I could hear desperate cries from BAM Malvinas' control tower: - Don't shoot! It's one of ours! Hold your fire! - I figured that happened when the lookout saw our anti-aircraft artillery opening fire upon García Cueva's Mirage while he was trying to land. We could see, farther away, tracer rounds streaking through the cloud cover.
Com Senn - When García Cueva indicated his intentions to attempt to salvage the aircraft, I was about to ask him to eject, but for the sake of discipline, I didn't. It was his personal decision; we all knew the dangers existing around BAM Malvinas: they were on red alert, receiving heavy enemy naval bombardment and there was no communication between the control tower and the anti-aircraft artillery positions. The runway was 1500 metres long and it was difficult to perform an emergency landing there, but García Cueva was an experienced and highly skilled pilot and he could have been able to land and slow down his Mirage in 700 metres using the aerobraking parachute.
Brig Donadille - the last words of García Cueva, as Senn and I heard them, were textually: ¡Me están tirando a mi... carajo! (They are shooting at me... damn it!)
"I was continuing my turn and the enemy leader was doing quite a hard descending turn to the left, going down very fast to the top of the solid cloud cover at 4000 feet. I'm not sure if he knew where I was. I rolled into a vertical descent behind him, locked one of my missiles and fired it. The missile streaked after him and just before he reached cloud I saw it pass close to his tail. Then both the aircraft and missile vanished".
(after being damaged by the missile and approaching Stanley airport for landing) Losing fuel rapidly from his machine's ruptured tanks, Cueva released his drop tanks and Argentine gunners, believing that these were bombs, opened fire and destroyed the Mirage IIIEA, in the process killing Cueva.
I cross-checked with "The British Aerospace Sea Harrier" by Andy Evans and the Harrier Special Interest Group (SIG) and both of them acknowledge García Cueva's bird as a Mirage IIIEA (registration number I-019 of Grupo 8 de Caza, damaged by an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile lauched by Sea Harrier XZ453 flown by Lt Steve Thomas on the 1st of May) and recognise the loss of the aircraft due to friendly fire by Argentine air defences.
Hope this helps
SUE and SH.
I would like to know if during the Super Etendard/Exocet attacks, the Sea Harrier's tried to intecept the Argentine airplanes.
From the Argentine Navy reports, those attacks had to fly below the deck for the last 150 NM before the suspect tarjet.
Approaching the tarjet area, the SUE climbed to make a quick radar serch and go down again.
At least in each attack, two of those jumbs were done. So that gave enough clues to the UK Task Force of the SUEs were coming.
The lunching usually was at 20 NM from the tarjet well inside the radar range of the UK's ships and the SH range.
According to some British reports, after the May 30th attack, many SH were lunch to try to intercet the intruders.
There are also reports about the lunching of 5 Sea Dart that day from the HMS Invincible.
From the Argentine Navy reports, those attacks had to fly below the deck for the last 150 NM before the suspect tarjet.
Approaching the tarjet area, the SUE climbed to make a quick radar serch and go down again.
At least in each attack, two of those jumbs were done. So that gave enough clues to the UK Task Force of the SUEs were coming.
The lunching usually was at 20 NM from the tarjet well inside the radar range of the UK's ships and the SH range.
According to some British reports, after the May 30th attack, many SH were lunch to try to intercet the intruders.
There are also reports about the lunching of 5 Sea Dart that day from the HMS Invincible.
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All many thanks for posting such an informative and thrilling thread. Having read many books on the subject its great to have such a balanced view of the actions.
Out of interest (and not wanting start another sidetrack) could our friends from South America provide their perspective on the Vulcan missions ?
Out of interest (and not wanting start another sidetrack) could our friends from South America provide their perspective on the Vulcan missions ?
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Chip Munk Ref # 98
Yes Sir
Let me tell you what I know and saw back then , it certainly will need more input since others have been researching and gathering more info along the years -
During the Falklands conflict I was the Radar Operator for the Army Radar , there was another Radra operated by Air Force -
The first Vulcan strike was on May 01 at about 0430 AM local time , on the radar 5 or 6 ecos were seen at 090 degrees ( due east of Stanley ) and about 70 or maybe 80 miles - I saw them coming in , at about 10 NM they go low and the first strike hits the airport - In other Forums I.ve been told that only the vulcan Strike will the other airplanes shown on the screen were countermeasures - And that only one Sea Harrier was standing about 20 NM east to cover.protect the vulcan -
I still have my doubts , I still believe the vulcan did not come by himself -
The other vulcan missions as what I remember , some how the Air Force radar let us know that we should expect a vulcan raid a few hours before it actually happen , for that matter , we several times when in doubt that the the airplane would be a vulcan , we would go into standby for several minutes and then back on line -
The vulcan mission that hit the 35 mm Sky Guard happen during the night , I remember Air Force Radra telling us , we should expect a raid , that night we had turn off the radar a few minutes before the strike , and when back on line it had already hit -
Regards Enrique
I'm sure that more input will be provided by Chary Bv / Cosmicomet 74 / Juanbalbo and others - Thank you
Let me tell you what I know and saw back then , it certainly will need more input since others have been researching and gathering more info along the years -
During the Falklands conflict I was the Radar Operator for the Army Radar , there was another Radra operated by Air Force -
The first Vulcan strike was on May 01 at about 0430 AM local time , on the radar 5 or 6 ecos were seen at 090 degrees ( due east of Stanley ) and about 70 or maybe 80 miles - I saw them coming in , at about 10 NM they go low and the first strike hits the airport - In other Forums I.ve been told that only the vulcan Strike will the other airplanes shown on the screen were countermeasures - And that only one Sea Harrier was standing about 20 NM east to cover.protect the vulcan -
I still have my doubts , I still believe the vulcan did not come by himself -
The other vulcan missions as what I remember , some how the Air Force radar let us know that we should expect a vulcan raid a few hours before it actually happen , for that matter , we several times when in doubt that the the airplane would be a vulcan , we would go into standby for several minutes and then back on line -
The vulcan mission that hit the 35 mm Sky Guard happen during the night , I remember Air Force Radra telling us , we should expect a raid , that night we had turn off the radar a few minutes before the strike , and when back on line it had already hit -
Regards Enrique
I'm sure that more input will be provided by Chary Bv / Cosmicomet 74 / Juanbalbo and others - Thank you
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Wales
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With regards the above comments on the Argentinian Skyguard:
It was captured by the RAF and is still in use to this day for use in low flying complaints and as 'enemy' radar on ranges.
It was captured by the RAF and is still in use to this day for use in low flying complaints and as 'enemy' radar on ranges.
