We filed an alternate on every single flight. Typically Batam for Singapore, occasionally KL. But whether your fuel policy requires you to carry an alternate (SQ, CX etc) or holding fuel in lieu (Aus carriers), the trick is knowing when to give it away and divert.

That 3rd set of eyes on the flight deck might have helped, but he/she may not have been technically allowed there due being burned out and therefore required to rest in the cabin. I know nothing about Singapore FTL’s, but have operated under such requirements numerous times.

Interesting report.

Far from, very far from, most declared fuel emergencies origins from the consequences of astonishingly poor fuel/time management, and even fewer of such events ends with multiple go arounds and quite frankly shockingly mismanaged flight execution. Singapore Airlines was as close to putting 280 people in the grave - as you could possible be - all because of target fascination. Makes me sick to read this report - and that´s even in its corrupted version.

I understand you´re living rent free in your circus? You do come across as happy clueless clown. The uber Clown.

Lookleft, I’m surprised you’re so sensitive to this thread. The initial post was highlighting that there was no coverage in the press of such a close call. The investigation report itself does not mention the final fuel figure (other than well below FFR). Do you agree that this has been hushed up a little? Why so defensive?

This sounds like an accurate account meaning the aircraft had essentially zero fuel as they cleared the runway. The issues with restarting the APU after it flamed out due to fuel starvation are normal. The long APU fuel line requires a maintenance technician to bleed the line after fueling to get the APU back online.

Maybe the addition of the word "usable" would be appropriate. FFR is "30 minutes usable fuel".

I can't think of any checklist/Flight manual procedure on anything I've flown that would not be covered by the addition of that word.

Batam 04 localiser is offset from runway heading, so no autoland. In an ideal world the crew would have known that…

You’d think that any SIN based pilot would know without looking at the port pages that their primary alternate didn’t have A/L capability

Johor Bahru is also available just up the road - I wasn’t there but I just can’t imagine that all three airports had crap weather.

Sounds like the crew threw away KL as a diversion option after the first go around

Any afternoon arrival in SE Asia can have “that” CB over the field - just take the gas

What's the "misconception" of FRF in Australia? The prescribed FRF is a specified number of minutes of "flight time". An aircraft's "flight" ends "the moment at which it comes to rest after being airborne". That looks to me very much like the end of the landing roll. If it's intended to cover the period taxiing to the gate, that's not very clear.

As others have already mentioned, the localiser is offset from the runway heading, so autoland is not available. As for what caused the NO AUTOLAND message, the B777 AFDS monitors 30 or so parameters to determine the autoland status. NO AUTOLAND can result from a downgrade of the status from LAND 3 or LAND 2; or if neither LAND 3 nor LAND 2 is annunciated by 600 ft AGL. In this case the PF disengaged the autopilot at about 1,200 ft AGL to manually capture the glideslope and localiser. He then re-engaged the autopilot at a little over 600 ft AGL and was met with a NO AUTOLAND message. The message would have appeared because neither LAND 3 nor LAND 2 was annunciated by 600 ft AGL.

The report says the estimated fuel on landing at SIN was initially 7,000 kg, ie FRF plus about 45 mins. They might have scraped into KUL if they'd diverted immediately after being told to hold at PASPU, but the first go-around didn't occur until 50 minutes later, after they'd diverted to BTH. By that time they didn't have fuel to divert anywhere!

The report also says the two planned destination alternates were Paya Lebar and Senai (Johor Bahru). The crew indicated that, while holding at PASPU, the aircraft's weather radar showed heavy precipitation over Changi and both the alternates, while the weather appeared fine over Batam.

Australian rules have always been the end of the landing roll. For example there is a major event at an airport that closes all terminals. You hold and then land 100kg above fix reserve but taxi around for 2 hours and run out of fuel waiting for a gate you haven't broken any Australian Aviation rules AFAIK.

Amongst other things, the Part 121 MOS defines FRF as the amount of fuel : "which is usable fuel that is remaining on completion of the final landing at the aerodrome."

Whether you have fuel to taxi is a moot point, once you are cutting into final/fixed reserve prior to completing the landing you have busted the law and in emergency territory. If the engines stop due to fuel exhaustion just after vacating the runway it's obvious that you did not have 30 minutes airborne, or any sort of reserves remaining.

The most interesting part of the report is the final landing. They obviously knew they were just about on fumes with a teardrop procedure onto the landing runway. This would have been so outside the box for the crew, obviously hitting the oh **** point.

Culture certainly comes into play here, google and read the report on the 777 engine fire on the runway, hesitation and unwillingness to make a command decision.

I type this as I’m about to board an SQ flight so take that as you will.

Does the aircraft you fly have a LOW FUEL checklist? If so is the amount that triggers the low fuel checklist greater than the FRF? Part 91 MOS refers directly to this ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 91-15v1.1

https://www.casa.gov.au/guidelines-a...r%20exposition.

read page 25.

737ng Low Fuel is at 1.8 FRF is approximately 1.2
787. Low Fuel is at 3.4 FRF is approximately 2.1
checklist says land asap.

Page 24.

Of course, and yes.

To be honest, I think you're reading too much into the AC. The low fuel procedure (eg. open crossfeed valves, boost pumps on, etc) is intended to ensure the fuel remaining is usable by the engines. The fuel quantity that triggers the procedures is not a "minimum fuel quantity" below which you're not supposed to operate, even though you might need to land ASAP.

Are you sure about that?

from the QRH (Boeing 787)
a couple of pertinent notes to help your decision making process
Note: Avoid high nose up attitude. Make thrust changes slowly and smoothly. This reduces the possibility of uncovering fuel pumps
Note: Use flaps 20 and VREF 20 for landing. Increased airspeed at flaps 20 gives improved elevator control for landing flare in the event of a dual engine flameout. Check the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance tables in the Performance Inflight-QRH chapter or other approved source.

The AC states: "There may be requirements, instructions, procedures, or limitations contained in aircraft flight manuals which establish minimum fuel quantity values that exceed the legislative minimum values. Where these exist, the flight manual value must be complied with." There are certainly procedures that must be followed in the event of a low fuel state. However, as I said previously, the triggering fuel quantity is not some minimum value below which you must not operate.

If you think it's an issue, I suggest you take it up with your fleet technical people.

Sorry, but it doesn't disturb. The title says it all "Another disaster averted". Why anyone would think it disturbing is a reflection of their own thinking, rather than the event.

In this case the crew used all the fuel before making the decision they had to land. In the Mildura situation the first jet to land 'may' have had over an hour of fuel left on board, but still busted the minima, and the company made sure the actual fuel logs and state were not released to the ATSB, the ATSB only had access to the dispatch calculation and a statement 'the captain routinely uplifts more fuel'. Prior to diversion the first crew to land there stated in the report that they had enough fuel to cover a TEMPO on arrival at Mildura, however they basically went straight into the approach 'due fuel' and landed. The ATSB even calculated that if they had held at altitude they could have still returned to Adelaide at 0955 almost 10 minutes after they had landed in Mildura, and that was based on minimum fuel uplift from Sydney. I don't have to tell you which airline that was, it was not SQ, and I would consider the lack of compliance with the ATSB on the issue as substantial or the ATSB has chosen not to release such data due to the implications with regard to CAR 257. Now does that constitute an airline having its arse covered or not...