There was an ek 380 in the betty hold the other day

But as others have alluded to it doesn't need to be a super, sometimes you just get nailed. If that's even what happened

From QF Pravda:

Interesting choice of words.

not quite right
 

Just to clarify QF32 was far an ideal example of proactive crisis communications - it is used by several comms professionals to demonstrate what not to do. As a reminder: QF initially denied the event - in fact there's a grab from Sky where Olivia is denying outright saying words similar to: "there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest the aircraft is a Qantas plane" vision cuts to twitter pic of villager holding up panel with logo - then to grab of ATC comms recorded by planespotter and posted to soc media.

Joyce was MIA for a considerable period (it was more than hour BTW) with the exec focus being one eye on the IOC the other on the ASX - I can tell you authoritatively that the initial media requests were met with an absolute fob off. (that's one of the reasons why so many journos write crap because airlines don't get proactive)

As for your reference to the open access given to 4 corners etc... two well connected experienced journos had the RR link and evidence absolutely nailed on the day as they were already working on the RR story with a lot of evidence from local and OS insiders. Prior to Joyce appearing they were asked (begged) to 'hold it' on the promise of an absolute exclusive and that no one else would get given this 'access' - they honoured the request in good faith and didn't slam Joyce with it at the presser; but they were later ripped off when they objected to the Q requested, highly massaged production approach that 4 corners and 9 eventually agreed to. (In fact one of them was lied to about crew not being avail for a pre-arranged interview....said journo then saw a camo from another network at Syd Dom on his way to shoot them beside the 380 parked in the hanger)

Regarding last Friday's incident - it was denied with the standard "we are not aware of any incident" last weekend. The CC debrief and follow up in HKG was (I'm told) far from best practice - the CC were not even told the truth and I hear that their union was kept in the dark and had to extract info.

The current anecdotal reporting, pax quotes coupled with the brush off 'it was just unexpected severe turbulence line' only has escalated the scare factor in this story eroding public faith.

Baseline: in a crisis an organisation has 3 minutes at best to set the agenda present the facts or if the facts are unknown, take control. Like with 32, it didn't happen.

Had QF acted last Friday with a proactive factual statement immediately after receiving the info in the IOC, they could have opened up the issue and closed it back down - the net outcome would have been appropriate recognition of the operating crew rather than the mish mash of out of context tech facts.

Such prompt action also eliminates the speculation and (less than responsible often uninformed) 'suspicions' that are now being circulated in some areas.

I do however agree with you 100% that RR in the 32 incident acted arrogantly and was wilfully misleading and deceptive.

I'll will wait for the investigation report - as we all should!

AT
:E

Personally I think that's a little harsh. As anyone in the industry knows, rumors can be rife and uninformed comment can come from anywhere. I can well imagine there was confusion initially while facts were ascertained. I seem to remember MW were monitoring the the aircraft data and were trying to establish in the absence of comms with the aircraft what was going on. I think any reasonable organisation would hold off until it had verified facts. I do remember reading there was initial confusion but that is surely more to the do with the nature of modern communications and not some oblique attempt to cover something up. When Qantas denied the incident, they could not possibly have known someone on Bantam Is was about to post a tweet of an engine cowling or part thereof. I think FAR too much emphasis and credence is put on individuals posting on social media who are largely uninformed and I blame the media for that because they promote it the interests of sensationalism rather than good journalism - and I can imagine the confusion, does Qantas confirm it on the basis of a tweet or do they say 'no comment' and appear to be hiding something or do they just remain silent for a short period of time and then come out with correct information that they have been able to verify. I think this is now days like peeling away the layers of an onion and all companies need to adapt to how to manage this, as does the media need to do somewhat better than run front page headlines based on the figurative 'epic fail' tweet.
I can't comment on the 4 corners info you've provided because I am not privy to that information. I have heard numerous corporate image consultants however, report that in their view the final analysis was that Qantas came out of this looking fairly professional whereas RR had a lot of work to do to restore their credibility. All companies will attempt at times to ensure a message is crafted in a way that is perceived in the right light and is not misconstrued and this can sometimes appear as evasive. I don't see here the type of action carried out by other operators in the past such as raiding a Pilot's house (allegedly) and seizing documents material to an investigation or practically perverting the course of justice to protect an image ("an orchestrated litany of lies...").

Finally, absolutely... we should always wait for the final report and last word would be there were probably several ways it could have been handled better but certainly the actions of the crew played very positively for Qantas.

To get back to QF 29 for a minute...Holding at FL220 seems a bit high only 60 miles out, unless there is a circuit somewhere over Macau?!

Not uncommon during busy times.

Not sure if relevant but a friend was on the flight (in J Class) and they told me they were on their way back from the loo and the aircraft seemed to pitch nose up but not so that they lost their footing and flew off the floor but when it came down it was quite severe and this person said their legs felt like they were crumpling under them - also said it was not like described by other pax and the other thing was it was very, very smoggy outside similar to when there are lots of bushfires in Sydney or Melbourne and the friend was not sure if that was a factor in what might seem like severe turbulence. Alarm went off yes but was not fire related, no emergency of any kind in terms of landing and the aircraft did hold disembarkation at the gate for a while until one pax was taken in ambulance and others were attended to and released.

That's completely the wrong way around.
If you pitch up, you crumple to the floor as a walking pax.
When you pitch down, you float off the floor.
Has your friend got it right - did you read your own post?

60 track miles to go or 60dme? Gotta go around lan tau...

Fair comment, I just checked their message and you're right, my bad. Of course I know that is the wrong way around, just in a hurry and was heading out the door so I didn't re-read before I posted.

This seems to be what we know:

1. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence approaching the hold at a low speed, and a low speed is normal approaching a hold.

2. A stick shaker activated.

3. Autoflight was disconnected.

4. Some passengers were injured.

What we don't know is what caused the severe turbulence - was it wake turbulence or was it pilot induced due to the stick shaker, in which case what caused the stick shaker?

Now, all professional jet pilots will know:

1. Intermittent stick shaker is not unusual when encountering severe turbulence (particularly when back at holding speed), whether it be caused by wake or other. As has been mentioned above, stick shaker is largely controlled by AoA vanes, which could easily be disrupted in a wake turbulence encounter. It doesn't mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky. On the other hand, a stick shaker caused by high level windshear which could also be accompanied by turbulence, may mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky.

2. The normal response to severe turbulence in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and maintain appropriate attitude and thrust (which would include increasing to turbulence penetration speed).

3. The normal response to a stick shaker in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and apply forward elevator.

Of course, 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, so a pilot chooses to either employ 2 or 3. Or, in the event of both, they would employ 3 and then 2, once 3 is complete.

My money is on severe turbulence caused by wake, which also gave them a stick shaker, and they applied 3 then 2. Which would be completely approriate. Passengers may have been injured prior to, or during that process. Either is possible. I've encountered high level wake turbulence before, it's not fun and it's hard to predict (short of grossly increasing separation minimums).

Derfred, can you confirm the Boeing procedure for encountering "severe turbulence" is to disconnect?????

Lol..

In reality, a severe turbulence encounter may result in an inappropriate attitude which would validate disengaging the autopilot. You then set an attitude as per Derfred's explanation. (Which is also what the book says... right?... or is it just the first sentence in the manuals which is important?)

Maybe a very simple"Cancel hold continue right turn heading 240".....grabbed the speed knob instead of heading..Wouldn't be the first airline that had done that.
We will just have to wait and see.

This is what was actually stated:

When did it turn into an encounter with severe turbulence? Lets rewrite Derfred's statement of fact with the real facts and take a different point of view.

1. The stick shaker activated and theaircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.

2. A .

3. Autoflight was disconnected.

4. Some passengers were injured.

This is what was actually stated:

When did it turn into an encounter with severe turbulence? Lets rewrite Derfred's statement of fact with the real facts and take a different point of view.

1. The stick shaker activated and the aircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.

2. The autopilott was disconnected and the flight crew maneuvered the aircraft in response.

3. Passengers were injured.

Now for the conjecture. The hold speed for a 747 is approx. 230-240kts at a rough guess. That's not slow! If you were coming into land at that speed it would be frighteningly fast. The stick shaker activates approx.10kts before the stall which would be possibly around the 120-130kt range. What was the A/T doing during this time? I would hazard a guess that it was not armed but the crew thought it was, not unusual in a Boeing if recent history is anything to go by. It would not take long for a 747 in level flight to have its speed decrease to the point of stick shaker activation. Something was distracting the crew so the speed was not being monitored. Why the speed wasn't being monitored and why the A/T didn't maintain the holding speed will come out in due course.

120 to 130 kt range?
It's been a while since I flew the Queen but I can easily tell you that clean at FL220 at their weight the Vs would have been a lot higher than that, up around 180 to 190 KIAS. And that's wings level......in a 25 deg AOB a fair bit higher.

I don't know Crosscutter, what does the book say?
Is hand flying in "severe" turbulence a recommended practice? Would V/S mode 0fpm work?

Look left, you may be surprised to hear that holding at fl220 is not in the approach config.
It is close to min drag speed clean( holding at min fuel flow is prudent)
At this speed a/c is vulnerable to stickshaker through turb from whatever source. Crew response will be dictated by their perception of the reason for this. For that information ask the crew.

Book says to leave autopilot in...unless speed, altitude or attitude deviations dictate otherwise.

VS mode would make no difference. In level flight thrust controls speed in both VS and other level flight autopilot modes.

So if Vs at FL220 is around is 180-190 what would the holding speed be, 240? In this incident turbulence has nothing to do with it. The stick shaker and the airframe buffeting seemed to occur at the same time. Possibly the A/T has not maintained the hold speed and the crew had taken their eyes off the ball.

For the Vref, ask the crew, for the MCP selected holding speed, ask the crew, for A/T engagement/serviceability, ask the crew,for weather, other aircraft in the hold, ask the crew.
An enquiry perhaps and wait for the results.

Most of you are as bad as Today Tonight / A Current Affair / Geoffrey Thomas.

Show a little professionalism and STFU until the final report is released. Until then, all this conjecture makes you sound like a pack of idiots.

Agree totally BSS. You have got to love these Monday morning quarterbacks who come out with some outrageous suggestions. I'd suggest the closest most have come to the flight deck of a Boeing (anything) is an after landing visit. Google is their friend, they hide behind a Pprune handle and pretend to be airline pilots.

Interesting.
Isn't that what I want? THR commanding 280kts or M.82 (SPD INT, of course), or whatever that second line says (I never read it anyway), and the auto flight system commanding a pitch, rather than an altitude.

Are you boys new to pprune then? If you want to wait for the final report then see you in 2020 when it is released. Even then a lot of people won't agree with its findings. Until then a discussion about the facts that have been released is what this particular bulletin board is for. Do you have any ideas about how to avoid airframe buffeting and a stick shaker activating when in a holding pattern? What do you think the A/T was doing and why did it not prevent the speed decaying to the stall speed? Or do you just occupy a control seat with your mind in neutral?

You can bet they were descending at near minimum clean speed the significance being they were above FL200 where minimum clean speed is not displayed on the PFD.
Entered the hold, thrust at idle (speed on elevator) autopilot possibly reduced the bank angle to protect itself from the slow speed thus didn't follow hold, crew disconnected rolled pulled G and bingo stick shaker. Thrust takes time to advance from idle to something decent at high altitude. Crew does stall recovery maneuver.

Lookleft, imagine what PPNe would look like....

Assuming that happened, an UNABLE HOLD AIRSPACE, or the like (don't have a 747 rating), at FL240 with nothing to hit terrain-wise, should this be an overpower or otherwise disconnect AP situation anyway? Practically, what is the implication of straying outside the confines of a hold (but unlikely outside the protected airspace of the hold) in a radar environment?

Look Left - there are many here who have been around longer than you, actually fly the aircraft in the scenario involved - don't think any of them have been rushing to conclusions.
After 50 years, 20 years Cat B on 767/747, I'm not.
Pprune is a rumour network - however it is not an alternative truth network. The danger is that rubbish written here may be taken as fact by some of the armchair aviators -( nothing wrong with armchair aviating -interesting subject to take an interest in) but "facts" peddled often enough are mistaken for the truth.

The scenario involved is that the aircraft experienced buffeting and a stick shaker activation whilst in the hold at FL220. They are the facts as stated by the ATSB. The alternative truth as peddled by QF media and others here is that the aircraft encountered severe turbulence which the caused the stick shaker to activate Feel free to correct me where I am wrong in the statement of the facts. So how often have you found yourself in the scenario as described, regularly get the aircraft to the stick shaker do you?

I made it quite clear that my discussion about the autothrust was entirely my conjecture.Given all your experience maybe you could provide some insight as to what may have occurred whereby a 747 enters a holding pattern and then nearly stalls?

I have a feeling that had this occurred to an Asian carrier then the calls for "wait for the report" would not be so prevalent and that plenty of experienced pilots would be posting about where the crew went wrong.

There is lots of talk about the stick shaker activation and the crew taking over------ but no mention of the -- last resort , [ bugger the crew ] the stick pusher activating to save the aircraft , that will stick heads in the ceiling panels-------did it activate --

Haha, a B747 stick pusher, that gave me a good laugh. Reminds me of the old saying: 'Better to keep your mouth shut and let people think you are a fool than to open it and have it confirmed'.

Haven't the time to sift through the submissions but has anyone mentioned FLCH?

Lookleft, relax.

I take your point about "facts", but I never said they were facts, I said: My comments about wake turbulence, and severe turbulence didn't come from the ATSB but I didn't make them up, they "apparently" came from the crew:

One source says the "crew" told them it was wake turbulence. Three sources use the word "turbulence", and one uses the word "severe".

Never had a stick shaker in an aircraft, but I've had a few in the simulator when practicing turbulence, aircraft upsets and other non-normal manoeuvres.

I just find it hard to imagine that an approach to stall recovery manoeuvre would cause anything like the mayhem in the cabin as described. Would applying forward elevator really set off smoke alarms and open overhead compartments? Sounds more like turbulence to me. Hence my conjecture that it may have been turbulence which caused the stick shaker rather than the other way around.

As for the "conjecture police" - thinking about real aircraft incidents and discussing all the possible reasons it may have happened, and how it may be avoided in future makes us all better aviators. If you don't like it, don't read it.

Derfred point taken regarding the origin of the reported turbulence. Passenger reports of turbulence are not inconsistent with the ATSB statement of airframe buffeting but the two are very different in origin. I could imagine that a distracted crew would experience a fair bit of a WTF moment if their first indications of a problem was buffeting and the stick shaker. They would have realised that the aircraft was about to do something nasty and reacted accordingly.

A significant application of forward elevator would have resulted in the chaos down the back of the aircraft as reported. Not dissimilar to the A330 incident off WA where a sudden nose down pitching manoeuvre led to injuries in the rear of the cabin.

Completely agree with your last statement.

Having heard the FACTS now, as related by the CAPTAIN of the aircraft, I can confirm that 95% of what gets written on PPrune is complete tripe! 5% excellent, but I'm sorry, the other 95% need a reality check.

Stick pusher on a B747..... for heaven's sake....

Well then... cough it up!
Rumours and BS only really develop well in lieu of facts. So out with it

Please

Why don't you just sell it, to Sixty Minutes? To make a ststement like that, in public, when you are assuming, is not cricket. Perhaps next time you will give it some thought, first.

"Not cricket", really? What does that even mean:ugh: Once again had this happened to anyone else then I don't think the indignation would be so righteous.

In case anyone is in any doubt this aircraft was about to stall. The crew responded in an appropriate way but how did it get to that point in the first place? In TEM terms, this aircraft was in an UAS after an undetected threat and/or error occurred. I have now idea of the sequence of events that allowed it to get to an UAS but I do know that if the attitude was appropriate then the only thing not providing the required performance was the thrust. it applies to any aircraft.

If you actually know something about the incident then more than happy to be set straight.