I think you would have a hard time in any airline avoiding disciplinary action if you refused to take an aircraft that was signed out as legal to fly.

You would want to have a really strong argument and know exactly what you are on about.

QantasLink had that memorable incident where the engineers refused the sign out aircraft because they could prove that the door locks were faulty. Yet the airline and the regulator disagreed.

Chimbu,

I agree with the reset culture as you say. Most of our ginger beers are pretty good hands, we have all seen the guys who are perhaps a bit too quick to call it a one off reset without any reference to the history.

Warren 9, I agree with the idea of not accepting the aircraft if it's obvious that there has been no troubleshooting going on for repetitive faults but many cases are not as black and white as the Air Asia and there is a legitimate issue of not going too far in to second guessing the often very detailed and highly informed job of the engineers.

I would suggest that the vast majority of our engineers do a stand up job. Perhaps one issue could be resolved by providing more information to us on how many resets are permissible for one, and I would certainly advocate a thorough going over the tech log history pre flight but certainly after any particular ECAM pops up as all good operators will.

i never had any trouble neville

The reset culture isn't really a culture, the Airbus troubleshooting manual actually directs the engineer to perform a single reset per flight leg. If the fault reoccurs in the same leg more action is required. With that in mind and the tendency for Airbuses self report faults that dont exist, for example through power transfers, it may seem like the engineers are just making the message go away.. It's not quite true.

The thing about Airbuses though is it will travel many sectors after a reset before another reoccurrence happens of a previously reset fault but as latent fault in the computer itself will manifest itself as more frequently occurring faults as exactly was the case in this crash. A competent MOC will monitor a trending fault with tools provided by Airbus themselves and competent engineers won't keep penning off a fault which occurs each flight or with a regular occurrence, that's what the DDG is for.

The airline won't want to wear an unnecessary delay and they definitely don't want engineers replacing computers that would go to a repair shop and subsequently returned as no fault found. Trend reporting is important but only if it's acted upon, which in this case it's plainly obvious it wasn't.

Good guess Bloggs, hence my question! So what's your genius take on it then ? :rolleyes:

When in alternate or direct law an Airbus is no longer fully protected, Airbus pilots should undertake upset recovery training to cater for such contingencies.


Regarding the "Stall Stall Stall" when forward airspeed is less than 60kts this warning is inhibited. Imagine dropping like a brick, forward speed less than 60kts, attempting a stall recovery and then activating "Stall Stall Stall" as you begin to recover.

Confused?? I would say most would be.

I am not saying this occurred in this instance, however the situation that crew can find themselves in can be very challenging.


As always it is not the actions of the pilots alone that lead to such tragedies.

I don't see why. Somewhere in the preamble of the MEL that affects my operation there's a comment, for example, that the PIC must assess the implications of multiple MEL, and other operating conditions.

I recall an incident many years ago under Mr Smith's Class E from FL245 to A045 (or similar) where an F/O left an aeroplane because "expediency" approved flight with a u/s TCAS, rather than fix it. That captain's position on the day was, "it can be MELd so I can't say no." This thought process overrode the Ops Manual that required repair in a location that repairs could be made, and the warning preamble.

The F/O in my opinion made the correct decision and whist asked to explain their actions there was no disciplinary action.

An impartial observer may have said that the original approval to operate was designed solely to avoid a delay.

Wow - those certificates must be very special and magical. :eek:

Certificates have the effect of ensuring compliance with standards? Of what are they made? Unicorn poop?

My major gripe with this mob is the volume of low hour, and very young pilots they pump out. They basically crew every delivery off cadets. Most reputable carriers have solid check and training standards that back these programs up (think Easy/Ryan). These guys do not.

This mob has at least a dozen "Senior First Officer's" on its A330 fleet younger than 25. Can't say I'd be too crash hot going from a 172 to an A330.

Now everyone can fly..

They were advertising for captains for the A330 recently.

"Minimum Age 26"

Quite simple I said, just hire one of your 26yr old A320 Captains..:ugh:

While I do see the point about better airlines having better training schemes, there's nothing preventing a mid twenty something from being an airline Captain (at one of the better airlines) if they're up to the job. Get them out of High School at 18, then a two year comprehensive training course and then 5/6 years as an FO will give them 4/5000hrs jet time, nothing stopping them from then progressing to the LH seat if they're up to the task. It has happened in Aus carriers in the past:

British Airways hands 21-year-old dream job as a pilot | Daily Mail Online

Age doesn't matter, its the basic training that counts.
British Airways put many new entrants in their early 20s from their training Academy into the RH seat of B737/A320/B757 with 200 + hours. After 50 sectors under supervision released to line, initially for some months with experienced Capt.
Many are now retiring as Capts after after many years of safe accident free operation.
I have a friend in the RAF, she was a Capt. on the TriStar Tanker/transport, in her late 20s, with 2000 hours total. Flew into many 'In Theatre' airfields in various recent war zones safely and competently.
Its the quality of the person and training that counts.

One simple solution regarding system resets:


Make a log entry for every defect.


Too often Engineers are called to the aircraft with a defect just prior to departure. A simple reset rectifies the defect and no Maintenance Log entry is made.


Every Maintenance Log entry has to be rectified / cleared IAW approved data.


No log entry means no record.

Did the previous crew write it up as a smoke/fume event? No engineer in their right mind will pen off a smoke event which stops after a recirc fan is isolated, with just a reset. That sort of negligence should be reported to CASA.

"This was greeted with confused looks, and a chat in a walkie talkie, and then the asian equivalent of "she'll be right mate".


What can I say!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A few (maybe 7 ) years ago I got to an aerobridge about 730 am . Smoke was coming out of the plane onto the aerobridge . The CSS insisted I come onboard and start safety checks etc . I didn't . WTF. The tech crew arrived shortly after and got everyone (crew only - bar me ) off . Sometimes get there itis is very dangerous. There had been multiple write ups about the "issue" in the tech log I think .

Trouble shooting systems is a dying art.
Seems to me that only those who are "mechanics" can do so, "engineers" seem to be in love with their title.

FWIW