With all due respect, that is just an incompetent who probably shouldn't be on the flight deck --- not an argument for flying on A/P.
If the passengers can tell the difference between the A/P and hand flying, that is a measure of how somebody's hand flying skills have deteriorated or were not good enough in the first place.

Tootle pip!!

A must read!
 

Got this from the guy himself. I was introduced to him in SIN a few days ago. He is a Boeing instructor now on their 787 sim in SIN.

Cheers

HR

"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the 400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, its a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all got it and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce normal standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt compute that you needed to be a 1000 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldnt pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued to fly while talking about how unfair Captain "Brown" was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested Radar Vectors to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then Cleared for the approach and he could have selected Exit Hold and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to Extend the FAF and he couldnt understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was Hold at XYZ. Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. Its actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they dont trust the people to not start WWIII by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they dont get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250 after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."

(signed)

would appear that it's not limited to Asian carriers,
Incident: Jetstar A320 enroute on Mar 12th 2014, alpha floor activation

Captain with well known Middle Eastern carrier operating wide-bodies turned off his flight director to keep his hand on raw data VMC climb after passing 10,000 ft.


Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.


How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.

I doubt this incident would happen in an Asian carrier as it involved disconnecting the A/P and the A/T and operating the speedbrake at high altitude! This seems to be a situation when you shouldn't be practicing your manual flying skills. There is a memory item to cover this situation, the crew should just have followed that.

JQ A320

"..noticed the airspeed was increasing"

"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"

Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?

.....who said they were even trained for this situation?
Perhaps it may have been discussed about 5 years ago during endorsement/line training and never thought about after.

One thing that stands out to me these days is the "training down " element rather than "training up", a legacy of inexperience in all areas if you'll excuse the expression.

Jetstar are not alone.

Who said you should be trained for such an event?

Leave the A/P engaged. Just ask a KA pilot what can happen if you don't.

Trained? Just read your FCOM, I can't think if a single case where a potential overspeed should be dealt with by disconnecting the A/P. My aircraft FCOM specifically states not to.

Try the Airbus A320 QRH overspeed checklist

Might suggest you do the same, this is what it states;

Lookleft, thankyou.

Lookleft,

Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment :=, I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.

Rarely is anything black and white.

Or it might have been a reference to the autothrust and autopilot bit! The question he was quoting was:

He seemed to be suggesting that the crew were trained IAW the Overspeed checklist which, as I posted, is the complete opposite.

The original poster replied to me in this fashion whereas you have gone with Bouquets and brickbats I suppose but I still stand by what I wrote based on what was written by CC! If CC wants to clarify what he wrote fine, I'm not sure that your intrepretation of my intepretation of what CC interpreted of oicur12.again's post has actually added anything to the conversation.:ugh:

Good on him to only have to endure tea and biscuits with a warning...in Korean Air, he will be filling out applications and sending out resumes!

The QRH overspeed checklist should really include a statement about the effect of selecting max speed brake at high level near the REC MAX altitude.

Air Crash Investigations TV. Ethiopean Airlines loss of control on night departure
 

TV Channel 7Two in Melbourne Tuesday 25 March 9.30pm.

This crash was the archetypal lack manual flying skills versus automation dependency - a subject frequently discussed over recent years in Pprune. The 737 departs on an uncomplicated SID at night over water. The captain gets disorientated, the co-pilot is no help at all, the aircraft eventually stalls and spirals into the sea off the cost of Lebanon with the crew not having a clue how to recover. If ever this was proof that manual raw data flying skills are vital for airline pilots, then see this particular Air Crash Investigation.

Having said that, although I have read the original accident report, there is no guarantee the accident depicted in this TV series, is a faithful reproduction of what really happened in the cockpit. Expect the usual screaming passengers of course.

The 737 FCTM has this to say if the overspeed occurs in high altitude cruise flight:

'When correcting an overspeed during cruise at high altitude, avoid reducing thrust to idle which results in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust and may result in over-controlling the airspeed or loss of altitude. If autothrottle corrections are not satisfactory, deploy partial speed brakes slowly until a noticeable reduction of airspeed is achieved. When the airspeed is below VMO/MMO, retract the speed brakes at the same rate as they were deployed. The thrust levers can be expected to advance slowly to achieve cruise airspeed; if not they should be pushed up more rapidly"

... which is interesting because the "overspeed" checklist doesn't mention speedbrakes, only thrust and attitude.

Bottom line, a brief overspeed is not the end of the world. The wings dont pop off 3 knots into the red on a modern jet.

Folks,
If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.
At the risk of stating the bleeding obvious, going a bit fast has nothing like the hazard of going "too slow".
Upsets happen at low speed, not high speed. We have come a long way since B707 days, "mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.
Tootle pip!!

Puzzled on that remark. Is that because of the protection against natural mach tuck, and which are now built in to the design features on todays jet transports?

Its not a question of your suitability for flight deck duties but in this day and age you won't be considered suitable to be on the flight deck if you don't consult the QRH (if its not a memory item)! A bit like the tailpipe fire-do you do it from memory or read the procedure form the QRH? All good unless you stuff it up then the first question asked will be "Did you follow the procedure as laid out in the QRH?" I am not disagreeing with you Leadie but if you start following any procedures other than whats been laid out then the limb you are out on will not be supported by the rest of the tree.

I've never failed a check flight or simulator session for the following.

FMC scratchpad message: "MORE DRAG REQUIRED"

Common sense tells me to fly the aircraft where I want it to be flown & correct the flight path, speed or configuration. Maybe even ask for a speed waiver.

If I do that, the message will disappear.

However my QRH CHECKLIST INTRODUCTION chapter or company procedure indicates I should be calling for the "FMC MESSAGE NON NORMAL CHECKLIST".

Same logic applies to a overspeed, fly the aircraft first.

MC

Folks,
Firstly, let me say that I have only flown Boeing large aircraft, not Airbus, and only worked for airlines that expected the pilot in command to be the pilot in command, and a pilot.
However, I doubt that Airbus says much different to Boeing. ie: Read the fine print for the "let out" statements empowering the PIC.
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate, by any statement that this is limited to those items that have recall items, and is limited to those recall items only, or, for that matter, limited to only procedures in the QRH.
I repeat, if a pilot cannot arrest an overspeed (or underspeed), having determined the reason, without reference to a QRH. should not be on the flight deck and certainly not be the PIC.
Any management that produces purported policies that seek to limit the authority of the pilot in command, particularly if they are contrary to the AFM, and as described by some of you, is not fit to be in an executive management position in an airline.
Some years ago, twice, Qantas had A330 suffer sever altitude excursions (with cabin crew/passenger injuries), the proper immediate actions were to disconnect the AP and regain control of the aircraft.
There was criticism, at the time, of the PIC's actions, the usual armchair pundits and Monday morning were critical of the crews not "using the QRH".
Is anybody here seriously suggesting that the crews, in such circumstance, should leave the AP/AT engaged while the aeroplane is horsing around all over the sky, while they dig out the QRH, to see what it says???
Needless to say, in each case, the pilots were confident in their abilities to hand fly the aeroplane anywhere in its flight envelope ---- that only comes from practice hand flying at all altitudes.
In another example, speaking of personal experience, a pilot mishandles reverse in gusty crosswinds, resulting in a stall and rapidly rising EGT ---- what are you going to do?? Let the engine cook. while you slow down enough to even think of digging out the QRH, which does not have a recall item, but does have a procedure that leads to shutting the engine down?? Or just shut the engine down ?? Having done the latter, I limited the EGT overtemp. to nothing more than an inspection on next base maintenance visit. To have "followed the procedure" would have resulted in an engine change.
Also speaking of personal experience of engine failures, I have always opted to disconnect the AP/AT early in an asymmetric approach, to make certain all the trims are where I want them and I am physically "plugged in", in both cases an engine out AP Autoland was not an option (one was the IGS at Kai Tak ). Not a good time to find out your personal flying skills are not up to date.
Things like this might only happen once (or never) in a career, but if they do, it is a very poor show if the PIC is found wanting for skills adequate for the situation.
Tootle pip!!

Agree with you whole heartedly Leadie, but
Spare a thought for GA operators, who lack the legal department or funds, who are obliged to set in cement in their ops manuals that the PIC has no perogative to do anything but blindly follow the QRH.
To disagree with the FOI's opinion results in the "Not fit and proper person" threat being marched out, or your manual not approved so your CEO is left with a few Million bucks worth of machinery he cant use.
How much of this is being pushed by our "Safety" regulator??

Airbus FCOM is "for guidance only".

It is not written in stone.

FCOM is "for guidance only"...
 

Our friends at CASA have made an art form of insisting that the guidance is indeed cast in stone! :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:


Otherwise, they would have to search for some intellect and some understanding of what "not unreasonable" actually means... best of luck on that! :{ :{ :{

Are we missing the point?
Surely that is to follow the correct procedures, whether from memory or by reference.
The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.

My understanding is that the Boeing preamble of this:

is in relation to this:

Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.

Leadie your A330 scenarios pre-date the QRH procedure now specified for an overspeed. One of the A330 altitude excursions was to do with flight control software problems and not a simple overspeed. So like your EGT overtemp experience a unique circumstance and one where PIC experience and judgement is required, I am not disagreeing with you on that point. All manufacturers and operators expect you to follow the published procedures in the first instance. Airbus state that with an overspeed your first action is extend the speedbrakes to full. If you're going to start disconnecting the A/P and A/T and cock it up then you really have no where to go in defending your actions. Merely stating that "I was the PIC and felt that I could handle the situation in a manner different to that specified by the manufacturer." leaves the CP shaking his head muttering "Another test pilot wannabe."

Leadsled, relax.

The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.

If I subsequently use speedbrake to arrest an overspeed when I could have just used thrust/attitude, and the resulting turbulent airflow causes damage the the elevator trim tab, I may have to explain why I acted contrary to the FCOM. (The early Boeing 737NG had issues with high speed speedbrake use on the elevator trim tab which needed an AD to address.)

The "out" which is referred to in a post above is available if the PIC believes that following the FCOM will result in a reduced safety outcome, or if the PIC believes that an alternative course of action will result in an increased safety outcome.

Sound knowledge of the FCOM and the experience of when to follow it or not is what determines who should be on the flight deck. It's not just WWII stick and rudder skills anymore. But yes, you do need to know how and when it is appropriate to hand fly the aircraft, and practice same when conditions are appropriate.

Leadie,
I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
The impossible happened, the engine maintained climb thrust, by the time the crew woke up to exactly what had happened the aircraft was on its back heading down.
We tried to reproduce the event in a simulator, had to dodgy up the software to get it to do it, but in all instances where the crew took immediate manual control the situation was recoverable, those that remained on auto pilot crashed.
I do believe with the best will in the world you can't write procedures to cover every event that may happen. At the end of the day it must come down to a judgement call by the PIC. If thats to be taken away, then automate the whole thing and do away with pilots altogether.

Leadsled,

The post further back was to do with the mishandling of an overspeed by the crew on an A320.

As posted - the QRH actions for an AIRBUS for overspeed CLEARLY state

AP:KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER .... FULL
THRUST REDUCTION .... MONITOR

Whilst not officially a memory item - it essentially is- because you don't have time to consult the qrh when encountering an overspeed.

The Jetstar crew handled this extremely poorly, of which I can only assume it is due to a lack of training in the sim of overspeed events.

There is no place for handling a big jet at 41000 ft manually. Humans just can't do it as well as an autopilot to handle the reduced longitudinal stability at high altitude.

Just a point of order. My QRH for the B737NG does not have 'overspeed' as a memory item. In fact it now has no actions at all! Also, there is a current bulletin titled 'Reduced Engine Response Times' that recommends the use of speedbrake when experiencing a sudden increase in airspeed, in order to avoid large thrust reductions.

The industry is quite dynamic & constantly changing, so it is often wise not to be too dogmatic about some issues.

I also agree with LeadSled. A pilot who knows how to actually fly, rather than just manage, would know what to do in order to slow the aircraft down safely & should not have to refer to the printed word.

ThornBird,
As a matter of interest, a good mate of mine was the Captain of that Lauda flight into Bangkok, a problem with the thrust reverser was evident on that previous flight, and logged. It manifested itself as non-normal rudder trim inputs on climb. As a captain on functionally identical B767 at the time, my interest was more than casual. I agree entirely that the situation was recoverable by disconnecting the AP/AT, and hand flying, we tried just about every possible combination in the sim.

Lookleft,
Not so, it was a general statement, not quite Mr. Boeing's exact words.

I would take a small bet that there is no statement in a B777 manual that could be reasonably interpreted as meaning the above.

Indeed, although not quite in these words: "If it can happen, it will", there is a statement in the Boeing aircraft I have flown, that tells the crew that Boeing do not claim to cover all possible eventualities, in (hopefully) rare cases, a properly trained and experienced crew will have to make it up as they go along.

Re. the two A330 incidents (accidents??) I mentioned, I am well aware of the details, and the eventual cause determined, the (Northrop??) ADCs were fitted to a variety of aircraft.

I find the difference between the Boeing and Airbus checklists interesting re. use of speedbrake. It always seems to me that Airbus logic in this area is a little strange. A bit like putting a foot on the brake, without taking your foot off the accelerator on a car.

Boeing has long cautioned the use of speedbrake, going back to the B707, the turbulent wake caused cumulative damage to the horizontal stab. Later model Boeing aircraft I have flown suppress inboard spoilers to limit turbulent air over the horizontal stabs.

I recall some of the logic in the A-310, where such as a flap overspeed with AP/AT engaged was "controlled" with an auto-trim pitch up, instead of a power reduction. This was in part the reason for the loss of an A-310 at Nagoya, and a spectacular loss of control over Paris, only a very smart pilot, handflying, recovered control. REcovery on AP was not possible.

Both accident reports are well worth reading, particularly those of you who doubt the value of keeping your hand flying skills 100% up to scratch.

Remember, it is modern "glass" aircraft that gave rise to significant additions to flightdeck vocabulary, being: "I haven't seen that one before" and " What's the bastard doing to us now". And: "Now I can't fly for sh1t, but I can type 100wpm". Make certain you can still fly.

As Asiana didn't realise, mode confusion can be a really seriously dangerous problem, hardly a new discovery. The guaranteed solution, in flight is: "Eliminate the suspect mode(s)" --- which will often mean hand flying.

Tootle pip!!

Useful debate, good reading. Learning lots.

I find it interesting that in the past 12 months we have seen several events unfold as the result of inappropriate use of automation.

The obvious one being Asiana.

But the 744 and the 737 that landed at the wrong airports in the US could also be considered the result of inappropriate use of automation, albeit under reliance versus over reliance. Both events could well have had fatal outcomes and both were probably the result of completely ignoring the assistance that onboard systems were providing. Indeed the 744 was conducting a GPS approach at the time and the crew must have completely botched some crossing heights to arrive at the pavement several miles short of where the ND was telling them where to go.

Just goes to show that although Southwest pilots hand fly more than most others (encouraged to and MANY sectors flown) it still doesn’t mean we get a good result every time.

Absolutely correct no Boeing manual does but it is certainly suggested in this article in Aero 8 from 1999.

My bolding. But we are in furious agreement on the need for pilots to practice their manual flying skills and for PICs to exercise their responsibility when the need arises.

Obviously not complex enough... :cool:

Just to clear something up with the Lauda Air accident, this is one of the findings from the accident report
Boeing had never modelled a thrust reverser deployment at high speed and it was only after extrapolating from low speed testing that any model was input into the simulators. Only by using extreme control inputs within a 4-6 second window could the situation be recovered by Boeing test pilots.

I seem to remember that Nikki Lauda had to put a lot of pressure on Boeing to admit that it was a design fault in the reverser system and not pilot error.

But that is what you have to do in extreme situations, use the limits of the control available. 4 to 6 seconds is a lifetime in a critical situation.
All procedures for deployment of reverse in flight have the same starting point, thrust to idle, then shut down the offending engine, having confirmed it is the correct engine to shut down
Where asymmetric thrust is an immediate problem, get rid of the asymmetry.
I am not, for one moment, suggesting pilot error was the cause of the accident, but it was recoverable, and there was at least some advanced warning of a reverser problem.
At least some B767 simulators, at the time, had a model for reverse thrust in flight, but I have no idea of the parameters.
Tootle pip!!