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-   -   Airbus A380, A6-EDA Inflight Engine Failure ATSB Final Report (https://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/523181-airbus-a380-a6-eda-inflight-engine-failure-atsb-final-report.html)

601 9th Sep 2013 01:43

Airbus A380, A6-EDA Inflight Engine Failure ATSB Final Report
 
This sentence from the Report does not make any sense.


Safety message
While the distress to the HPT was severe enough in this case to result in an in-flight engine shutdown, the associated risks to the safety of continued flight were relatively low, given the failure had been contained and the operator’s procedures were effective in managing the engine shut down. This occurrence also pointed to the value of real-time engine condition monitoring, since advanced warning of engine degradation and efficiency loss allows inspection and corrective action before damage progresses to a level where it can cause an in-flight shut down.
If the real-time engine condition monitoring was doing its job, the problem would have been detected and this shutdown would not have occurred.

SIUYA 9th Sep 2013 03:06

See Safety Analysis on p.8 of the report...


During the previous flight, the engine manufacturer’s condition monitoring program had noted some adverse trends in the engine’s operating parameters, prompting the issue of an Urgent Remote Diagnostic Notice that alerted the operator to the potential deterioration of the aircraft’s No 3 engine high pressure compressor (HPC) efficiency. As a result, an inspection of the engine was scheduled upon the aircraft’s return to the main base in Dubai. At the time of the failure event, the engine’s exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and HPC trend monitoring criteria were not yet at a level that would have required an immediate inspection of the engine.
I can't understand why the aircraft was cleared to do another sector AFTER an Urgent Remote Diagnostic Notice was issued as a result of adverse trends in the engine operating parameters.

:confused:

max AB 9th Sep 2013 03:36


At the time of the failure event, the engine’s exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and HPC trend monitoring criteria were not yet at a level that would have required an immediate inspection of the engine.
Maybe that's why.....

Centaurus 9th Sep 2013 07:27


Safety message

While the distress to the HPT was severe enough in this case to result in an in-flight engine shutdown, the associated risks to the safety of continued flight were relatively low, given the failure had been contained and the operator’s procedures were effective in managing the engine shut down. .
Maybe I have misunderstood the ATSB statement that says "the associated risks of continued flight were relatively low".

But as I read it, ATSB would have happily given the green light for the captain to continue all the way on three engines to its destination 15 hours away if he elected to choose that course of action. We know these engines are reliable but isn't the ATSB statement stretching their trust of these engines a bit too far, as well as encouraging risk taking?

donpizmeov 9th Sep 2013 08:16

Its the trade off of continuing on three to destination or somewhere else down route vs landing at 560t (190ish t) above landing weight) vs flying around to reduce weight (still going to be over weight as the 380 won't dump to landing weight). Two ENG drift down still clears all the hills in oz. The curfew at Sydney is a pain in the arse, maybe better options for pax and company at PER and SIN.
Its nice to have options. Think 10 sqn even shut em down to stay in the air longer Centaurus. But it was never the same when it left TVL.

The don.

4dogs 9th Sep 2013 09:03

Perhaps it is even simpler
 
Centaurus,

Perhaps it merely says that the ATSB thinks that the failure was relatively benign, despite the metal rain on someone's roof (but no-one's head!) in Riverstone NSW, because there was no collateral damage to the aircraft of any significance and that the operator's procedures for engine failure were appropriate. :ok:

There is no discussion about alternative courses of action to dumping fuel and landing back at Sydney - the absence of which I take to be tacit approval of the decision NOT to continue. :D

For the life of me, I cannot understand how you came up with the (somewhat random) thought that the ATSB was endorsing a continuation of the flight to the destination... :=

donpizmeov 9th Sep 2013 09:34

Dogs,

Can you quantify how much safer it is flying to PER (for example) in a 737 on two than a 380 on three?

The don.

max AB 9th Sep 2013 10:11

OMG....better ground all those three engined jets around the globe....then what about the twins...them too. Only safe jet is a single engine one IMHO..it's only 1/8 as unsafe as a B52!!!

Ollie Onion 10th Sep 2013 01:16

I would have thought that an urgent inspection would not be required due to the fact that the risk of the reported parameters resulting in an engine failure in the immediate future were deemed to be low.

Also even if the end result was going to be an engine shutdown, losing one of four engines is not an overly dramatic occurrence. It is not ideal or desirable but the impact on the aircraft safety is negligible. As with most 'airline safety' it is about managing risk, the risk here did not warrant a grounding of the aircraft.

peuce 10th Sep 2013 02:52


Also even if the end result was going to be an engine shutdown, losing one of four engines is not an overly dramatic occurrence.
I daresay QF32 shows otherwise.

You can't make a blanket determination...every engine failure is different..and requires different assessments and different solutions.

You could have a single engine failure on a B52 cause significant damage. It's not in relation to the number of engines on board...engine computers aren't that smart.

Ollie Onion 10th Sep 2013 03:05

Well I would beg to differ. The entire design of the airframe and engine is based upon 'containing' engine failures.

Obviously the QF example is in the extreme, most engine failures are not overly dramatic. Infact the entire premise of ETOPS is based on their being an acceptable risk given that there WILL be a number of In Flight Shut Downs (IFSD).

I am just saying that given a number of indications that may show the engine in question was not operating normally it is quite acceptable to continue with that engine in service as long as all of the indications still fall within acceptable parameters. I have taken aircraft that may show a higher than normal oil consumption, or indeed one a few weeks ago that needed to be checked at the start of every flight day due to debris being found in the oil. If we were so worried about all engine failures resulting in QF like damage we should be grounding aircraft as soon as engines show any signs of abnormal operation. We don't do that because it is not always a given that an engine failure will occur and even if it does chances are the actual 'failure' won't result in any damage or put the aircraft in any imminent danger.

Wally Mk2 10th Sep 2013 03:09

Obviously the loss of one powerplant on a multi eng A/C is all about loss of performance & system degradation, the latter usually taken care of by by multiple redundancies built into 2day's modern airliners.
Any decision based on the above to continue a good commander takes into account all the possibilities going on or returning to either the Dep drome or an Alt drome.
'Peuce' sums it up well, every Eng failure is diff.
Commercialism is also taken into account but should be the least featured thought in a commander mindset.
Even heavily monitored engines can fail & do unexpectedly after all they are machines designed by the hand of man & therefore subject to failure.

Wmk2


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