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In view of the dependance we all have in electronic distribution of data, it shouldn't be too hard for a boffin to find a way of attaching to the flight plan, the information the pilot (crew) has on departure - perhaps quoting a Naips reference.
Anything later could be automatically flagged and passed via Airservices or the company if approved. Non users of Naips might need another authorised reference? |
I have noticed from a few audits where CASA have issued a NCN because the PIC has not updated their weather forecasts for the next landing point before departure.
Not one, that I know of, have asked about updating weather forecasts in flight. |
Not one, that I know of, have asked about updating weather forecasts in flight. |
Effectiveness of Airline Operational Control
Thanks topdrop, your post #767 confirms my understanding of Airservices' responsibilities with respect to the distribution of operational information to aircraft in flight. However, given this incident, Airservices may need to review its distribution procedures in the event of an unplanned automatic broadcast service failure (e.g. MIA AWIS).
So, given the above and assuming no technical facility or equipment failures, it would appear that the responsibility for updating the flight crew of YIR on the changed meteorological conditions at YPAD, after YIR had already departed from YBBN, lies squarely with Virgin; either with the airline operations controllers or the flight crew themselves. If the responsibility lies with the airline operations controllers, then what facilities do they have to communicate data to their flight crews whilst they are in-flight; or are the flight crew expected to use their own initiative to receive updates through AERIS and/or specific Flightwatch request once they have flight planned and departed? My reason for focusing on this particular aspect is because I seem to recall (I could be wrong with my facts here) that a similar incident occurred with a Virgin flight bound for Cairns (with marginal weather) some years ago where the flight crew was caught out when the Cairns ILS unexpectedly failed whilst they were in flight, and they weren't notified until they received the Cairns ATIS and were also faced with limited ALTN options due to their critical fuel state. When the ATC operational control function was disbanded some years ago (1985?) somebody (CAA/BASI?) undertook a review of the capability of Australia's domestic airlines to assume the operational control function from ATC prior to the function being disbanded. My recollection was that one of the key findings of this review noted that the domestic airlines were not well positioned to assume this function at the the time for a number of reasons. It would be most interesting if this report could be located and compared to today's current practice. If the major airlines are not up to speed on operational control, considering the level of resources available to them, then what is the situation with Australia's regional and smaller airlines? If all my recollections are correct, then clearly there is a need for ATSB/CASA to undertake another review of the effectiveness of airline operations control functions exercised by Australia's airlines considering the abolition of ATC Operational Control and the FIS delivery functions once provided by the Flight Service Units located at regional aerodromes (like the Mildura FSU). If such a review is not undertaken in the near future, I fear it will only be a matter of time before something goes horribly wrong and everyone will be running around saying: IT WASN'T MY FAULT ! |
QSK,
ATC Operational control was shutdown in 1991. |
QSK,
I don't remember the Virgin Cairns incident. Failure of the Cairns ILS will be passed to aircraft within 1 hours flight time at time of failure. When the NOTAM is issued advising ILS not available, the NOTAM will be issued to those within 1 hours flight time when NOTAM is received by ATC. Aircraft outside the 1 hour is responsibility of company or pilot We regularly pass info to aircraft more than 1 hour away - I tend to add 30 mins to it. I don't know if failure of AWIS is NOTAMed, but AERIS is certainly NOTAMed. We occasionally get queried by pilots as to why they didn't receive amended TAF or TTF. I don't remember any queries where the aircraft concerned was within 1 hour. We recently had a query from a QF pilot as to why the ATIS being received by ACARS was 2 or 3 issues out of date. Turns out there was a problem with QF ACARS. Do pilots get informed of ACARS issues so pilots will look elsewhere for operational information or do the companies use alternative routing to pass operational information? |
In view of the dependance we all have in electronic distribution of data, it shouldn't be too hard for a boffin to find a way of attaching to the flight plan, the information the pilot (crew) has on departure - perhaps quoting a Naips reference. Anything later could be automatically flagged and passed via Airservices or the company if approved. Non users of Naips might need another authorised reference? As an ATC the only reason I can see for using one hour prior to ETA, is an underlying assumption that every crew, by whatever means, will update their met/NOTAM brief inside one hour of arrival themselves. However, given this incident, Airservices may need to review its distribution procedures in the event of an unplanned automatic broadcast service failure (e.g. MIA AWIS). If the major airlines are not up to speed on operational control, considering the level of resources available to them, then what is the situation with Australia's regional and smaller airlines? |
I did flight data for Ops Control and I don't think anyone involved in it or knew about it were under any misapprehension as to the waste and exorbitant cost of it. Something had to be done, problem is, you put it under airline control and looky-looky at what happens.
I also flew as a VFR pilot when Flight Service was around, it too was expensive to run. It could have survived with the right re-structuring. It was a great resource to all pilots. MIA wouldn't have happened if it was still around. We seem to be like a little kid poking it's hand into a lions cage just to see how far we can push it before we lose a hand. Every day is one day closer. |
TAATS has every pending and active IFR flight plan, and receives every forecast (amended or otherwise) and every NOTAM When ATC did ops control, it included a watch on destination and alternates, If we can't watch the alternate, the company will have to do it, so since they will (should) have the system in place for that, they might as well watch the destination as well. |
A lot of domestic flight plans do not have the alternate, if any, on it and as an Approach controller you don't have time to keep an eye on weather/NOTAMs for those alternates that you don't regularly receive at your console. They have to be requested from the system and could be amended 5 mins after you requested it and you wouldn't know. Alternates for Cairns can vary from Mareeba (10mins away) to Sydney or Alice Springs in the wet season. When ATC did ops control, it included a watch on destination and alternates, If we can't watch the alternate, the company will have to do it, so since they will (should) have the system in place for that, they might as well watch the destination as well. If the airlines want an ops watch on their altn, all they have to do is put it/them on the flight plan. We already have a computer that has all the necessary data to automatically ops watch every IFR aircraft in or entering the Australian FIR, why not use it? |
Nautilus,
Agree, that could work well. |
Crater in the mouldy Swiss cheese perhaps??
Besides the colourful language from the 'Heff', the following exchange from last Monday's Senate Estimates in regards to this incident is worth regurgitating...:cool::
Senator XENOPHON: Okay. I would be grateful for copies of those. I just want to ask a question that I asked in another committee, to the Bureau of Meteorology, and it relates to the emergency landing of a Virgin Australia 737 at Mildura in June of this year—is that familiar?—and the ATSB has provided a preliminary report. I was a bit unclear—I did not quite understand the bureau's response—as to who has responsibility for the automated weather information services. I thought, initially, the answer was that Airservices Australia did. But who actually has responsibility for the AWISs? Mr Hood : Senator, we are also obviously doing our own follow-up on the fog incidents in Adelaide and in Mildura. My understanding is that the airport is responsible for the maintenance of the AWIS, but we are following that up and if clarification is required of which agency is responsible— Senator XENOPHON: So it is not necessarily the Bureau of Meteorology, it is not Airservices Australia; it is the actual airport? Mr Hood : That is my understanding. But I am happy to take that on notice and provide a full response in relation to that. CHAIR: Just pausing there, why would that plane—is this the one that held over the airport and then did an illegal landing? Senator XENOPHON: Well, it wasn't illegal; it was all about running out of fuel. CHAIR: Yes, but you wouldn't— Senator XENOPHON: He was under the minimum. CHAIR: But why, in god's name? It could have gone to bloody Woomera or anywhere else. Why did it hang around there if the weather was ****? Mr Hood : Senator, we are also obviously— Senator XENOPHON: Did Hansard get the expletive on your part, Chair? CHAIR: But it's true. That could have been a fatal—just with a simple decision— Senator STERLE: With the greatest of respect, Mr Hood was about ready to answer and you just both jumped in on him. CHAIR: No, no. Senator STERLE: I reckon he could mix it with the pair of you! CHAIR: There is no simple answer. It was not very sensible to hold it— Senator STERLE: Chair, he didn't get the opportunity! He was just about ready to answer and then Senator Xenophon picked up on your choice of language and then you were all into it. CHAIR: But you will— Senator STERLE: You are doing it again. He hasn't got the answer. CHAIR: I haven't finished the question. Senator STERLE: You did. You just spoke then. CHAIR: You will concede that the guy could have diverted to Woomera or somewhere instead of risking a landing that could have been a catastrophe. Mr Hood : There are over four million aircraft movements in Australia a year, very few of which cause us significant concern. I think it is fair to say this is a concerning incident. We are cooperating fully with the ATSB. It is our hope that the ATSB will establish all of the facts and make appropriate recommendations, on which we will act. { Don't hold your breath on that one Hoody!:E} Senator XENOPHON: These AWISs, the automatic weather information services: who on earth owns them, controls them, is responsible for them? I am not any wiser now than I was this morning when I asked the Bureau of Meteorology. I am just trying to work it out. Ms Staib : We will take that on notice. As we said, we believe it is the airport's responsibility, but we will confirm that. Senator XENOPHON: So who runs Mildura Airport? Mr Mrdak : Mildura council. Mr Hood : I suppose this is one of the issues that is a line of inquiry for the ATSB. Anything that needs clarifying—these are the things that get uncovered in an incident such as this. Senator XENOPHON: From an operational point of view—the functioning of an automatic weather information service—the information from that is something that gets fed to air traffic control, correct? Mr Hood : Yes. We can interrogate the automatic weather information service. Senator XENOPHON: No. Is the automatic weather information service something that air traffic controllers have access to or does it only go to the pilot? How does it work? Mr Hood : It would take a lengthy explanation, but— Senator XENOPHON: Give me a short one. CHAIR: It is afternoon tea time, so make it short. Mr Hood : Primarily, our responsibility is the passing of terminal area forecasts and amended terminal area forecasts to the aviation industry and also meteorological products on request. Senator XENOPHON: If it is clearly relevant to air traffic control and the control of airspace—you know, if an airport is fogged in—is there a role for Air Services Australia, is there an obligation on Air Services Australia, to monitor whether an automatic weather information service is operating or not? Because apparently, as I understand it, in Mildura it was broken. Mr Hood : That is how I understand it also, and it is a line of inquiry— Senator XENOPHON: Don't you know about those sorts of things? Mr Hood : Is currently a line of inquiry for our procedures team as well. We are looking at that aspect. Senator XENOPHON: So I've got to wait for next estimates. CHAIR: I propose we go to afternoon tea. Mr Mrdak : Chair, I think Mr Wolfe can solve at least part of Senator Xenophon's mystery of the ownership of the system. Senator XENOPHON: And control and supervision. Mr Wolfe : I will be brief. The automatic weather information service, the AWIS, is as Mr Hood has indicated the responsibility of the airport operator. Inside the AWIS is an AWS, an automatic weather station, which is the Bureau of Meteorology's responsibility. The transmitter on top is the airport's; the weather station is BoM's. CHAIR: The thing that beggars me is how you can hold till you run out of fuel. Why, when you are coming to the point of a safe diversion, don't you get to buggery and divert? Why would you hold till you run out of fuel, unless you had a suicide mission in mind? Thank you, very much. We will come back after afternoon tea. Mr Mrdak : That is precisely what the ATSB is now examining. CHAIR: That is crazy. Someone should get the bullet over that. It is also interesting that he still shows a healthy respect for the ATsB and will action their final recommendations once the investigation is completed...hmm the question is will the bureau actually have any worthwhile SRs or will it all be (again) nicely wrapped with a politically correct pink bow??:rolleyes: |
Yes, Minister
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The thing that beggars me is how you can hold till you run out of fuel. Why, when you are coming to the point of a safe diversion, don't you get to buggery and divert? There is no simple answer. It was not very sensible to hold it He needs to realise that all decisions are based on information and if that information is corrupted, or inaccurate, the quality of the decision is affected. |
'Don't shoot the messenger!'
esquire2012:
There has to be a better way than the farce of Senate Estimates. More interested in finding a scapegoat (someone should get the bullet), than finding the underlying problems (job of the ATSB really) and providing the political means and ways to rectify it (duty to the public that elect and pay them) Here was a significant aviation incident that, as is documented throughout this thread, caused some serious debate about several underlying safety issues hidden within the layers of swiss cheese. However this thread died a natural death nearly 4 months ago.:{ However now it is brought to our attention again and is officially back on the public record, courtesy of the Senators.:D framer: It seems to me that the Chair is very quick to jump to the conclusion that the Captain made a blatantly poor decision and that he doesn't have a solid understanding of the subject he is commenting on. He needs to realise that all decisions are based on information and if that information is corrupted, or inaccurate, the quality of the decision is affected. |
Is YPWR even available as a alternate?
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Interesting observation.
Answers provided by Mr Hood compared with those of the CASA folk. It is no wonder they have no patience after the other BS yet when someone starts providing quality they can't let it flow. Go figure. |
I'd guess that MIA direct to WR 360 nm would burn at least 2000 kg if not more, so if the "Chair" had been PIC they'd have diverted to WR and run out of fuel. Onya Chair!
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What a bunch of fools commenting on stuff they no zero about.......
( apart from Nick ) Could someone ring Nick and fill him on on this? Comments from the chair like that are childish ill informed dribble and the chair needs to be put in his place. ********. |
My thoughts exactly, a public apology from Heffernan is not out of order.
1. YPWR is 60NM further than YMIA 2. YMIA was forecast fine and the nearest suitable aerodrome. 3. I don't believe they could have diverted to YPWR anyway as it wasn't an emergency at the point of diversion. YPWR needs 48 hours prior notice and is contained within a bunch of restricted areas. Yes you could go there on fire, but I don't think you could use it as a weather alternate. Heffernan is just trying to blame the PIC without actually looking at the evidence or having any understanding of the situation they were in. |
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