You are Monday morning quarterbacking again........

They had no way of knowing the Fog was going to lift inside 60 mins. At 61 mins the Tanks run dry and THEN THE **** REALLY DOES HIT THE FAN.......

I suggest the QF boys decision to bust the minima a little ( with full confidence in their HUD GPS LNAV ) to land ASAP was a damn good one.....

Go on Gazumpy. Enlighten me.

Well well. Gazumpy seems to be gazumped?

Post #46 says the QF 737 was still on the ground at Mildura at 3pm

I am trying to get my head around the wx for YMIA. My reading of the TAFs is we have the TAF issued at 1758 with TEMPO 19/24 BKN 006. The next TAF issued at 2302 but not becoming valid until 0000. Please correct me if I am wrong but I think they have both diverted to YMIA (ETA YMIA before 0000) with the forecast TEMPO BKN 006?

During pre flight the TAF---

TAF AMD YMIA 171758Z 1718/1812 24005KT 9999 SCT030 BKN060 BECMG 1718/1720 21006KT 9999 SCT006 SCT030 BECMG 1800/1802 18010KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 BECMG 1807/1809 16008KT 9999 SCT040 TEMPO 1719/1724 BKN006 RMK T 06 05 07 13 Q 1016 1018 1020 1019


The next TAF during descent into ADL--

TAF YMIA 172302Z 1800/1812 20008KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 RMK T 08 12 13 10 Q 1020 1019 1019 1020

Last TAF as they arrived MIA---

TAF AMD YMIA 172352Z 1800/1812 20007KT 3000 BR SCT003 BKN040 BECMG 1800/1801 19006KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 PROB30 1800/1802 0500 FG BKN002 RMK T 07 11 13 10 Q 1019 1019 1019 1020

THEY WERE LED UP THE GARDEN PATH.....

BKN 600' AGL is not below the minima......when they made the divert decisions there was no mention of BKN 600' or Fog and the METARS were ok...:hmm:

Tempo ended at 0000 so just need fuel for that plus 30mins. Both crew probably could have held for 30 and landed with FFR but that wasn't the wx they experienced so on arrival decided that it was better to conduct approach. As you probably know conducting approaches burns through the fuel much quicker than just being in a hold.

"Rules are for the guidance of wise men, and the obedience of fools."

Group Captain Sir Douglas Bader CBE, DSO & Bar, DFC & Bar, FRAeS, DL

Willadvise,

That is correct.

However the aircraft diverted to Mildura on the basis of the Metars. That is to say actual weather. Metars were not AUTO they were actual observations.

I dont know about Virgin but the Qantas had legal fuel on diversion. I think the report states 2.9 at mildura. They arrived at 2342z. Tempo ended at 2400z. So thats 18+30 = 45 mins holding fuel.

With regards to what Qantas did after the event, that is a matter for Qantas and has no bearing on the situation as it unfolded.

Hey gazumpy you still there?

I am waiting for your expert response.

This little incident will no doubt find its way into many TEM or CRM courses over the next 100 years or so and I can imagine that the debate has only just begun.

Two different airlines, two different operating cultures, flying the same aircraft dealing with the same dire situation with thankfully an outcome resulting in no loss of life or injury.

What really jumps out of that initial report and some questions I'd like answered are;

The Qantas aircraft sails straight in after at least one aircraft has conducted a missed approach and diverted, conducts one approach with sufficient fuel on board and decides to just 'bust' minima, does so by 'only 150 feet', gets visual, sweet as, lands, refuels and continues on its merry way no worries!

The Virgin aircraft then conducts a missed approach after the Qantas aircraft had landed. I guess they were very lucky the fog cleared enough in those few minutes that they only had to 'bust' the minima by 150 feet because both before and after their landing other aircraft couldn't get in.

How much below the minima did the Qantas crew really go? Was this a classic case of getinitis and deference?

What was the Qantas crew's plan of action should they not get visual by busting minima off their first approach? This it appears, was not discussed.

Once you start making up your own minima and instrument approach conditions, on the fly, at an unfamiliar airport things start to get very sticky. A plan of action needs to be discussed, as was done by the Virgin crew.

Why wasn't the Qantas crew stood down immediately after such a serious incident?

They are the facts and they are the questions I can guarantee you will be asked by the ATSB and also the regulator during the process of investigating this incident :ok:

Capt Fathom

I may have written that poorly.
1384 was our original aircraft and it was still there when we left on a replacement Virgin 737

From memory the Qantas aircraft passengers did not leave the aircraft. I think it departed around midday or shortly after.

We left around 3

Kris

Complypot, who says the Qantas pilots didn't discuss their plan had they not got visual? Were you in the cockpit?

Compylot

The report does not detail the qantas discussions.

You have no way of knowing what the Qantas crew discussed so to make such a blanket assumption is absurd.

Nor do you have any insight into what the qantas crew might have done if they did not become visual. You may speculate but it means nothing.

You state that qantas just sails in with SUFFICIENT FUEL. Sufficient for what?

The Qantas guys can see that the fog is becoming a problem they know that aircraft have missed by flying to minima. They plan to fly 200 feet below minima on their first attempt, its in the report and they get visual.

What did you expect them to do fly around mildura on a scenic tour waiting for the fog to clear?

Clearly both busted minima on the first go. Just because we are provided with some insight into virgins decision making process does not mean that qantas didnt have a process.

Gazumpy says that the virgin crew did not yet have a fuel emergency on their first attempt yet they busted minima anyhow.

Qantas busts minima on first attempt and gets hammered by you guys.

Why cant you virgin guys just accept that 2 crew managed 2 seperate aircraft in their own way as part of a response to a difficult situation.

One landed with FFR intact and one did not. So what. They both managed the situation to a safe outcome.

From my armchair, and I believe the Pilots did an excellent job considering the circumstances.

Cloud on the TAf with 600 ft even though sct should be a warning to avoid especially without an ILS.
The companies and CASA allow domestic Aircraft to operate without an alternate subject to WX requirements.
As ADL did not require an Alternate until arrival then obviously an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.
The companies and CASA are mostly to blame , the Pilots dealt with the situation very well , a minima bust was inevitable through no fault of their own, I think an ILS is better for the situation in all cases.
Also because somebody diverts somewhere it may not be the correct choice for the next guy too, different fuel states etc...(the follow like sheep scenario I am not saying this is what happened but it is worth mentioning) .

How did this get turned into a QF v VA thing??

A very ordinary day at the office yet safe outcomes prevailed with very few options available.
Well done to both crews.
If this rears its head in the media again, I only hope the professionalism of both crews is highlighted, something that was lost on the initial reports.

My only disappointment, that both crews didn't down tools and head off to the nearest bar for a solid debrief ;)

Correct.

The report DOES detail the discussions by the Virgin crew though.

So either the Qantas crew didn't discuss what to do should they not get visual or it wasn't included in the prelim report... It seems on the surface that the Qantas crew were committed to getting in on that first approach no matter what.

This isn't virgin vs qantas, this is an analysis of the facts. Deidentify the airlines involved and present this scenario to any airline pilot worth his salt and I can guarantee that the same questions would be raised.

an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.

(very dated observation here)

Whether we like it or not, the reality is that we can be called to account for our decisions after the event.

If a crew elects not to comply with one or more specific requirements and the outcome is unfortunate then two situations arise -

(a) there was another reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.

Becomes a very tenuous argument to sustain the original decision in the face of an aggressive barrage by skilled counsel or a Regulator hell bent on taking action against the pilot's licence.

(b) there was no other reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.

Far easier to sustain the original decision in court or at whichever inquisition is relevant.

Looking back some years when forecasting was very problematic with respect to fog conditions, I can't recall any crews of my acquaintance who didn't religiously consider dew point, temperature split, cloud cover, wind expectation, high/low, etc. This was especially so heading off to those airports notorious for being fog lovers ... motoring westbound to PER or southbound to LST/HBA late at night bring back more than a few memories ..

We all got plenty of practice at PNR calculations on the way (no FMS etc. toys back then - maybe the odd hand held calculator but, mostly, it was smoke off the prayer wheels).

Every now and again, folks got caught out but experience managed to win the day (night, as the case may have been). One can even recall tales similar to the present events .. mind you, one would never have been involved in such things, oneself ... :uhoh:

The other consideration ... delaring an emergency at the time makes the commander's perception of the situation much clearer to all the players.

The QF landing and previous autolands these past few weeks has begun to concern me. Unless the report is leaving out something, did qf declare a pan and fuel emergency? If not , why not. They busted minimums. Why did they bust minimums and land with 2.1, almost 1hr? My concern is not a qf vs va thing, but perhaps there is a more accepted culture at qf of autoland below minima etc that has crept in?

Reminds me of my old job where the gpws was very intermittent. Everybody just kept flying it like that because that's the way it has always been until a new pilot came in and essentially said wtf! We got so used to it thought it was ok.

Hopefully I'm wrong and more facts to come.

You guys just dont get it do you?

Put yourselves in the QF drivers seat for a moment.

You arrive at the circuit and you know that aircraft have missed out on approaches to the minima. ... its in the report.

You know that the weather is getting worse just by observation. ...its in the report

You know that you dont have fuel to divert...its in the report.

What would you do?

Top post JT! Very enlightening and I have a question (my bold): So don't crew do that anymore, if not why not? And is it even taught in CPL/ATPL Meteorology syllabus or is it all rote learning these days (i.e. the forecast on the box doesn't indicate any probs so it should be fine)?:confused:

I know from flogging around in WA with RUFDUS in the middle of the night, in the cooler months and in particular on long legs (like PD to JT) I would religiously do what you described JT and it saved my bacon several times. It also wasn't that long ago!:rolleyes:

Pick the trend post

Note: And I'm not being critical of the crew involved, on the contrary maybe this a failing in the CAsA ATPL/CPL syllabus that may need to be addressed?:ok:

Tenret

My post is not about the actions if the crew. It is about the culture of the airline. Did they declare a pan and fuel emergency? If so end of discussion, its just the report doesn't say.

If they din't declare a pan then my concern is that this "busting" of minimums is considered more normal at QF than VA where I fly. Busting minimums is an emergency rule break and warrants at minimum a pan call.

Last month I watched at the t/h of 16R a 747 land with both the previous and following aircraft miss. Conditions did not improve where I was.

B737 landed below weather minima and substantially below FFR
 

Incident: Virgin Australia B738 at Mildura on Jun 18th 2013, landed below weather minima and substantially below final fuel reserve

A story, with a happy ending.

I suggest the reason we have the thinking of the VA crew is because the CVR was available. The fact that the QF crew refueled and continued meant that most or all of that portion of the recording would have been recorded over, and unavailable later. Good or bad, take your pick.

Tenretni
 

To answer your question"what would do?"

1)Talk to the first aircraft in the sequence and ask, " how much fuel do you have? And whoever had less gets the first go.

2)when comes to my turn, do the approach to minima, then MAP.

3)Cabin prep, then discuss with other crew member, flying to the ground and landing, unsighted if possible

4)Declare an emergency

5)Land, and stand myself down.

6) Go to pub and have several beverages

7)Find meteorologist responsible, and send very strongly worded letter, questioning his parentage!

It's not too difficult, is it?


Fuelling up and shooting through, is ....um ......how do I put it.......questionable?

Pure guess work on my part, but I would suggest that management have since stood down the crew. I stand to be corrected on that

What happened to.. Analyze, Decide, Implement, Evaluate ..?

What we can all agree on is that both aircraft found themselves in a situation where they were fast being painted into a corner and the only option available to both was an emergency landing. A landing that had the very real possibility of damage and or injury to the aircraft and passengers.

Two separate crew, in the same aircraft type, handling the situation in two very different ways.

OK, the outcome for both was the same, no one was hurt, VH-VYK and VH-YIR (no mention of the airlines involved here, lets keep emotion out of it) landed without injury or damage. The decision making processes that ultimately lead to that same outcome, at this stage and going on the information we have in the prelim report, were very different!

One crew it seemed, planned and discussed what they were doing, from alerting ATC to providing a local standby, briefing the cabin crew and even discussing where to expect they might see the runway when they did get visual by looking at the wind vector.

The other crew it seems just decided on the first attempt to 'bust' minima and land. Did the cabin crew or passengers know that the aircraft was carrying out an emergency landing? Did they discuss or evaluate exactly what they were about to do?

Now, more information may come to light that provides a clearer picture on the decision making by the crew of VH-VYK and they could of well discussed such matters.

I'm sure that the crew of both VH-YIR and VH-VYK are nothing short of competent professionals, but that doesn't mean that by going over the facts in the cold hard light of day we can't, at this point in proceedings start formulating some cold hard questions that when evaluated and discussed will hopefully provide some cold hard answers that will ultimately benefit everyone :ok:

Tentretni
 

Seems I missed a few posts back where you asked me a direct question about virgins first approach going deliberately below the minima.

Virgin are aware of at least 2 diverts to BHI, qantas "volunteer" visual at 150 below minima, virgins fuel state approaching minima on first approach is within a few kilos of declaring an emergency, and you actually criticise them for going 260' below the minima in a fact finding exercise to locate the disposition of the runway to better plan their second approach.

But think it is ok to go 150' below the minima on first approach with fixed + 30 minutes, no emergency declaration, no cabin prep, just hang on and hope for the best.

Is that the question you are asking? Do you actually read your posts before you send them off?

It is definitely not ok to go below minimas without rock solid reasons. With the cvr of qantas not being available, the only source of information about the discussions in the qantas cockpit are through personal testimony.

My advice to the QF crew if I were their legal council, would be to exercise their right to silence, which is exactly what they have done.

Tenretni are you joining up the dots yet?

FWIW there's a 30 page thread on the incident in the "Australia, New Zealand and Pacific section".

http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-...y-landing.html

Or help you with your witch hunt. The way you are carrying on, Gazumped's advice to the QF crew to stay silent would be a good idea. Put 20 years in the industry under your belt on top of the two? you already have and you may be less inclined to run around with a spear because you'll understand the situation a little more.

On the contrary gazumpy.

I am not crticising the virgin crew for descending below minima when they (by your account) did not yet have a fuel emergency. I think that was an appropriate course to take.

You are the one criticising the qantas crew for doing precisely the same thing.

From the report:

Both crew went below minima on their first attempts. Neither crew had declared an emergency at that stage. Virgin in descending to 300 feet below minima on their first attempt had not prepared the cabin for an emergency landing. No problem with that.

That was rightly done when they found themselves with no option but to not just descend below minima, but to descend all the way to the ground.

Gazumpy if you want to suggest that qantas were just hanging on and hoping for the best, well the same can be said for the virgin guys on their first attempt.

Its an absurd assertion to make but i wont try to stop you.

Amazing that QF have managed to keep this one out of the media.

Any word on whether the HUD was in use and what that actually portrays?
That could have made a huge difference in QF getting in.

Hopefully the heat is put on the respective airports to get CAT II everywhere after this debacle.

I have done a visual approach landed easily no worries, and the fog bank rolls over and the guys 5 miles behind goes around. It is not out of the realms of possibility.

Neville
The worsening weather could very well have been the difference.
I mean in reading some of the report detail it appears that VA started their first approach nearly 10 minutes after QF.

Thats a long time in foggy weather.

Tenretni
 

The two questions you asked we're

1) " Why not land off the first attempt given that FFR already compromised?

2) Why risk a flameout on a second approach?

Then you deliberately baited as to why I hadn't yet answered you, just so you are kept in the loop the answers are below, do you need directions?

ANSWER 1) FUEL STATE ON FIRST APPROACH WAS NOT QUITE AT FFR, so your assertion is blatantly false!

ANSWER 2) FLAMEOUT IS NOT A RISK RIGHT DOWN TO UNUSABLE AT NORMAL ATTITUDES, provided SOP's are followed. Suggest you read certification requirements.

Do you know what SOP's are, or do I have to spell it to you?

Questions answered?

HUD won't help you as far as flare guidance without an ILS. What it will do is enable head free + track/path/speed monitoring

Gazumped

Mate the VA guys descend by 260 feet below minima on a fact finding mission without preparing the cabin.

Those poor QF guys descend by 150 feet without preparing the cabin but OH NO you burst a blood vessel.

Pretty selective don't you think?

Yep, no excuse other than brain fade.

I think this discussion is maybe forgetting that the crews were probably getting additional information that is not part of the ATSB report. I don't fly for the airlines, so I'm guessing. But I would hope that the respective companies were making phonecalls to people on the ground at MIA and relaying this on the company frequency.

If I was onboard, I'd be pulling out the mobile and calling someone on the ground, although I'm not sure that the workload of the approach would have allowed this.

Either way, I would hope that the captain was getting some informal contemporary information on the fog and its development that would aid his judgement.

Lone pine
 

I haven't burst any blood vessels, it would appear a few guys are though.

The 260 ' below the minima is a deliberate planning action, they knew what in all probability was going to occur, to get an idea of the disposition of the runway prior would seem a very well thought procedure, don't you think?

The whole issue is " when can you go down below the minima?"

On the contrary, not selective, factual.

The consensus seems to be, so long as no suitable alternate is within range, you can do whatever you like, regardless of fuel state. Curious, no? Note no blood vessels at risk here

Gazumped

I accept that the VA crew deliberately descended below minima as part of their fact finding mission.

I also accept however that the QF crew deliberately descended below minima to try and break visual

One deliberately descended below minima in search of facts the other did in search of the ground.

One found the ground and landed the other got his facts right and landed in zero vis on his second attempt.

No emergencies were declared at that stage. No cabin preps were made at that stage.

So where exactly is the problem.

You cannot simply choose some facts and ignore others just to paint a picture.

Glad about the blood vessels!

Sometimes after arguing incessantly with everyone around me, I stop and think, "Wow, gee, maybe it's not everyone else...".

:E

Lone pine
 

Thanks about the concern for my blood vessels, we should take care of each others welfare when possible.

My point of view is all about fuel. At what fuel state can you bend the rules?

Remember the Irish copper. Just because you think you know how things will pan out, doesn't necessarily mean that you can act on that future assumption.

Fuelling up and shooting through, and thus overwriting the cvr, may prove quite fortuitous.