Guys the argument that holding an alternate and getting caught is the same as arriving with nothing and getting caught is not the same argument.

A380 could have a quadrouple engine failure too. It is possible.

Compressor Stall:

I have been in Qantas for nearly two decades, have been on the line for the entire time and have regularly operated Trans-Pacific and very long range flights. You know how many times I have been in the situation that we are all debating here on this thread?

None! Nada! Zilch! Zippo!

I can, however, relate a tale from real-life experience to balance this discussion about always having an alternate.

NZ regulations required us to always have an alternate from top of descent. So to digress here briefly, if CASA were aghast at the QF policy, they could easily introduce a similar regulation if they wished. They haven't.

Anyway, I once flew from Sydney to Auckland (yep back when QF trans-Tasman flights were actually flown by Qantas pilots) that departed Sydney about 9pm and arrived in Auckland about 2am local time. The alternate airports in NZ for the aircraft type were Wellington and Christchurch.

The TAFs for the flight were Auckland - CAVOK for the entire period with no deteriorations at all; Wellington - fog for our ETA; and Christchurch - fog for our ETA. For the return scenario, Sydney would close due curfew half-way across, which left Brisbane and Melbourne (with a very strong jet stream to negotiate before landing).

The flight plan had us arriving in Auckland with sufficient fuel to divert from TOD to Nadi (which must have required less fuel than diverting to Brisbane or Melbourne from TOD). When we were approaching the west coast of NZ, we could see the lights of Auckland from 200 miles out, yet because of the NZ regs we landed with over 20 tonnes of fuel (which was astronomical for a 767). Could you imagine the cost of fuel carriage if this was multiplied for every single sector that we operate?

A second story:

When the cost of fuel was very high, our flight planning section was looking to minimize fuel carriage and Batam, about 15 miles away from Singapore Changi was approved for use as an alternate.

When we arrived at flight planning at Heathrow, Singapore had TEMPO TS for about an hour either side of our arrival time. Batam, however, was a single-line forecast and so we were given diversion fuel to Batam (5/8s of f*** all) rather than TEMPO holding fuel. That day we had the luxury of being able to carry TEMPO fuel for Singapore, so that's what we did. If we open up the possibility of using close-in alternates as SOP, that scenario would become much more the norm than the current system. I prefer the current system.

Somebody during the discussion has already mentioned risk mitigation. 99.9% of the time, the current fuel policy works.

Good to hear, Shark Patrol, but two of your colleagues have had issues in two weeks. I've been flying for a couple of years less than you and I have never had an engine failure. Should I stop briefing and considering the EO SID?

Seriously though - the issue is not with QF. The issue is with CASA. IMHO, CASA should be considering its policy in line with the rest of the developed world. But - as I have seen first hand some years ago in the CASA office - their attitude of "Qantas do it this way, so it's the only way" will I suspect prevail.

and here endeth the thread.

well said.

Without wishing to get into a tit-for-tat with you CS, the point of this discussion is the risk factor that is involved. Like you, I've never had an engine failure either, but obviously engine failures have to be considered because the regulations require them to be considered.

But where do we draw the line on what else should be considered? If I fly into a flock of birds on takeoff, I could easily lose two engines after takeoff. Should four-engined aircraft always be required to consider two-engines out performance whenever they fly? How would this requirement affect current operations?

As you rightly said, it is CASA that sets the legislative agenda within this country. I'm absolutely certain that they are fully aware of the fuel policies of every AOC-holder that is operating within their jurisdiction. If they had a problem, they would either act to warn the operator of a deficiency or legislate to ensure compliance.

Your last statement seems to reflect some sort of anti-QF bias, and I would hope that that is not the case. CASA is charged with regulating the industry and ensuring the safety of the flying public. At the same time, they would also be under immense pressure to ensure that aviation is a sustainable industry in this country. If they do not feel that they have adequate experience or qualifications to regulate the airlines that they oversee, then that's another problem entirely.

Yes, but the requirements become more onerous. Unless the destination is isolated (no alternate within 1:45 flight time; called Island Reserve with its own fuel and weather requirements), we always dispatch with a suitable alternate. When we discard the alternate in-flight due to higher than planned fuel usage, we have to protect against a loss of one runway, loss of precision approaches and poor weather, and probable ATC delays.
I'm not saying that the policy we operate under is perfect, but it attempts to protect against singular failures outside of our control, like grossly incorrect weather forecasts, or runway blockages.

FWIW, our airborne fuel policy in a nutshell:

Hi Shark Patrol - I don't have anything against QF. They are merely implementing a method of complying with a CASA rule regarding carriage of alternates (or lack of) and it works, mostly. As I made it clear on page 1, it is the CASA rule - not QF - that is under discussion.

My experience tells me that there is a very strong opinion in some elements of CASA that the Qantas way is the only way - even when presented with the fact that every other NAA and even the aircraft manufacturer sees it differently (a different issue than fuel for destination). That frustrates others in the industry - but I hold nothing against Qantas for creating an environment to capitalise on this luck.

Fly safe. :ok:

How does the Qantas operations manual define final reserve?
1. A variable figure depending on estimated landing weight and listed on the flight plan
2. A fixed amount covering all eventualities e.g. 737 1200kg (40x30 mins)
3. Something else
Does Casa expect you to have at least this amount crossing the outer marker, or on landing?

As more and more attention is focussed on fuel saving (sensible given the oil price) the pressure to reduce extra fuel increases. We are going to see more and more diversions and low fuel situations. An occasional event is fine, but if everyone shows up with little margin then things get complicated as they did in Madrid last year, even though everyone appears to have been in full compliance with the rules.

It may be different elsewhere, but our flight plans have considerable variance in how much fuel you really use, mainly but not only because we use the convention shortest departure longest arrival. There is no substitute for experience.

Answer 1.
FIXED FUEL RESERVE (FFR)
The reserve fuel calculated as 30 minutes of holding fuel at 1,500ft. It is the
minimum fuel required to be in tanks at the completion of the landing roll.

Thanks for giving a swift answer. If you use option 1 in my experience 737 final reserve can be anything from 700kg to 1200 kg. It would be interesting to know how much it varies on the A380 from ferry to MZFW.

As a fare paying passenger it certainly is concerning that in this day and age some pilots end up with only one option left, I thought the old saying was "if you are up to your last option you should not be up there".

I doubt it was their last option. They probably could also have gone to Williamtown or Richmond.

They also could possibly have gone to Canberra with and landed with less than FFR.

However all of the above would also have been classified as "emergency" options. Obviously the Captain decided autoland in Sydney was the safest of these options. (Commercial considerations don't count once it's an emergency - safety only).

The actual TAF/TTFs
 

Before this wanders off any further, does anyone have the relevant TAF and the TTFs that preceded and eventually led to this situation?

Historic TAF/TTF database. Set up a query with the location UTC date and time, two formats HTML( pretty) or text.

A great resource
 

FYSTI, thank you - that is most helpful.

Nice to be able to check the facts ;)

I suppose the question at the back of mind is this.

If Sydney is forecast CAVOK, should you carry an alternate? I'm looking out the window at the moment at a Botany Bay and airport skyline that only has single Chemtrail ( :E ) to mark the sky. I'd plan to arrive in Sydney on a day like today with about 75 minutes worth of fuel. You want me to turn up with more than double that in case of.........

If I'm flying from MEL-SYD I have CBR from about 10'000' on descent. If CBR's gone u/s due FG in the morning but Sydney's wide open you think I should have a return to Melbourne? My 'normal' fuel means I have Richmond anyway but that's considered an 'emergency' field for my operation.

Interesting discussion. CASA rules and therefore Qantas fuel policy is more conservative than other regulatory agencies I have operated with..

Like most other countries, CASA rules do not require fuel for an alternate unless the destination forecast weather conditions are below the alternate minima at the flight planning stage.

If anytime after the flight planning stage the weather conditions deteriorate below the alternate requirements or special alternate requirements, where available, the minimum inflight fuel must include fuel to an alternate.

If the inflight fuel remaining is not sufficient to enable the aircraft to conduct the approach at the destination and proceed to an alternate, then the flight must proceed to a new destination airfield that does itself not require an alternate or if it does require an alternate, the minimum inflight fuel must cover this.

In the event that the above option is not available the crew must make a decision based on the safest course of action, and file the appropriate paperwork as this is a reportable incident.

All international flights, I have operated into Sydney or any other Australian airports, that depart with flight plan fuel and no destination alternate fuel, will always have the inflight fuel on-board to divert to another suitable airport before descent has commenced.

So if forecast or actual weather conditions deteriorate below special alternate minima, inflight, and I do not have fuel to fly, approach, missed approach and full divert, then I divert to new destination.

This is Qantas fuel policy and CASA rules.

Neither the Qantas fuel policy or the CASA rules permit an aircraft to continue to a destination airport that has weather conditions below the inflight special alternate minima, let alone an airport that is below the landing minima without having full divert full to a suitable alternate.

So in answer to the opening of this thread, no I do not think there should be a change in the Qantas "Fuel Policy"

P.S
I have also operated into New Zealand ports and their rules only require the "TOD alternate" for International flights operating to a airport with a single runway, this is not a weather requirement, their alternate requirements are very similar to CASA, however the New Zealand NZCAR's "inflight fuel" only requires alternate fuel if the destination weather deteriorates below the approach minima, unlike the CASA requirement of the special alternate minima, therefore CASA rules are more conservative in this regard.

Safe Flying

I may be wrong here but didn't the QF flights go past a PNR and therefore were committed when FOG came in. IE it wasn't at TOD that the FOG occured?
Not knocking Qf policy just interested.

Good chance the aircraft had gone past a point where retuning back to an adequate airport was no longer available, however still more than one option ahead (prior to TOD) when flying towards Sydney from any direction.

I'd say 'yes'. Otherwise they would have diverted to said alternate!

I beg to differ. Which Countries do you include in "Most other countries"?

Neither EASA (formally JAR) compliant States, nor North America allow planning without an Alternate except for very restrictive rules in the case of a remote destination.

I will go further than that wiz-Mangatete please advise which countries other than Australia do NOT require ALTN's for an IFR flight?

From an EASA perspective, that's the whole planned v enroute decision making spektrum.

No, there'd be no reason to return to Melbourne- you'd land there with the same fuel as Sydney, so where is the safety advantage in that?

The thing would be, you departed with fuel to reach two different places should one become unusable- in your scenario, one did.

The fact that Sydney has two independent runways is relevant- but lets take a scenario like Perth. it's CAVOK so you ONLY have fuel for Perth when, as number two, another aircraft becomes disabled on the intersection- NOW things get interesting.

Now, before the peanut gallery gets excited, you WOULD be allowed to commit to Perth with no alternate using en route commit rules- but you would have to DEPART with planned fuel to an alternate.

The chances of having an airport go unusable on the rare occasion you have to commit are obviously much lower than if you depart with nothing but fuel for destination on a routine basis.

If casa made flight planning altns mandatory i think we'd find a few very quickly added alts for the 380, Ric, ntl and avv lol, theyd all be sub 15 ton at a guess

wizofoz,
I suggest you have a close look at the FARs (both 91 and 121) on the subject, carefully and fully, and then revise your understandings.

In particular, the higher alternate criteria for no alternate on flights up to 6 hours are not particularly restrictive, given US weather patterns, although it is considerably higher than 400'/1600m equivalent.

One of the things that has always exercised my mind, is the number of countries that do not require planning for an en-route engine failure or depressurization, on the basis of them being a very rare event --- I fully understand the risk management logic, but having come from a background of always planning for depressurization and an engine failure en-route -- ???

As to "remote" destinations and "island holding", remote is determined on the basis of practically available alternates. This means that, if alternates are so far away that planning for an alternate makes the operation commercially nonviable, the destination can be approved as a "remote" airport.

This is why, for many years, Perth was a remote airport for "large" aircraft.

CStall,
No, they don't, see above, and have a look at the actual fuel policies of some longhaul carriers who are smart enough to know the "Qantas" system works, and has worked, with minor variations, for a bleeding long time now.
Two alleged events happening to one Australian carrier over a short period of time do not invalidate the statistics that under pin the Australian legislation and CASA approved fuel policies ( and please don't raise the accepted/approved thing).

Tootle pip!!

OK then, I will make a different point.The Australian fleet has yet to fly a statistically significant number of hours. When it catches up to the first world, we'll analyse the statistics. :ok:

Maggot,

There are lots of 380s flying into oz with planned ALTNs at the moment. That would be all of the ones not operated by QF.

The Don

Creamie,
If you take,as a starting point, just post WW11, and every sector operated since then, by ANA, Ansett, EWA,TAA, Qantas, MMA et al, and up to the present residual carriers, you may not be surprised that I would argue that what started out as a pragmatic approach to Australia's problem of long distances and very limited facilities, has been proved with the passage of time. And statistically valid. It certainly was not statistically based originally.

The first time I personally got involved "at the coalface", in the actual numbers, was in the early days or ETOPS/EROPS//EDTO/acronym of choice.

Remember that Qantas and Air NewZealand were into these operations in a big way, long before US or anyone in the then EU/JAA area. For the first five years or so of EROPS, something like half of all EROPS operations were conducted by QF and ANZ. In US, ALPA was bitterly opposed, largely because of the "Speed/Weight" formula used to set pilot salaries, and UK CAA and JAA, and European unions ( who had also opposed glass cockpits) were bitterly opposed. I think it was something like five or six years after the B767s went into service, before the first Airbus (A-310?) was EROPS certified, because of commercial pressure, and the 60m strangle hold was well and truly broken.

In arriving at the first QF EROPS fuel and operational policies for the B767, Boeing certainly thought the statistics were valid (but could be accused of commercial bias) CAA (or whatever is was then) agreed, as did the AIPA, -- who hired somebody whose name escapes me now, to do figures independent of Boeing etc.

Contrary to what some think, this was not all about the probability of engine failure, everything revolved around the weather, and how you handled it pre-flight and in-flight, for any number of reasons, when the forecasts turned out to be rubbish.

Along the way, a pretty deep analysis of the company historical records supported the long time policies.

I do think a 60+ years set of records, over heck knows how many sectors,millions?, is statistically valid, even if the number of aircraft in the Australia airline fleet was (and still is) miniscule, compared to US or other parts of the world.

Don------
So, what's your point??

Tootle pip!!

Try and keep up leady old boy, mine was directed at Maggot.

The distances needed for ALTNs in Oz, and the lack of bad wx means a lot of fuel would be wasted every year carrying fuel that is not needed if ALTNs were planned all the time. Two autolands on CAT 1 ILSes in how many years doesn't mean the system is broken, it just means its a bit different.

the Don

Yeah, you might ‘think’ that, but that does not make it so.

Another 60+ plus years and the Australian fleet might get close to the bottom end of where first world aviation operators are today in terms of kilometres/pax/kgs flown. :ok:

Creamie,
Quite so, but at a minimum, it is a good start.
As you and I both know, for risk (safety) analysis, rates per sector flown are preferred by many as a truer measure of risk exposure than rates per ATK or similar. Hence US publishing rate per hours flown and sectors flown.

Don,
You are confusing posts ---- as a practitioner with something well over 20,000 on QF flighdecks alone, do you think I might actually understand the ins and outs of the QF fuel policy. Quite how you could come to the conclusion that I have any issue with the QF practices beats me.


Tootle pip!!

Yeah yeah, know that - im just remarking my cynicism that the stroke of a pen (mostly) and a little cash would suddenly allow far more convienient ALTNs that would easily accomodate a 380 (runway wise), qf doesnt carry them as such as they dont want to deal with a 380 turning up at Avv/ric/ntl at 7am. Looking at the 'usable airports' chart for qf 380s and this policy comes more clear, apart form maybe 15 airports 'designated', no airports are available (for planning) apart from these as they dont want to deal with a 380 turning up at these places, unless a very serious problem is unfolding, of course.
What this rambling is getting at; very few "suitable" airports available because they dont want to spend on it but if qf needed to carry altns for every flight, i'd bet few extras would pop up as available very quickly... :suspect:

Plus

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24331/a...605473_001.pdf

Plus

Media releases: 02 August 2005 - Final ATSB report: Aircraft landing at Sydney in fog conditions

Plus

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3460925...77.pdf#page=11

JAR allowed no alternate for flights less than 6 hours where there are 2 seperate runways and the weather was forecast to be 2000/5km. It was in the EASA version of my former employer's part A 6 months ago so I guess they are carrying on with it.

Actually, there seems to be a whole bunch of them:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/32921/b20040246.pdf

I think you need to re-read that. Most of them state that the aircraft landed at the destination minima. What is your point anyway?

Tactical edit :rolleyes:

Capt K,

3 in that report landed either with less than required fuel or in conditions below the minima.

My point? I was presenting some facts which Ledsled should have considered before he implied that this thread was a lot of hullabaloo over (quote again): "Two alleged events happening to one Australian carrier over a short period of time". :ok:

....but man they've got nice shopping and carparks.

NevilleN et al,

If you take the trouble to look at the comparison tables in the ATSB report on the subject, it makes it quite clear that the rule in the nominated countries are not greatly different to Australia's rules on the subject.
Put another way, the belief that "the rest of the world always requires an alternate" is just a tad inaccurate.

Bloggs,
My original remarks were directed at the genesis of this thread, not the recorded history of aviation.

In summary, the Qantas approach to flight planning and fuel reserves, and in-flight operational control, as well as always meeting statutory requirements nationally and internationally, is an operationally and commercially intelligent system, that has been proven by time.

A major part of reason the system works so well is that Operational Control travels with aircraft, and responds to the address: "Captain".

Tootle pip!!