And the first Alwyn Award should be awarded to Leady, who claims that the NAS 2b Class E airspace was a success:

3 RAs involving RPT IFRs and no-radio VFRs = success. :D

Those three incidents were correctly read by AsA as ringing alarm bells about the fundamental flaws of E airspace.

Is that so? I didn't know QF still operated 707s in 1990, when ICAO created Alphabet airspace. Advisory airspace it may have been. It certainly wasn't F.

I ask yet again: what is the benefit of E airspace?

Dick,
What about it? Who needs a positive ident? Break free of your fundamentalist views and do some lateral thinking: aircraft control can be done without surveillance!

Thanks Lead, I am not blinkered and am always willing to listen.

At least your responses are measured. I will read your response again. It needs some considered time, given the effort you've made.

I certainly envy you the B707 days. My Dad used to look after you guys as an AWA LAME in the mid-sixties. I can remember sitting up in the old Darwin terminal and watching the jets taxying in, sweeping in a right turn and parking right below his workshop - he was one floor up, so we looked down on the 'monsters.' QANTAS 707s and BOAC 707s and Comets were the highlight of a young kid's week.

OK, let's kick nostalgia in to touch. You still have not justified TCAS as a mitigator if we are going to be truly 'ICAO compliant.' Lead, this was a CASA study not a 'commissioned one.'

Of course C generates extra workload and requires a higher level of responsibility than E, that is self-evident.

However (and it is an important "however") it is very much a matter of degree in terms of impact on cost. Given the amount of VFR traffic in/out of Alice for instance there would be no change required in terms of staffing the enroute airspace (above A085) for a C vs E airspace steps designation. And the tower airspace D component would still be processing the same aircraft in and out, as they currently do with C over D.

Let us consider what the case with E steps (vice C) at YBAS would be in terms of processing VFRs;

Enroute and Tower Controllers - a little less separation workload overall but potentially less notice given of the aircrafts presence to the tower ATC inbound (particularly above A085 from the Sector airspace), possibly a more "reactive" working environment than in the case of an overlying C, eg sequence planning considerations for a start?

Pilots (VFR and IFR)
- No VFR/IFR separation assurance provided to them in the CTA steps above D

Self-separating gabfest taking up A/G time, reliance on radio procedures, slightly increased pilot situational awareness workload...would I be drawing too long a bow in daring to assert a diminution of safety in absolute terms?

No impact on ATS staffing or cost either way - in this location-specific case. So the aviation industry would prefer E...because...? Other than the people who would consider it a God-given right to fly where and when they want, of course.

Yours Sincerely

Mortimer Konstantin Papadopolous

Don't worry Mr 'Howabout'....I too read yr thoughtful posts.

But, alas, I feel now that I am tooo faar removed from the ' at the workface' situation to render suitable / sensible responses / suggestions to the 'cause'.

(Thanks Dick......)

However, rest assured Mr Bloggs, I shall NOT be the one who causes you a problem in 'E'.....I don't particularly want to GET RUNOVER by a 'Fast Mover',
so, I will simply descend early, if required, take the 'scenic route' in, and leave the collision 'risk' areas close to destination AD's to those silly enuf to believe in 'E' for all......(IMHO)

I am of the opinion, that one day maybe, after a few 'incidents', that the wheel will turn full circle.....and we will have CTA and OCTA ag'in......in some form or another...:uhoh:

Cheers;)

P.S. VERY well stated Mr Papadopolous...a candid view and sensible view.

Griffo, don't ever worry about being 'redundant.'

The problem in the modern environment is that memories are too short. Opportunistic individuals will raise seemingly logical arguments about airspace. As time goes on, who's there to rebut 'upside down airspace?'

You'll notice there's been no reply to my 'upside down' question, or using TCAS as a mitigator.

The inconvenient questions are just ignored in the hope that subsequent posts bury them.

You might have been out of the game for a while, but the basic arguments have not changed in 20 years. What your views were when we lost that service (and 'saved' an unsubstantiated 10 mil was it?) hold true today.

From where I sit, you are eminently qualified to provide cogent comment on the issues.

Don't hold back Mate. You've done the time and, from my perspective, you're no less entitled than the rest of us to address the dodgy arguments that keep getting repeated.

I must wind this up now and get back to the main thread. I'm sure, by now, that Dick will have a controller posting under his/her real name to confirm that E can be done cheaper than C.

As Dick says, one cannot be believed if one does not have the courage to post under a real name. I'm hugely confident that he's arranged for just that. Given that Dick places so much emphasis on real names, otherwise you're not believable, I don't doubt for an instant that Dick has got one of those 'dozens and dozens' to post under their own name.

Leadsled
Where is the analysis? and the reference system ATM infrastructure?
Where is the volume specific analysis result?
That is incorrect. Even if the risk exposure were assessed as 'low', an ATC service to both IFR and VFR [D, C or higher] further removes said risk, otherwise the scaled classifications of airspace have no relative significance, which we all know is not the case.
Collisions and NMAC's in E [in the US and elsewhere] disprove the 'vanishingly small' argument, in terminal [climb and descent] areas.

Are you supporting Australia 'rolling the dice' with E in terminal areas where turbo-jet RPT operate in significant numbers? Why would you? Other coutries have had to reconsider/reclassify 'after' the fire tenders have hosed down the remains, why not learn from O/S mistakes?

Most reclassification of 'previously assessed' class E in other coutries has followed serious incidents and accidents. What in your mind is wrong with that approach to risk management? lots in my mind! That is why ALARP principals have been appended to risk management practices. Lessons learned from others 'mistakes'.

If the above is not accurate, and [as you and Mr Smith suggest], the risk is reduced to vanishingly small away from the circuit areas [but still within aircraft climb and descent trajectories] why then are speeds restricted to 250kts?

That goes to the crux of airspace classifications and the management of risk. The higher the speed [normally a product of profile and altitude/flight level] the larger the protection margins become with increasing closing/crossing speeds. That is why A is used in high level enroute airspace where see and avoid is impractical, and visual track keeping [tolerances for separation purposes] also becomes impractical [due altitude].

The offset consideration at lower level [below A100] is traffic mix and density. The service levels and equipment needed to address the risk to ALARP [as already discussed in this and other like type threads] vary from those in 'clean configured' climb/descent and cruise airspace away from circuit areas.

Mr Smith
If the above question is indicative of your understanding of Air Traffic Control, then please do everyone a service by refraining from comment or involvement until you have had someone download you a copy of an ATC manual [pick any country], and learn a bit about how ATC operate separation standards [there are many, many non-surveillance separation standards] and procedures in ALL countries, including the USA.

Tks for that Mr 'H',.....

And although DICKmay not remember me personally, he certainly had no qualms in using FS to 'prove his point' against ATC.....

BK to CB wasn't it?? Went OCTA to avoid 'unnecessary delays'....and got FULL service ALL the way....Then wrote to the ATC Head Honcho of the time complaining about 'His' organisation's lack of service.....
But, he GOT IT from good ole' FS......

As an aside.....I believe the new tower complex at BRM will be built as a joint RFF/TWR building on the opposite side of the rwy to the present CAGRO site - can't call that a 'shudder'...'tower' - so that the controllers will be facing SOUTH across the runway, and be reasonably well away from the RPT parking bays.....
And the majority of the traffic goes/comes from the N / NE to E...
The jets from PH via NWN come in from the S, and depart to intercept the 200deg track out, so the poor controllers will be 'flat out' looking over their shoulders to spot inbound /outbound VFRs, and Jet tfc from ports to / from the north, ...MOST of the time.
For what 'they' the workers need - IMHO - is that the new TWR should be next to the present site to give them a better 'overall' picture with 'minimum fuss'....
(Yeah...I know they 'do it' procedurely....CNCE not avbl, remain OCTA...do they still say that...stay N of Willies creek...go away, I've got a JET...)
And, yes I've worked there so I have the experience and the knowledge to say so....

Oh, and the 'original' sum to be saved was $80M! Mike Smith lectures refer...
This was subsequently shot down to ....not much at all.

And even less when one considers wot we 'ave now....

Ah well!!.......:confused:

Tks for the indulgence...normal program resumes....:ok:

A rational discussion between people with opposing views, what is PPRUNE coming to.

Keep it up people.

I'll give you mine.

On one condition.

ARFOR,

As to the various analysis, to which I have referred, all in Airservices and (hopefully) CASA records.

"Low" and "vanishingly small" are far from the same thing.

Further on, as far as I am concerned, you have made a number of assertions about E safety elsewhere, but that is all they are, assertions.

Several Airservices "analysis" of US MAC/NMAC in E have been "interesting", one neglected the fact that much of the mid west is 6/7000 ft, and claims a number of en-route problems. When the geographical position and height was examined, it was clear that ALL to alleged en-route MAC/NMAC were, in fact, in circuit areas or the boundaries of circuit areas, they might have been 7/8000' AMSL, but they were only 1000/1500' AGL.

If you believe the Airservices "risk analysis" for the windback of 2B was kosher, you obviously haven't read the three analysis by eminent risk management experts, including one paid for by CASA. Or maybe you really believe the error rate for pilots dealing with ATC instructions really is 50 to 100%, but for ATC person, only one in a million.

As to NAS 2b, and three RAs, do YOU know how many RAs there were, during that period in C. Dig out the records and have a look. Do you understand that you can have an RA ---- without separation being infringed.

As you fundamentally do not accept the basis of ICAO airspace classification, there is really little point debating with you.

Howabout,
re. TCAS as a mitigator, we both know ICAO does not permit its use, but I know how well TCAS II works, there are plenty of places where I believe TCAS (long before any warnings) rather than ATC. I must re-read the Avalon study, I didn't realise (missed/forgotten) that ACAS/TCAS had been raised as a mitigator, but I have no objection to it ---- as long as a difference is filed with ICAO.

Don't forget, both Ansett and TAA fitted TCAS long before it was mandated in Australia, because of the number of ATC errors ---- and that is all a matter of record.

As for the poster who thinks I was claiming the existence of Class F in the 1960's, wake up and smell the roses --- and re-read what I said about the development of airspace classifications with an open mind ---- as long as it is not open at both ends.

Tootle pip!!

PS: How well I remember the AWA "radio man" at each station in Australia, and at Bankstown. Indeed, the last AWA sign only disappeared from YSBK in the last year. A good mate of mine, and near neighbor, now nearly 90, spent most of his career with AWA, starting with flying boats at Rose Bay.

Leadsled,

That is no reason to imply "oh well, we get more RAs in C so who cares if we get them in E". If that is the standard of your comparative analysis, then you don't have much credibility in my eyes. Where were they? What aircraft types and what operations were involved? Were both aircraft safe anyway?
And quite frankly, I don't care how many RAs occurred in C, because I assume that the system would look at them and attempt to improve to stop them. All the RAs in E were caused by only one thing: the VFR was either unknown or not under the control of ATC. Launy was very very close to one hundred-odd killed. You are very lucky it didn't happen, because you and all your scientific studies would have been thrown out the door.

It is becoming painfully obvious that you and Dick really couldn't give two hoots about the RAs we had in E in 12 short months and don't propose that we do anything about preventing them in the future. That is unacceptable, when the cost of upgrading the airspace is "vanishingly small" whilst protecting RPT. The only issue is unhindered access to the airspace, isn't it?

All this measured discussion is terrific, but don't forget to make submissions to CASA, they will not base any decisions on PPrune discussions. From memory, comments on Broome close end of the month.

:ok:

Does the U.S. allow no radio no transponder light sport types access to Class E airspace as we do?

Class C requires all aircraft to be in contact with ATC and have a clearance.

Class E does not.

Therefore to me, Class C provides a higher level of safety than E.

A number of aeronautical studies by CASA have stated that a Class C service can be provided v.s. Class R for no additional cost. Neither Airservices or Civilair have come out and disputed it, and I suspect the reason is the opinion came from ATCs and ASA in the first place.

No , just not game to be open about basic safety fundamentals because they will be undermined if it looks as if they have a different view or agree with DS.

What other reason could there be for not having all ATC"s posting under their real names for genuine safety issues?

And why are these anonymous ATC,s ( if they are ATC,s) so dopey to say that they will take on the responsibilities of C for the same cost as E.

In all other countries I know of ATC,s are not expected to operate C without radar and extra manning.

CaptainMidnight;

When did this arrangement come into being?

I'm not even sure if RAA aircraft are allowed above 5000ft yet.

Workload
 

There is a lot of talk about workload changes for the controller between C and E; how about the SUM of the workload of the controller AND the cockpit crew between the two categories?

Captain Midnight
That does not seem to be the idea of AIP GEN 1.5(1) and (6.1.2) :hmm:

Dear Captain Midnight,

Perhaps it is a problem with your night vision, but a Mode C transponder is mandatory in Class E airspace in Australia --- for all aircraft with a suitable power supply, which means about ~98% of all powered aircraft.

In US, below 10,000ft, there is NO transponder requirement generally in E, beyond the 30nm transponder veil from the centre of Class B airspace, and from memory, not even a requirement for VFR to have VHF comms, but don't quote me on the latter.

Given the prevalence of Class E airspace in the US, operations of any category of civil aircraft, avoiding E or higher airspace, are not practical, and therefor, yes, LSA operate in E to the same rules as other VFR.

As for the Australian "5000'" rule, that is a hangover from the days of mandatory position reporting for all aircraft above 5000, and another example of Australian "inverted risk management", as the risk decrease, the CNS/ATM resources increase ---- quite illogical. And, of course, incomplete reforms.

And, largely, the reason for the conditional 5000' cap on "ultralight" aircraft ---- but not hang-gliders.

Finally, I love the logic that says that RAs area serious safety problem in E, but can effectively be disregarded as a safety problem in C. The mind boggles at such logic being used to support Australia's "inverted risk management".

Tootle pip!!

PS There are serious and legitimate divisions of opinion about the seriousness of the NAS 2b events in both Tasmania and Brisbane. I suggest you all reacquaint yourselves with the facts in each case --- and I do mean facts, as in the ATSB analysis in each case.

While you are at it, perhaps you should look at the disposition of every incident report filed by RPT crews during the "2B year", particularly Regionals, and see what the ATSB thought of the quality of each "complaint".

As to the one north of Melbourne, I would suggest a very close reading by everybody ---- the situation (with all concerned having comms with ATC) should never have developed the way it did, and shares some critical characteristics with the Brisbane event.

In both the latter, high time professional pilots were in command of the GA aircraft. The actions of the RPT Captains, in both cases, is worthy of close study and consideration ----- but, rather what we see here is the virtually automatic assumption the the GA aircraft is in the wrong, flown by somebody who doesn't know what they are on about.

I posted a detailed answer to this question some time ago:

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-a...ml#post5164366

As to how many such sports aviation aircraft there are around the country, I wouldn't have a clue.

So is the situation different here from the U.S., where they have mandatory transponder requirement for ALL aircraft within 30NM from the centre of Class B airspace - which we don't have??

Dick, correct me if I'm wrong, but last time I checked PPRune isn't a recognised way of notifying anyone of anything.

Better a dopey controller than a dopey pilot because I won't die when it goes horribly wrong. Just like it so nearly did at LT :ugh::ugh::ugh:

Latest RAA magazine quotes 3077 aircraft at Feb 2010 and 10,136 members at Feb 10 2010.

I don't believe they are going to just go away. Probably best to factor them into the discussion.

Leadsled,
No it's not. Unless you are privy to something the ATSB hasn't put on the public record, there is nothing untoward in the actions of either RPT crew.

What is questionable is:

1/the decision by a "high time professional" GA crew (your words) to fly a high performance Lancair through busy terminal airspace VFR. That is just plain dumb, as the subsequent near-miss showed;

2/the insistence by you and Dick Smith that this situation was AOK.

Put your reading glasses on. I said or implied nothing of the sort.

Amply confirmed by the Tobago PIC.

For the newbies in this discussion, here are the links to the three Class E NMAC reports:

737 v Lancair Brisbane

737 v C421 Canty

Tobago v 737 Launy

Arr, the virtues of E airspace.

Lets bore the audience with some history and clarity:-
If one were to accept what you say as being the case, and apply a correction factor, the net effect [difference in outcome] of the collision modelling [ARM] [and ALARP] would amount to an amplitude difference of how much? I would suggest ‘nil’ in terms of scaled collision mitigation options that are available, particularly where surveillance is not available to offset the lack of an Air Traffic Control Service to both IFR [on conflicting but unknown VFR] and other conflicting VFR with VFR in Class E!

Whilst we are at it, we need to clarify the use of the word ‘analysis’. In the context of these ‘safety’ related discussions, the two main groupings within the ‘defined’ aviation processes are ‘HazID’, and of course separately ‘Aeronautical Studies’.

HazID’s

I have seen some of those for NAS2b, and know some of those directly involved. The HazID’s did not support the retention of a specific class of airspace above class D zones, rather, identified the hazards that needed mitigation. We should discuss how these were then applied [or not] to the non-existent volume specific assessments and ALARP? Which of course brings us on to the ‘governance’ trigger for the return to class C?

Mr Jeff Griffith [whom I have met] from the US, was first involved in Airspace in Australia in 1996, through 2004 [NAS2b]. In 1996, he was contracted by the then Australian NAS Implementation Group to provide technical input into each of the NAS characteristics. Previous to NAS2b commencement, industry raised concerns regarding the lack of volume specific safety assessments. None the less, NAS2b went ahead.
After several safety issues, and subsequent BASI/ATSB reports, moves were made by industry to address the inherent inadequacy of Australian NAS2b Class E.

The reports you mention

In 2004, Mr Griffith was again called on this time by CASA to assess the Airservices case for return to Class C over D. In August of 2004 Mr Griffith submitted the following:-

http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi...ith_Report.pdf

- He suggests that the US NAS is safe and efficient [see the NTSB data below]
- He makes no mention of the difference between Australia and the US in terms of surveillance, ATC sector size, traffic density comparisons.
- He makes no mention of the disparity between US D/E and Australian D/C Air Carrier movements.
- He seems unaware [or omits] that the US NAS operates Class C where similar levels of RPT/Air Carrier aircraft operate in Australia.

It was put to Mr Griffith at the time, that the absence of commonality between the two systems made transplanting one into the other necessitous of volume specific safety cases, which before rollout, had been rejected by the NAS people he had been working with.

In addition to the Griffith report commissioned by Mr Dolan at CASA, was of course Professor Terry O’Neill’s report, whom CASA also retained to assess the Airservices safety case for return to class C

http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi...AAs_NAS_2b.pdf

With regard to method, Professor O’Neill said:-
Here are some other extracts relevant to our discussion:-
Correct. Which in hindsight is exactly why industry at the time were vigorously asking for volume specific assessments prior to the NAS2b roll out. They did not happen.

He goes on to say:-
Again correct. Why was it not done?
An expert panel from the US? great idea! Why was it not done before roll out?
Does any of this sound familiar? :=

It strikes me as foolhardy to remake similar errors of process. :ugh:
The difference of course is that ‘low’ is part of the scaled outcome terms used when reporting considered risk/s. Where does ‘vanishingly small’ feature in defined aviation [airspace] risk assessment processes?

On that theme:-
The class of airspace involved with these MAC and NMAC’s was? Remembering of course the practical differences between US D rules and ICAO D application such as Australia and the UK! Or were they plain old Class E accidents and incidents?

Have you a reference?

From the Broome ’Aeronautical study’, may 09’
Clearly the ARM does not equate the error rate for pilots dealing with ATC instructions to be 50 to 100%. I’m not sure the Airservices case [2004 rollback] using TAAM came to that conclusion either.

And;
This aviation risk assessment tool is internationally recognised, and has been used for many years. Funny thing though, where is the modelling calculations for the options within the Broome report, including the E over D, and C over D options?

Sound familiar? :ugh:

In general terms regarding risk in class E:-

Aviation Accident Database Query There is plenty in there to sober up with!

More specifically, Class E, and the limitations of see-and avoid, I commend the following TSB Canada report to the interested reader:-

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-re...6/a06o0206.pdf
This is what concerns me [and apparently many others] with Class E and not properly utilising/applying A.L.A.R.P :-
Yet ‘vanishingly small’ came home to roost! :=
Make that came home to roost twice! := :=
Common theme!
This about sums it up for me:-
Learn from others who know from bitter experience, the bitter experience is world-wide!

Lead, you remain a gentleman and debate on merit. Unfortunately, not everyone does.

As regards your point on TCAS II; sorry, but it just doesn't wash. You have been most vociferous about not registering differences. All of a sudden you maintain that such a course is OK. Once again, you can't have it both ways old sport.

NAS was plagued by cherry-picking. TCAS is the last line of defence, as recognised by ICAO, and should never be used as mitigation in the classification of airspace..period.

Dick, I'm still waiting for that controller out of the 'dozens and dozens' that has put his/her real name to the assertion that E is cheaper than C.

Surely they would use their real name on something so important.

I am sure you will agree.

Lead, you're on the wrong sled. Unfortunately, for you, your genuine attempts to inject objectivity are destroyed by infantile obfuscation from a direction that's sometimes referred to as 'friendly fire.'

An interesting post, ARFOR. Thank you.

Get them to call ATC for a clearance...in C airspace. It doesn't cost anyone a cent. :ok:

Holy Ghost ARFOR, is that copyright?

I'd like to print and frame.

OK, where's the ATC that is so passionately committed and is one of Dick's 'dozens and dozens' that will tell us under his/her real name that E is cheaper than C.

After all, Dick asserts that if you are unwilling to use your real name then you don't have the courage of your convictions.

Guys like ARFOR, DNS, the penguin, and a host of others, can be shot down by only one of those 'dozens' posting under their real name.

It's simple: All you have to say is that 'E is cheaper than C and my real name is (for example, something like) Dick Smythe'

How hard is that in the interests of credibility??

Going to play devils advocate here.... :ooh: IF and I say IF we had the 100% ADSB fitment, E over D in the regional areas, with the local ADSB feeds to ATC and ADSBin/TCAS for RPT or anyone who wanted it, how would that stand up?

At least the IFR heavy metal would have a chance against any VFR's who may be out of the system and bending the rules (yes there are lots that do, the reason Bloggs and co are concerned) when lots of IMC is around the approach to regional airports.

That would beat class G any day, and be better all round for all concerned I think.

Only problem I see is the other side of the fence debated against the proposed scheme. Could have helped their cause I reckon.

Over to you pro folk to debate if you think its relevant. (If not ignore and back to normal viewing)

J:ok:

Jab, with all due respect, don't put yourself down. You are perfectly entitled to throw in your thoughts.

I'm no expert when it comes to ADS-B, but I think that as a solution it's a long way off.

The immediate question is 'what can we do with what we have?'

From my perspective, and in light of the deafening silence from the 'dozens,' if a Class C service can be provided, with no extra resource implications, then it should be.

Anything less, with fare-paying, trusting punters down the back is culpable negligence.

God help the poor sod that sticks his moniker on a piece of paper that says E when C could be done for the same price.

In the event of a prang there'll be nowhere to hide.

Howabout

Thanks, just food for thought given those that want the greater freedom of E for VFR, yet seemed to put arguments against a proposal that would have made there current agenda more warm and fuzzy. Some of them were not ANTI ADSB as such, but argued against its 100% scheme and as such have denied a way of achieving their current ideals while at the same time satisfying the ............
In my mind in the remote places, especially when the wx has been like it has of late over the interior E over CTAF's and E down to very low levels like in the USA would be a better thing than IFR bashing around in G with no service at all (Mt Isa for example). In good weather well its pretty much the same as G for both IFR and VFR really, but in bad wweather it should help the IFR.

For the busier terminal areas (Launie, Alice, Maroochy etc) C over D actually makes sense for the climb / descent zones, and E elsewhere, say around Hervy Bay Bundy, Ballina etc.

From what I can see E in place of G would be a good thing when weather is a problem. But without Radar maybe the RPT folk would rather self seperate until up into C. I will leave that to the pro's to comment on. Mind you the other day all in class G we had a Rex, a Virgin and a Jaba all in IMC plus a meat bomber (assume in VMC) and Class G, BNE CEN was working hard at keeping all informed but it would have been nice to have had the one bloke who could see all of us at once to do the seperating rather than all of us trying to get it right. We almost had E in G there .....minus the official seperation. Now the cost of that must have been the same as G=E=C.... :confused:

Anyway......back to my fencepost.

Jaba...your on the money wrt ADS-B Rx, one piece of kit changes the entire outcome of NAS airspace issues.

ARFOR, that is a top post. You have distilled years of argument wrt the fallacy of UNALERTEDSee and Avoid, and the folly of cherry picking the US system without also the facilities and procedures accorded to movement levels as well as all the links to relevant articles.:ok::ok::ok:

Leadsled, mea culpa:ugh:

One of the many...
 

Ok Dick, I'll bite...there is no extra workload running C as opposed to E.
There is also no extra workload from A to C...
Happy now?

You can quote me if you like.
For the record...ex FSO multiple stations, ATC in Perth, Brisbane, Muscat, Abu Dhabi and Shannon.

ARFOR - great post ......... thank you.

Jaba - re 100% ADS-B fitement. I don't know to what extent the ABIT proposal went to fitting the sports aviation fleet e.g. to hang-gliders. They might have been included. You would also have to have ADS-B in gear fitted to powered aircraft so they can see the traffic of course.

FWIW one H/G pilot told me he regularly operates in NE Victoria up to A100, and that he has on occasions had powered aircraft pass underneath him. I suspect those aircraft never sighted him. You wouldn't intentionally fly under a H/G - you'd give one a wide berth.

the captain of the fairies is loose in the bottom the midnight garden.:eek:

Who can forget the ABIT (ADSB Implementation Team) and all their broken promises and lies!

Credibility about the same as a "rock spider's" court testimony having been caught at a "Wiggles" concert.

BTW, was it a hang glider thermalling up to 10,000 feet or a powered trike.

Someone should throw a net over you.:hmm:

Frank

Sorry, none of your post makes any sense to me.

I was not offerring support for the ABIT or otherwise, merely stating I wasn't sure if the proposed fitment covered all SPA types.

And hang gliders in NE Vic operate up to 10,000 feet (A100) not 1000 feet (your A010) - that make any more sense to you?

There you go Captain. (Another pedant), :*I have amended my last post. (But why then would you think anybody is so blind as to fly under a hang glider when it was at 1,000 feet)?

As for ABIT. It was a gathering of fairies with magical promises that anybody could be excused from knowing what was proposed and what wasn't. It was a sham by confidence tricksters and a disgraceful waste of money.

Really?

I asked whether it was a hang glider or a powered trike for a reason. I take it this would have been in class E airspace?

Mike, are you refering to class C over D at place like Broome with no terminal radar?

Let's say there is a VFR aircraft at 6500' going from south to north about 20 miles to the east of Broome at the closest point. At about the same time you have an IFR Kingair on descent from the east, inbound to Broome as well as local flights and circuit traffic. It's sky clear.

Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?

Pull my other leg!

Howabout,

I have no idea where you got this idea.

On the contrary, in several formal appointments in the past, I pushed hard for Australia to clean up its act in notifying differences to ICAO --- an area where Australia had been very slack, with some quite serious consequences, particularly NMACs, brought about by differences between Australia and ICAO ATC terminology.

At least all those terminologies have been harmonized now, but Australia's (or at least, some Australian pilots) determination to be an aviation Galapagos, with all sorts or wild and wonderful mutations of aviation developing in splendid isolation, seems to be as strong as ever.

Unfortunately, a predictable result was the Australia section in the Jepp. WW Text becoming as big as it, sadly, is.

I see we have a new term invented by the naysayers:However, many of the posts here refer to "un-alerted see and avoid", and nobody has seriously advocated "un-alerted" see and avoid, quite the contrary, as I have pointed out in writing, on many occasions.

Nevertheless, all the usual suspects trot out "un-alerted see and avoid" right on que as a straw man to shoot down!!Bbut wait, there's more, now we have something new Back to the NAS 2b windback, anybody who believes a 1 in 1 to a 2 in 1 error rate for pilots executing ATC instructions is a reasonable error rate must have two willies, you can't get that stupid playing with one. Just as much as ascribing an error rate of (by remarkable contrast) 1 in 1,000,000 to ATC persons.**

To further suggest that such figures do not materially alter the outcome of the analysis is (at best) revealing the writer has no in-depth knowledge of the various qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment.

As usual, we have some wonderful examples of selective quoting, on the entirely reasonable assumption that most readers will not bother to read the whole of a very lengthy document.

However, to suggest that Prof.O'Neill's report on the NAS 2b windback supports the process is taking self delusion to a new high. On any reasonable reading of the O'Neill report for CASA, or the reports done by three other highly qualified persons, can only be described as scathing of the analysis, including such ridiculous "data" as the above mentioned error rates for pilots and ATC.

IF Australia had an outstanding safety record (using ICAO standard terms, not selective reporting) there might be some logic in rejecting the US approach, but as US/FAA has better safety outcomes in all categories except gliders, I see no reason to not learn from the US. This is comparing US with everybody else, not just Australia.

Indeed, even in the narrow area of actual collisions (again excluding gliders) the Australian record is inferior to the US, as anybody can see by an examination of published figures.

Tootle pip!!

PS: The excellent safety record for gliders in AU, (and almost as good in UK) is quite reasonably ascribed to the quality of community administration of gliding by GFA. This is the one single area of air safety outcomes where we are head and shoulders above the US.

** Maybe this is reflective of true level of respect many controllers have for pilots, a suggestion not entirely without "foundation". In about 2002/3 or thereabouts, the Flight Safety Foundation did a most interesting study of Australian pilots, ATC persons and maintenance engineers, and their attitude to each groups contribution to Australian air safety.
Go look for it on the net, and read it, in summary, each group regarded their contribution to air safety as the most valuable, and the other two groups as threats to air safety. A psychological analysis of the individual and group answers was fascinating.

Leadsled...post changed..100 times UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ug h:
unassisted, I can make the most monumentaly epic fails......regardless!

Give me the exact senario, ie you make it up, and ill give the action response for both classes of airspace.

I dare you:ok: