Near Miss @ YSSY ? virigin and cathay ?
 

saw a highlight of this just a moment ago, any news on this ?
they showed footage of a virgin blue and cathay pacific.
near miss just over south sydney if i can recall!!

It might have happened back in April? sounds like an RA from the news report, 10 seconds was mentioned before calculated impact.

Ch 7 Sydney reported the findings of the ATSB report to be found here:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...200701982.aspx

According to the Channel 7 report, the Virgin Blue aircraft got to "within striking distance" of the Cathay aircraft.

"According to the Channel 7 report, the Virgin Blue aircraft got to "within striking distance" of the Cathay aircraft."

Bloody Unions..........

Must have been VB's Military version hey!:ugh:

F/O: Guns or Missiles

Capt: Its full of A scaler's....go the Missiles:E

J:ok:

3.5km and 600feet......to the media, its lucky they did not swap paint!:rolleyes:

...............jaba............I had to laugh, very funny:):):)..............how sad are we, we see this potential incident/accident as a 'money' induced funny........still humor is needed in this sometimes crazy world :)

Capt wally:)

Mmmm check this out!?
PP:eek:

Tuesday December 18, 07:54 PM
Air controller error sparked near-miss

A distracted air traffic controller's data error led to a near-miss between two aircraft south-west of Sydney airport, an incident report has found.
The lapse affected a Boeing 737-8FE from Melbourne that was descending to Sydney airport on April 4 and an Airbus A330-342X departing for Hong Kong.

In a report released on Tuesday, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said the two aircraft came within 1.9 nautical miles (3.52km) of each other and were just 600 feet (182.88m) apart.
Air safety standards require aircraft to be separated by three nautical miles (5.56km) and 1,000 feet (304.8m).
The report found the air traffic controller responsible for the planes had just come on duty and was distracted and changing the personal settings on his Air Situation Display (ASD) console.
He entered an incorrect radar data tag showing the cleared flight level for one of the aircraft.
"The displayed cleared flight level (CFL) differed from the level assigned to the B737 by the controller," the report said.
"That assigned level was being used for separation by another air traffic controller."
The error was spotted just before an alert on the console was activated and controllers took action to avert a collision.
The situation was further complicated by bad weather, which had forced changes in flight paths.
"The investigation concluded that this data entry error occurred within two minutes of the air traffic controller assuming responsibility for the control position," the report said.
"The reconfiguration of the in-use console by the controller during that time increased the risk of the controller being distracted from the traffic separation task."
The report found that adjusting personal settings on the ASD consoles was not part of official handover procedures.
It was not an "isolated occurrence" for controllers to adjust the settings while directing aircraft, the report said.
Airservices Australia is reviewing the handover procedures in the wake of the incident.

Funny how these things pop up, months after the incident occurs

Is this incident a function of too few ATC's or stress or both?

ONE fatal accident will wipe out AsA's entire "savings" for 100 years!

The technology to reset settings on a console is easily done; it was one of the original 'features' of TAAATS; but some shinny bum decided that the $200K would be better used elsewhere; Over ten years using the new gear, that's $20K a year. Originally proposed was a card reader that knew exactly what you liked alternatively you could have punched in you employee code; 1 second tops.

Having said that; I've always "hovered" after a handover, especially when there is stuff going on. I bet we will soon be 'required' to monitor for X minutes after a handover. Just like the supervisors are required to monitor the handovers; yeah right!

On another issue we aren't paid for handover time anymore if it happens at the end of a shift.

The sooner we get "mode S altitude" select the better; why is it taking so long?

Also folks it's 3NM or 1000Ft not "and".

.....well picked up "SM4 Pirate":)

ATC do a damn fine job under duress at times. We are dealing with humans here, not machines where there is a good chance something can be done correctly every time, not so with the human mind. Hence plenty spent on repetative training.

The acuracy of GPS these days being used for primary lateral nav is amazing & the controllers need to be even more vigilant, poor buggers I take my hat off to all of them.
Just as a slight thread drift here. I was transiting the Tasman recently when an opposite direction B767 travelling to the land of the long white cloud was dead in line on our reciprical track & I mean dead!!.............He could have slipt my Transponder aerial right down the middle it seemed that spot on ! That being the case am amazed that there aren't more transgressions in separation standards, & that's not from any fault of the guys we trust!.
We trust you guys, (ATC) keep the puppet strings tight & we'll dance for you every time !:)

Capt Wally:-):)

Haven't read the report, but HO/TO is a routine part of the job, not due to staff shortages or stress :ok:

Having read the report, but without the full benefit of replays, etc IMHO ATSB may have missed the target. It seems to be a case of assigning a level verbally and entering a different CFL. This happens more frequently than it should and is a case that warrants more research than it gets. The HO-TO is a red herring, but perhaps it's easier to make recommendations on that than to look at the deeper problem.
Again from the report, the resolution of the incident appears to have been initiated by the controller as part of his scan, co-incident with STCA and (maybe?) before TCAS.

If the separation minima applicable was 3NM or 1000 feet, it would appear that the incident took place within the jurisdiction of the Sydney Terminal Control Unit.

The controllers there are the biggest bunch of lazy, overpaid, prima donnas in the world - and believe me, I have seen some prima donna controllers around the world.

When TAAATS was implemented way back when, every controller in Australia was happy to go with the HMI that was proposed [and as amended based on operational trials etc] - but NO, not Sydney controllers. The HMI wasn't good enough for them - they had to have a special system partition built so that they could use the equipment the way they thought it should be used.

There is NO excuse for 'adjusting' the HMI layout individually in a highly specialised environment like a TCU. Adjust the seat height - adjust the volume - but DON'T ajust the primary functionality and display characteristics - there should be absolutely no need.

It would be like a 747 driver changing the display settings on the 'dashboard' because he/she doesn't like what the manufacturer installed.

The controller concerned should be severely caned, and management at SY TCU should be hung out to dry for allowing such prima donna behaviours!!!!!

Chn 7! you can't be serious!

Some air prox !

Fly jets do you Reverse?

10 miles at 16 miles/min closure..... We'll leave the math to those that think it wasn't close

Separation
 

Just tell me why, in this day and age, we are navigating using GPS updated FMS data so we are almost guaranteed to be flying right over the top of each other. Why? Because technology can do it. It is a mindless, senseless use of technology. If we were really looking at aircraft safety, lateral as well as vertical separation would make a whole lot of sense. In years gone by, prior to TCAS, mid air's were avoided simply because aircraft were never exactly on track. I fly 1 or 2 miles right of track but ATC hate it. Doesn't suit their system apparently. It used to be that they were there to assist pilots but is seems these days that we are there for their benefit. I've lost count of the number of times I get asked when I'll be returning to track. I won't be. For goodness sake, make the airway 10 miles wide and within that, leave us alone! Having had a serious wake turbulence encounter I encourage all to do the same. One less hole in the Swiss cheese.