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-   -   Always pay attention to your fuel status (https://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/296732-always-pay-attention-your-fuel-status.html)

neville_nobody 18th Oct 2007 09:26

Always pay attention to your fuel status
 
Or else this kinda stuff happens:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...200705093.aspx

ScottyDoo 18th Oct 2007 12:21

How about cut-and-paste-and-post so the lazy amongst us don't have to open new stuff.

Can't be bothered... :zzz:

neville_nobody 18th Oct 2007 13:06

God help you in GA then............................:}:} Gen Y :ugh::hmm:

ScottyDoo 18th Oct 2007 13:14

Not in GA!!!

pithblot 19th Oct 2007 07:47

Not in GA! Then G-EAOU :)

training wheels 19th Oct 2007 08:05

Here you go guys .. no sweat. :)


On 11 August 2007, a Boeing 737-476 aircraft, registered VH-TJE, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service between Perth, WA to Sydney, NSW. The flight crew consisted of a pilot in command, who was the pilot flying, and a copilot. The aircraft took off from Perth at 0544 Western Standard Time. About 2 hours 40 minutes later, the master caution light illuminated associated with low output pressure of the aircrafts main tank fuel pumps. The pilot in command observed that the centre tank fuel pump switches on the forward overhead panel were selected to the OFF position and he immediately selected them to the ON position.

The main fuel tanks were low on fuel and the investigation estimated that there was about 100 kg in each of the main tanks. The centre fuel tank contained about 4,700 kg of fuel when the master caution occurred. The flight continued on the flight planned route and landed at Sydney 51 minutes after the initial illumination of the master caution light.

The investigation is continuing.

Capt Kremin 19th Oct 2007 08:18

Guys this incident was the subject of another thread which was locked. I am not trying to stifle debate here, but should you wish to comment, be aware that the crew has already suffered considerable ramifications as a result of this incident. Please bear that in mind.

Jet Jockey 19th Oct 2007 08:36

What the @#*&
Surely the sky gods master of the universe and everything else could not make such a basic mistake with all their superior training. ??????

ScottyDoo 19th Oct 2007 10:05

Anyone can.

Thanks for posting it.

squawk6969 19th Oct 2007 10:37

Capt Kremin

For those of us who do not know, exactly what are those ramifications?

SQ

Captain Sherm 19th Oct 2007 10:53

Good point.....tell us what happened so we can learn Captain K.
I could easily have done this (mistake) myself but for the fact that for years have been flying a type that tells you via EICAS if you have fuel in centre tanks but the pumps aren't on. We all need to learn.

Capt Kremin 19th Oct 2007 15:09

Demotion for the captain... nuff said.

Servo 19th Oct 2007 23:37

There for but the grace of god go I............. that is why I never comment on someone else's "misfortune"

As long as we ALL learn from it, no one is immune to making mistakes.

I learnt the other day a hard lesson, dont trust your offsider, NEVER assume they have done the job properly.

Regards,


Servo

Thai997 20th Oct 2007 02:34

Were there other issues that lead to a demotion ??

Seems very harsh punishment for was was essentially a human factors related event (ie not a deliberate SOP violation).

What does this do for the reporting culture at QF ?

UnderneathTheRadar 20th Oct 2007 03:00

Based purely on the speculation of the earlier thread, the key to action against the crew may lie in of the further investigation items listed in the ATSB report:

- post flight actions

Otherwise it does seem a bit draconian.....

UTR

Poto 20th Oct 2007 07:15


What does this do for the reporting culture at QF ?
I don't think it was reported:confused: - part of the issue here.

fergusdog 20th Oct 2007 10:21

JET JOCKSTRAP U MUST BE FROM THE JSTAR:mad:

squawk6969 20th Oct 2007 10:42

So I think I get it here......engineers told to shift fuel, coz she's a bit full in the guts......hope nobody noticed!

I feel if that was my crew, I would rather here a ...."hey boss we fecked up here, where is the incident forms, lets all not make this mistake again hey!"

And after some refressher training of sorts......back to work coz now you are a far more valuable asset around here from experience........one would hope.

But if you dont have that kind of management and you have a feeling that its better to try to hide it......this is what happens.

What ever happened to people being able to stick their hand up and say ....ooops, sorry, and then be proactive?

I thought that was the best way to move forward, rather than a culture of cover up ad then humiliate!

SQ

PS: Servo...where you the skipper?

sayallafter 20th Oct 2007 11:43

Maybe the check list would be better to have a requirment to state the number of pumps on....ala.......13000 kg, 6 pumps on.

Centaurus 20th Oct 2007 14:24

Maybe the revised (2006) Boeing checklist design had something to do with the initial fuel tank faulty selection process. With the first officer now over-loaded with about 80 percent of the pre-start scans and other cockpit checks - plus he now has to read, challenge and respond to his own voice and the captain " managing by observing" while the first officer's hands are flashing all over the various panels, is it any wonder that occasional balls-ups occur. Most go unreported - after all no point in cutting your own throat..


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