Megan #1079:

“Evidence is that crews wereobserved operating in and out of cloud, though telling McMurdo they were VMC.”

Never heard of any such evidence.



“Quote: Previous crews were told that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station when in fact, it was 27 miles west. Soit cannot be said that misinformation about the waypoint (and therefore the nav track) was the difference. All those who came back over the previous two years were also misinformed, albeit in a different way.
All that does is heighten thefact that that none of those crews had any idea where the waypoint resided. The question to be asked if the crews were aware of the waypoint location, why did none ask why is it called McMurdo, when in fact it was not. And what about the missing leg from the false McMurdo to the real McMurdo for the company cloudbreak. Collins didn't ask either, even though he had plotted the falseMcMurdo.”

The crew had an idea where the waypoint was, but it was wrong. They all left their respective briefings under the assumption that thewaypoint was at McMUrdo Station. That answers your question that follows: They did not know, at the briefing, that the waypoint was 27 miles west of McMurdo Station, hence the lack of any questions.


As to the “missing leg”, there was none. The intention was for the nav track to go to the NBD at McMurdo Station, whereupon they would do an out-and-back cloud break procedure, not a straight line descent from 27miles west.


Collins did not plot the “false McMurdo” until after the briefing, on the night before his flight. At the conclusion of the briefing three weeks before, his assumption was the same as Captain Simpson and the others: The waypoint is at McMurdo Station, like the audio-tape was saying.

That will go down well with all the airline captains, out for a frolic not knowing what they were doing. There was only one captain that did not know what he was doing, and all the errors that crew made have been aired on here so many times.

No one has come up with any justification for using AINS below MSA when it was specifically prohibited.

The airline planned nothing below MSA, that was at the captains discretion.

We know Mahon did not appreciate what was acceptable and what was not in the front office of an airliner. But to hear his views parroted on this forum, which is supposed to be frequented by professional aircrew, is quite disturbing

The believers get around the 'don't rely on AINS below MSA' rule in the same way that Captain Collins did, by saying he was VMC. Thereupon, the believers run into all sorts of problems, as did Captain Collins.

Such as....

1. He wasn't in the area approved for VMC below MSA (even if he had been on his plotted track)
2. He possibly (highly likely in my view) wasn't actually in VMC for a lot of the time during the descent
3. He never identified high terrain that would have been nearby even if he had been where he supposedly thought he was
4. Even if he was VMC, the AINS was not approved as some sort of VFR backup. As someone said, the AINS could be wrong for reasons other than the reliability of the box of equipment. It required human inputs at various stages. A wrong digit could easily have been punched in during programming on the morning of the flight, for example.

Yeah, a truly great piece of commercial flying.

It truly is.

It seems to me that the argument has been won on logic and reason so many times over. But looking at many of the postings of the Mahon believers, and their ability to ignore facts and twist logic 180 degrees and back again; it seems to me they are motivated by forces other than portraying justice, or truth. Some seem to have a kind of "union rules" screw Air New Zealand at all costs mentality. Others hold Mahon in such high regard that they are literally incapable of actually debating his conclusions. Interesting.

Every other crew that went down to Antarctica returned safely. There was low flying, flight below MSA and no definitive proof that they were either VMC or not. Their routes were never changed the night before. Jim Collins route was changed and instead of overflying the safe flat waters of McMurdo Sound, it was headed directly at Mt. Erebus. The storytellers will try and tell you the crew were lost ( he - Mr Shannon: ......... drew the further conclusion that each of them was perfectly satisfied as to the course and position of the aircraft.” And ...[Baragnawath....... “The point is, there is no evidence that this flight crew was in doubt to it’s position”. With that comment, I entirely agree”. (Mahon), there were alleged kamikaze descents through holes in the cloud implying the aircraft was not VMC,(there are no less than 13 references [from the CVR] made by one pilot to the other confirming that the aircraft was flying in VMC). These are facts brought in evidence.
There was no training for Antarctic flying as recommended by the U.S. Navy. Compressor Stall may be able to enlighten us here what that would entail. Whiteout was obviously an important factor in this accident, although the storytellers have tried to trivialise this factor. There was no survival equipment stowed on the aircraft. Route briefings were inadequate and insufficient. No route training because no one was suitably qualified. Confusion in the flight department on where the final waypoint was, route changes etc,.etc,. What a disaster waiting to happen, as megan already observed.

So nothing has changed. No new evidence and still assumptions, presumptions and innuendo.

The Honourable Justice Peter Mahon you still have unreservedly identified the undisputed probable cause of the Erebus disaster:

Justice Peter Mahon through your brutal honesty and integrity, you were not afraid to stand up to corporate pressure and big government.

We salute you Sir.

belated reply @whiskery
 

I'm not going to be drawn into the conversation on at what point the letdown became VMC as it's conjecture (and been going on here with the same protagonists for nearly 7 years!) but there is no doubt that the aircraft was at some point well before impact established in VMC, and clear of cloud, as evidenced by the famous photograph of Beaufort Island, and comments about Taylor on the right.

From the Beaufort Island area (true) southwards, the closer one gets to the coast, generally the more ice cover there is (polynyas aside) and with cloud cover, thus comes the greater chance of whiteout.

I have no doubt that they had good visibility under the cloud and believed that they were looking down the sound, which on their track is bereft of landmarks until some 25nm past the original (unmoved) McMurdo waypoint.

For context, the sound and McMurdo are visible in the right of this picture; this aircraft is following roughly the same track as the original planned track (a/c heading is about 5° left). [note that this is a panorama picture of two images, covering about 80° field of view; the aircraft is tracking a line extrapolated to the left of the mountain in the far right of shot. Beaufort is the obvious island. Impact site is in the large bay in the middle of shot, behind Beaufort Is]

http://i663.photobucket.com/albums/u...ebuspano-2.jpg

Importantly, they were not expecting any terrain in their path. When it went to whiteout ahead it is possible they did not do anything in the short term as they thought they were not in harms way tracking happily down the sound and had visibility out to the side (and misidentified landmarks).

In short, Whiskery, given the same cloud conditions, I believe that they would likely also have encountered whiteout as they got closer in to the sound if they'd tracked the unchanged flight plan. It might have been possible to see the mountains in the distance, negating the whiteout, but we'll never know.

c_s, what altitude is that photograph taken from? Regardless, having to race-course to 'get below' the cloud and the lack of sighting ANY positive landmark tends to suggest the conditions shown in your photo do not have any relevance to the discussion at hand. It shows a mountain, McMurdo etc. Landmarks that Collins never saw.

The argument isn't whether they were in trouble at 1500" i.e whiteout etc, by that stage it was too late anyway. The argument is how they got to be that low without positively fixing their position before descent.

Presumably the INS was accurate (evidence shows it was 3 miles out). It gave the crew, bereft of any other assistance (TACAN, radar, eyeballs), their only known means of navigation. The INS gives coordinates. It would have read "you are here. Between where you are now and where you want the aircraft to go there is a mountain. Outside the Himalayas, it's one of the tallest mountains in the world. Are you sure you want to select nav track hold?"

You've described your experiences flying in Antarctica in whiteout conditions vividly. The first one was educational, the dog turd story instructional. Now consider yourself in Collins position. Without positive reference to anything other than an inertial system that hasn't been updated for hours, would you have descended below the LSALT? When you knew, even on the safe side, that a massive mountain was less than 5 minutes flying time away?

As I said earlier, I'm in no doubt that the company, the regulators and the government all played a part in this disastrous accident.

However, claiming that the crew were simply 'passengers', that it would have happened if another crew was flying that day, and that Colins etc are 100% absolved of any lack of basic airmanship is ludicrous. As 3 Holer (please Lord, never place me under his command) has said;

They were in VMC yet they hit a mountain? I know what qualifies as 'VMC' in class G, as well as other classes of airspace. Being unable to avoid a CFIT due to lack of visibility means that the aircraft was NOT in VMC. It's either that or a mass murder-suicide, take your pick.

The Mahon self-flagellators will try and have you believe that being 'certain' that you are at a position in space (even though you are wrong), and being certain that you are in VMC (even though you're not) wihout any cross-checking, position fixing etc means that you are absolved if you subsequently kill everyone under your jurisdiction. There are people who have posted on this thread that I wouldn't fly with. Ever.

Hempy
Around 15-20k. I don't remember, and can't be bothered correlating time stamps to tracking data.
The conditions on the day were nothing like the pic and that wasn't its intention. The picture was designed to give an appreciation of an oblique view of the area and likely snow and ice cover that on a bad day would tend to white out. Anywhere with no open water will whiteout. That's both McMurdo sound the the ill fated flight track. I can't remember what date this pic was taken, but it's fairly representative of ice cover for November.
I had posted this many years ago and a few weeks back someone asked me to put it up again, and I just found the link by accident.
No.
It's likely that there was plenty of visibility (as defined for aeronautical purposes) at 1500', even straight ahead.
Is it still VMC when it gets dark on a clear night?

Thank goodness

Where I come from 8,000m horizontally is required at A100 to be considered 'VMC'. 5,000m below that. Those rules were developed so as to give the pilot enough time to react to a mountain appearing in the windscren if he somehow found himself uncertain of position i.e 'what's that mountain goat doing in the middle of that cloud bank?'
No, that would be NVFR

I suggest you go and (re)read the definitions of VMC and VFR. You'll find them in your CAR 1988.

c s.

I'm fully aware of NVFR v's VMC (although it was a long (:() time and many hours ago). I assumed by your question that you were comparing your 'whiteout' scenario with NVFR. Perhaps I was a little obtuse.

Since you are bottled up on the CARs, would you like to state the instrument requirements for a NVFR rating?

I still don't get your point. VMC is 'N'VMC. Already megan has told us that other crews had descended in marginal conditions. Apparently this means that Collins and crew showed equal airmanship. If proven (which I doubt he(?) can, it looks like a race to the bottom (of Mt Erebus)

NVFR, Class IV Instrument if its that long ago for you, whatever you want to call it doesn't enter into the accident. I raised it to show the flaw in your understanding. VMC is a Condition, not a Rule. VMC does not change, night or day. How you are allowed to fly does change night or day.

It is almost certain that they were in VMC until impact. Or at least until the EGPWS call. They had descended to a (low) level clear of stratiform cloud with plenty of visibility. It's just that what was there ahead was not able to be seen due to certain wavelengths of light being filtered out.

According to ICAO - Visibility for aeronautical purposes is...the greatest distance at which a black object of suitable dimensions, situated near the ground, can be seen and recognised when observed against a bright background.

If that black rock band visible on the upper slopes thousands of feet above stretched to sea level across their track, would they have flown into it?

My point is your quote is incorrect. I know it has ultimately little outcome on who wears the proportion of blame, which is the trend of this thread.

My intention isn't to apportion blame as such. My intention is to teach young aviators that 's#|t happens, when it's all up against you, go by your training. If it looks bad and it smells bad, it's probably rotten'.

There's not much point blaming the company, the regulator or even the government after you are dead. You're dead. At the end of the day, the pilot in command has (had) the ultimate responsibility for that flight and everyone on board. He wasn't in 1A, he was the Captain.

I don't do anything on 50% surety, I'm not a gambler. Collins and his crew gambled on that flight, and lost all in.

Arguments about other crews that won a jackpot are irrelevant, 50/50 odds are 50/50 odds regardless of the numbers of players.

Gamblers + ATPL = a bad mix imho.

It was that day, anyway.

Memorandum of the Royal Commissioner, Mr. Justice Mahon, as to Evidence and Information Obtained Overseas

Exact quote, "There were occasions, so it was said by one witness, when Air New Zealand aircraft were observed to be flying in and out of cloud although on the basis of their radio transmissions they were flying VMC."Well, tell me this, why then did the pilots give evidence to the contrary. They all said they thought the track went down the sound. Not one said they thought it went to the TACAN. From Brief of evidence before Royal Commission.

F/O Irvine, "When I left the briefing I had a clear understanding that we were flying into the McMurdo area up the McMurdo Sound with Ross Island and Mt. Erebus well out to our left."

F/O Gabriel, said that during the briefing he compared the TACAN co-ordinates with the co-ordinates of the "McMurdo" waypoint on the flight plan which he had in front of him. He realised the waypoint was to the west of the TACAN. He therefore believed the navigation track ran to the west of Ross Island though he did not know its precise location.

Captain Simpson, He said that he looked at the flight plan produced by Captain Wilson at the briefing and noticed that the "McMurdo" position on it was further south west than the Byrd reporting point, being at the head of McMurdo Sound. Thus by inspecting the co-ordinates Captain Simpson was clear the computer flight path ran down McMurdo Sound and not across Mt. Erebus. Fixed it for you, ampans above post I address is a case in point. He has always sunk the boot in to Collins in particular even reminding us how Collins failed something or another at school. And he still exhibits a total ignorance re whiteout, as is Hempy. :cool:

Fixed your formula Hempy Poor airline planning + Poor training + lack of oversight = a bad mix

An example is the planning of the cloudbreak procedure. You would have thought a proving flight would have been carried out to iron out any glitches that may have arisen. The procedure was virtually unflyable, as spelled out by F/O Rhodes, and no one had ever attempted it.

Seeing as you profess to be the font of all knowledge, tell us all how you would have handled that flight megan, disregarding the benefit of hindsight.

Would you have followed Collins actions, or would something have twigged that all was not right?

Hearsay, and ultimately irrelevant. You are surely not suggesting that your "normalisation of deviance" subculture went so far that it was considered acceptable by airline management and pilots to blatantly ignore the requirements for VFR?

This was from a ground observer at McMurdo, hardly proof of non-VMC compliance. It's possible for cloud to be between the observer and aircraft giving the impression the aircaft entered cloud.

Thanks for that photo Compresser Stall. Clears things up a lot. It's easy to see how a relatively high overcast could obscure Ross/Erebus completely.

Is it fair to say then you would not descend (today) without a radar or navaid fix?

If you would, can you describe the limits of visual identification that you would consider acceptable in terms of visibility, sight of ground or water or ice and landmarks for descending below MSA under IFR?

Thank you compressor stall for your insightful reply to my questions. You have confirmed my belief, you know what you are talking about re: Antarctic flying. Your last sentence I found very helpful in getting me off the fence, especially the last four words.

That is the difference in comprehending this disaster.

Whiteout should never have been a problem, certainly not at 1,500ft.

The weather given by McMurdo was well below the minimums for any approved descent. They were even specifically advised by the locals on the ground that the area was no good for sightseeing.

In the briefing they were told if Ross Island/Mt Erebus were cloud covered to go to the South Magnetic Pole.

The VMC requirements for these flights was not the normal limits, it was specifically stated 20KM Vis.

With that limitation in mind how could you do the race track circuits during the descent and never identify Ross Island, Mt Erebus, or in fact anything to positively identify your position, if you were in fact VMC with 20 K vis?

One line of position, especially from the AINS, which was not cleared for navigation below MSA, was surely not enough.

. The statement by Mulgrew, the local expert 4 minutes before impact, "I still can't see very much at the moment, keep you informed soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are". surely puts any possibility of VMC flight at the lower portion of the descent in doubt.

Evidence given by an air traffic person is hearsay and irrelevant? Thats a new angle.The airline professed that crews were not permitted to descend below 6,000, yet almost every one did. I can give the list of each flight and the height they descended to if you so wish. Some went as low as 500 AGL over the ridge line behind the base. Although they deny any knowledge, the airline used the fact that crews descended below 6,000 in their very own advertising. So yes, the airline blatantly ignored the fact that crews did not comply with their supposed 6,000 rule. Read the Commissions report, beginning page 74.While that may have validity, I'm inclined to think an ATC individual would have an opinion not to be discounted.How do you explain the ability of crews to descend to 1,000 AGL, if they deemed VMC conditions existed, if flying the alternate route to the Ninnis and Mertz Glaciers? (Brian Hewitt's memo 25 November 1976) AINS was the only means of navigation available - no TACAN, no NDB, no nothing, except AINS.