M.E.L.s
 

In the now locked threads about Tech Logs etc, there are many comments about M.E.Ls.

I always understood that ANY Captain at ANY Airline could elect not to go with a certain M.E.L. applied, however he would need to have a VERY good reason.

I have never yet seen one actually refuse to go.

However I have seen many instances where, with a bit of consultation between the Captain and the LAME, things can be worked out, even if there is no M.E.L.

These M.E.L.s are not just issued on a whim, I have even seen CASA cancel some quite valid ones just because one word is spelt incorrectly.

A Captain won't not go just because of one MEL, if the thing is that serious usally it isnt in the MEL so gotta get the ginger beers to fix it while you have a coffee :ok:

The problem arises when you have multiple MEL's. Cant think of a combination at the moment but you can get a combination which make the aircraft in the captains opinion unsevicable, but still legal under the MEL's

My point was (as I understand the situation) the Captain does NOT have to accept any particular M.E.L., however his Company will expect a good reason why.

With multiple M.E.L.s, that is usually taken into account anyway.

An example would be on a twin, say one generator/alternator U/S. The M.E.L. would normally state subject to the A.P.U being serviceable, and other things like it would have to be a non ETOPS.

In my experience the MEL items that cause the most debate are Yaw Damper and Auto Pilot - obviously because they have a significant impact on pilot workload. I have seen a captain refuse to take an a/c with the Yaw Damper inop. He was regarded as being within his rights, and, as far as I know, it caused no problems between pilot and management or pilot and maintenance.

I think I would be a bit more cautious with multiple MELs.

For a single MEL, the MMEL guru committee has brainstormed the effects of the U/S on certification and come up with an equivalent risk level by imposing appropriate restrictions.

Can I ask you to quote where in the typical MMEL there is any cogent indication that the intention is to cover multiple failures ?

A crew refusing an MEL permission is the last in the line of defences .. the MMEL doesn't address the detailed specifics of TODAY's flight .. weather, alternates, crew fatigue, etc. etc. ....

We left one behind once. The Mels covered it if I remember correctly, but only just. The aircraft had just come out of maintenance and from memory (it was a long time ago!) the EECs were MELed out and after starting both engines there were intermittent indications on one of the of the EPR gauges as well as one of the fuel flow gauges-or something like that. Can't remember the exact details but basically it was something to do with the engines that the mels covered, however, the engineers had no idea as to the cause of the combination and it was all too dodgy so we left it behind for it to get properly fixed and went to another plane! As far as I know no ramifications, just the sensible safe thing to do. Doesn't happen very often though! (Not dispatching cause of mels/too many mels I mean...)

It should not be a problem anyway, as the LAME that issues a new MEL, is obligated to first make sure it will not conflict with any other MEL or restriction already on that Aircraft.

Maybe not Planemad2.
A classic example is an MEL that prohibits flight in known, forecast, or probable icing conditions. Can be hard to get your point across when departing an airport that is cavok and 30 degrees! It's a situational awareness thingy...some people are more on to it than others.

As far as qf are concerned,the MEL book is an extract of the MEL master that is generated by the manufacturer.Not all of the Master MEL's are used by the company via consultation with CASA.It is true when applying a MEL the LAME should make the flight crew aware of the restrictions that may occur .In all my many years with the company ive seen a few pilots refuse to accept the MEL and in some cases they were asked to phone ops and in other cases the a/c failed to depart.Overall it is a system that has worked fine until recently we have noticed that maint watch have been telling flight crews over the phone how to carry out maint procedures that must be addressed by a licenced engineer specific to the trade cat.You may ask how this has been carried out ,well the answer is by the abuse of using an ATP.
Also main watch have also given flight crews the licence to reset tripped circuit breakers which as we all know is a bit of a no no.Its a worrying trend.
Manually dripping fuel tanks is another area that has been bastardised by qf maint watch.We had one incident in the west recently where a brave flight crew member dripped a wing ,but inadvertantly left the stick unlocked.It was picked up during the next pre flight.
These instances are both worrying and trending in the upward direction.

I though id leave this for the qf captain that decided PA or cabin interphone wasnt that necessary the other day and decided to fly a 737 from NT to SYD
History of the flight
The flight was operating from London (Heathrow) to Kiev and took off at 1445 hrs with the first officer (FO) as the handling pilot. The departure was uneventful until 1458 hrs when, climbing through FL240, the commander heard three or four electrical 'crackling' sounds. Shortly afterwards the cabin call aural warning sounded on the flight deck, but despite several attempts neither pilot was able to establish contact with the cabin crew via the interphone. At about this time the FO noticed a small amount of smoke in the area behind the commander. The commander could not see the smoke but was aware of an electrical burning smell and therefore instructed the FO to don his oxygen mask. The commander put on his own mask and re-established communication with the FO, thus completing the recall items for the 'Electrical Smoke / Fumes or Fire' checklist. He then took control of the aircraft whilst the FO retrieved his Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) in order to complete the remainder of the checklist.

Both pilots were aware of continued banging on the locked cockpit door, which had commenced after their failed attempts to reply to the cabin crew on the interphone. This heightened the pilots' concerns about what was happening, since they were unable to either communicate with the cabin crew or establish the cause of the smoke.

The commander was unsure whether his oxygen hose was long enough to allow him to reach the flight deck door. Therefore, in the absence of any visible smoke, and having briefed the FO, he cautiously removed his mask. He could still smell the smoke but had no difficulty breathing and decided that it was safe to leave his mask off. He went to the door and checked through a peephole for signs of fire or possible intruders. Seeing neither he opened the door and was met by a flow of water coming from a panel in the roof between the forward toilet and the galley. The cabin services director (CSD), who had been the person banging on the door, explained that about fifteen minutes after takeoff he had seen sparks and flames coming from the panel, followed shortly thereafter by a continuous stream of water.

The CSD had attempted to notify the flight deck at the time by using the cabin interphone and had initially heard the commander's voice reply, but the interphone had then ceased working. One of the cabin crew working at the rear of the aircraft then reported to him that the rear galley and some of the cabin lights were no longer working. Another member of the crew turned the water isolation valve off but, despite this, water continued to pour from the roof. Concerned that the water might find its way into the avionics bay the crewmember plugged the gap under the flight deck door with towels. The CSD had then started to bang on the flight deck door in an attempt to get the pilots' attention and, looking through the peephole, could see that both pilots were wearing their oxygen masks. Still unable to establish communications with the flight deck the CSD gathered the cabin crew together in the forward galley to explain the situation and to brief them for an anticipated return to Heathrow. It was at this point that the commander opened the flight deck door.

After satisfying himself that he was fully informed of the situation in the cabin, and that there was no longer any fire, the commander briefed the CSD that they would be returning to Heathrow and advised him to prepare for a possible emergency evacuation. The commander also told him that he would make an announcement to the passengers.

Before the commander left the flight deck in order to check the cabin, the aircraft had been levelled at FL260 and ATC notified that they had a "technical problem". No emergency had been declared at this point since the flight crew were still unsure of the situation in the cabin. However, whilst the commander was in the cabin ATC asked whether they wished to declare an emergency. The FO replied that they did and on a further suggestion from the controller agreed to commence a turn towards Stansted Airport, which was then about 55 nm to the west.

When he returned to his seat the commander decided to leave his oxygen mask off since there was now no smell of any smoke. He instructed the FO to remove his oxygen mask, in order to facilitate communications, before briefing him on the situation in the cabin. The commander then declared a MAYDAY, requesting an immediate diversion to Heathrow. This was acknowledged by ATC and new vectors were given for them to fly. The crew then completed the remainder of the smoke checklist from the QRH and the commander briefed for a monitored approach for an ILS to Runway 27R at Heathrow, with the FO flying the approach and the commander taking control for the landing.

Meanwhile, after being informed of their intention to return to Heathrow the CSD had commenced briefing the passengers for a precautionary landing. Since the cabin interphone was not working he decided the most expeditious method was to arrange for the four cabin crew members to walk through the cabin personally briefing the passengers. Having done this they isolated the cabin electrical services and the CSD went onto the flight deck to inform the commander that the cabin had been secured for landing. The commander had previously explained the situation to the passengers, successfully using the public address (PA) system but he told the CSD that should the system subsequently fail and in the absence of any other instruction the doors should be left in 'auto' after landing. The CSD then returned to the cabin and the cabin crew took their seats for landing.

During the approach the commander requested that the ILS be protected so that they would be able to carry out an autoland should the smoke return and their view be restricted. ATC replied that a CAT III ILS would be available but that protection could not be guaranteed: they also advised that a surveillance radar approach would be available if necessary. The approach was continued and the commander took control at 1,000 feet and completed a normal landing, bringing the aircraft to a halt on the runway, as requested by ATC. The FO, as briefed, then went immediately into the cabin to check for any more signs of fire. There were none, and the commander relayed this information to the fire services who were now at the aircraft and speaking to the commander on a discreet frequency.

The fire service requested that the engines be shut down before carrying out an external check for signs of fire or damage. None were found and they boarded the aircraft and used thermal imaging equipment to look for hot areas in the ceiling. Again none were found but, on pulling down the damaged ceiling panel, a burnt wiring loom could be seen. Next to this was the water supply hose to the forward galley, from which water was still pouring. Whilst the fire crews were investigating the source of the fire the passengers were disembarked from the rear of the aircraft onto awaiting buses, following which the aircraft was towed clear of the runway.

Sorry for the length but i hope the message sinks in to some.

Capt Fathom,

Good example, one which I have experienced many times over the years.

Usually not a problem in Sunny Queensland, however that is why any sensible operator would keep a close eye on these M.E.Ls, as an Aircraft may be perfectly okay to operate with that M.E.L item out of say BNE, but may be grounded later in the day at somewhere like maybe CBR or HBA.

Capt Fathom that's true although a good look at the SigWxProg full of forecasted weather en-route should be enough of an indication of issues later on in the flight, long after departure from the CAVOK field.....

Like you said, awareness! :ok:

an MEL that prohibits flight in known, forecast, or probable icing conditions.
How about in tropical Singapore, or Malaysia?

"known, forecast, or probable icing conditions" exist once the OAT drops below 10 C and visible moisture is present.
That occurs almost EVERY day in many aircrafts' operations, when flying through/in cloud.
To comply with the MEL, this condition (flying in known, forecast, or probable icing conditions) must to be avoided, which usually involves flying considerably lower than usual levels, or making large enroute deviations.

It may well be a warm 25 or 30 on the ground, but several thousand feet above it ain't!

Speaking of icing as someone was, reminds me that there are often ways of getting around these M.E.L.s. ;)

Had an Airbus A300-600 a few years ago, first flight of the day, departing on an International Flight, and when Captain did his preflight checks, NONE of the outboard fuel tank boost pumps would operate.

At first we thought it was an electrical problem, but then we found out they were all frozen.

There was no easy way to thaw them out, and we looked like having a big delay.

The M.E.L. was very specific, pumps must be operating if there is fuel in the tanks, and as the tanks were full, the Captain could not take the Aircraft. (and we only had the one Aircraft).

When it got near the scheduled departure time, I asked the Captain if the Aircraft was already at max weight or not, and if not, why couldn't we just declare this fuel in the outers as UNUSABLE fuel, add that amount of extra fuel to the centre tank, and go?

After checking all the weights and manuals, that is what we did.

So sometimes you can get around these M.E.L.s.

Incidentally, all the pumps came good not long after takeoff, just he couldn't legally go with them U/S and that original fuel figure.


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Kaptin M,

Your post wasn't there when I started (slowly) typing my previous one.

Yes, I am well aware of that.

I have also had the reverse situation.

Had a DC9 arrive in TSV direct from BNE, some 30 odd years ago now, and the Captain after doing his walkround wanted to ground the DC9 because the APU Fuel Heater was operating on the ground with a temperature of some 35C.

I finally convinced him that although it was 35C where we were standing, he had just come down from 33,000 feet and the FUEL temperature was probably still minus.............. :ok: