Aussie Andy et al.

So the spin doctors have worked their magic, and you, supposedly a pilot, are using this spin as evidence that all is good? You either
1. Have no understanding of what is going on, including believing a jet on descent receiving an RA is no problem
2. Understand the situation but are stupid enough to believe the way the spin doctors have latched onto the wording of the report
3. Are going to be pro-NAS no matter what, and are disengenuous in your use of the report.

The problem is the media bytes have worked their magic, and the public in general will from now on see any further NAS criticism as"union scaremongering". The minister should be shot. I really can't wish a NAS related incident on him (he "flies a lot"), but........

It's going to be uphill from here, now. Facts won't help ****su-Tonka. Short of getting the DJ crew on telly and bagging the airspace, I can't see how the media (and public) can be turned (without a MAC).

Still shaking my head...........

Snarek (and anyone else even slightly pro-NAS).
Now, this happens often. What if he had forgotten to turn his transponder on? This also happens often. Would have put a whole different complexion on this, don't you think? I mean Isn't that the whole basis for NAS? The 737 pilots aquired the C421 with the aid of DTI and TCAS. They are trying to kill DTI, it is not even required to be passed to a VFR. Would DTI have benn available if there was no transponder at all? TCAS only works if the transponder works. With mode A only, would the TCAS have still issued an RA? Is it just me, or did the report gloss over that bit? How many jet pilots ignore TA-only alerts generated by what are presumed to be lighties on the deck, way below them?
For anyone who isn't an ATC, this is the bit that stings So, are they saying that by vectoring outside CTA the controller assumes responsibility? Absolutely. So you can only muck the ones around you do have control of. ie the jets. Very efficient (not). ATCs are going to wear some of the **** when it goes wrong, no matter what.

Fri "Melbourne Age"

Air traffic union accused of scaremongering
December 19, 2003

The air controllers' union has been accused of blatant scaremongering over an air traffic incident north of Melbourne.

Earlier this month, air controllers and the Federal Opposition called for the scrapping of the new air traffic control system, known as the National Airspace System, after claiming that two aircraft were within 20 seconds of colliding.

Civil Air president Ted Lang called for a full review of the new air control rules, which allow private planes to fly in commercial air traffic lanes. But the report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau found that at no stage did the planes come closer than 2.7 kilometres in distance and 121 metres in height.

It found the proximity of the aircraft - a Virgin Airlines Boeing 737 flying from Coolangatta to Melbourne, and a Cessna C421 from country Victoria - was not enough to be deemed a near miss, termed an "airprox" in the report.

It also found that the Virgin flight had the Cessna in sight and had slowed its rate of descent to keep a safe distance.

"There was no infringement of separation standards," the report said.

A spokesman for Transport Minister John Anderson called on Labor transport spokesman Martin Ferguson and the air traffic controllers to apologise for "blatant scaremongering over the non-incident" before it was investigated.

"Basically, there is no question that the new airspace caused the problem," he said.

- AAP

Guys, sticks'n'stones... etc. remember?

Clearly, there was never any point at which the aircraft were "20 seconds" from collision when the a/c were not under control of ATC: read the report.

Andy, I'll type slowly so you can keep up.......

The aircraft were @ 1nm apart. A 737 on descent at FL180 travels at @ 5nm per minute. That is 20 seconds apart . The RA is generated when the aircraft are 20 seconds apart .

Is there anything you are having trouble with so far?

They may have missed, had there been no intervention. The regulators aren't happy with that, hence TCAS was required equipment on the 737. "Might have missed" is not good enough, it seems, whenever it suits the regulator. Some on this forum are concerned about just where that line in the sand should be for "might miss".

To my mind, this incident is really effin embarrassing if you are pushing the NAS barrow.

Bit like repealing the .05 BAC, then when a car prang occurs when the driver is a fissed as a part, saying no infringement of the road rules occurred, and alcohol is no longer a factor (although it would have been last week)

Are we expected to accept RA as the norm. 20 secs relates to less than 3nm !!!

So where do we now go with air safety/hazardous practice?

Is a near miss (air prox) dangerous in one type of airspace and not in another?

Is a near miss dangerous between IFR and IFR and not with other combinations of IFR/VFR?

Is an RA reportable now?

Will the Transportation Safety Act be repealed, amended, cancelled? What then the value of statistics for assessing trend?

Is that it - is this all over with this precedent?

Change the goal posts/definitions and the thing no longer exists. My goodness what place are we now in! What has been created?

Clearly some guidance should be forthcoming.

Can I leave now - I have a headache?

Reprogram TCAS!
 

Clearly now that we have brought our airspace into the 21st century, it is time to bring TCAS into the 21st century, too, and not have it give unnecessary advisories (whether TA or RA) if the aircraft aren't even going to be "close".

How about:
TA - 1 NM/200 FT and provided 10 sec to CPA
RA - 0.3 NM/50 FT and provided 2 sec to CPA

At least RAs will only be associated with airproxs then. :mad:

ferris: Quoting from the report:Then: So the point is (a n d n o w i a m t y p i n g s l o w l y y o u i n s u l t i n g i g n o r a m u s . . .) that the descent of the 737 had been stopped at FL180, while the C421 was level at FL175. The 737 was no longer on descent, so there was never any "countdown" to impact. The reason for this is the 500 ft separation established by the controller - the controller did a good job: he was in contact with both aircraft for over 7 minutes before issuing the instruction which provided this separation. Then, after the vertical separation had been achieved:And then, about two minutes later (still level at FL180):So tell me, oh great one: where in that sequence of events was the "20 seconds to impact"? The VFR aircraft was at a VFR level, the IFR aircraft was at an IFR level, 500' nominal separation was provided.

The RA went off because when both aircraft are LEVEL and if the aircraft are within 750 feet or so (see below) then the alert is based on time to CPA - Closest Point of Approach. Note: that does equate to "time to collision". This is why some people think that Civil Air's widely reported claim that the aircraft were "20 seconds from collision" was unduly sensationalist. (And this, in turn, may be why people think that Civil Air may have some other agenda...).

(N.B. "For encounter geometries involving low vertical closure rates ... the vertical dimensions for RAs vary from 750ft to 900ft, depending on the TCAS aircraft’s altitude." Ref. http://www.casa.gov.au/avreg/fsa/dow...r/apr_tcas.pdf)

(By the way, are you sure that 20 seconds is the correct "tau" figure?: above 10,000', I think a higher "SL" may apply, hence the RA would trigger at 30 seconds time to CPA not 20... not that this changes anything).

Furthermore, the aircraft were never "1NM apart"... you are about 50% out as the report says the closest they came was as follows:As for Civil Air's latest press release: yet again it has an overly sensational headline which shouts that the aircraft were "300 feet apart". No, they were not... see above: the VERTICAL SPACING was 300 feet "when there was 2.74 NM between the two aircraft", according to the report. Hardly the same, is it?

Now, you can call me any names you like - if that's what float's your boat!

Have a great day!

Andy :ok:

I notice Kerans has gone quiet.

Probably waiting for an apology, but if I were him I wouldn't hold his breath, the anti-NAS mob seem to be able to displace truth and reality as fast as a 747 displaces air!!!

Mau kimana pak???

PT

Well done Andy.

I'm with you. 300ft at nearly 3 miles is a hell of a lot different to 300ft vertically away from another aircraft. Did Ted ever put out a press release saying that the REX aircrafts' RA was not a result of a GA aircraft getting in the way? But that would mean having to back down now wouldn't it.

TBT

AA, TBT,

"Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay"

The ATSB report itself says that there are no separation standards applicable between VFR/IFR in Class E, so isn't this title true? Isn't it? You may think the use of the 300ft is questionable, but does it change the truth of the statement?

The body of the release does not mention any distances, because the point of the release is to highlight that it is made clear by the ATSB report that there are no separation standards between VFR/IFR in E. Simple. The title could have used 150ft and still have been correct, regardless of what distances occur in the report.

If you are so concerned about truth in the NAS debate then are you happy with the publically stated $50-$70M savings that are unfounded and unproven? Or that the Minister has said that the airspace is safer? Will you answer these questions?

You have not demonstrated that the new airspace is not less safe. You have not demonstrated that there are savings in the airspace. You attack the perceived tactics of one side of the debate whilst not concerning yourself with the government-level public misinformation being made by those who are pushing NAS through.

The Government and NASIG want the public to feel happy about the airspace changes. Pilots and ATC know that it is less safe and does not save any money (it probably now costs more money). You want to attack groups that attempt to bring this to the public's attention.

Prove that NAS is as safe or more safe.
Prove that NAS will save money

And again, please tell me how the statement "Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay" is incorrect.

Of course it is safe Here to Help. They were nearly 3 miles apart. If it wasn't safe, then half of the movements into a GAAP would not be safe either.

Really be serious here. 2.7nm = 5000 metres. Which just happens to be the VMC minima for aircraft below 10,000. (from memory, so could be wrong.)

I'm not about to poop my pants if an aircraft gets within 5 Km of my position, regardless of if they are 300 feet above me or even at my level. Sheesh...

I'm not about to go into the argument that the NAS is going to save money or that it is safer. Too early to tell. Then again the speed limit went from 100Km/h to 110Km/h so is it safer to travel faster??????


TBT:D

Ahhh - I've got it. The $50 - 70 M is due to the consequent reduction in staff and services now required by ATSB and CASA. No safety infringements/reductions (elimination of standards and procedures) = reduced requirement for CASA and ATSB.

Nothing to do with AA - however there will be a small increase in staff required to service E. Bet it's busy and getting busier with all that extra "save your ar$$e" R/T!

But hang on, didn't we move from FLIGHT STANDARDs regulation to random audit in the early nineties - and look what happened!!!!

Cunning little devils - had us all looking the other way!!!!!!!!

AIP GEN amendment (pending) (bringing back some MIL terminology)

In the event of a pending mid-air collision the 'responsible person' should call "BREAK RIGHT" and conduct a 5G, 60 degree turn in the direction of the nearest South American Travel Agency.

So far, I believe you are the only one doing any name calling. Sure, I have implied you are a bit slow, but you have to call them as you see them. I also gave you an out: either you were a bit slow, or being disingenuous, or a combination. Still undecided on that. However, . Why had the descent been stopped? Because the controller saw the ModeA only? No!!!! The point is that the descent was stopped by chance . Do you understand that point? It was chance that the 421 pilot called up at that moment, and his altitude became apparent. What if he hadn't, or what if his transponder was not selected on at all, or U/S. How would the controller, and hence the jet, have known about him at all? A VFR isn't supposed to use the radio at all under NAS (Dick suggests VFR enroute pilots should listen to CDs. A call was made because he was requesting a clearance. Is this lost on you? This is an example of NAS at work. The ATSB report is basically saying that "it was all according to the rules". It doesn't say the "rules are good".
Jets and lighties shouldn't be in the same airspace without clearances.

TBT
Half of them aren't.
You aren't demonstrating an understanding of standards. If the controller was seperating, the lateral standard is 5nm. Does 5nm look like a lot when you're in the cockpit? Sure does. Does 5nm look like a lot on a radar screen? Definately not. Does 1.5nm look like a lot on a radar? I'd say the symbols would almost be overlapping, depending on what scale was being used. Using arguments about distances when you are talking jet speeds is totally misleading to anyone who doesn't understand the situation (you, by the sounds of it).
A TCAS RA is an incident. To have it brushed off like this is, well, politically expedient.

Andy and Time Bomb Ted,

You guys seem to be preoccupied with the 2.74nm / 300' separation that occurred. Frankly that one doesn't worry me as much as the 1.5nm / 400' separation they had at one point. Now fellas, that is close when it involves a jet flying at 300kts....

What are we worried about?
 

The system worked.
NAS is a success.
The aircraft didn't collide.
This is despite the amateur pilot failing to activate his transponder properly.
AND despite failing to abide by the NAS golden rule - "seeing",

AND thus not "avoiding".
AND failing to remain clear of a major inbound IFR route.
AND failing to request a clearance within the appropriate time.
THERE was no incident.
THE aircraft didn't collide
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
today.
Welcome to the 21st century........DTI is on the way out, to be replaced by DFI
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Drug Free Idiocy.

CG

Ferris … good points …

The controller used his discretion and initiative (and experience) to stop the descent of the B737 about 90secs before what he saw as a real possibility of ……. A very dangerous, unsafe situation.

On the screen … a radar track symbol is 3.5mm wide. The ASD scale is 1Nm = 2mm

"The ATSB report is basically saying that "it was all according to the rules". It doesn't say the "rules are good"." - Agree. Basically, the ATSB presented some facts and concluded that "… this occurrence did not constitute an airprox occurrence." Nothing more.

There's other stuff that the ATSB report didn't say … or ignored … and one (at least) discrepancy with other documented info ...

-----

"Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay"

Read the fine print of the press release rather than just the big print of the title!

-----

"Pilots of VFR flights should avoid IFR holding patterns" (AIP ENR1 18.3.3)

Nobody seems to have questioned the fact that this all occurred in the immediate vicinity of a key holding pattern - CANTY. And, given the poor weather … there could well have been holding!

-----

The message may be getting thru to some of the Virgin crews …. That would explain the recent diversions by jets around unidentified VFR radar tracks without mode C!

-----

Many pro-NAS people here have commented upon the fact that the aircraft came within 300 or 400FT, or were within 1NM or 2.7NM etc.

The important point is that, prior to November 27, the aircraft would have been positively separated, with minimum distances. The only factor impacting on the distance between the aircraft here was luck. They could have missed by 100NM. They also could have hit. The system did sweet FA to affect the outcome. It was factors outside NAS which saved the day.

1) The C421 was in Class E airspace, without squawking Mode C. (He had no way to know this, because the system is deliberately designed to exclude him. This is a major failing of NAS which it's architects are aware of. It only took 6 days for it to happen.)

2) The C421 was approaching one of the major IFR inbound tracking points.

3) By chance the C421 called up, requecting a clearance into the adjacent class C airspace.

4) As a result, for better or worse, Mode C failure is detected, Mode C is selected, traffic information is passed, and a TCAS RA occurs.

Now, if the C421 pilot had remained silent as he is supposed to do in Class E, what would have been the result:

1) No Mode C
2) No traffic information to the B737
3) No last minute 'save' by the controller.
4) No TCAS RA
5) The absolute last resort - see and avoid unknown traffic by the B737 (even with DTI the C421 never saw the B737 - 300 FT and 2.7NM away!)

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the sytem that is now going to cost you MORE money, for less safety.

And what kept them 'nearly 3 miles apart'? Luck. Great system!.

I just don't get it. VOZ has TCAS RA but elects to use visual. TCAS is mandated for B737s but can the aircraft fly without it (minimum equipment)? Nothing on the flight plan indicates TCAS and ATC basically do nothing with any advise of "nil TCAS"

TCAS & MEL
 

I have heard QANTAS now have TCAS on the MEL as a result of NAS - No TCAS, no trip. Don't know about others....

Not quite accurate.

TCAS is a MEL item I would guess on all aircraft, each aircraft having it's own Master MEL from the manufacturer, this can them be altered to an Operators MEL with approval of CASA.

For example Eastern OMEL for the Dash - TCAS 10 day item no operational restrictions.

Is now being changed to add conditions that the aircraft basically can't operate out of Class A with an inop TCAS. Still a 10 day item so theoretically could spend 10 days going SYD-CBR

As much as I hate to ruin a good NAS/VFR pilot bashing session, I would like to pose a couple of questions based on the known facts.

1. Why did the 737 need to go through the E airspace? At 50 DME and above FL180 he could delay his descent to stay in the class C steps and still not need to exceed 3000fm.

2. It was eight minutes from when the C421 requested an airways clearence into Essendon until he was advised VFR not available, then a further six minutes for an IFR clearence to be given. Is this considered an acceptable level of service, at 10:00 am on a weekday?

3. If the controller was concerned about a potential conflict why didn't he simply ask the C421 to do a orbit or standard rate turn at his current position. This would have given an immediate 2 minute increase in seperation. Happens going into CBR all the time.


Just trying to find the forest .... too many damm trees in the way....

RV8builder
Excellent questions. Herewith my thoughts:
I guess he could have, unless there are STAR requirements, such as those at Sydney, which would not permit this. I fact, at Sydney, aircraft are often required to be as low as 10,000 by 45NM. Avoiding class E is impossible in this case.

More to the point – why? The only reason to avoid a certain class of airspace would be if the airspace is not conducive to safe operations. That is precisely the point of the argument.

I am not sure about the timing in your post (a total of 14minutes), but even so, the ‘delay’ mentioned was not a delay to the aircraft. As far as I am aware, the clearance was issued when the aircraft required it. Of course, the change from VFR to IFR, the requirement to obtain flight plan details etc. and the requirement to rearrange the traffic to facilitate IFR separation will cause additional workload. This may lead to delays which would not have occurred under pre-NAS2B operations.

The point here is that the controller was not required to be ‘concerned about a potential conflict’. There is no requirement for the controller to separate - - only to provide traffic information and allow Class E procedures to kick in. The system should have allowed the B737 to descend straight through the C421’s level with no intervention by the controller. Of course, in this case, the controller did not sit idly by and let it all go bad.

Fortunately, this incident amply demonstrates the potential short-comings of NAS. Many of the ‘holes in the swiss cheese’ lined up on the day. Happily, some of them did not.

Failed defences
1) VFR aircraft was operating in an area of high levels of IFR traffic, and in fact at a major IFR tracking and holding point.
2) Mode C was not operating correctly, resulting in radar and TCAS defences becoming unusable (until later when the problem was rectified).
3) Despite the relatively close proximity, the C421 pilot failed to see (and therefore was unable to avoid) the B737 at any time, despite the fact that it was undoubtedly VMC at the time.

Successful defences
1) A spot of luck – in that the C421 called up, and the Mode C problem was rectified.
2) Traffic information was passed correctly.
3) The controller intervened.
4) The B737 pilot saw the C421 – with the benefit of directed traffic information.
5) TCAS provided a further defence.

What can we learn from this incident? What would have happened of the C421 had not chosen that moment to call? Can we make the system safer? Please, let us all learn from this.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. If the controller was concerned about a potential conflict why didn't he simply ask the C421 to do a orbit or standard rate turn at his current position. This would have given an immediate 2 minute increase in seperation. Happens going into CBR all the time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Isn't that the whole reason E was introduced? So those pesky Air traffic controllers don't have to issue clearances and delay important VFR operators?..... actually this is a good example of why the old system DID work. The only time an ATC clearance was not immediately issued was when a Sep standard did not immediately exist but would do very soon - it was safe. (or when the aircraft had not submitted a flight plan which the controller has to do on a screen which goes over the top of their traffic picture they are trying to run).

One point I think is not appreciated here is that the ATC was under no obligation to cut off VB's descent. VB could have sailed right on thru the E airspace.

The point about descending thru E airspace on descent to C - just about all major AD in Australia almost require that now with the E steps. e.g. Gold Coast E starts at 30nm S at 8500 ' up.

If you apply the Ministers rhetoric one step further....IF the worst HAD happened and there WAS a midair.... there still would have been NO BREAKDOWN in SEPARATION, because.... no sep standard existed! Now tell me again how this is safe and not crazy??

Why wont Anderson talk to CivilAir or AIPA? If he is so confident in the system why doesnt he get out and tell the professional bodies why?

Why hasnt he responded to Martin Fergusons questions in parliament about why Dick Smith didnt oppose him in Gwydir?


From Hansard link: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/dr210803.pdf

RV8builder

The ATSB report fails to mention any of the other factors involved in this (choke) incident.

These would be -
Workload
Internal intercom coordination
Other routine traffic handling
Weather

The coordination can be frustratingly slow. Probably the Traffic Manager and/or the Flow controller would be involved in approving the final clearance. They in turn may have had to assess the weather conditions down the line. If there were TS in the area, this would have complicated matters, especially VFR. If diversions had been going on closer in, the TM will be pretty conservative about having a VFR'y in the terminal area. If the pilot asked for IFR, then there may have been another round of coord. More time taken.

The BE20 mentioned in the report as not a factor, was still part of traffic picture, and I believe occupied some of the controllers traffic management strategies.

For some reason, maybe because it's an interim report, none of the above is made evident.

I am happy to stand corrected on any of the above.

CG

Maintaining F190 til 40Nm Melbourne, and then trying to meet STAR requirements and setup for a straight-in ILS is pushing it a bit for a slippery B737.


Depends ... but in this case, the controller had to identify the aircraft, get his mode C on and verified, take flight details 'cause the pilot didn't submit any! coordinate clearances with TMA especially since the wx was poor ... and, maybe he had to separate other traffic! At 10:00 am near Melb, these weren't the only two aircraft in the sky!


Maybe because of the above factors and possibly because the BE20 was just behind and closing .... that's the BE20 the ATSB said was not a factor ... but which the controller was concerned enough about to instruct to descend


Exactly ... such as separation from VOZ


.... but there are/will be other reports that do .... trouble is ... we're not likely to see them.


Mixing jets on climb/descent and VFR lighties is damned scary!

quote:

" Maintaining F190 til 40Nm Melbourne, and then trying to meet STAR requirements and setup for a straight-in ILS is pushing it a bit for a slippery B737."

Why do we insist on low and slow arrivals in this country? Perhaps we should look at the STAR's and SID's next. As much as I like the sound of 747's wandering around the Sydney basin low and slow burning tons of unnecessary fuel (and I know the political implications of having JWH at Kirribilli) I really think we need to start thinking outside our 1960's square of ideas on ATC.

quote:
" Depends ... but in this case, the controller had to identify the aircraft, get his mode C on and verified, take flight details 'cause the pilot didn't submit any! coordinate clearances with TMA especially since the wx was poor ... and, maybe he had to separate other traffic! At 10:00 am near Melb, these weren't the only two aircraft in the sky!"

Yep, there was probably at least two others in the area! Last time I called Socal Approach for a pop-up clearence it took all of thirty seconds, and that included a "G'day Mate" for a controller who had seen too many Crocodile Dundee pix. Even Stansted only takes one to two minutes and both are a hell of a lot busier than Melbourne in the middle of the morning.



I think we need to all take a deep breath, stand back and look at things from a new perspective - just because we are used to having things done one way dosen't make it the best way.


Arr... there's the forest....now pass the chainsaw...

Rv8Builder:

Low and slow? Burning tons of unnecessary fuel? You're kidding, aren't you, mate? The IDLE POWER descent profile for the Boeings around here is very roughly the following:

80nm... FL200... 300KIAS
60nm... FL150... 300KIAS
40nm... FL110... 300KIAS
35nm... FL110... 250KIAS
20nm... 5000.... 250KIAS

So at 40nm to be on a normal idle power glide descent, you want to be around FL110. Roughly. So, as you can see, FL190 as about 8000' above profile. That's a fair few extra track miles or a fair bit of speedbrake to get back onto profile....

RV8builder
The future of airtraffic control is a more rigid and inflexible system. ASA long term plan is to put everyone on a SID/STAR with no track shorting, flow done by the MAESTRO system everyone 250 below A100. Eventually they hope to get rid of departures entirely and a very much reduced approach service.
I suggest you also take a look at Ferris's interesting post on why it takes longer to get a cleareance is Aus

quote:
" Low and slow? Burning tons of unnecessary fuel? You're kidding, aren't you, mate? The IDLE POWER descent profile for the Boeings around here is very roughly the following:

80nm... FL200... 300KIAS
60nm... FL150... 300KIAS
40nm... FL110... 300KIAS
35nm... FL110... 250KIAS
20nm... 5000.... 250KIAS"

Interesting figures. According to my mental E6B that works out at about 1125ft/min. Why then was the Virgin 737 coming down at 3000ft/min?

Not wishing to upset anyone but it seems to me that arriving at 45DME @ ~FL200 would only require a 2000ft/min descent, which is well within the capabilities of the aircraft and a lot slower than the Virgin was doing into class E.

If you don't like class E, don't use it! If the STAR is outdated lets get it changed. Request a TOD to remain in A/C and everyone can stop worrying and get back to important stuff, like how the hell are we going to beat the Indians twice!

RV8:

I have never flown anything heavy, but your averaging of the descent profile is not, I beleiev,how it works. Energy management is what the FMC and route/star design is supposed to optimise. Part of that descent might be 4000fpm, the last part probably no more than 800fpm. dont forget reducing to achieve 250KIASBLWA100.



1.Hmm. why didnt the ARG include changing the STAR design in part of their 'Wide Industry Consultation'.

2.The STAR would actually lokk quite entertaining as it looped down in small circles over the top of a major city airport.

3. If we dont like it , why should WE put up with it? How about we say to the RV8 fliers: If you dont like our C airspace dont fly in it? (or request a clearance like we used to?). Lets see - 3-4 people inconvenienced at the expense of 3000.

4. Getting a clearance was no big deal. All you had to do what be prepared to get off your ar$e and put a flight plan in. Either way you needed a transponder. But before we could tell if it was working.

Some bloody progress.

RV8

Play Flight Simulator a bit do we, mate?
I smell a snarek out there somewhere.

CG

Get Real
 

PLENTY OF DRIVEL AND DOUBLE STANDARDS HERE.

The NAS is a pup, but with commonsense, decency and cooperation we can help it to work, ( what is the alternative? )

Consider the following.

How many VFR aircraft in class E will have non functioning transponders from either faults or finger problems? How many VFR aircraft in class E , either cruising or climbing / descending above 10 000ft ( where +250knts permitted ) will have transponder problems..... I'll bet stuff all, and even this infinitesimal no. will decrease with greater awareness.

How hard is it for a controller to say to a 73 " unverified traffic 10nm ahead 12 O'clock "? ( and even " altitude unknown" ) How hard is it for the superior being at the pointy end to then diverge 5 or 10 degrees for a few seconds till the traffic is sighted or passed? This happens many times a day in the US.

Don't give me the " it's not the controllers job " crap either. It's everybody's job to maintain and contribute to safety. C O M M O N S E N S E. The VFR had every-right to be where he was and it's not ' his job ' either, to be somewhere else if you want to persue that logic.

It disgusts me to see the no of jabs and insinuations made at this ' inferior pilot ' ( Chief galah and others ) As an ex military guy he has been through training to a competency level most of you blokes could only dream about. He did nothing wrong and the point he was making was that under the rules, and in his opinion thing worked out and were resolved satisfactorily. Sure, experience will help him fine tune future actions but that is normal given the rate of change and new circumstances.

If you think this incident is an exception, think again. I have 20k hours. I fly a Navajo. I fly in the flight levels. I fly mainly VFR. I always plan via IFR routes if possible. I usually submit an IFR formulated flight plan but lodge VFR to save money if conditions are suitable, ( unlike you prima donnas with someone else to pay the bill on a sky clear day ). If required, the plan is in the system so there will be no delays if a change of category is required. I monitor the correct frequencies ( now made a damm side harder with them and boundaries being removed from the charts ) I will be listening and looking out for you and I hope you will be doing likewise.

I notice an insinuation from some posting whom I assume to be ATC that they will give the run around to anyone they feel doesn't fit into their cosy world of expectations. You should know boys that that behaviour will not be tolerated and as well as getting a serve over the airwaves you will be filling out a lot of paperwork and maybe even getting some legal ' please explains '

Stop bitching and change your procedures and habits to live with the realities as they now exist.

I think like most involved that there has been a significant dilution of the ' safety ' environment that we perceived existed prior to NAS. However how this actually reveals it's self or whether it is even significant will only be shown over time. The emphasis on changing pilot behaviour and expectations, and transponder use may completely mitigate the changes.

One effect on me will be to fit one of the new ' cheapy ' TCAS systems. I may also request a transponder check from ATC when approaching busier areas. You can be sure that I will also be listening and talking to you if the need arises.

Safe Flying. BP

RV8 Builder:

Knots INDICATED airspeed, mate. INDICATED. Yes, I know that 300/6=5 nm per min and that means 8 mins to cover 40 nm and FL200-FL110 is 9000, 9000/8=1125. But you're not thinking TAS. And then there's wind... ie, Ground Speed... May well be doing 3000 fpm, even 4000 fpm at times, if only to get BACK onto profile for a range of reasons.

Bush Pelican:

Quote 1: The NAS is a pup, but with commonsense, decency and cooperation we can help it to work, ( what is the alternative? )

The alternative is to expand Class C back out so that heavy RPT aircraft containing the BULK of the Australian population that flies is properly contained in such airspace. Doesn't mean VFR can't be there - just need a clearance and receive proper separation from the heavy tin, and everyone else in there for that matter.

Quote 2: As an ex military guy he has been through training to a competency level most of you blokes could only dream about. He did nothing wrong....

The first sentence - that may be. However the second sentence - well he DID do wrong - he was in Class E airspace without his transponder in Mode C. Undeniable cock-up. Please don't argue otherwise. It worries me that YOU may not realise this. Better read your NAS stuff again. And while you are there you'd better read the VFR Airmanship stuff about not tracking via aerodromes, navaids, etc....... if you say you fly VFR along IFR routes.

400'/1.5nm separation BY PURE LUCK is not acceptable for the paying public. It could have been even less. It COULD have ended up zero/zero under this system. How close is it going to have to come before the "powers" in charge wake up?

Oh, and if you are wondering what the airlines are actually thinking vs saying officially - well they are two very different things. The reason is neither airline wants to get the minister offside. Think about the various things going on at the moment (Pacific rights, Tasman flying, QF-ANZ tie up, etc etc) and you may start to understand. True story. So it s#it$ me when Anderson says QF and DJ support NAS2B. Well the reality is that they just haven't said "Minister, NAS2B is a crock". So far it has been left to the unions to fight and thus far hasn't been terribly well handled.

What's it going to take?

bush pelican

Your
Yeah right.
Your professional pilot did not comply with AIP ENR 1.10-4 2.3 or 2.4 in regard to Flight Notification.
He did not comply with AIP ENR 1.6-9 8.1.2 in regard to Operation of Transponders.
He did not comply with AIP ENR1.1-30 18.3.2 a & c. and 18.3.2 in regard to VFR flights in Class E Airspace.
He did not comply with AIP ENR 1.1-3 3.18 in regard to submitting of flight plan details.
He did not comply with AIP ENR 1.1-29 18.1.2 in regard to see-and-avoid.

None of this seemed to be contributory in the ATSB report.

As for double standards - why do you need a TCAS when the Class E golden rule of "see and avoid" should be all you need?

CG

Chief Galah

Yes, appropriately named.

I know snarek well, he helped run our aero club for a while.

For your info:

1. Snarek has been flying for about 20 years.
2. He owns two aircraft, one 'normal' one warbird.
3. He seems to me to be the only one here to have listened to the debate and modified his position based on what he heard.

We are, I think, lucky you are not on the AOPA Board.

BANGSAT!!!

PT

Chief galah:

A bloke comes here and tries to ask a few sensible questions, and you get personal abuse instead.

No, I haven't been able to play Flight Sim lately, hell I haven't even got 2004 yet. I've been too busy flying in places where they have air traffic service instead of air traffic control.

A mindset change appears to be overdue at your console.

Bush "Pelican"??

Can't really tell if the transponder is not working properly ... a no-mode C radar track could be anything from A015 to F180/F245!

This non-incident certainly highlighted the need to look for non-mode C radar tracks ... and now that I'm looking .... there's lots more than I thought ... and lots appearing in the path of RPT traffic.
If you've got lots of time to scan for VFRs ... not that hard ... but makes separating difficult when the IFRs divert in the middle of a tight traffic sequences ... its no longer air traffic control ... and this is happening more than you might think!