Gaunty (just quickly): Riddle; TCAS is designed as a back-up for when the system fails. There has already been heaps of debate about using see and avoid as the primary means of sep, and a lot of that apllies to TCAS as well.
AND;
Same direction, similar speed traffic is very easy to acquire visually (and visual sep is a great standard, predicated on having first aquired the traffic visually ) You will note the controller didn't say "overtake your co. traffic, and see if you can see him, he's there somewhere", did he? Do you understand the the significance of the difference? Crucial to the debate.

AK. You have in fact stated on this thread that you believe NAS without ADSB is not good.
page 3
Why then aren't you predicating NAS on ADSB?
Further, why aren't you opposed to this incremental implementation approach? Their plan is to drive the change, one little piece at a time, as the individual pieces, in isolation, aren't too unpalatable. As a whole, they suck. That is why they are doing it that way.
page 1
They are not intertwined. Perhaps you should be opposing NAS until they are?

I have been trying (very trying some say) to put my viewpoint v.v. what are genuine professional concerns regarding the NAS proposals from an ATC, and aviators perspectibe - be them full time professional, part-time, recreational etc.

Quite frankly the issues that I have raised don't seem to be of concern to a certain ilk - there seems to be a sense that RPT or unions or someone are 'stealing' airspace that they they should have access to - I don't understand this stance. The underlying principle here in this argument has to be, should be and must be safety.

Class E down to 8500 FT on the edge of a busy TMA is not based on safety - I personally believe it is based on some perception that non-commercial operators do not get a fair go at using the airspace because it is designated C. I cannot think of when since Sep 2001 I could not issue a clearance to cross control airspace to a VFR aircraft in Class C. Sometimes I might move the aircraft a little from it's preferred route to facilitate unrestricted descents/climbs for other aircraft that may be conducting instrument approaches or departures (many of them training for/renewing their CIR), but they get the clearance. From some I have had the accusation here that RPT get the priority - well, its true that capital city aerodromes have priorities, but you would not believe the number of times I have had 7x7 drivers call me after landing insisting they should have had priority over the PA31 or BN2 or C172 -- forgetting or ignorant of the fact they were not flying into a capital city today - and that ATC do not apply priorty in that case - thats right we don't. And sometimes that makes the job difficult. For example, if we have seen 3-4 jets all close together at about 230NM away, they want to know their landing tiome and relevant adjustments to speed on desc or holding by 120NM to run at the very latest. So at 20 minutes to run they start the descent and their FMS says they will be touching down at 13:02.5 - nice accuarate gear the Honeywell. In reality they may be following the C172 who is still doing run-ups at an ALA just outsode the Control Zone and we dont know about him yet (hopefully they have flight planned - well statisitically their is a 50% chance they have from what I see each day). Or they the Boeing may end up number 2 to a BN2 who is coming in low level and not on radar but ends up being 1 minute ahead of the Boeing. So the nince fuel saving idle thrust descent gets screwed over by ATC in the eyes of the RPT driver as he gets issued reduce to 250KIAS at FL180 then back to 220 at 25 miles to run. The other option is the BN2 or C172 gets a spin or told to remain OCTA (only for a minute or 2). As you can see - we can't win. And you know - Class E won't solve it either.

Profile Decsent for a heavy is around 110-120 miles to run TOD (forecast
wind dependant blah blah)

This means with 40 to run they are at about A100 (250 BLW A100) or maybe
A120 on a high speed desc (around 320KIAS)

Currently that profile is kept within C or positively controlled
Airspace. With the proposed E airspace extensions they will be in Class E at FL180 to A090 (2-5 minutes at up to 4500fpm descent) and will not see you as you exercise your 'right' to fly through the airspace (of course you will have your transponder on you say - why do I see 5 primary paints for every one 1200 Squawk on a weekend around the very edge of CTA on a weekend then?). And the big guy on descent wont hear you on the radio either because you will on a different frequency. But they will be 'seeing and avoiding' ignoring such things as transition checks, entering STARS into the FMS, talking to company frequency etc.

Failsafe: When a number of aircraft were identified to be on incorrect MBZ and CTAF frequencies a case for AFRU's was made - and they are a good system - as long as you KNOW that you should be expecting th hear a response, so technically they are still not failsafe. Tell me - what is the failsafe for VFR aircraft to have their transponder swithced on? And to KNOW it is working?

I am assured by correspondents here that VFR pilots are in VMC. I will have to take your word for it. I have to do that everyday I suppose - for some of them who find that magical hole between the ILS to minimas. Not failsafe and not idiot-safe ( a minority I know - but it only takes one).

Finally, I have said it many times - this is not and Industrial issue - our jobs are not under threat or at stake - NAS is creating and costing money and overtime like you wouldn't believe! So why are their objections from CivilAir? Safety - the safety case has not been made for this. ATC's are safety professionals - that is ALL we do. That is our job. When a system that is less safe is forced upon us, we would be irresponsible not to speak out. Even when others with more at stake for political reasons will not.

To say that TCAS will save the day is wrong. As was mentioned a lot of less than professional VFR operators don't switch their transponder on. Secondly when was the last time the mode C was verified. If the transponder is incorrect it is more harm than good.

See and avoid between VFR and High performance IFR aircraft has time and time again been shown to be floored as the primary means of separation. If the Transponder is showing incorrect altitude on the VFR and the IFR is busy doing other stuff apart from looking out the window, it is outside radar coverage and the two aircraft are on a different frequency, you better hope Winstuns big sky theory is working.

I say again in Non Radar airspace, for mixing High Performance IFR's with VFR's C airspace is safe, E airspace is less so, for that reason NAS is flawed.

And again I don't work in Australia, so I am not trying to save my C airspace job. But as has been said before there will be more ATC's not less, so the "Controllers Union looking after their memebrs jobs" argument is way off the mark

Gaunty

TCAS is not compulsory in Australia. Transponders are not compulsory in Australia. AOPA is to thank for the latter. Your example and subsequent comparrison are somewhat rediculous (to be expected I guess)

How I ask is this relevant to the debate?

Riddle me that!

Next!
 

What a waste of space that was.

The NAS, facts and fantasies

Just the facts, Maam :

FACT : The sky is very large.

FACT : Aircraft are very small (compared to the size of the sky).

FACT : The random chance of a mid-air collision decreases with the cube of the distance away from the airport.

FACT : The primary mid-air collision risk mitigator in the enroute environment is the :
:ok: :ok: Big Sky Theory :ok: :ok:

NB : Whether or not a pilot maintains a vigilant look-out has no bearing on any of the above factors.

NB : Whether or not a pilot listens to a particular air traffic control radio frequency has no bearing on any of the above factors.

NB : Whether or not a pilot talks on a particular air traffic control radio frequency has no bearing on any of the above factors.

NB : Whether or not an aircraft has TCAS or ADSB fitted has no bearing on any of the above factors.

FACT : In order to further reduce the chance of a mid-air collision airline aircraft are required by regulation to be fitted with TCAS II.

FACT : TCAS II systems are commercially available to anyone who wants one.

FACT : VFR aircraft in class E airspace are required by regulation to carry and use an altitude-encoding transponder so that they are conspicuous to TCAS equipped aircraft.

FACT : TCAS equipped aircraft are aware of the position of nearby transponding aircraft.

NB : Whether or not a piece of airspace is within any kind of air traffic control radar coverage has no bearing on any of the above factors.

NB : Whether or not a third-party air traffic control service is aware of the position of VFR traffic has no bearing on any of the above factors.

FACT : VFR aircraft have been flying unannounced in class G airspace since the AMATS changes of 1991 – in many places sharing the airspace with airline aircraft.

FACT : For over a decade IFR aircraft in class G airspace have not been given traffic information on VFR aircraft, and VFR aircraft in class G airspace have not been given traffic information on other VFR aircraft.

FACT : Since the AMATS changes of 1991 there have been zero mid-air collisions in the enroute environment. (Despite the dire predictions of the flight service officers’ trade union at the time.)

FACT : In areas of high traffic density (like the terminal area around an airport) it’s important that pilots know where the other aircraft are.

FACT : TCAS and ADSB allow the pilots to know where the other aircraft are.

FACT : It is very easy for pilots in the terminal area near to an airport to avoid a mid-air collision by using a combination of the airport traffic radio frequency, TCAS, and looking out the window.

FACT : Pilots have been required by regulation to look out the window in order to avoid a mid-air collision for many decades : Refer CAR 163A.

FACT : Whether or not a third-party air traffic control service knows where the aircraft are is largely irrelevant as long as the pilots know where the aircraft are.

Here’s a few popular fantasies :

FANTASY : See and avoid is the primary means of avoiding a mid-air collision in the enroute environment.

NB : The Big Sky Theory is the primary risk mitigator with TCAS the secondary risk mitigator.

FANTASY : There is a class of airspace known as “commercial airspace”.

FANTASY : The companies that operate RPT flights own the sky, and in particular the “commercial airspace”.

FANTASY : Australia would be a better place if all the airspace was class A.

FANTASY : The RPT pilot unions represent the interests of airline passengers.

FANTASY : The RPT pilot unions have a mandate to speak on behalf of airline passengers.

FANTASY : Someone on the ground must always know where all the planes are.

FANTASY : An aircraft cannot fly safely if it is outside air traffic control radar coverage.

FANTASY : An aircraft cannot fly safely unless the pilot is in radio contact with air traffic control.

FANTASY : The more you talk on the radio the less chance there is that you will be involved in a mid-air collision.

FANTASY : NAS will create a need for more air traffic controllers.

FANTASY : Civil Air (the air traffic controllers trade union) would never disingenuously wave the safety flag to deliberately scare the public when the union is faced with an industrial relations issue.

FANTASY : The world would be a better place if there were more air traffic controllers.

FANTASY : VFR aircraft must be positively separated from VFR aircraft in class C.

FANTASY : IFR aircraft must be positively separated from VFR aircraft in class D.

FANTASY : Air traffic controllers need to know where all the VFR aircraft are in class E.

FANTASY : The owners and operators of regional airports know what goes on above their airport’s obstacle-free surface.

FANTASY : All pilots of private category flights are PPLs.

FANTASY : All pilots of private category flights have a death wish.

FANTASY : All private pilots are incompetent.

FANTASY : All pilots of small aircraft are incompetent.

FANTASY : The only reason a pilot would fly VFR is because they don’t have an instrument rating.

Comment :

In my view the proposal to change some of the existing Australian class G (that uses ICAO class F procedures) to class E is two (or perhaps one) step(s) in the wrong direction. I don’t believe it’s needed - it’s simply over servicing and will lead to unnecessary delays and expense. It’s a solution in search of a problem.

But in my view the proposal to change some of the existing class C to class E is two steps in the right direction because it will reduce unnecessary delays and expense.

If the proposal were to change existing class C to genuine ICAO class G then that would be four steps in the right direction (ICAO-G = no service, no charge, no delay).

Class G = Good enough for me. :ok:

But if the general public demand that airline jets operating between capital cities be positively separated from other IFR aircraft then :

Class E = Good enough for everyone. :ok:

Lengthy post, much waffle, get to the end, entire thing wasted because you make a statement that the public want Big jets separated from IFR and E makes this all OK. Do the public even know what IFR is. The public know big jet = safe... VFR Flying Jacket Crowd = Volvo Drivers of the sky.

Public want do not to be hit by the cowboys doing their own. Cowboys = Volvo Drivers of the Sky.

Get it yet?

Next time before you post, copy it and pm it to me so that I can save you from your own self.


edit = spelling but then again I am just an incompetent ATC.

How will it all work?
 

This thread has long since degenerated into a slag fest (without any help from me ;) ), but I'll post a few questions anyway:

Scenario : B737 descending through class E airspace, being radar vectored for sequencing at a controlled aerodrome. The pilot spots an unidentified aircraft and determines that a collision risk exists . No traffic information has been passed by ATC. What happens now?[list=1][*]Does the pilot deviate from his vector/ route clearance?[*]Does the pilot deviate from his level assignment?[*]Does any deviation from a clearance count as a 'reportable incident', given that this is the primary/only means of 'separation' available under the circumstances?[*]If the answer is NO, then are TCAS RAs still 'reportable incidents'?[*]Does the pilot assume that the other aircraft was a VFR aircraft and that therefore no breadown of IFR-IFR separation has occurred?[*] What liability attaches to the B737 pilot/operator if their devaition from clearance causes a breakdown of separation with another IFR aircraft?[*]What calls are made to ATC in the event of deviating from clearance?[*]For the bean-counters: Does the deviating B737 maintain its position in the arrival sequence? (i.e. is ATC obliged to maintain its priority at the expense of other traffic which did not deviate from their clearance?[*]Have any operators yet provided RPT pilots with 'guidelines' as to how much 'self separation' to apply between themselves and unidentified aircraft, taking into account both operational and public perception factors. For that matter, had any companies done so for class G operations.[/list=1]

In particular, if anyone has relevant experience in how RPT jets operate in non-radar E airspace in the USA, your input would be very worthwhile.

Also, has anyone had any experience of IFR pick-up, VFR-on-top or VFR climb/descent since they came in?

Have these procedures provided the benefits you were expecting?

No names, no pack drill, but.... hands up who has requested IFR pickup in C?

(BTW, I know we're supposedly following some sort of hybrid, North American, US McNAS system, but introducing the term 'pick-up' into the Australian system is ...... un-Australian!!!! Surely we could have called it something like IFR Uncleared Transition in E - or IFR UTE for short

BIK_116.80

Long time no seeum, great chat the other night:ok:

Thanks for the usual eloquent disquisition on fact v fantasy

methinks tobzalp has his countries confused, but we wouldn't want to confuse the discussion with facts or reason.

It's much easier to try and marginalise any who have the temerity to discuss issues or hold an opposing view by attempting to demean them. I had a very good run with Volvos and the '75 Station Wagon bought as a new shopping cart for mother and the first of three babies, was stored and handed on down through my three children as they grew up and moved on, it's still going strong and still looks like new with a neighbours son and his wife around the corner, carrying their new baby in it.

Deja vu;
Circa 1969 and I'm standing on the tarmac at Perth Airport being roundly berated by an apoplectic airline captain for having the temerity to;
a. operate an aircraft in IMC within 100nm of his AIRLINE AIRCRAFT (F27)
b. causing a hazard to his passengers by causing our aircraft to arrive at the approach fix several minutes before him and not having the wit to cause ATC to send us off to Bunbury or someother safe place to hold whilst he worked out how to get himself on the ground.

We had just unloaded around half a billion US Dollars worth of passengers. I guess they were just lucky we amateurs didn't kill em.

Seems like not much changes.

I digress.

ferris me old

You miss my point, I should have qualified it with the enroute non radar Class E case.
In non radar Class E base is FL180, hardly Indian country for the so called "VFR Flying Jacket Crowd = Volvo Drivers of the sky". :rolleyes:
In Radar Class E is down to 8,500ft but with a transponder "billy blowfly" can be seen as traffic by the controllers radar AND the TCAS.

I'm also here to tell you that from my experience most of the Vovo Drivers get nosebleed above 5000ft. That is 8500ft is hardly a VFR traffic jam enroute and in close, due to climb and descent profiles positively empty and yet again they can be "seen".

I'm a bit concerned about the furore around the
and the general construction of the argument on the basis that unless you're an airline pilot you're not a real one, neither is your aircraft and in any event they, the airline pilots, are much too busy to be looking out, perhaps we need more eyes or hands in the cockpit then, just for good CDF airmanship.

That logic presupposes that the bugsmasher has a higher magnitude of deathwish than the airline guy. I have said it in these halls before, it really doesn't matter whether you have one or many hundred bodies behind you, we all have the same responsibility towards each other and our individual a&seholes in the airspace . It might be a good ego feeder for some but I cant process the notion that "I am/have to be 400 times more responsible than you, therefore........". I wonder if the pax are comfortable about the 146 guys only being a quarter as reponsible as the B744 ones :confused:

I dont think it is intentional but I am sure that there is more a lack of information and the facts than virtue in the argument.

Simply why would ASA and CASA sign off on anything that they can not justify in safety terms.

As has been revealed here they ASA are flat out retraining and qualifying staff, maybe when the dust settles and more information gets out there, it will become clearer.

We are signed up to 2b education and we have been assisting, as has I understand Qantas is in the production of the pilot educational material.

Oh and the DC10, I actually do understand the difference, I was merely pointing out how flexible the US system is.
Of course that happens routinely in Oz doesn't it.:uhoh:

Slagging off by everyone here just doesn't cut it

gaunty

Yes AsA and CASA signed off on the safety case for stage 2b.

Both are stakeholders in our airspace and therefore have a vested interest to proceed with it. Interestingly enough, CASA only gave conditional approval for 2b.

Why isnt the safety case for each stage conducted by an independent third party, ie the ATSB.

Whew!... what a thread!
I am not in Aus at the moment and have missed all the media about this. From what I have read here, ( and correct me if I'm wrong) , under the new scheme the situation could exist where a PJE aircraft climbs to FL130 in E without making a radio call except for on the local aerodrome frequency, a heavy enters E on descent through that level without traffic info about the PJE aircraft , the PJE is in a climb concentrating on intercepting the run in on the gps and looking out not quite as much as he/she could, the heavy's F/O is reading a plate while the captain turns around to remind a hostee he'll be in her room at 9pm sharp, meanwhile the 260hr PJE pilot realises that they didn't turn their transponder to alt as they lined up for flight number 27 of the day....oops too late.

Is that scenario possible? I have quickly read the posts and missed anything that showed otherwise, it must be there though because surley nobody would be silly enough to rely on an overloaded underpaid new cpl to turn the tx to alt in order to avert disaster....
I look forward to someone pointing out what I have missed.
cheers, cjam

cjam

So I guess we run any sytem on the lowest common denominator then. :(

Sounds like back to the three man cockpit and two man jumper to me.:rolleyes: man with red flag preceding them to the runway.

I can see it now two "red flag men" having a bit of biffo as to who gets right of way at the intersection. :p


Aerognome
Love that nic. :)
I don't suppose the so called CASA conditional approval was the all too common individual "I just don't like it" rather than the result of rational process.

I also understand that the safety case was audited by an independent thrid party, at least for ASA.

Why do they have a vested interest for it to proceed, just because they are stakeholders? It is not as if there is not already a system in place.

Sigh. After reading BIK post I don't see much point in contributing to this thread anymore. You guys seem to have it all figured out . Your safety case is big sky.

Let me say it now in advance. I told you so.

And dont blame the controller when it happens. Although I am sure the court will attribute a portion of the blame to the poor soul who is Johnny on the spot that day.

Your ignorance is breathtaking - even when presented with the facts you blindly march forward despite them.

Some of you guys just reinforce the case for outright opposition to anything you utter - reasoned debate is not in your vernacular.

So count me out now in trying to reason with you.

Bik, you appear to display a remarkable level of flexibility with your ‘facts’.

And where traffic levels warrant it, the primary mitigator is supplemented by secondary, tertiary etc. mitigators, such as traffic information, control etc. No airspace system relies only on this primary mitigator. No safe transport system does.

True, simply ‘listening’ and ‘talking’ have no bearing on the chances of avoiding a mid-air collision. You might as well be singing Auld Lang Syne on the radio of that is all you are going to do. Listening and reacting to other traffic or control instructions does have a bearing in avoiding mid-air collisions.

Although why you would want one if it has no bearing on ‘the above factors’ is beyond me. Perhaps it is because TCAS does in fact offer a supplementary level of safety?

True, but does not tell the full story. Merely being aware of the current position of conflicting traffic is not the same as being aware of the other traffic’s intentions, nor does it afford the opportunity to negotiate mutual avoiding action, either directly or via a third party.

VFR aircraft have ‘announced’ through broadcasts. It is precisely this that Dick Smith has been trying to avoid.

Where traffic has been known (e.g. in radar coverage) traffic has been and continues to be provided.

True

Wrong. It is important that someone knows the positions, intentions etc of aircraft so that a cogent plan can be formulated which provides – dare I say it – a ‘safe, orderly and expeditious’ flow of air traffic. (We can’t all be number one in the sequence.)

TCAS shows the positions of transponding traffic. ADSB will, in the future, do many things. ADSB will be akin to an ashtray on a motorbike on November 27.

Operations in the terminal area involve much more than avoidance of a mid-air collision. The ‘ease’ with which terminal area operations can be conducted safely would, I suggest, be dependent on the traffic levels, complexity, weather etc. A point will be reached when it becomes less easy, difficult and ultimately impossible.

Excellent point. Even though in Clas A airspace, the current primary mitigator against mid-air collisions is ATC, the regulators have long recognised that reliance on one, single mitigator is unsatisfactory. This is exactly why we have a ‘layered defence’. If ATC fails, pilot situational awareness may detect it. If not, then TCAS. If not, then ‘see and avoid’. (Not forgetting ‘luck’ or big sky theories.)

Knowing where the aircraft are is the very smallest part of a safe air traffic management system. The reason controllers (Say in class A) know where the aircraft are is because they ‘put’ them there. They did this because they knew the positions, intentions etc. of other aircraft. They plan for safety. By doing this, pilots can, in most cases fly more directly, staying at the same levels for longer, thus saving money.

I won’t comment on these.
As has been pointed out already, the public do not want to be ‘positively separated from other IFR aircraft’. They probably want to avoid mid-air collisions altogether. By the same token, they would prefer to avoid mountains, mountain goats, tall trees, balloons and other objects likely to interrupt the drinks service.

Yes, this is certainly an interesting thread!

It is sad however to see some of the posters drift off topic somewhat in order to try and make a point, some of which are quite valid and some of which are pure rubbish.

As an AOPA member since I learnt to fly in the '60's I am very much aware of the responsibility they see to their membership (and others) in regard to airspace reform. I am also fully aware of the "other" arguments as I have been employed in the industry for all my working life, including almost 20 years flying regional airline type aircraft.

None of the posters to date have really got to the nuts and bolts of the problems discussed to date. And that is what is being proposed has not (as yet) been presented to the industry in a form that all of us understand. In other words there is no level playing field. Both Gaunty and BIK have attempted to list some or all of the issues, but is it really their role on an internet bulletin board to do that? And they are obviously doing it from one end of the non level playing field! With due respect to the board of AOPA (whom I would not want to trade places with) there is still not any significant info on the AOPA web site or forum and I would be correct to say that both Gary and Andrew have said more here than there – I wonder why that is?

Andrew has clearly had difficulty controlling how his fingers wiz across the keyboard as I found some of his posts did neither he nor his cause much good. Next time you feel like that Andrew, save it and come back a few hours later and if on second reading you still feel it is worthy of posting then ok, but please don't shoot from the hip. (and shoot at the target, not the other shooters!)

We must all realise that an association of people with common interests have much more leverage than any individuals (with perhaps one exception!!) and like AOPA, I am sure that the AFAP, AIPA and CAOAA have the best interests of their membership at heart. You are free of course not to agree with any or all of the positions so taken, but please don't allow that to taint the discussion. As professionals (and that includes amateur professionals, or is that the professional amateurs?) I believe that none of these associations would use the safety argument if they did not believe it was valid to do so. There are many issues discussed above which are quite valid examples of concerns that exist right across the industry. Just because I don't fly that type of aircraft or in that type of airspace is no reason to say it does not matter. The "I only want what is good for me" position is unbalanced and inappropriate to the discussion. We must consider the whole picture and how each of us interacts with other users. To do less, dare I say… is not professional.

THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH THE NAS AND ITS INTRODUCTION IS THAT WE IN THE INDUSTRY ARE DEVOID OF ALL THE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE EFFECTIVE JUDGEMENT ON THE PROPOSAL TO DATE AND WHAT THE AIM IS FOR THE END STATE PACKAGE. IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN WITH ANY VALIDITY AS TO WHAT IF ANY THE COST SAVIINGS WILL BE AND TO WHOM, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SAFETY WILL NOT BE COMPRIMISED.

The information and education to date is somewhat lacking and I would have to say much of it is provided without any explanation or justification. This to me IS THE PROBLEM.

Certainly the big sky policy is a significant mitigator in terms of a possible mid-air collision, however I know at least one regional airline pilot that had a very close call with a glider in en-route airspace (above 5000ft) a few years back. By the time they saw each other there was no time to move and the glider went under the regional turbo-prop by only a matter of metres – a close one. No TCAS of course, different radio freqs and see and avoid did not work (and would not have). What scares me is that very little or nothing has been achieved to prevent a reoccurrence of such an incident. Certainly a high degree of reliance on the big sky theory.

IF we are to embrace change in airspace reform (which we have needed for many years) then collectively we need to know the answer to all the "why" questions. And I don't believe we do.

The major mitigator of any change to airspace is information and education. (Look at the G Trial – if we had 100 pilots in that airspace, I would bet you there were 90 different ideas on how it should work – no wonder it failed). This education must be significant and on-going, for years if necessary. To date, we have not even seen anything other than an introduction. The rest of the book is blank (and getting thicker).

Of course the problem is not helped by having the whole project made political. Many industry players have attempted to place their case to the Minister without much luck it seems. The Minister should be listening to all of the arguments and then seeking appropriate advice from his advisors. It is sad when it seems he is not entertaining any case which is not in line with what the NASIG have had him sign off on.

Whilst I am a strong supporter of airspace reform, I am appalled at the way this project is being managed (and I don't believe that is Mike's fault – more the NASIG and the Minister I feel).

Obviously the resources necessary to provide the necessary information and ongoing education is either not there or not considered important enough. Whilst this situation continues, then it is quite likely that the transition to a new airspace model will be anything but smooth.

"no known traffic" :ok:

oh???
 

triadic

Sorry if I seem caustic, I didn't mean to start out that way. Read threads from plazbot (inverted and not) Jack Axiom and a few others, and perhaps you will see why.

Unlike CivilAir and AFAP scaremongers, AOPA reps don't get paid. With other jobs to do our fingers are often 'fast' across the keyboard.

I do however pay attention to a lot on here (except Jack Axiom, his anti-GA mates and plazbot) and have yet to firm my view on final NAS.

So, here I am waiting to hear :ok:

AK

I am flattered that you include me. It concerns me however that you from all of your previous posts and the definite manner with which you went about them finally admit that you don't really know just what is going on and that you have to have a think about it. It is quite simple. E and G me all you want but what you must do is look at the End State of NAS. Even you Organisation has reservations about it.

I can't believe that it has taken around 5 100 post plus threads to get to this. Finally.

Here is the post I tried to send yesterday........

Gaunty;

Any safety system , any system where lives are at stake , yes, absolutely.
Also, in an earlier post, you appear to attribute remarks and phraseologies to me that were clearly made by other posters. Please don't, and I'll afford you the same courtesy.

Mr Kerans;

Civil Air reps are not paid. They just happen to care.
Still nobody has answered the questions about what benefits are being derived at what cost. Maybe if AOPA ran a positive campaign, rather than running interference for NASIG, you might get more respect. I feel certain that if you approached Ted Lang, and the AFAP, you would get support for ADSB etc., but not while you appear to be running a seperate agenda. NAS and ADSB has to be linked for your stance to have any credibility.

BIK.
Just keep plugging away with that "we can all do what we want in the sky and it won't matter" drivel. It further marginalises you.


We cannot ignore the end state. It is where this is all going. None of these windrow-dressing intermediate steps mean much. The end state is what it's all about. There is no point going half-way down the road, only to turn back again . The debate should only focus on the end state. But that wouldn't serve NASIGs interest, would it?

Gentlemen,

We are finally reaching the guts of the matter!

At the NASIG meeting with the unions on the 30 Sept last it was announced that the end state model is not clearly evident ( to NASIG ) and that further reforms to airspace were reliant largely upon supporting technology. Herein lies the problem, the technology is currently not available. The changes proposed in 2b do reduce the current safety levels, if airspace reform stalled after the introduction of 2b we would be left with a less safe airways system. That is why the introduction of 2b should be stopped.

We need to be able to clearly see where the Airspace Reform Group and NASIG are going with airspace reform.

The tripartite union campaign is based on the end state model as it is currently understood, which with the aid of smoke and mirrors NASIG is clouding the picture and confusing the issue.

There is nothing wrong with airspace reform, it is an evolving thing. However, any changes made must not reduce safety.

None of the reresentatives from the AFAP AIPA or Civilair are paid for their time, they just happen to care about the safety of ALL airspace users.

My thoughts have again turned to moral decision making. What temperament drives an intransigent self-centred interest, altruistic, or doomsayer's point of view.

Some possible choices in this airspace debate are:

1. Self-centred - I am passionate, loud and strongly support the airspace model which most closely matches my self-interest(s). I will demonise all other models.

2. Altruistic - I also am fervent, and aggressive, but will support the airspace model, which provides the greatest good for the broader community. I'm prepared to override my desire for higher levels of system safety when convinced that the level of safety offered is very good and restrictions, regulations and other constrictions are minimised; thereby providing freedom of opportunity.

3. Doomsayer - I am most indignant, and in your face; I will only support the airspace model that provides the highest level of system safety to all types of operations, otherwise aircraft will collide (one day?). I oppose any model that reduces the current level of system safety.

In our society we highly regard the leader and statesman whom, against a tide of opposition, brings about worthwhile reform, but will devalue arguments put in an aggressive and domineering fashion. Meanwhile, we also highly regard the dissenters (whistleblowers) in our societies who are entitled to be heard and protest, and sometimes have altered us to unseen dangers. We always need a fulsome debate, but how do we resolve the impasse, while we value freedom from regulation, a fair deal, and acceptance of personal risk.

I contend that when pilots and airspace managers/designers can suspend self-interest and view the whole bowl of fruit (resist focusing on the single bad grape), it is possible to present the Australian community with an airspace model, which passes the "greatest good" test and is worthy of general support.