Virgin 737 BNE RUNWAY OVERRUN
Good point.
I meant to address the selective requirement to readback bits of ATIS information. If the readback of QNH on approach is important, notwithstanding that it's contained in ATIS that's already been confirmed by the pilot as having been received, I would have thought it would important for ATC to confirm receipt of the displaced runway end ATIS information by a pilot who's about to take off on that runway. But that's just me.
I meant to address the selective requirement to readback bits of ATIS information. If the readback of QNH on approach is important, notwithstanding that it's contained in ATIS that's already been confirmed by the pilot as having been received, I would have thought it would important for ATC to confirm receipt of the displaced runway end ATIS information by a pilot who's about to take off on that runway. But that's just me.
LB
The ATIS code and the QNH read back are for 2 different reasons.
Saying the ATIS code is to confirm receipt of the QNH/wx.
“Descend 9000’ on 10xx” is to make sure you actually set it coming through transition/changing from area QNH to local - not just have it displayed somewhere.
The ATIS code and the QNH read back are for 2 different reasons.
Saying the ATIS code is to confirm receipt of the QNH/wx.
“Descend 9000’ on 10xx” is to make sure you actually set it coming through transition/changing from area QNH to local - not just have it displayed somewhere.
Not in many if not all circumstances in which I'm required to readback QNH. Just fat, dumb and happy below the transition altitude in an area maintaining the altitude I've reported when requesting an inbound clearance, which request includes 'with [e.g.] Charlie'. ATC looks and sees me squawking that altitude at that location, then proceeds to tell me I'm identified, give me an inbound clearance ... and the QNH. If it's so important for me to read that QNH back, notwithstanding that ATC can see I'm where I say I am (both laterally and vertically), it seems to me to be at least as important, if not more important, for ATC to confirm that the crew of a fat jet about to take off has received the bit of ATIS information that says the runway end has been displaced.
Don't bother trying to assist Lead Balloon with his crusade against reading back the QNH on descent. He has had it explained on other threads and will hijack any other thread that he can to once again flog his own personal agenda.
Back to the original topic. I can see how this happens with all the NOTAMs that the airports put out. Not only that but the airports will disregard the timings of their own runway works NOTAMs if the conditions don't suit. The problem can carry over to the printed ATIS where there can be a lot of information crammed into a small space. You just have to look at Sydney as an example. Every once in a while PRM approaches will be snuck in there, lost in all the other wordage. Unfortunately CASA and the airline won't consider this to be an issue and will put the crew, especially the PIC, through the wringer before they will be released to the line again.
Back to the original topic. I can see how this happens with all the NOTAMs that the airports put out. Not only that but the airports will disregard the timings of their own runway works NOTAMs if the conditions don't suit. The problem can carry over to the printed ATIS where there can be a lot of information crammed into a small space. You just have to look at Sydney as an example. Every once in a while PRM approaches will be snuck in there, lost in all the other wordage. Unfortunately CASA and the airline won't consider this to be an issue and will put the crew, especially the PIC, through the wringer before they will be released to the line again.
When Three Mile Island nuclear reactor was out of the control, the problem was not too little information, it was too much random information overloading the operators.
My seat had a window... The drunk pretzel we traced was weird.... One of the observer crew had kept a note on a CFP of the clearances they were given, for taxi... the crew were debriefed, and the ATC tapes were pulled...
What got me out of the seat was putting the plane on the ground into an area of the airport that had one runway that was far too short to operate from, and the other runway had been shortened by NOTAM.
Had it been a B74, which the company also operated into this airport, the way §25 Subpart B works [§25.109, §25.113}, they would have been at high speed through the guys in the works area.
What got me out of the seat was putting the plane on the ground into an area of the airport that had one runway that was far too short to operate from, and the other runway had been shortened by NOTAM.
Had it been a B74, which the company also operated into this airport, the way §25 Subpart B works [§25.109, §25.113}, they would have been at high speed through the guys in the works area.
When Three Mile Island nuclear reactor was out of the control, the problem was not too little information, it was too much random information overloading the operators
Over time a culture developed whereby it became normal to operate the plant in alarm. This culture developed despite the fact that the alarms existed for the primary purpose of alerting operators to that which was abnormal.... The consequence was that the protective purpose of the alarm was lost..... The culture of operators regarding the operation of the plant in alarm was a contributing factor to the disaster.
That is still a problem with Lé Airbus' ECAM architecture, you can have a cascading alerting process that messes up the crews efforts to resolve matters. The legacy issue that has impacted the Max 7 & 10 are questioned for this issue of "advanced" crew alerting systems, a mandate to put in a system that has its own share of problems seems a little silly. Demanding a poisoned bandaid be applied doesn't seem to get you where you need to go.
For some reason ATC assumes that saying 'with Charlie' means the crew has copied and understood and acted upon the displaced runway end part of Charlie on take off but not the QNH part of Charlie when inbound.
My apologies if my point is too obscure and this is thread drift.
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 11th Dec 2022 at 01:41.
Who recalls the Emirates A340 that had inadequate power settings for the runway length available?
Reduced power is great for saving money but it definitely does not save runway distance
https://www.flightglobal.com/emirate.../86203.article
Reduced power is great for saving money but it definitely does not save runway distance
https://www.flightglobal.com/emirate.../86203.article
Yes. A3 to A7 for the run gives them about 1700m.
Having a look at the data, the inbound flight landed and a car was on the closed part of the runway, you can't tell me they didn't know about it if the same crew operated the flight back. During the closure only two aircraft opted for A3, two VA 737s. The other one was up before reaching A7 but still seems a bit tight for my liking. Will be interested to see some of the performance data when the report comes out.
Having a look at the data, the inbound flight landed and a car was on the closed part of the runway, you can't tell me they didn't know about it if the same crew operated the flight back. During the closure only two aircraft opted for A3, two VA 737s. The other one was up before reaching A7 but still seems a bit tight for my liking. Will be interested to see some of the performance data when the report comes out.
Same type, same day, same company, luckily caught the new ATIS during pushback - very easily could not have - especially among the unnecessary NOTAMS and no notes in the briefing package.
Fortunately, applied the correct WIP OPT and additionally denied A3 for departure by ATC for separation!
In hindsight, I can easily understand how this could be missed.
It appears the most serious incidents are on C&T flights these days - no data on that - but make of that what you will. 🤷♂️
Fortunately, applied the correct WIP OPT and additionally denied A3 for departure by ATC for separation!
In hindsight, I can easily understand how this could be missed.
It appears the most serious incidents are on C&T flights these days - no data on that - but make of that what you will. 🤷♂️
Not all aircraft have Mode S EHS transponders, sleeve of wizard.
If the QNH is 1013 and I set 1033 in my steam driven altimeter then fly at 6,100' indicated and report maintaining 5,500', what is my steam driven 'blind' encoder squawking as my altitude and how would ATC know what QNH I've set on my altimeter?
And if the set QNH is reported on aircraft fitted with Mode S EHS, why TF does ATC require readback of the ATIS QNH after the crew of the aircraft fitted with that gizmo have reported receipt of the ATIS information code which includes that QNH? Surely ATC will know if the correct QNH has been set, via information given to ATC via the gizmo.
If the QNH is 1013 and I set 1033 in my steam driven altimeter then fly at 6,100' indicated and report maintaining 5,500', what is my steam driven 'blind' encoder squawking as my altitude and how would ATC know what QNH I've set on my altimeter?
And if the set QNH is reported on aircraft fitted with Mode S EHS, why TF does ATC require readback of the ATIS QNH after the crew of the aircraft fitted with that gizmo have reported receipt of the ATIS information code which includes that QNH? Surely ATC will know if the correct QNH has been set, via information given to ATC via the gizmo.
I’ve been told about reduced runway length by ATC before in Oz. Not sure if it’s procedure or if it was just offhand. Seems commonsense though. Having said that, the other 1000 arrival and departures from BNE managed to find the notam and allow for it…………this time………
Pretty easy to standardise across all Towers (Civil and RAAF) to cater for all combinations of reduced runway length including where there is a displaced threshold for arrivals (kcboy I feel your pain).
Not sure why any of this is relevant to the topic, however, apart from the actual TXPDR discrete code, Australian ATC only receive one element of Mode S data, apart from uncorrected altitude (Q1013/QNE), and that is selected cleared flight level or cleared altitude from the MCP.
A number of other elements are being transmitted but they are not selectable or available to civil ATC in Australia, currently, in the Thales Eurocat platform.
I trust this helps in determining the TODA/LDA problem.
A number of other elements are being transmitted but they are not selectable or available to civil ATC in Australia, currently, in the Thales Eurocat platform.
I trust this helps in determining the TODA/LDA problem.
So here’s a question Drops: if ATC is so captivated by our altimeter settings why do you insist on serving up a frequency change exactly when we are supposed to be switching to QNH?
I went into Newcastle earlier this year, end of a 10.5 hour day, in the soup weaving our way between TS.
Anyways runway length cut almost in half, doing instrument approaches that didn’t really work because the first 1000 metres of the runway were in pieces (they eventually sorted this out with a temporary RNAV aligned with the displaced threshold). ATC didn’t mention any of it, I couldn’t believe it. Not on the ATIS, not on first contact, nothing. They were purely relying on people finding out about runway length halved 8 deep in the NOTAMS. Between the RNAV putting you on 4 reds if you followed it’s profile to the original threshold, runway length being shortened significantly and ATC not telling you about any of it, turning up there at night after a 10.5 hour day :/ I’m glad nobody had any major issues there.
Anyways runway length cut almost in half, doing instrument approaches that didn’t really work because the first 1000 metres of the runway were in pieces (they eventually sorted this out with a temporary RNAV aligned with the displaced threshold). ATC didn’t mention any of it, I couldn’t believe it. Not on the ATIS, not on first contact, nothing. They were purely relying on people finding out about runway length halved 8 deep in the NOTAMS. Between the RNAV putting you on 4 reds if you followed it’s profile to the original threshold, runway length being shortened significantly and ATC not telling you about any of it, turning up there at night after a 10.5 hour day :/ I’m glad nobody had any major issues there.
Sadly, that's typical of the overly prescriptive approach adopted by the aviation regulators here in Australia; an approach that focuses entirely on following the "rules", with little or no thought given to the practicalities, or safety. Up until several years ago, ATC in Perth would often report the wind recorded at the top of the control tower, along with the "official" wind recorded on the ground. It was very useful for pilots during the strong summer easterlies, when the wind at 200 ft could be very different to that on the ground. They stopped doing it because, we were told, it wasn't within the "rules".
Last edited by BuzzBox; 12th Dec 2022 at 04:14.
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ICAO has already defined the abbreviation as NOtice TO AirMen or NOtice TO Air Ministries so that horse has already bolted.
Put's me in mind of that Billy Connolly skit about "Just ask you're 'Wait Person'. "It's not a f--king wait pair-sson, it's a f--king WAITER!! AND, BTW, It's nooo a 'pairsson hole cover' either, it's a f--king MAN Hole COVER, sooo teek yar sh-tty language an' f--k off!!!!!!!".
Put's me in mind of that Billy Connolly skit about "Just ask you're 'Wait Person'. "It's not a f--king wait pair-sson, it's a f--king WAITER!! AND, BTW, It's nooo a 'pairsson hole cover' either, it's a f--king MAN Hole COVER, sooo teek yar sh-tty language an' f--k off!!!!!!!".