Climb power down the ILS
I was flying the A330 at the time (not JQ).
The ‘TOGA Tap’ was titled ‘Go Around from Intermediate Altitude’ in our manuals, and was an Airbus approved procedure.
However, why anyone would do one from DA in fog eludes me. Why not just push the thrust levers to TOGA and let the aircraft do its thing?
The ‘TOGA Tap’ was titled ‘Go Around from Intermediate Altitude’ in our manuals, and was an Airbus approved procedure.
However, why anyone would do one from DA in fog eludes me. Why not just push the thrust levers to TOGA and let the aircraft do its thing?
There’s a fair degree of bitter mistruth about Ansett on this thread. Ansett never taught a TOGA-tap nor do I believe the crew in this incident were Ex-AN. I’ve flown with three Airbus operators with seven lots of SOP’s and Ansett’s initial training on flying the the A320 was excellent if of reasonable competency. Let’s not understate reasonable competency here, Airbus 320/330 has crashed four times on GA, with Nagoya stated above, being different technology in the A300. Anecdotally, the rapid rise of Jetstar with the Airbus wasn’t without its drama.
Ansett had an incident on GA in Sydney in the early days. The Capt took over however the FO still had side-stick input and the GA performance wasn’t met. Soon after the takeover procedure formally stated a requirement to push the takeover switch ( common sense )
Ansett had an incident on GA in Sydney in the early days. The Capt took over however the FO still had side-stick input and the GA performance wasn’t met. Soon after the takeover procedure formally stated a requirement to push the takeover switch ( common sense )
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 23rd May 2022 at 07:43.
[QUOTE=Gnadenburg;11233944]There’s a fair degree of bitter mistruth about Ansett on this thread. Ansett never taught a TOGA-tap nor do I believe the crew in this incident were Ex-AN. I’ve flown with three Airbus operators with seven lots of SOP’s and Ansett’s initial training on flying the the A320 was excellent if of reasonable competency. Let’s not understate reasonable competency here, Airbus 320/330 has crashed four times on GA, with Nagoya stated above, being different technology in the A300. Anecdotally, the rapid rise of Jetstar with the Airbus wasn’t without its drama.
Hi Gnadenburg, I would agree it was never actually officially "taught" but it was put out there as a suggested method to avoid flap overspeed at light weights with low GA alts. I personally remember, but it was just a suggested method and wasn't pushed as it wasn't in the ops manual (my memory is this was before the intro of FCOM).
Hi Gnadenburg, I would agree it was never actually officially "taught" but it was put out there as a suggested method to avoid flap overspeed at light weights with low GA alts. I personally remember, but it was just a suggested method and wasn't pushed as it wasn't in the ops manual (my memory is this was before the intro of FCOM).
A few facts about that incident:
The crew did two GA,s that day, the second one off 16. On the second GA TOGA was correctly applied, they then diverted to Avalon.
On the first GA the crew did not continue the climb to the GA altitude of 4000'. For some reason, not properly explained in the report, they flew level with the gear up at an altitude that set off the "Too Low Gear" warning. That warning was cancelled by the use of the Emergency Cancel button.
The PIC had never flown for AN but had been one of the many pilot beneficiaries of the Impulse purchase by Qantas.
Any suggestion that the incident was somehow the result of AN SOPs or culture is complete fantasy.
The crew did two GA,s that day, the second one off 16. On the second GA TOGA was correctly applied, they then diverted to Avalon.
On the first GA the crew did not continue the climb to the GA altitude of 4000'. For some reason, not properly explained in the report, they flew level with the gear up at an altitude that set off the "Too Low Gear" warning. That warning was cancelled by the use of the Emergency Cancel button.
The PIC had never flown for AN but had been one of the many pilot beneficiaries of the Impulse purchase by Qantas.
Any suggestion that the incident was somehow the result of AN SOPs or culture is complete fantasy.
Krusty the GA procedures had been altered by moving the order in which things are done. The crew did a second GA off 16 and got it right. What was the difference? The PF actually moved the thrust levers to the TOGA detent. The cockup had very little to do with the GA SOP and a lot to do with the PF not moving the thrust levers to the GA detent and not reading the FMA ,and to compound the error by not climbing to the GA Altitude. Even at FLX/MCT, it would have had sufficient performance to get to 4000'.
That's what I get from the report, that the TL was advanced forward of the FLX/MCT Detent, but it does not say it reached the TOGA. Therefore the mode never changed and it continued to follow the ILS, then all sorts of things happened in a flurry to recover the situation before terra-firma was involved. Nothing to do with SOP more to do with not confirming FMA change and when it didn't do what it was supposed to the startle effect crept in.
There but for the grace of god go we all.
It was a screw up but as always, there were many factors that aligned to make this event possible.
Its worth remembering that you didnt need to have worked for AN to have been exposed to the " TOGA TAP ".
This " procedure " had been trained throughout the introduction of the A 320 into JQ service. The pityfull amount of training that ALL recieved in those days and diluted SOPS directly led to this occurrence.
It is worth noting that the operating crew did have the common DF to get themselves out of bad situation. Learning experience for all? Definitely. First time a mode awerness issue has happened in Aus? Definately not.
All while the CEO was telling us how he liked painting rocks.
MCD.
It was a screw up but as always, there were many factors that aligned to make this event possible.
Its worth remembering that you didnt need to have worked for AN to have been exposed to the " TOGA TAP ".
This " procedure " had been trained throughout the introduction of the A 320 into JQ service. The pityfull amount of training that ALL recieved in those days and diluted SOPS directly led to this occurrence.
It is worth noting that the operating crew did have the common DF to get themselves out of bad situation. Learning experience for all? Definitely. First time a mode awerness issue has happened in Aus? Definately not.
All while the CEO was telling us how he liked painting rocks.
MCD.
Last edited by ManillaChillaDilla; 24th May 2022 at 07:28.
It is worth noting that the operating crew did have the common DF to get themselves out of bad situation.
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I think after this incident Airbus amended the GA procedure so that the FMA callout was made before the positive climb callout, thus ensuring that the GA phase had been activated.
Originally Posted by Jester64
I think after this incident Airbus amended the GA procedure so that the FMA callout was made before the positive climb callout, thus ensuring that the GA phase had been activated.
The change that Airbus made after this event was highlighting the extant note to the “check and read the FMA” with some additional verbiage to tell you what to read. The underlying manufacturer procedure never changed.
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Originally Posted by compressor stall
you’ve got that arse about. Read the report linked above . Airbus was always FMA first. It was JQ alone that changed the OEM procedure and pushed the FMA mode call / check down the list.
The change that Airbus made after this event was highlighting the extant note to the “check and read the FMA” with some additional verbiage to tell you what to read. The underlying manufacturer procedure never changed.
The change that Airbus made after this event was highlighting the extant note to the “check and read the FMA” with some additional verbiage to tell you what to read. The underlying manufacturer procedure never changed.
