QF Q400 Crew Forget Landing Gear
Spot on, CS.
This thread encapsulates everything that’s wrong with aviation in Oz. For the love of god, everyone of us has done something dumb at some point in our careers. It’s not a case of if but when. Someone left the gear down, were told about it and put the gear up. Yet here we are with a two page thread and ensuing debate about it.
well its not so simple as " they left it down- were told about it and then they put it up"
The debate is what were the factors that allowed them to get to 15000+ft. From lift off and the not hearing or not calling positive rate, the after takeoff checklist, the extra vibration and noise, the fact that three green lights were illuminated when normally the would not be and the fact that a lever that normally points to the roof was pointing at the floor.
we all cock up - we got to to learn from it.
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The event also happened around the time Sydney was going into lock down again with the threat of more stand downs. That on top of reduced flying all year, no wonder crew like this made mistakes during 2021.
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There are 2 categories of pilots:
1. those who criticise the errors of others; and
2. those who think “that could be me tomorrow”, and continually strive to learn and improve.
I occasionally fall into category 1. When I do, I try to recognise it and push myself into category 2. I know I’m not perfect. I thought I was, once, but it turned out I was mistaken.
Which category do each of you fall into?
1. those who criticise the errors of others; and
2. those who think “that could be me tomorrow”, and continually strive to learn and improve.
I occasionally fall into category 1. When I do, I try to recognise it and push myself into category 2. I know I’m not perfect. I thought I was, once, but it turned out I was mistaken.
Which category do each of you fall into?
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Australia
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There are 2 categories of pilots:
1. those who criticise the errors of others; and
2. those who think “that could be me tomorrow”, and continually strive to learn and improve.
I occasionally fall into category 1. When I do, I try to recognise it and push myself into category 2. I know I’m not perfect. I thought I was, once, but it turned out I was mistaken.
Which category do each of you fall into?
1. those who criticise the errors of others; and
2. those who think “that could be me tomorrow”, and continually strive to learn and improve.
I occasionally fall into category 1. When I do, I try to recognise it and push myself into category 2. I know I’m not perfect. I thought I was, once, but it turned out I was mistaken.
Which category do each of you fall into?
I know I’m not perfect. I thought I was, once, but it turned out I was mistaken.
Which category do each of you fall into?
Which category do each of you fall into?
It's all very well for pilots on here to be reminding themselves of how fallible they might be: 'There but for the grace of God go I'... etc. But the famed (and perhaps overstated) Qantas reputation for safety is on a knife-edge here. The challenges visited by COVID on flight crew recency-of-experience notwithstanding, operational checklists have to stand for something, and if the SLF cannot rely on our storied Qantas aircrew to treat checklists seriously, then who can they have confidence in? This small lapse (made less small by the fact that the mistake got past not one pilot, but both) amounts to a frightening derangement of process and a diminution of the general view (whatever it might be) of QF flight crew competence. Deserves to be stated.
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It's all very well for pilots on here to be reminding themselves of how fallible they might be: 'There but for the grace of God go I'... etc. But the famed (and perhaps overstated) Qantas reputation for safety is on a knife-edge here. The challenges visited by COVID on flight crew recency-of-experience notwithstanding, operational checklists have to stand for something, and if the SLF cannot rely on our storied Qantas aircrew to treat checklists seriously, then who can they have confidence in? This small lapse (made less small by the fact that the mistake got past not one pilot, but both) amounts to a frightening derangement of process and a diminution of the general view (whatever it might be) of QF flight crew competence. Deserves to be stated.
a frightening derangement of process
- so I disagree with your language of “a frightening derangement of process” - unless you are trying to get a sound-bite in the media, this is a gross overstatement of the risk matrix. A far more “frightening derangement of process” was the contributing factors leading to the A330 departing with pitot covers, for example.
a diminution of the general view (whatever it might be) of QF flight crew competence
- Joe Public probably won’t get too excited if “a Qantas pilot forgot to put the wheels up”. It’s not the main news story of the day. The aircraft stayed safely away from Primary Schools and Orphanages.
If genuine risks to aviation safety in Australia are to be discussed, I would suggest directing attention to the real threats, such as fatigue management, bean-counters running ATC (Ballina), bean-counters running airlines (all of them, and including cost pressures on pilot training, engineering, aircraft purchasing, and outsourcing everything), bean counters running manufacturing (Boeing), self-funded “cadet” schemes, cheap pilot labour (to avoid costly training) via “critical work shortage visas” for pilots, and the general plummeting work conditions and pay for pilots in general.
A Q400 missing “gear up”, and the checklist supposed to catch it (if that’s what happened) is not insignificant, and I look forward to learning from the report in 3 or 4 years’ time (there’s another problem right there!). But let’s keep things in perspective. And more importantly, let’s focus on the fix rather than the criticism, particularly before anyone knows what really happened.
Drawing general conclusions about the state of the industry (or a company) from one event like this is not likely to be accurate nor helpful.
…...The challenges visited by COVID on flight crew recency-of-experience notwithstanding, operational checklists have to stand for something, and if the SLF cannot rely on our storied Qantas aircrew to treat checklists seriously, then who can they have confidence in?
Most reputable airlines are ensuring that crew returning from long Covid induced lay-offs are trained to the pre-Covid standard, albeit with unavoidably less recent line operational experience.
I agree with your post except for these last 2 bits:
- an error got through a few slices of swiss cheese. That probably happens more often than most realise in all professional safety-critical outfits, not just aviation. We have learned to learn from these mistakes rather than criticise (e.g. Threat and Error management training). The organisation will learn from the final ATSB report (when it comes), and in the meantime, pilots who recognise that “it could happen to me tomorrow” stay on their toes and reinvigorate their defences.
- so I disagree with your language of “a frightening derangement of process” - unless you are trying to get a sound-bite in the media, this is a gross overstatement of the risk matrix. A far more “frightening derangement of process” was the contributing factors leading to the A330 departing with pitot covers, for example.
- well yes, any publicity of an aviation screw-up diminishes the general view, and of course tall-poppy syndrome makes Qantas (including it’s wholly owned but independently operated subsidiaries) particularly susceptible. Rain Man was awesome PR for Qantas, but also created a rod for their back with increased public scrutiny of any stuff-ups.
- Joe Public probably won’t get too excited if “a Qantas pilot forgot to put the wheels up”. It’s not the main news story of the day. The aircraft stayed safely away from Primary Schools and Orphanages.
If genuine risks to aviation safety in Australia are to be discussed, I would suggest directing attention to the real threats, such as fatigue management, bean-counters running ATC (Ballina), bean-counters running airlines (all of them, and including cost pressures on pilot training, engineering, aircraft purchasing, and outsourcing everything), bean counters running manufacturing (Boeing), self-funded “cadet” schemes, cheap pilot labour (to avoid costly training) via “critical work shortage visas” for pilots, and the general plummeting work conditions and pay for pilots in general.
A Q400 missing “gear up”, and the checklist supposed to catch it (if that’s what happened) is not insignificant, and I look forward to learning from the report in 3 or 4 years’ time (there’s another problem right there!). But let’s keep things in perspective. And more importantly, let’s focus on the fix rather than the criticism, particularly before anyone knows what really happened.
Drawing general conclusions about the state of the industry (or a company) from one event like this is not likely to be accurate nor helpful.
- an error got through a few slices of swiss cheese. That probably happens more often than most realise in all professional safety-critical outfits, not just aviation. We have learned to learn from these mistakes rather than criticise (e.g. Threat and Error management training). The organisation will learn from the final ATSB report (when it comes), and in the meantime, pilots who recognise that “it could happen to me tomorrow” stay on their toes and reinvigorate their defences.
- so I disagree with your language of “a frightening derangement of process” - unless you are trying to get a sound-bite in the media, this is a gross overstatement of the risk matrix. A far more “frightening derangement of process” was the contributing factors leading to the A330 departing with pitot covers, for example.
- well yes, any publicity of an aviation screw-up diminishes the general view, and of course tall-poppy syndrome makes Qantas (including it’s wholly owned but independently operated subsidiaries) particularly susceptible. Rain Man was awesome PR for Qantas, but also created a rod for their back with increased public scrutiny of any stuff-ups.
- Joe Public probably won’t get too excited if “a Qantas pilot forgot to put the wheels up”. It’s not the main news story of the day. The aircraft stayed safely away from Primary Schools and Orphanages.
If genuine risks to aviation safety in Australia are to be discussed, I would suggest directing attention to the real threats, such as fatigue management, bean-counters running ATC (Ballina), bean-counters running airlines (all of them, and including cost pressures on pilot training, engineering, aircraft purchasing, and outsourcing everything), bean counters running manufacturing (Boeing), self-funded “cadet” schemes, cheap pilot labour (to avoid costly training) via “critical work shortage visas” for pilots, and the general plummeting work conditions and pay for pilots in general.
A Q400 missing “gear up”, and the checklist supposed to catch it (if that’s what happened) is not insignificant, and I look forward to learning from the report in 3 or 4 years’ time (there’s another problem right there!). But let’s keep things in perspective. And more importantly, let’s focus on the fix rather than the criticism, particularly before anyone knows what really happened.
Drawing general conclusions about the state of the industry (or a company) from one event like this is not likely to be accurate nor helpful.
As with most incidences in aviation the incident was multifactorial.
Expect more of this in the future... Airbus have removed Gear Up from the checklist. Rationale is that there is an VLE overspeed alert and increased fuel consumption.
Back in my days as a trainer I would notice some pilots rattling off checklist responses without really checking. To confirm my suspicion, I would challenge with the before landing checklist at the after take-off stage, or before take-off checklist on final approach. Plenty of suckers would give responses to the checklist being read, not the one actually executed - to earn themselves a tick in the 'below average' box for 'situational awareness' on the training form for the day.
A very long time ago I did a Type Rating on the MU2 with a European operator. This is a complex aeroplane and was being flown single pilot in a demanding environment. Their checklist policy was to use it up until engine start, then again after shutdown. Everything in between was done by methodical scanning, the philosophy being that head-down reading to one-self was not as effective as keeping eyes and ears open, minding the store.
That's exactly why Airbus did it. In the name of safety. The basic philosophy is that the only things on the checklist are things that will kill or hurt you or the aircraft. They are trying to reengage the pilot with the aircraft by forcing them to think about their actions. There was a lot of operator pushback pre roll out (some certain corners of the planet more than others apparently) but the new changes eventually rolled out a few months ago.
The reality is in this day and age checklists on new airliners should be very minimal. However manufacturers do not innovate and are obsessed with common type ratings and that includes the Dash 8-400. Hence the need for long and persistent checklist as the pilot has to make up for the lack of technology.
I have done many stupid things or forgotten things in my career. We once flew Toulouse to Heathrow with the APU running. It was only when the other pilot went to the loo, and I did a casual cockpit scan - an hour+ into the flight - when I noticed the APU was still running ! Ooopps !
Hence checklists.
But they must be taken seriously. A couple of times at my ATPL flight school, I witnessed instructors in piston twins landing with the gear up, which bent the props and all sorts. I now have a personal checklist when on very short finals, when I say under my breath "Fly. By. Wire":
F = Flaps set?
B = Brakes: Auto brake selected and no residual pressure?
W = Wheels down and locked?
The key is to use checklists properly; They are not there to be gotten out of the way as quickly as possible, they are there to check stuff and prevent death. For example, I deliberately do my (Airbus) control checks in a different order to the book, because it is too easy to give the expected vocal response rather than actually looking properly at the flight control page and stating what is seen. More than once I have been holding full right, when the response has been "full left". My response is "Are you sure?".
Hence checklists.
But they must be taken seriously. A couple of times at my ATPL flight school, I witnessed instructors in piston twins landing with the gear up, which bent the props and all sorts. I now have a personal checklist when on very short finals, when I say under my breath "Fly. By. Wire":
F = Flaps set?
B = Brakes: Auto brake selected and no residual pressure?
W = Wheels down and locked?
The key is to use checklists properly; They are not there to be gotten out of the way as quickly as possible, they are there to check stuff and prevent death. For example, I deliberately do my (Airbus) control checks in a different order to the book, because it is too easy to give the expected vocal response rather than actually looking properly at the flight control page and stating what is seen. More than once I have been holding full right, when the response has been "full left". My response is "Are you sure?".
